Internet DRAFT - draft-moran-iot-nets
draft-moran-iot-nets
IOTOPS B. Moran
Internet-Draft Arm Limited
Intended status: Informational 24 April 2023
Expires: 26 October 2023
A summary of security-enabling technologies for IoT devices
draft-moran-iot-nets-03
Abstract
The IETF has developed security technologies that help to secure the
Internet of Things even over constrained networks and when targetting
constrained nodes. These technologies can be used independenly or
can be composed into larger systems to mitigate a variety of threats.
This documents illustrates an overview over these technologies and
highlights their relationships. Ultimately, a threat model is
presented as a basis to derive requirements that interconnect
existing and emerging solution technologies.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 October 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Survey of baseline security requirements . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Requirement Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Hardware Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1.1. Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1.2. Hardware Immutable Root of Trust . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1.3. Hardware-Backed Secret Storage . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Software Integrity & Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.1. Boot Environment Trustworthiness and Integrity . . . 5
4.2.2. Code Integrity and Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.3. Secure Firmware Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.4. Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.5. Resilience to Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.6. Trust Anchor Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Default Security & Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.1. Security ON by Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.2. Default Unique Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. Data Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.5. System Safety and Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.6. Secure Software / Firmware updates . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.7. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.7.1. Align Authentication Schemes with Threat Models . . . 10
4.7.2. Password Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.8. Authorisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.8.1. Principle of Least Privilege . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.8.2. Software Isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.8.3. Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.9. Environmental and Physical Security . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.10. Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.11. Secure and Trusted Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.11.1. Data Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.11.2. Secure Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.11.3. Data Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.11.4. Least Privilege Communication . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.12. Secure Interfaces and network services . . . . . . . . . 14
4.12.1. Encrypted User Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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4.13. Secure input and output handling . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.14. Logging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.15. Monitoring and Auditing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction
This memo serves as an entry-point to detail which technologies are
available for use in IoT networks and to enable IoT designers to
discover technologies that may solve their problems. This draft
addresses.
Many baseline security requirements documents have been drafted by
standards setting organisations, however these documents typically do
not specify the technologies available to satisfy those requirements.
They also do not express the next steps if an implementor wants to go
above and beyond the baseline in order to differentiate their
products and enable even better security. This memo defines the
mapping from some IoT baseline security requirements definitions to
ietf and related security technologies. It also highlights some gaps
in those IoT baseline security requirements.
2. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Survey of baseline security requirements
At time of writing, there are IoT baseline security requirements
provided by several organisations:
* ENISA's Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT in the context
of Critical Information Infrastructures ([ENISA-Baseline])
* ETSI's Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Baseline
Requirements [ETSI-Baseline]
* NIST's IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline
[NIST-Baseline]
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4. Requirement Mapping
Requirements that pertain to hardware, procedure, and policy
compliance are noted, but do not map to ietf and related
technologies. NIST's requirements ([NIST-Baseline]) are very broad
and already have mappings to ENISA baseline security recommendations.
4.1. Hardware Security
4.1.1. Identity
ENISA GP-PS-10: Establish and maintain asset management procedures
and configuration controls for key network and information systems.
NIST Device Identification: The IoT device can be uniquely identified
logically and physically.
These requirements are architectural requirements, however [RFC4122]
can be used for identifiers.
4.1.2. Hardware Immutable Root of Trust
ENISA GP-TM-01: Employ a hardware-based immutable root of trust.
This is an architectural requirement.
4.1.3. Hardware-Backed Secret Storage
ENISA GP-TM-02: Use hardware that incorporates security features to
strengthen the protection and integrity of the device - for example,
specialized security chips / coprocessors that integrate security at
the transistor level, embedded in the processor, providing, among
other things, a trusted storage of device identity and authentication
means, protection of keys at rest and in use, and preventing
unprivileged from accessing to security sensitive code. Protection
against local and physical attacks can be covered via functional
security.
NIST Data Protection: The ability to use demonstrably secure
cryptographic modules for standardized cryptographic algorithms
(e.g., encryption with authentication, cryptographic hashes, digital
signature validation) to prevent the confidentiality and integrity of
the device’s stored and transmitted data from being compromised
This is an architectural requirement.
