Internet DRAFT - draft-moriarty-acme-client
draft-moriarty-acme-client
IETF K. Moriarty
Internet-Draft Dell Technologies
Intended status: Standards Track August 5, 2020
Expires: February 6, 2021
ACME End User Client and Code Signing Certificates
draft-moriarty-acme-client-05
Abstract
Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) core protocol
addresses the use case of web server certificates for TLS. This
document extends the ACME protocol to support end user client, device
client, and code signing certificates.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on February 6, 2021.
Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Identity Proofing for Client Certificates . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. End User Client Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. CodeSigning Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Pre-authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Challenge Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. One Time Password (OTP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1.1. HMAC-Based One-Time Password (HOTP) . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1.2. Time-Based One-Time Password (TOTP) . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1.3. Generic One Time Password (OTP) . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Public Key Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3. WebAuthn or Public/Private Key Pairs . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.3. URL References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix B. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
ACME [RFC8555] is a mechanism for automating certificate management
on the Internet. It enables administrative entities to prove
effective control over resources like domain names, and automates the
process of generating and issuing certificates.
The core ACME protocol defined challenge types specific to web server
certificates with the possibility to create extensions, or additional
challenge types for other use cases and certificate types. Client
certificates, such as end user and code signing may also benefit from
automated management to ease the deployment and maintenance of these
certificate types, thus the definition of this extension defining
challenge types specific to that usage.
2. Identity Proofing for Client Certificates
As with the TLS certificates defined in the core ACME document <xref
target="RFC8555"/>, identity proofing for ACME issued end user
client, device client, and code signing certificates is a separate
process outside of the automation of ACME. Identity proofing may be
an out-of-band process, if needed, and for this draft is likely tied
to the credentials used for the defined challenge types.
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Identity proofing for these certificate types present some challenges
for process automation. NIST SP 800-63 r3 [NIST800-63r3] serves as
guidance for identity proofing further detailed in NIST SP 800-63A
[NIST800-63A] that may occur prior to the ability to automate
certificate management via ACME or may obviate the need for it
weighing end user privacy as a higher concern and allowing for
credential issuance to be decoupled from identity proofing (IAL1).
Using this guidance, a CA might select from the identity proofing
levels to assert claims on the issued certificates as described in
NIST SP 800-63 r3 [NIST800-63r3].
The certificate issuing CA may make this choice by certificate type
issued. Once identity proofing has been performed, in cases where
this is part of the process, and certificates have been issued, NIST
SP 800-63 r3 [NIST800-63r3] includes recommendations for
authentication or in the context of ACME, management of issuance for
subsequent client, device, or code-signing certificates:
If federations and assertions are used for authorizing certificate
issuance, NIST SP 800-63 C [NIST800-63C] may be referenced for
guidance on levels of assurance.
Existing PKI certification authorities (CAs) tend to use a set of ad
hoc protocols for certificate issuance and identity verification.
For each certificate usage type, a basic process will be described to
obtain an initial certificate and for the certificate renewal
process. If higher assurance levels are desired, the guidance from
NIST SP 800-63 r3 [NIST800-63r3] may be useful and out-of-band
identity proofing options are possible options for pre-authorization
challenges or notifications.
3. End User Client Certificates
A client certificate used to authenticate an end user may be used for
mutual authentication in TLS, EAP-TLS, or messaging. The client
certificate in this case may be stored in a browser, PKCS-#11
container, KMIP (possible, but just code signing and device client
certificates in practice), or another key container. To obtain an
end user client certificate, there are several possibilities to
automate authentication of an identity credential intended to be tied
to an end user.
[We need to determine if it is important in ACME to define an
automated method that tests the identity or the user or to just have
consistent credentials for the authentication challenges. The
credentials may be distributed through an out-of-band method that
involves identity proofing.]
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[Several authentication options with identity proofing are
intentionally provided for review and discussion by the ACME working
group.]
