Internet DRAFT - draft-mrw-abfab-trust-router
draft-mrw-abfab-trust-router
Network Working Group M. Wasserman
Internet-Draft S. Hartman
Updates: 4556 (if approved) Painless Security
Intended status: Standards Track M. Wasserman
Expires: August 29, 2014 JANET (UK)
February 25, 2014
Application Bridging for Federation Beyond the Web (ABFAB) Trust Router
Protocol
draft-mrw-abfab-trust-router-02.txt
Abstract
A Trust Router is an infrastucture element used to construct multihop
Application Bridging for Federated Authentication Beyond the Web
(ABFAB) federations. This document defines both the Trust Router
Protocol and the Temporary Identity Protocol, which can be used
together to enable multihop ABFAB federations without requiring a
centralized Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 29, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Multihop Federation Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Temporary Identity Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Temporary Identity Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Temporary Identity Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. Role of the Trust Router in Temporary Identity Requests . 10
6. Trust Router Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. Trust Router Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.1. Hello Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.2. Trust Link Database Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.3. Trust Link Update Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. Trust Router Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2.1. Hello Message Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2.2. Exchanging Trust Link Databases . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2.3. Trust Link Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2.4. Serial Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2.5. TCP Connection Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2.6. Conceptual Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2.7. Peer Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2.8. Trust Link Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Message Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. Message Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. Temporary Identity Protocol Representation . . . . . . . . 13
7.2.1. Temporary Identity Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2.2. Temporary Identity Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.3. Trust Router Protocol Message Representation . . . . . . . 13
7.3.1. Hello Message Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.3.2. Trust Link Database/Update Representation . . . . . . 13
7.3.3. Trust Link Ordering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.3.4. Entity Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.3.5. Trust Link Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.3.6. Trust Link Database Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.3.7. Trust Link Update Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. Message Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.1. Temporary Identity Request Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.2. Temporary Identity Response Example . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
12. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
12.1. Changes between -01 and -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
12.2. Changes between -00 and -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Introduction
A Trust Router is an infrastucture element used to construct multihop
Application Bridging for Federated Authentication Beyond the Web
(ABFAB) federations. This document defines the Temporary Identity
Protocol and the Trust Router Protocol, which can be used together to
enable multihop ABFAB federations without requiring a centralized
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
This document defines a Temporary Identity Protocol that can be used
by a AAA Client (such as a AAA Proxy near a Relying Party) to
negotiate a shared key with the AAA Server(s) in a target IdP realm,
so that the AAA Client can use the AAA Server(s) to authenticate
users within the realm.
Temporary Identity requests are forwarded by Trust Routers across a
chain of Trust Links, eventually reaching the AAA Servers within the
target realm. Responses are returned along the same chain.
Information about available Trust Links and the paths that can be
used to reach AAA Servers within the IdP realms is propogated between
Trust Routers using the Trust Router Protocol, which is also defined
in this document.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
This document introduces the following terms:
Trust Router: This is a logical ABFAB entity that exchanges
information about Trust Paths that Relying Parties can use to
create transtitive chains of trust across multihop ABFAB
federations.
Trust Link: A Trust Link is an assertion that a given Trust Router
is capable of providing a temporary identity to communicate with
another ABFAB entity (either another Trust Router, or a AAA Server
within an IdP).
Trust Path: A Trust Path is a concatenation of Trust Links that can
be used by an RP to contruct a transitive trust chain across a
federation to a target Identity Provider.
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Temporary Identity Protocol: The Temporary Identity (TID) Protocol
is used to negotiate a shared key between a AAA Client and a AAA
Server that can be used for subsequent AAA authentication
requests.
Trust Router Protocol: The Trust Router Protocol is the mechanism
used by two Trust Routers to exchange information about Trust
Links and Trust Paths.
Community of Interest A Community of Interest (COI) defines a group
of Services and IdPs that have agreed to cooperate to provide
access to a specific set of services only to those users within a
particular community. Communities of Interest can be layered on
top of the base Trust Router infrastructure to allow selected
access to IdPs that have joined a specific group.
Authentication Policy Community An Authentication Policy Community
(APC) is a type of community in which the members have agreed to
specific policies regarding user authentication.
