Internet DRAFT - draft-ohba-6tsch-security
draft-ohba-6tsch-security
6TSCH S. Chasko
Internet-Draft L+G
Intended status: Informational S. Das
Expires: January 11, 2014 ACS
R. Marin-Lopez
University of Murcia
Y. Ohba, Ed.
Toshiba
P. Thubert
cisco
A. Yegin
Samsung
July 10, 2013
Security Framework and Key Management Protocol Requirements for 6TSCH
draft-ohba-6tsch-security-01
Abstract
Since 6TSCH forms layer 3 meshes over IPv6, use of key management
protocols defined at layer 3 or above matches the target architecture
so they can apply for the process by a new device of joining the mesh
to extend it. This document details that particular operation within
the whole 6TSCH architecture.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 11, 2014.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Security Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. KMP requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Phase-1 KMP requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Phase-2 KMP requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.3. External Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. KMP candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.1. Phase-1 KMP candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.2. Phase-2 KMP candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
The emergence of radio technology enabled a large variety of new
types of devices to be interconnected, at a very low marginal cost
compared to wire, at any range from Near Field to interplanetary
distances, and in circumstances where wiring could be less than
practical, for instance rotating devices.
At the same time, a new breed of Time Sensitive Networks is being
developed to enable traffic that is highly sensitive to jitter and
quite sensitive to latency. Such traffic is not limited to voice and
video, but also includes command and control operations such as found
in industrial automation or in-vehicular sensors and actuators.
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6TSCH aims at providing an open standard with new capabilities, both
in terms of scalability (number of IPv6 devices in a single subnet)
and in terms of guarantees (delivery and timeliness). Both the
ISA100.11a and Wireless HART protocols are gaining acceptance in the
automation industry and demonstrate that a level of determinism can
be achieved on a wireless medium with adequate guarantees for low
speed control loops, used in mission critical Process Control
applications. For industrial applications, security is not an option
and a power efficient authentication mechanism is strictly required.
For other usages such as rust control, intrusion detection or seismic
activity monitoring, the capability to correlate inputs from multiple
sources can be critical, and the value of the network directly
augments with the number of connected devices. In order to scale to
appropriate levels, the need for spatial reuse of the spectrum often
implies routing capabilities over short range radios. Proprietary
variations demonstrate that RPL can scale to multiple thousands of
devices, but at the same time expose a new challenge for security
that must enable deployments of any scale with security requirements
that may vary widely. If the cost of the security in terms of
network operations and system resources depends on that degree of
security, then 6TSCH should enable different profiles that can match
different requirements and capabilities.
Since 6TSCH forms layer 3 meshes over IPv6, key management protocols
defined at layer 3 or above can apply for the process by a new device
of joining the mesh to extend it. This document details that
particular operation within the whole 6TSCH architecture.
ZigBee IP [ZigBeeIP] ("ZigBee" is a registered trademark of the
ZigBee Alliance) is a standard for IPv6-based wireless mesh networks
using PANA for network access authentication and secure distribution
of a link-layer group key called Network Key to authenticated mesh
nodes formed over unslotted CSMA-CA MAC of 802.15.4. Each mesh node
in the same ZigBee IP network derives the same link-layer key from
the Network Key to protect IEEE 802.15.4 MAC frames exchanged between
adjacent mesh nodes. While sharing the same link-layer key among all
mesh nodes can make the required key state maintained by each mesh
node compact, a compromise of a mesh node can lead to link-layer key
leakage in the entire ZigBee IP network. Also, the cost of updating
the link-layer key can be high as the key needs to be updated at all
mesh nodes whenever the 4-octet frame counter at any single node
wraps or the key is considered to be compromised or weak.
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In the case of TSCH MAC which uses 5-octet global frame counter
referred to as Absolute Slot Number (ASN), the frame counter is not
likely to wrap in the expected lifetime of the device, but key update
for a common link-layer key is still issue if the key needs to be
changed for other reasons.
This document introduces a more secure and scalable key management
framework for 6TSCH networks and identifies requirements for key
management protocols to be used in the framework.