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4.2. Software Integrity & Authenticity
4.2.1. Boot Environment Trustworthiness and Integrity
ENISA GP-TM-03: Trust must be established in the boot environment
before any trust in any other software or executable program can be
claimed.
Satisfying this requirement can be done in several ways, increasing
in security guarantees:
1. Implement secure boot to verify the bootloader and boot
environment. Trust is established purely by construction: if
code is running in the boot environment, it must have been
signed, therefore it is trustworthy.
2. Record critical measurements of each step of boot in a TPM.
Trust is established by evaluating the measurements recorded by
the TPM.
3. Use Remote Attestation. Remote attestation allows a device to
report to third parties the critical measurements it has recorded
(either in a TPM or signed by each stage) in order to prove the
trustworthiness of the boot environment and running software.
Remote Attestation is implemented in [I-D.ietf-rats-eat].
4.2.2. Code Integrity and Authenticity
ENISA GP-TM-04: Sign code cryptographically to ensure it has not been
tampered with after signing it as safe for the device, and implement
run-time protection and secure execution monitoring to make sure
malicious attacks do not overwrite code after it is loaded.
Satisfying this requirement requires a secure invocation mechanism.
In monolithic IoT software images, this is accomplished by Secure
Boot. In IoT devices with more fully-featured operating systems,
this is accomplished with an operating system-specific code signing
practice.
Secure Invocation can be achieved using the SUIT Manifest format,
which provides for secure invocation procedures. See
[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest].
To satisfy the associated requirement of run-time protection and
secure execution monitoring, the use of a TEE is recommended to
protect sensitive processes. The TEEP protocol (see
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]) is recommended for managing TEEs.
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4.2.3. Secure Firmware Update
ENISA GP-TM-05: Control the installation of software in operating
systems, to prevent unauthenticated software and files from being
loaded onto it.
NIST Software Update:
1. The ability to update the device's software through remote (e.g.,
network download) and/or local means (e.g., removable media)
2. The ability to verify and authenticate any update before
installing it
3. The ability for authorized entities to roll back updated software
to a previous version
4. The ability to restrict updating actions to authorized entities
only
5. The ability to enable or disable updating
6. Configuration settings for use with the Device Configuration
capability including, but not limited to:
7. The ability to configure any remote update mechanisms to be
either automatically or manually initiated for update downloads
and installations
8. The ability to enable or disable notification when an update is
available and specify who or what is to be notified
Many fully-featured operating systems have dedicated means of
implementing this requirement. The SUIT manifest (See
[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]) is recommended as a means of providing
secure, authenticated software update. Where the software is
deployed to a TEE, TEEP (See [I-D.ietf-teep-protocol]) is recommended
for software update and management.
4.2.4. Configuration
NIST Device Configuration:
1. The ability to change the device's software configuration
settings
2. The ability to restrict configuration changes to authorized
entities only
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3. The ability for authorized entities to restore the device to a
secure configuration defined by an authorized entity
Configuration can be delivered to a device either via a firmware
update, such as in [I-D.ietf-suit-manifest], or via a runtime
configuration interface, such as [LwM2M].
4.2.5. Resilience to Failure
ENISA GP-TM-06: Enable a system to return to a state that was known
to be secure, after a security breach has occured or if an upgrade
has not been successful.
While there is no specificaiton for this, it is also required in
[RFC9019]
4.2.6. Trust Anchor Management
ENISA GP-TM-07: Use protocols and mechanisms able to represent and
manage trust and trust relationships.
EST (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7030) and LwM2M
Bootstrap ([LwM2M]) provide a mechanism to replace trust anchors
(manage trust/trust relationships).
4.3. Default Security & Privacy
4.3.1. Security ON by Default
ENISA GP-TM-08: Any applicable security features should be enabled by
default, and any unused or insecure functionalities should be
disabled by default.