The terms Identity Provider (IdP), Relying Party (RP), Subject, and
Federation are used as defined in [I-D.lear-abfab-arch].
3. Motivation
Figure 1 shows an example federation where the Relying Party Foo, has
established relationships with various Identity Providers.
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+---------------+
| Identity |
| Provider | `..
| Example-A.org | `-._
+---------------+ `..
`-._
+---------------+ `._ +-----------+
| Identity | `- | Relying |
| Provider | ------------------ | Party Foo |
| Example-B.org | _.- +-----------+
+---------------+ _,-'
,,'
+---------------+ _.-' o
| Identity | _,-' \|/
| Provider | ' |
| Example-C.org | / \
+---------------+ Subject
Figure 1: One-to-many Federation Example
When an RP receives a request to access a protected resource (or
requires authentication for other purposes) the request includes a
realm name that indicates the IdP the Subject has selected for this
exchange. Offering the Subject the ability to choose among many
different IdPs is necessary because a Subject may have, and want to
maintain, uncorrelated identities in several different realms within
a single federation (i.e. work, school, social networking, etc.).
However, this also places a burden on the RPs to establish and
maintain business agreements and exchange security credentials with a
potentially large number of Identity Providers.
In order for a single-hop federation to function, each IdP needs to
maintain business agreements and exchange credentials with every RP
that its Subjects are authorized to access. Figure 2, shows the
likely outcome, which is that a single-hop federation will come to
resemble a dense mesh topology.
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+---------------+
| Identity |
| Provider |-.._
| Example-A.org |`. ``-.._
+---------------+ `-. ``-..__ +-----------+
`. `--.| Relying |
+---------------+ `. __..--| Party Foo |
| Identity | __:.--'' .-'+-----------+
| Provider |_..--'' `. .-'
| Example-B.org | .-'.
+---------------+ .' '. +-----------+
.-' -. | Relying |
+---------------+ .-' `-.| Party Bar |
| Identity |.-' ____....---''+-----------+
| Provider |.----'''
| Example-C.org |
+---------------+ o
\|/
|
/ \
Subject
Figure 2: Mesh Federation Example
As discussed in section 2.1.1 of [I-D.lear-abfab-arch], as the number
of organizations involved in a ABFAB federation increase, static
configuration may not scale sufficiently. Also, using a Trust Broker
to establish keys between entities near the RP and entities near the
IDP with improve the security and privacy of an ABFAB federation.
Figure 3 shows the structure of a federation where each IdP and RP
has a single connection to the Trust Router infrastructure.
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+---------------+
| Identity |
| Provider |\
| Example-A.org | `.
+---------------+ \ +-----------+
\ .-'| Relying |
+---------------+ `. +---------------+ .' | Party Foo |
| Identity | \| Trust |.-' +-----------+
| Provider |........| Broker |
| Example-B.org | /| |`-.
+---------------+ .' +---------------+ `. +-----------+
/ `-.| Relying |
+---------------+ / | Party Bar |
| Identity | .' +-----------+
| Provider |/ O
| Example-C.org | \|/
+---------------+ |
/ \
Subject
Figure 3: Federation Broker
To improve the operational scalability and security of large ABFAB
federations, this document proposes a Trust Broker solution
consisting of of a set of Trust Routers, as described in this
document, running the Trust Router Protocol and forwarding Temporary
Identity Requests between RPs and IdPs.
4. Multihop Federation Example
The diagram below shows an example of a successful exchange in a
multihop federation using the Trust Routers to forward Temporary
Identity Requests:
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Realm D | Realm C | Realm B | Realm A
+----------+ | +----------+ | +----------+ | +----------+
| Trust |<-1->| Trust |<-1->| Trust |<-1->| Trust |
| Router | | | Router | | | Router | | | Router |
| D |<-4->| C |<-4->| B |<-4->| A |
+----------+ | +----------+ | +----------+ | +----------+
^ ^
| | | | |
5 3
| | | | |
V V
+----------+ | | | +----------+
| Identity |<---------6--------------------------->| Relying |
| Provider | | | | | Party & |
|AAA Server| | AAA Proxy|
+----------+ | | | +----------+
^
| | | |
|
| | | |
|
+----------+ | | | |
| Subject |----------2---------------------------------+
| | | | |
+----------+
| | |
Figure 4: Example Message Exchange
A multihop federation exchange matching the above diagram can be
summarized as follows:
1. We start with a single federation including four realms, each
containing a single Trust Router. The Trust Routers are peered,
such that their interconnections form a multihop federation.