2. Acronyms
In addition to the acronyms defined in
[I-D.palattella-6tsch-terminology], the following acronyms are used
in this document.
KMP: Key Management Protocol
PANA: Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access
SA: Security Association
MAC: Media Access Control
3. Security Framework
This section describes a security framework consisting of four phases
as shown in Figure 1. The architecture is applicable to not only
6TSCH networks but also non-time synchronized mesh networks. Each
node in a mesh network runs through the following phases:
o Phase-0 (Implanting Phase): In this phase, a node installs
credentials used for subsequent phases in a physically secure and
managed location before the node is placed to where it is expected
to operate. Details on Phase-0 is outside the scope of this
document.
o Phase-1 (Bootstrapping Phase): In this phase, a node (re)installs
credentials used for subsequent phases from an authentication
server after it is placed to where it is expected to operate. The
credentials installed during Phase-1 include Phase-2 credentials
and Phase-3 credentials, and may also include long-term Phase-1
credentials if the initial Phase-1 credentials are intended for
one-time use such as a temporary PIN. An authentication and key
establishment protocol called a Phase-1 KMP is conducted between
the node and the authentication server using Phase-1 credentials.
The Phase-1 credentials have longer lifetime than Phase-2 and
Phase-3 credentials so that Phase-2 and Phase-3 credentials can be
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renewed using the Phase-1 credentials. Both symmetric and
asymmetric key credentials can be used as Phase-1 credentials. In
Phase-1 KMP, the Phase-2 and Phase-3 credentials are distributed
from the authentication server to the node. When the
authentication server is multiple hops away from the node, mutual
authentication between the node and the authentication server is
conducted via a neighboring node acting as an authentication
relay. There may be no link-layer security available between the
node and its neighboring node in this phase. An authentication
server is typically (but is not necessarily) co-located with the
coordinator of the mesh network. Phase-1 is optional if Phase-2
credentials are installed during Phase-0 and do not need to be
updated.
o Phase-2 (Link Establishment Phase): In this phase, the node
performs mutual authentication with its neighboring node using the
Phase-2 credentials to establish SAs between adjacent nodes for
protecting 802.15.4 MAC frames. The authentication and key
establishment protocol used in this phase is referred as a Phase-2
KMP or a link establishment KMP. For highly scalable mesh
networks consisting of thousands of mesh nodes, certificates are
used as the Phase-2 credentials. The SA of a link between node i
and node j maintains link-layer keys, i.e., 128-bit keys used in
AES-CCM* mode, a variant of the Counter with Cipher Block Chaining
- Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) Mode, for encryption,
authentication or authenticated encryption of 802.15.4 frames.
K_i denotes a link-layer key for protecting broadcast MAC frames
originated at node i. K_ij denotes a link-layer key for
protecting unicast MAC frames originated at node i and destined
for node j. There are several variations of forming link-layer
keys.
1. K_ij=K_i for all j, K_i!=K_j for all i, j (i!=j)
2. K_ij=K_ji, K_i!=K_j for all i,j (i!=j)
3. K_ij!=K_ji, K_i!=K_j for all i,j (i!=j)
In model 1, unicast and broadcast keys for protecting MAC frames
originated at a given node are the same. In models 2 and 3,
unicast and broadcast keys originated at a given node are
distinct. The difference between models 2 and 3 is that unicast
keys are bi-directional in model 2 while they are uni-directional
in model 3. One model may be chosen among three depending on the
required security level and the number of keys maintained by each
node.
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o Phase-3 (Operational Phase): In this phase, the node is able to
run various higher-layer protocols over IP over an established
secure link. Additional authentication and key establishment may
take place for the higher-layer protocols using Phase-3
credentials. A node in Phase-3 is able to process Phase-1 and
Phase-2 KMPs. Example use cases are:
* A Phase-3 node can initiate a Phase-1 KMP to update its Phase-2
or Phase-3 credentials.
* A Phase-3 node can forward Phase-1 KMP messages originated from
or destined for a Phase-1 node that is joining the mesh network
through the Phase-3 node.
* A Phase-3 node can initiate a Phase 2 KMP to establish a new
link with a newly discovered neighbor node.