NIST Logical Access to Interfaces:
1. The ability to logically or physically disable any local and
network interfaces that are not necessary for the core
functionality of the device
2. The ability to logically restrict access to each network
interface to only authorized entities (e.g., device
authentication, user authentication)
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3. Configuration settings for use with the Device Configuration
capability including, but not limited to, the ability to enable,
disable, and adjust thresholds for any ability the device might
have to lock or disable an account or to delay additional
authentication attempts after too many failed authentication
attempts
These are procedural requirements, rather than a protocol or document
requirement.
4.3.2. Default Unique Passwords
ENISA GP-TM-09: Establish hard to crack, device-individual default
passwords.
This is a procedural requirement, rather than a protocol or document
requirement.
4.4. Data Protection
The data protection requirements are largely procedural/
architectural. While this memo can recommend using TEEs to protect
data, and TEEP ([I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]) to manage TEEs,
implementors must choose to architect their software in such a way
that TEEs are helpful in meeting these requirements.
ENISA Data Protection requirements:
* GP-TM-10: Personal data must be collected and processed fairly and
lawfully, it should never be collected and processed without the
data subject's consent.
* GP-TM-11: Make sure that personal data is used for the specified
purposes for which they were collected, and that any further
processing of personal data is compatible and that the data
subjects are well informed.
* GP-TM-12: Minimise the data collected and retained.
* GP-TM-13: IoT stakeholders must be compliant with the EU General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
* GP-TM-14: Users of IoT products and services must be able to
exercise their rights to information, access, erasure,
rectification, data portability, restriction of processing,
objection to processing, and their right not to be evaluated on
the basis of automated processing.
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NIST Data Protection:
1. The ability to use demonstrably secure cryptographic modules for
standardized cryptographic algorithms (e.g., encryption with
authentication, cryptographic hashes, digital signature
validation) to prevent the confidentiality and integrity of the
device's stored and transmitted data from being compromised
2. The ability for authorized entities to render all data on the
device inaccessible by all entities, whether previously
authorized or not (e.g., through a wipe of internal storage,
destruction of cryptographic keys for encrypted data)
3. Configuration settings for use with the Device Configuration
capability including, but not limited to, the ability for
authorized entities to configure the cryptography use itself,
such as choosing a key length
4.5. System Safety and Reliability
Safety and reliability requirements are procedural/architectural.
Implementors should ensure they have processes and architectures in
place to meet these requirements.
ENISA Safety and Reliability requirements:
* GP-TM-15: Design with system and operational disruption in mind,
preventing the system from causing an unacceptable risk of injury
or physical damage.
* GP-TM-16: Mechanisms for self-diagnosis and self-repair/healing to
recover from failure, malfunction or a compromised state.
* GP-TM-17: Ensure standalone operation - essential features should
continue to work with a loss of communications and chronicle
negative impacts from compromised devices or cloud-based systems.
4.6. Secure Software / Firmware updates
Technical requirements for Software Updates are provided for in SUIT
([I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]) and TEEP ([I-D.ietf-teep-protocol]).
Procedural and architectural requirements should be independently
assessed by the implementor.
ENISA Software Update Requirements:
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* GP-TM-18: Ensure that the device software/firmware, its
configuration and its applications have the ability to update
Over-The-Air (OTA), that the update server is secure, that the
update file is transmitted via a secure connection, that it does
not contain sensitive data (e.g. hardcoded credentials), that it
is signed by an authorised trust entity and encrypted using
accepted encryption methods, and that the update package has its
digital signature, signing certificate and signing certificate
chain, verified by the device before the update process begins.
* GP-TM-19: Offer an automatic firmware update mechanism.
* GP-TM-20: (Procedural / Architectural) Backward compatibility of
firmware updates. Automatic firmware updates should not modify
user-configured preferences, security, and/or privacy settings
without user notification.
4.7. Authentication
4.7.1. Align Authentication Schemes with Threat Models
ENISA GP-TM-21: Design the authentication and authorisation schemes
(unique per device) based on the system-level threat models.
This is a procedural / architectural requirement.