A trusted federated service that ties the user to an email address
with a reputation of the user attached to the email may be possible.
One such example might be the use of a JWT signed OAuth token.
Risk based authentication used for identity proofing with red herring
questions is a third option that could utilize public information on
individuals to authenticate. This would be similar to the signup
process used in some financial applications.
Existing credentials - for instance, FIDO. FIDO uses a public key
pair and does not perform identity proofing. FIDO authentication
provides a different key pair to each service using FIDO for
authentication, which are generated at the client and registered by
the server. This may require using the FIDO credentials from a
specific service for authentication to gain ACME issued crededentials
(not advised based on how FIDO credentials are supposed to be used).
Are there instances where the same provider would issue both sets of
credentials? You wouldn't want to expose your FIDO credentials to a
different party, that's why each service has their own. Would you
set up a mechanism to get FIDO credentials to then obtain a
certificate? (What use cases would this be necessary? When do you
need a certificate where you already have a specific public/private
key pair?) This can be defined as an auth type, but should it be?
One-time password (OTP) authentication is a secure option. In cases
where a higher assurance level is needed, OTP may be a good choice
and many options exist today for OTP that could use an app on a phone
for instance tied to an existing (or newly established) password.
The OTP may be tied to an out-of-band process and may be associated
with a username/password and other accounts.
One consideration is to understand if the use case could just use
FIDO and not create anything new (ACME client certificates). FIDO
provides a mechanism to have unique public key pair based access for
client authentication to web sites and they are working on non-web.
Identity proofing is intentionally decoupled from authentication in
this model as that is in line with NIST 800-63r3 recommendations for
privacy protections of the user. The credential in this case is
authenticated and would be consistent for it's use, but the identity
proofing for that credential is not performed. Obviously, identity
proofing is more important for some services, like financial
applications where tying the user to the identity for access to
financial information is important. However, is automated identity
proofing important for any user certificate or should it remain
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decoupled where it could be automated by a service offering or is
there a need for a standardized mechanism to support it for user
certificates?
Three methods for ACME client authentication, not identity proofing,
are proposed in the Challenge Type Section.
4. CodeSigning Certificates
The process to retrieve a code signing certificate is similar to that
of a web server certificate, with differences primarily in the CSR
request and the resulting certificate properties. [The storage and
access of a code signing certificate must be protected and is
typically done through hardware, a hardware security module (HSM),
which likely has a PKCS#11 interface. A code signing certificate may
either be a standard one or an extended validation (EV) certificate.]
For automation purposes, the process described in this document will
follow the standard process and any out-of-band preprocessing can
increase the level of the issued certificate if the CA offers such
options and has additional identity proofing mechanisms (in band or
out-of-band).
Strict vetting processes are necessary for many code signing
certificates to provide a high assurance on the signer. In some
cases, issuance of a standard CodeSigning certificate will be
appropriate and no additional "challenges" [RFC8555 Section 8] will
be necessary. In this case, the standard option could be automated
very similar to Web server certificates with the only changes being
in the CSR properties. However, this may not apply to all scenarios,
such as those requiring EV certificates with the possibility for
required out-of-band initial authentication and identity proofing.
EV code signing certificates have a distinct set of requirements from
EV web certificates. In particular, they don't have associated
domain names, nor is CAA checking done. The code signing certificate
links a public key to an organization, not a domain. CAs may chose
different methods to enable the use of ACME for EV code signing
certificates. The intent of this work is to provide additional
authentication challenge types that may enable their automation
process.
Organization validation is required for standard code signing
certificates from most issuers. The CSR is used to identify the
organization from the included domain name in the request. The
resulting certificate, however, instead contains the organization's
name and for EV certificates, other identifying information for the
organization. For EV certificates, this could require that the
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domain is registered with the Certificate Authority provider, listed
in CAA [RFC6844], and administrators for the account are named with
provided portal access for certificate issuance and management
options.