2. A Subject (with an identity in Realm D) attempts to access a
service provided by a Relying Party in Realm A.
3. The Relying Party does not have direct access to a AAA Server in
Realm D that it can use to authenticate the Subject, so it asks
its local Trust Router to forward a Temporary Identity Request to
Realm D.
4. Trust Router A forwards the request along the Trust Path from A
to B to C to D.
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5. The AAA Server in Realm D receives the Temporary Identity request
from the local Trust Router and configures a Temporary Identity
for the AAA Proxy in Realm A.
6. The AAA Proxy in Realm A can now reach the AAA Server in Realm D
to perform the authentication.
5. Temporary Identity Protocol
The Temporary Identity protocol is a simple request/response protocol
that is used to established a shared secret between a AAA Client and
a AAA Server that can be used for subsequent AAA exchanges. The
shared secret is established via a Diffie-Helman (DH) exchange, and
it therefore cannot be duplicated by the Trust Routers that forward
the Temporary Identity Protocol messages.
5.1. Temporary Identity Request
A Temporary Identify request initially includes the RP Realm for
which the identity is being requested, the Target Realm of the
request, the Community in which the request is scoped, and a set of
client DH parameters used to generate the shared secret.
As a Temporary Identity request is forwarded across the Trust Router
chain, it may accumulate additional information, such at APC that
corresponds to a COI in the original request and a set of Realm
Constraints and Domain Constraints that will be stored by the AAA
Server and used for Channel Binding to ensure that the later AAA
Request comes from an appropriate AAA Client.
5.2. Temporary Identity Response
A Temporary Identity Response includes most of the fields in the
original request. However, the client's DH information has been
replaced by a list of AAA Servers for the target realm and a DH block
corresponding to each server. The AAA Client can use that
information to generate a shared key with each server.
5.3. Role of the Trust Router in Temporary Identity Requests
Trust Routers forward Temporary Identity Requests on behalf of their
local AAA Proxies and their neighboring Trust Routers. As part of
forwarding these requests, Trust Routers perform a COI to API
conversion on the Community field, storing the original COI in an
"orig_coi" field. They also add Realm and/or Domain Constraints that
can later be used by the AAA Server to ensure that AAA Requests are
coming from the correct AAA Client.
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6. Trust Router Protocol
The Trust Router protocol is a TCP-based protocol that is used to
exchange information between Trust Routers about available Trust
Links within an ABFAB Federation.
As discussed in the multihop federation document, When a Trust Router
advertises a Trust Link, such as A(T) -> B(T), it is making an
assertion that Trust Router A is able, and willing, to provide
temporary identities (via KNP) that can be used to reach Trust Router
B.
Trust Routers use the information they receive about available Trust
Links to construct Trust Paths that can be used to reach AAA Servers
(i.e. RADIUS or DIAMETER servers) for a set of Identity Providers
(IDPs) within a ABFAB federation. They then return the shortest path
to a specific IDP in response to Trust Path Queries.
6.1. Trust Router Messages
6.1.1. Hello Message
Hello Messages are the first messages exchanged by Trust Routers when
they bring up a new TCP connection, and they may be exchanged at
other times to ensure that database information is synchronized, or
to trigger a full Trust Link Database download. The first Hello
messages exchanged over a new TCP connection are also used as the
vehicle to establish an authenticated and encrypted GSS-API session.
6.1.2. Trust Link Database Message
A Trust Link Database Message contains a full (potentially filtered)
set of Trust Links that can be reached through the sending Trust
Router. This message may be quite large, and is only sent when
solicited by the receiver.