4.7.2. Password Rules
ENISA applies the following requirements to Password-based
authentication:
* GP-TM-22: Ensure that default passwords and even default usernames
are changed during the initial setup, and that weak, null or blank
passwords are not allowed.
* GP-TM-23: Authentication mechanisms must use strong passwords or
personal identification numbers (PINs), and should consider using
two-factor authentication (2FA) or multi-factor authentication
(MFA) like Smartphones, Biometrics, etc., on top of certificates.
* GP-TM-24: Authentication credentials shall be salted, hashed and/
or encrypted.
* GP-TM-25: Protect against 'brute force' and/or other abusive login
attempts. This protection should also consider keys stored in
devices.
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* GP-TM-26: Ensure password recovery or reset mechanism is robust
and does not supply an attacker with information indicating a
valid account. The same applies to key update and recovery
mechanisms.
As an alternative, implementors are encouraged to consider
passwordless schemes, such as FIDO.
4.8. Authorisation
4.8.1. Principle of Least Privilege
ENISA GP-TM-27: Limit the actions allowed for a given system by
Implementing fine-grained authorisation mechanisms and using the
Principle of least privilege (POLP): applications must operate at the
lowest privilege level possible.
This is a procedural / architectural requirement, however at the
network level, this can be implemented using Manufacturer Usage
Descriptions (see [RFC8520]).
4.8.2. Software Isolation
ENISA GP-TM-28: Device firmware should be designed to isolate
privileged code, processes and data from portions of the firmware
that do not need access to them. Device hardware should provide
isolation concepts to prevent unprivileged from accessing security
sensitive code.
Implementors should use TEEs to address this requirement. The
provisioning and management of TEEs can be accomplished using TEEP
(see [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]).
4.8.3. Access Control
ENISA GP-TM-29: Data integrity and confidentiality must be enforced
by access controls. When the subject requesting access has been
authorised to access particular processes, it is necessary to enforce
the defined security policy. ENISA GP-TM-30: Ensure a context-based
security and privacy that reflects different levels of importance.
These requirements are complex and require a variety of technologies
to implement. Use of TEEs can provide a building block for these
requirements, but is not sufficient in itself to meet these
requiremnents.
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4.9. Environmental and Physical Security
ENISA defines the following physical security requirements. These
are hardware-architectural requirements and not covered by protocol
and format specifications.
* GP-TM-31: Measures for tamper protection and detection. Detection
and reaction to hardware tampering should not rely on network
connectivity.
* GP-TM-32: Ensure that the device cannot be easily disassembled and
that the data storage medium is encrypted at rest and cannot be
easily removed.
* GP-TM-33: Ensure that devices only feature the essential physical
external ports (such as USB) necessary for them to function and
that the test/debug modes are secure, so they cannot be used to
maliciously access the devices. In general, lock down physical
ports to only trusted connections.
4.10. Cryptography
ENISA makes the following architectural cryptography requirements for
IoT devices:
* GP-TM-34: Ensure a proper and effective use of cryptography to
protect the confidentiality, authenticity and/or integrity of data
and information (including control messages), in transit and in
rest. Ensure the proper selection of standard and strong
encryption algorithms and strong keys, and disable insecure
protocols. Verify the robustness of the implementation.
* GP-TM-35: Cryptographic keys must be securely managed.
* GP-TM-36: Build devices to be compatible with lightweight
encryption and security techniques.
* GP-TM-37: Support scalable key management schemes.
4.11. Secure and Trusted Communications
4.11.1. Data Security
GP-TM-38: Guarantee the different security aspects -confidentiality
(privacy), integrity, availability and authenticity- of the
information in transit on the networks or stored in the IoT
application or in the Cloud.
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This Data Security requirement can be fulfilled using COSE [RFC8152]
for ensuring the authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of data
either in transit or at rest. Secure Transport (see Section 4.11.2)
technologies can be used to protect data in transit.
4.11.2. Secure Transport
ENISA GP-TM-39: Ensure that communication security is provided using
state-of-the-art, standardised security protocols, such as TLS for
encryption. ENISA GP-TM-40: Ensure credentials are not exposed in
internal or external network traffic.