+---------------------------------+
| Phase-0 (Implanting) |
+---------------------------------+
|
v
+---------------------------------+
| Phase-1 (Bootstrapping) |
+---------------------------------+
|
v
+---------------------------------+
| Phase-2 (Link Establishment) |
+---------------------------------+
|
v
+---------------------------------+
| Phase-3 (Operational) |
+---------------------------------+
Figure 1: 4-Phase Key Management Model
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N)s - Node N is running Phase-1 KMP as a server
N)c - Node N is running Phase-1 KMP as a client
N)r - Node N is running Phase-1 KMP as a relay
N)) - Node N is running Phase-2 KMP
. .. ...
N, N, N - Node N is in Phase-1, -2 and -3, respectively
. . .. ... ... ...
A A)s A)) A)s A A
/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \
. . . . .. .. ... ... ... ... ... ...
B C B)c C)c B)) C)) B)r C B)) C)) B C
/ \ / / \ / / \ /
. . . . . . . . .. .. ... ...
D E D E D E D)c E)c D)) E)) D E
(0) -> (1) -> (2) -> (3) -> (4) -> (5)
(0) Initially all nodes are in Phase-1. (1) Nodes B and C run
Phase-1 KMP with Node A (i.e., the authentication server) to obtain
Phase-2 and Phase-3 credentials. (2) Nodes B and C run Phase-2 KMP
with Node A. (3) Nodes D and E run Phase-1 KMP using Node B as an
authentication relay. (Alternatively, Node E may use Node C as an
authentication relay.) (4) Node D runs Phase-2 KMP with Node B. Node
E runs Phase-2 KMP with Nodes B and C. (5) All nodes are
operational.
Figure 2: Example Sequence
Since we already identified PANA as the Phase-1 KMP due to its
authentication relay and secure credential distribution capabilities,
and Phase-3 KMP requirements would depend on application protocols,
we focus on Phase-2 KMP requirements in the next section.
4. KMP requirements
4.1. Phase-1 KMP requirements
Requirements on Phase-1 KMP are listed below.
R1-1: Phase-1 KMP MUST support mutual authentication.
R1-2: Phase-1 KMP MUST support stateless authentication relay
operation.
R1-3:s Phase-1 KMP MUST support secure credential distribution.
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4.2. Phase-2 KMP requirements
Requirements on Phase-2 KMP are listed below.
R2-1: Phase-2 KMP Nodes MUST mutually authenticate each other before
establishing a link and forming a mesh network. No authentication
server is involved in the Phase-2 authentication.
R2-2: Phase-2 KMP authentication credentials MAY be pre-provisioned
or MAY be obtained via Phase-1 KMP.
R2-3: Phase-2 KMP authentication credentials MUST have a lifetime.
R2-4: Phase-2 KMP MUST support certificates for scalable operation.
R2-5: Phase-2 KMP message exchanges MUST be integrity and replay
protected after successful authentication.
R2-6: Phase-2 KMP MUST have the capability to establish security
association and unicast session keys after successful authentication
to protect unicast MAC frames between nodes.
R2-7: Phase-2 KMP MUST have the capability to establish security
association and broadcast session keys after successful
authentication to protect broadcast MAC frames between nodes.
R2-8: Phase-2 KMP MUST support confidentiality to distribute the
broadcast session keys securely.
5. Security Considerations
In this section, security issues that can potentially impact the
operation of IEEE 802.15.4e TSCH MAC are described.
In TSCH MAC, time synchronization and channel hopping information are
advertised in Enhanced Beacon (EB) frames
[I-D.watteyne-6tsch-tsch-lln-context]. The advertised information is
used by mesh nodes to determine the timeslots available for
transmission and reception of MAC frames. A rogue node can inject
forged EB frames and can cause replay and DoS attacks to TSCH MAC
operation. To mitigate such attacks, all EB frames MUST be integrity
protected. While it is possible to use a pre-installed static key
for protecting EB frames to every node, the static key becomes
vulnerable when the associated MAC frame counter continues to be used
after the frame counter wraps. Therefore, the 6TSCH solution MUST
provide a mechanism by which mesh nodes can use the available time
slots to run Phase-1 and Phase-2 KMPs and provide integrity
protection to EB frames.