6.1.3. Trust Link Update Message
Trust Routers send Trust Link Update messages to other Trust Routers
to whom they are connected whenever their Trust Link Database is
updated. Trust Link Update messages contain the portions of the
Trust Link Database that have changed since the last update. They
also contain a serial number that can be used by the receiving Trust
Router to determine if any updates have been missed, in which case a
full Trust Router Database download is needed.
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6.2. Trust Router Operation
This section describes how Trust Routers work, in general. Detailed
message formats are described in later sections of the document.
6.2.1. Hello Message Exchange
6.2.2. Exchanging Trust Link Databases
6.2.3. Trust Link Updates
6.2.4. Serial Numbers
6.2.5. TCP Connection Handling
Trust Routers communicate by exchanging full JSON-encoded messages
over a TCP connection. If incomplete messages are received, or if
the TCP connection is interrupted before a complete message is
received, the incomplete messages will be discarded, and no protocol
actions will be taken based on the contents of the incomplete
message.
In the Trust Router Protocol, no information about the availability
of Trust Links is inferred from a TCP reset, or a retransmission
timeout on the TCP connection to another Trust Router. A Trust
Router is only considered unreachable after an attempt to reestablish
a TCP connection to that Trust Router is reset or times out.
When a Trust Router is found to be unreachable, the Trust Links
supplied by that Trust Router are not removed from the local Trust
Link Database. They will however, be marked as deprecated until a
connection can be reestablished with the Trust Router that sent them,
and it can be verified that the sequence number of that Trust
Router's Database still matches the sequence number of the most
recent Trust Link information received.
When Trust Links are marked as deprecated, they will not be used if
another, non-deprecated path exists to reach the target Identity
Provider. If there are no paths to the target Identity Provider that
traverse only non-deprecated Trust Links, a path containing a
deprecated Trust Link will be used.
6.2.6. Conceptual Data Structures
6.2.7. Peer Table
6.2.8. Trust Link Database
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7. Message Representation
This section provides details about the contents and encoding of both
Trust Router Protocol messages and Trust Path Query messages.
7.1. Message Encoding
The Trust Router Protocol and Trust Path Query messages are encoded
in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627].
7.2. Temporary Identity Protocol Representation
7.2.1. Temporary Identity Request
7.2.2. Temporary Identity Response
7.3. Trust Router Protocol Message Representation
7.3.1. Hello Message Representation
Name or Realm (??) Auth-Token (??) Database-Serial-Number Database-
Request
Database-Serial-Number field contains the current serial number of
the sending Trust Router's Trust Link Database. This information may
be used by a receiving Trust Router to determine whether it should
request a full Trust Link Database download.
The Database-Request field indicates whether the receiving Trust
Router should respond to this message with a Trust Link Database
message, to share its full Trust Link Database with the sending Trust
Router. If this field has a value of "true", a download is
requested. If it is "false", a download is not requested.
7.3.2. Trust Link Database/Update Representation
In the Trust Router Protocol, each Trust Router will send a
(potentially filtered) set of Trust Links to its neighboring Trust
Routers. The representation of these Trust Links is designed for
efficient encoding, and to allow easy population of a conceptual
Trust Link Table on the receiving Trust Router. Each Trust Router
will only distribute a set of Trust Links that form a connected tree
rooted at the sending Trust Router.
Conceptually, a Trust Link consists:
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o A Trust Router that is willing to provide a temporary identity.
o The Trust Router or AAA Server which the identity can be provided.
o The Communities-of-Interest to whom the link is available.
o A lifetime for this link, in seconds.
However, the actual Trust Links passed in the Trust Router protocol
rely on inference and ordering to eliminate the need to include the
first Trust Router identity in each distributed link. Instead, we
use an Index variable, which indicates each Trust Link's level in a
conceptual tree, and we order the Trust Links, so that a Trust Link
with an Index of N is subordinate to the closest previous Trust Link
with an index of N-1 that applies to the same Community-of-Interest.
Each conceptual tree is rooted at the sending Trust Router, which is
represented by an an entry with an Index value of 0.