This requirement is satisfied by several standards:
* TLS ([RFC8446]).
* DTLS ([RFC9147]).
* QUIC ([RFC9000]).
* OSCORE ([RFC9203]).
4.11.3. Data Authenticity
ENISA GP-TM-41: Guarantee data authenticity to enable reliable
exchanges from data emission to data reception. Data should always
be signed whenever and wherever it is captured and stored.
The authenticity of data can be protected using COSE [RFC8152].
ENISA GP-TM-42: Do not trust data received and always verify any
interconnections. Discover, identify and verify/authenticate the
devices connected to the network before trust can be established, and
preserve their integrity for reliable solutions and services.
Verifying communication partners can be done in many ways. Key
technologies supporting authentication of communication partners are:
* RATS: Remote attestation of a communication partner (See
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]).
* TLS/DTLS: Mutual authentication of communication partners (See
[RFC8446] / [RFC9147]).
* ATLS: Application-layer TLS for authenticating a connection that
may traverse multiple secure transport connections.
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* Attested TLS: The use of attestation in session establishment in
TLS (See [I-D.fossati-tls-attestation]).
4.11.4. Least Privilege Communication
ENISA GP-TM-43: IoT devices should be restrictive rather than
permissive in communicating.
This Requirement can be enabled and enforced using Manufacturer Usage
Descriptions, which codify expected communication (See [RFC8520])
ENISA GP-TM-44: Make intentional connections. Prevent unauthorised
connections to it or other devices the product is connected to, at
all levels of the protocols.
This requirement can be satisfied through authenticating connections
(TLS / DTLS mutual authentication. See [RFC8446] / [RFC9147]) and
declaring communication patterns (Manufacturer Usage Descriptions.
See [RFC8520])
Architectural / Procedural requirements:
* ENISA GP-TM-45: Disable specific ports and/or network connections
for selective connectivity.
* ENISA GP-TM-46: Rate limiting. Controlling the traffic sent or
received by a network to reduce the risk of automated attacks.
4.12. Secure Interfaces and network services
ENISA Architectural / Procedural requirements:
* GP-TM-47: Risk Segmentation. Splitting network elements into
separate components to help isolate security breaches and minimise
the overall risk.
* GP-TM-48: Protocols should be designed to ensure that, if a single
device is compromised, it does not affect the whole set.
* GP-TM-49: Avoid provisioning the same secret key in an entire
product family, since compromising a single device would be enough
to expose the rest of the product family.
* GP-TM-50: Ensure only necessary ports are exposed and available.
* GP-TM-51: Implement a DDoS-resistant and Load-Balancing
infrastructure.
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* GP-TM-53: Avoid security issues when designing error messages.
4.12.1. Encrypted User Sessions
ENISA GP-TM-52: Ensure web interfaces fully encrypt the user session,
from the device to the backend services, and that they are not
susceptible to XSS, CSRF, SQL injection, etc.
This requirement can be partially satisfied through use of TLS or
QUIC (See [RFC8446] and [RFC9000])
4.13. Secure input and output handling
Architectural / Procedural requirements:
ENISA GP-TM-54: Data input validation (ensuring that data is safe
prior to use) and output filtering.
4.14. Logging
Architectural / Procedural requirements:
ENISA GP-TM-55: Implement a logging system that records events
relating to user authentication, management of accounts and access
rights, modifications to security rules, and the functioning of the
system. Logs must be preserved on durable storage and retrievable
via authenticated connections.
NIST Cybersecurity State Awareness
1. The ability to report the device's cybersecurity state
2. The ability to differentiate between when a device will likely
operate as expected from when it may be in a degraded
cybersecurity state
3. The ability to restrict access to the state indicator so only
authorized entities can view it
4. The ability to prevent any entities (authorized or unauthorized)
from editing the state except for those entities that are
responsible for maintaining the device's state information
5. The ability to make the state information available to a service
on another device, such as an event/state log server
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Certain logs and indicators of cybersecurity state can be transported
via RATS: See [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]. Where associated with SUIT
firmware updates, logs can be transported using SUIT Reports. See
[I-D.ietf-suit-report].