While ACME allows for the client to directly establish an account
with a CA, an initial out-of-band process for this step may assist
with the additional requirements for EV certificates and assurance
levels typically required for code signing certificates. For
standard certificates, with a recommendation for additional vetting
through extended challenge options to enable ACME to establish the
account directly. In cases where code signing certificates are used
heavily for an organization, having the portal access replaced with
ACME authenticated client access with extra challenges for
authentication may be an option to automate the functionality.
[For standard certificates, is it worth defining SMS and email for
the challenge? Obviously, EV needs more, so a few choices are
suggested in this revision.]
To improve the vetting process, ACME's optional use of CAA [RFC6844]
with the Directory "meta" data "caaIdentities" ([RFC8555]
Section 9.7.6) assists with the validation that a CA may have issue
certificates for any particular domain and is RECOMMENDED for use
with code signing certificates for this additional level of
validation checking on issued certificates.
As noted in RFC8555, "the external account binding feature (see
Section 7.3.4) can allow an ACME account to use authorizations that
have been granted to an external, non-ACME account. This allows ACME
to address issuance scenarios that cannot yet be fully automated,
such as the issuance of "Extended Validation" certificates."
The ACME challenge object, [RFC8555] Section 7.1.5 is RECOMMENDED for
use for Pre-authorization ([RFC8555] Section 7.4.1). Additional
challenge types are added to provide higher levels of security for
this issuance verification step. The use of OTP, FIDO credentials
(public/private key pairs), or validation from a certificate issued
at account setup time are defined in Section 8. Pre-Authoriziation.
Questions for reviewers:
[Is there interest to set a specific or default challenge object for
CodeSigning Certificates? Or should this be left to individual CAs
to decide and differentiate? The current challenge types defined in
RFC8555 include HTTPS (provisioning HTTP resources) and DNS
(provisioning a TXT resource record). Use of DNS may be possible,
but the HTTP resource doesn't necessarily make sense. Since the
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process to retrieve an EV CodeSigning certificate usually requires
proof of the organization and validation from one of 2 named
administrators, some other challenge type like public/private key
pairs or OTP may be needed as defined challenge types. An
organization may want to tie this contact to a role rather than a
person and that consideration should be made in the design as well as
implementation by organizations.]
ACME provides an option for notification of the operator via email or
SMS upon issuance/renewal of a certificate after the domain has been
validated as owned by the requestor. This option is RECOMMENDED due
to the security considerations of code signing certificates as a way
to limit or reduce the possibility of a third party gaining access to
a code signing certificate inappropriately. Development of
additional challenge types is included in this document to support
this for pre-authorization, which would better match the security
considerations for this certificate type. Additional types may be
added if agreed upon by the working group.
Since DNS is used to identify the organization in the request, the
identifier "type" ([RFC8555]Section 7.4) is set to dns, not requiring
any additions to the ACME protocol for this type of certificate. The
distinction lies in the CSR, where the values are set to request a
CodeSigning certificate for a client certificate. [Question: Is it
helpful to define an identifier for the administrator or for the
developer to distinguish the certificate type in ACME and not just
the CSR?]
KeyUsage (DigitalSignature) and ExtendedKeyUsage (CodeSigning) in the
CSR MUST be set to the correct values for the CA to see the request
is for a Code Signing certificate. The Enhanced Key Usage SHOULD be
set to show this is a client certificate., using OID
"1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2". The CN MUST be set to the expected registered
domain with the CA account.
An advantage of ACME is the ability to automate rollover to allow for
easy management of short expiry times on certificates. The lifetime
of CodeSigning certificates is typically a year or two, but
automation could allow for shorter expiry times becoming feasible.
However, lifetimes are less of an issue for code signing certificates
than other certificate types. however there is a legitmate case for
"one signature per certificate." Automation might be helpful in this
case if patches or software updates were frequent or to minimize the
knowledge needed for the organization using this method.
Automation of storage to an HSM, which typically requires
authentication is intentionally left out-of-scope.