7.3.3. Trust Link Ordering
7.3.4. Entity Identity
When we send Trust Router or AAA Server identities in the Trust
Router Protocol, that information will be sent in an Entity Identity
structure containing the following fields:
o Name
o Type
o Realm
The Name field will typically contain a fully-qualified domain name
(FQDN) that can be used to reach the indicated entity (e.g. "tr-
A.example.net").
The Type field indicates that the entity is a Trust Router (Type =
"T") or a AAA Server (Type = "R", "D", or "S" for a RADIUS Server,
DIAMETER Server or RADSEC Server, respectively).
The Realm field contains the security realm associated with the
entity (e.g. "example.net").
7.3.5. Trust Link Entry
As transmitted in the Trust Router Protocol, a Trust Link entry will
have the following fields:
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o Index
o Target-Entity
o Communities-of-Interest
o Lifetime
The Index field contains a non-zero integer value, indicating the
depth of this Trust Link in a conceptual tree of links rooted at the
sending Trust Router. The maximum value of this field is 255.
The Target-Entity field contains a the Trust Router or AAA Server for
which temporary identities can be generated. This also represents
the Trust Router that can generate identities for any directly
subordinate nodes in the conceptual tree.
The Communities-of-Interest field contains an array of strings, each
containing a Community-of-Interest for which this link is available.
The Lifetime field contains an integer that indicates the lifetime of
this Trust Link in seconds. Links are removed from the the
conceptual Trust Link Table if their lifetime expires.
7.3.6. Trust Link Database Message
A Trust Link Database will consist two fields:
o Serial-Number
o Trust-Links
The Serial-Number field contains an integer indicating the version of
the information contained in this database. The maximum value for
this field is (2^32 - 1).
The Trust-Links field contains an array of Trust Link Entries.
7.3.7. Trust Link Update Message
8. Message Examples
8.1. Temporary Identity Request Example
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{"msg_type": "TIDRequest",
"msg_body":
{"rp_realm": "foo.example.com",
"target_realm": "bar.example.net",
"community": "trust-router-hackers.baz.example.edu",
"dh_info":
{"dh_p": "FFFFFFFF...",
"dh_g": "02",
"dh_pub_key": "FBF98ABB..."
}
}
}
8.2. Temporary Identity Response Example
{"msg_type": "TIDResponse",
"msg_body":
{"rp_realm": "foo.example.com",
"target_realm": "bar.example.net",
"community": "apc.baz.example.edu">
"orig_coi": "trust-router-hackers.baz.example.edu",
"aaa_servers":
[{"server_name":"aaa-server.bar.example.net",
"dh_info:
{"dh_p": "FFFFFFFF...",
"dh_g": "02",
"dh_pub_key": "FBF98ABB..."
}
}]
"realm_constraints":"*.foo.example.com"
}
}
9. Security Considerations
[TBD]
10. IANA Considerations
IANA has allocated the following TCP port numbers for use by
protocols described in this document:
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[TBD]
11. Acknowledgements
This document was written using the xml2rfc tool described in RFC
2629 [RFC2629].
The following people provided useful comments or feedback on this
document: Daniel Kouril, Linus Nordberg, Jim Schaad, Rhys Smith,
Kevin Wasserman.
12. Change Log
12.1. Changes between -01 and -02
o Changed Trust Path Query protocol to Temporary Identity Request
Protocol
o Added TID details based on implemented code.
o Restructured document to remove need for separate multihop
federations document.
12.2. Changes between -00 and -01
o Minor revisions, added authors.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
13.2. Informative References
[RFC2629] Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
June 1999.
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Authors' Addresses
Margaret Wasserman
Painless Security
14 Summer Street, Suite 202
Malden, MA 02148
USA
Phone: +1 781 405-7464
Email: mrw@painless-security.com
URI: http://www.painless-security.com
Sam Hartman
Painless Security
14 Summer Street, Suite 202
Malden, MA 02148
USA
Email: hartmans@painless-security.com
URI: http://www.painless-security.com
Margaret Wasserman
JANET (UK)
Email: josh.howlett@ja.net
Wasserman, et al. Expires August 29, 2014 [Page 18]