4.15. Monitoring and Auditing
Architectural / Procedural requirements:
* ENISA GP-TM-56: Implement regular monitoring to verify the device
behaviour, to detect malware and to discover integrity errors.
* ENISA GP-TM-57: Conduct periodic audits and reviews of security
controls to ensure that the controls are effective. Perform
penetration tests at least biannually.
5. Security Considerations
No additional security considerations are required; they are laid out
in the preceeding sections.
6. Normative References
[ENISA-Baseline]
ENISA, "Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT in the
context of Critical Information Infrastructures", n.d.,
<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/baseline-
security-recommendations-for-iot/>.
[ETSI-Baseline]
ETSI, "Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things:
Baseline Requirements", n.d.,
<https://www.etsi.org/deliver/
etsi_en/303600_303699/303645/02.01.01_60/
en_303645v020101p.pdf>.
[FDO] FIDO Alliance, "FIDO Device Onboarding", n.d.,
<https://fidoalliance.org/specs/FDO/FIDO-Device-Onboard-
RD-v1.0-20201202.html>.
[I-D.birkholz-rats-corim]
Birkholz, H., Fossati, T., Deshpande, Y., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Concise Reference Integrity Manifest", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-birkholz-rats-corim-03, 11
July 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
birkholz-rats-corim-03>.
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[I-D.fossati-tls-attestation]
Tschofenig, H., Sheffer, Y., Howard, P., Mihalcea, I., and
Y. Deshpande, "Using Attestation in Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-fossati-
tls-attestation-03, 13 March 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-fossati-tls-
attestation-03>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS)
Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-rats-architecture-22, 28 September 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-
architecture-22>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C.
Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-19, 19
December 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-rats-eat-19>.
[I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid]
Birkholz, H., Fitzgerald-McKay, J., Schmidt, C., and D.
Waltermire, "Concise Software Identification Tags", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-24, 24
February 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-24>.
[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]
Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., Zandberg, K., and
O. Rønningstad, "A Concise Binary Object Representation
(CBOR)-based Serialization Format for the Software Updates
for Internet of Things (SUIT) Manifest", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-manifest-22, 27 February
2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
suit-manifest-22>.
[I-D.ietf-suit-report]
Moran, B. and H. Birkholz, "Secure Reporting of Update
Status", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
suit-report-05, 13 March 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-suit-
report-05>.
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[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. M. Wheeler,
"Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-teep-architecture-19, 24 October 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-teep-
architecture-19>.
[I-D.ietf-teep-protocol]
Tschofenig, H., Pei, M., Wheeler, D. M., Thaler, D., and
A. Tsukamoto, "Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning
(TEEP) Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-teep-protocol-12, 13 March 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-teep-
protocol-12>.
[IoTopia] "Global Platform Iotopia", n.d.,
<https://globalplatform.org/iotopia/mud-file-service/>.
[LwM2M] NIST, "LwM2M Core Specification", n.d.,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Software-Identification-
SWID/guidelines>.
[NIST-Baseline]
NIST, "IoT Device Cybersecurity Capability Core Baseline",
n.d., <https://www.nist.gov/publications/iot-device-
cybersecurity-capability-core-baseline>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4122>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8152>.
Moran Expires 26 October 2023 [Page 18]
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[RFC8520] Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
Description Specification", RFC 8520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8520>.
[RFC8995] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000>.
[RFC9019] Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Brown, D., and M. Meriac, "A
Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things",
RFC 9019, DOI 10.17487/RFC9019, April 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9019>.
[RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9147>.
[RFC9203] Palombini, F., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and M. Gunnarsson,
"The Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE) Profile of the Authentication and Authorization
for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework", RFC 9203,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9203, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9203>.
Author's Address
Brendan Moran
Arm Limited
Email: brendan.moran.ietf@gmail.com
Moran Expires 26 October 2023 [Page 19]