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5. Pre-authorization
Additional challenge types are defined here for the verification of
administrators at an organization requesting CodeSigning
certificates. SMS and email are listed as possible in RFC8555 and
may be used singularly or in combination as the ACME protocol allows
for multiple pre-authorization challenges to be issued. Additional
pre-authorization types are defined that provide a higher level of
assurance to authorize a request.
6. Challenge Types
The challenge types defined in the following subsections are to
authenticate individuals or holders of specific pre-issued
credentials (users acting in roles for an organization). The
challenge types can be used to obtain end user certificate types or
as a pre-authorization challenges with certificate types such as the
Code Signing Certificate. Please note that the pre-authorization
challenge is also coupled with the account certificate in ACME for
verification. The process for obtaining EV Code Signing Certificates
typically requires authorization from one or more individuals in a
role for the organization. The use of pre-issued secure credentials,
at an assurance level appropriate for the certificate type being
issued, provides a way to automate the issuance and renewal process.
6.1. One Time Password (OTP)
There are numerous one time password technologies with slight
variations between implementations. The response to the challenge is
entered in the provided URL, offering flexibility to those using this
challenge type to acomodate the specific requirements of their
solution. Looking at 2 OTP solutions, the challenge response is
provided via a tool or app without any user interaction of
information required from the server to generate the challenge. The
2 solutions that operate in this manner include SecureID and Duo
Security. If a challenge is required to generate the response to be
provided in the URL, the token can supply the challenge.
type (required, string): The string "otp-01".
token (required, string): A random value that uniquely identifies
the challenge. OTP types and input vary between technologies.
The token value will match the type expected for the pre-issued
OTP credential. The user will be able to supply a response in the
provided URL from this challenge. It MUST NOT contain any
characters outside the base64url alphabet and MUST NOT include
base64 padding characters ("=").
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{
"type": "otp-01",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/chall/WrV_H87EyD3",
"status": "pending",
"token": "challenge"
}
6.1.1. HMAC-Based One-Time Password (HOTP)
HOTP([RFC4226]) describes an algorithm for the generation of time-
based password values.
type (required, string): The string "hotp-01".
token (required, string): The HOTP value. This SHOULD be the 6
digit representation.
{
"type": "hotp-01",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/chall/WrV_H87EyD3",
"status": "pending",
"token": "123456"
}
6.1.2. Time-Based One-Time Password (TOTP)
TOTP([RFC6238]) describes an algorithm for the generation of time-
based password values, an extension from HOTP.
type (required, string): The string "totp-01".
token (required, string): The TOTP value. This SHOULD be the 6
digit representation.
{
"type": "totp-01",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/chall/WrV_H87EyD3",
"status": "pending",
"token": "123456"
}
6.1.3. Generic One Time Password (OTP)
There are numerous other one time password technologies with slight
variations between implementations. The response to the challenge is
entered in the provided URL, offering flexibility to those using this
challenge type to acomodate the specific requirements of their
solution. Looking at 2 OTP solutions, the challenge response is
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provided via a tool or app without any user interaction of
information required from the server to generate the challenge. The
2 solutions that operate in this manner include SecureID and Duo
Security. If a challenge is required to generate the response to be
provided in the URL, the token can supply the challenge.
type (required, string): The string "otp-01".
token (required, string): A random value that uniquely identifies
the challenge. OTP types and input vary between technologies.
The token value will match the type expected for the pre-issued
OTP credential. The user will be able to supply a response in the
provided URL from this challenge. It MUST NOT contain any
characters outside the base64url alphabet and MUST NOT include
base64 padding characters ("=").
{
"type": "otp-01",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/chall/WrV_H87EyD3",
"status": "pending",
"token": "challenge"
}
6.2. Public Key Cryptography
Certificates may be pre-issued and stored according to assurance
level requirements for the purpose of identifying a user's identity.
If a higher assurance level is needed for a user serving in a
specific role or for that individual, it is possible for identity
proofing to occur in person using identifiers acceptable for the
specified process and the private key stored appropriately for the
required assurance level. PKCS#11 software or hardware tokens are
both possible options. This model assumes that there may be multiple
authorized users with different certificates that can be used for the
authorization or pre-authentication challenge. As such, the user
first provides the digital signature, so the account management can
determine if one of the acceptable certificates was used to digitally
sign the token.
type (required, string): The string "cert-01".
token (required, string): A random value that uniquely identifies
the challenge. The token for a certificate authentication
challenge includes a value for the recipeint to digitally sign
using their private key and post to the provided URL. The ACME
server then uses the digitally signed content to verify that the
challenge was signed using authorized credentials (certificate
issued and authorized for this challenge type). It MUST NOT
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contain any characters outside the base64url alphabet and MUST NOT
include base64 padding characters ("=").
{
"type": "cert-01",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/chall/WrV_H87EyD3",
"status": "pending",
"token": "Some challenge to digitally sign"
}
6.3. WebAuthn or Public/Private Key Pairs
W3C's WebAuthn uses raw public/private key pairs that are issued
specific to a service. If WebAuthn or public/private key pairs
(PPKP) are selected as the challenge type, the account and credential
issuance will have to occur prior to use of this challenge type. The
WebAuthn or public/private key pair credentials would be specific to
the certificate management account and would be created by the
client, then registered with the service as occurs with normal
WebAuthn regisration of credentials. As with normal WebAuthn and
public/private key pairs, the token or challenge is digitally signed
to prove possession of the private key.
type (required, string): The string "ppkp-01".
token (required, string): A random value that uniquely identifies
the challenge. This challenge will operate much in the same way
as the certificate challenge as the operations are largely the
same. The user will be able to supply a response in the provided
URL from this challenge. It MUST NOT contain any characters
outside the base64url alphabet and MUST NOT include base64 padding
characters ("=").
{
"type": "ppkp-01",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/chall/WrV_H87EyD3",
"status": "pending",
"token": "Some challenge to sign"
}
7. Security Considerations
This will likely be full of considerations and is TBD for this
revision until challenge types are settled.
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8. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA, yet.
9. Contributors
Thank you to reviewers and contributors who helped to improve this
document. Thank you to Thomas Peterson who added the one-time
password types, HOTP and TOTP. Thank you to Tim Hollebeek for your
early review and added text specific to EV certificate issuance and
one time use code signing certificates. Thank you to Andrei Popov
and Deb Cooley for your reviews and suggestions made in -04. Thank
you to those who reviewed the CAA text removed in version -05
including: Carl Mehner, Roland Shoemaker, Ben Schwartz, and Ryan
Sleevi.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4226] M'Raihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and
O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password
Algorithm", RFC 4226, DOI 10.17487/RFC4226, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4226>.
[RFC6238] M'Raihi, D., Machani, S., Pei, M., and J. Rydell, "TOTP:
Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm", RFC 6238,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6238, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6238>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>.
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10.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-acme-ip]
Shoemaker, R., "ACME IP Identifier Validation Extension",
draft-ietf-acme-ip-08 (work in progress), October 2019.
10.3. URL References
[NIST800-63A]
US National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-63a.pdf".
[NIST800-63B]
US National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-63b.pdf".
[NIST800-63C]
US National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-63c.pdf".
[NIST800-63r3]
US National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-63-3.pdf".
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Appendix A. Change Log
Note to RFC Editor: if this document does not obsolete an existing
RFC, please remove this appendix before publication as an RFC.
02 draft added subsections contributed from Thomas Peterson on HOTP
and TOTP.
Appendix B. Open Issues
Note to RFC Editor: please remove this appendix before publication as
an RFC.
Author's Address
Kathleen M. Moriarty
Dell Technologies
176 South Street
Hopkinton
US
EMail: Kathleen.Moriarty@dell.com
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