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6. IANA Considerations
There is no IANA action required for this document.
7. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Thomas Watteyne, Jonathan Simon, Maria Rita
Palattella and Rene Struik for their valuable comments.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A.
Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, May 2008.
[RFC6345] Duffy, P., Chakrabarti, S., Cragie, R., Ohba, Y., and A.
Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
Access (PANA) Relay Element", RFC 6345, August 2011.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.
[RFC6786] Yegin, A. and R. Cragie, "Encrypting the Protocol for
Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
Attribute-Value Pairs", RFC 6786, November 2012.
[I-D.palattella-6tsch-terminology]
Palattella, M., Thubert, P., Watteyne, T., and Q. Wang,
"Terminology in IPv6 over Time Slotted Channel Hopping",
draft-palattella-6tsch-terminology-00 (work in progress),
March 2013.
[I-D.watteyne-6tsch-tsch-lln-context]
Watteyne, T., Palattella, M., and L. Grieco, "Using
IEEE802.15.4e TSCH in an LLN context: Overview, Problem
Statement and Goals", draft-watteyne-6tsch-tsch-lln-
context-02 (work in progress), May 2013.
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-rg-dex]
Moskowitz, R., "HIP Diet EXchange (DEX)", draft-moskowitz-
hip-rg-dex-06 (work in progress), May 2012.
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8.2. Informative References
[RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,
"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005.
[RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
"Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
Networks", RFC 4944, September 2007.
[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, March 2010.
[RFC6550] Winter, T., Thubert, P., Brandt, A., Hui, J., Kelsey, R.,
Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur, JP., and R.
Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and
Lossy Networks", RFC 6550, March 2012.
[I-D.keoh-tls-multicast-security]
Keoh, S., Kumar, S., and E. Dijk, "DTLS-based Multicast
Security for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs)", draft-
keoh-tls-multicast-security-00 (work in progress), October
2012.
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]
Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
"Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", draft-ietf-
hip-rfc5201-bis-12 (work in progress), June 2013.
[I-D.draft-palattella-6tsch-terminology]
Palattella, MR., Ed., Thubert, P., Watteyne, T., and Q.
Wang, "Terminology in IPv6 over Time Slotted Channel
Hopping. draft-palattella-6tsch-terminology-00 (work in
progress) ", March 2013.
[I-D.draft-thubert-6tsch-architecture]
Thubert, P., Ed., Assimiti, R., and T. Watteyne, "An
Architecture for IPv6 over Time Synchronized Channel
Hopping. draft-thubert-6tsch-architecture-00 (work in
progress) ", March 2013.
8.3. External Informative References
[IEEE802154e]
IEEE standard for Information Technology, "IEEE std.
802.15.4e, Part. 15.4: Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area
Networks (LR-WPANs) Amendament 1: MAC sublayer", April
2012.
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[IEEE802154]
IEEE standard for Information Technology, "IEEE std.
802.15.4, Part. 15.4: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC)
and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications for Low-Rate
Wireless Personal Area Networks", June 2011.
[ZigBeeIP]
ZigBee Public Document 15-002r00, "ZigBee IP
Specification", 2013.
Appendix A. KMP candidates
A.1. Phase-1 KMP candidates
PANA [RFC5191] is the Phase-1 KMP candidate since it supports mutual
authentication, stateless authentication relay function [RFC6345] and
encrypted distribution of attributes [RFC6786]. The PANA
Authentication Agent (PAA) is located in the coordinator of the mesh
network.
A.2. Phase-2 KMP candidates
Once Phase-1 is complete by using PANA, it is assumed that node will
have a certified public key (and associated private key). A
candidate Phase 2 KMP must use this certified public key to perform
an authentication process. As a consequence of a successful
authentication some cryptographic material for unicast and multicast
link protection between nodes must be generated.
A list of candidate protocols may provide the requirements defined in
Section 4.2 (this is a preliminary list that may be extended in the
future):
o HIP DEX [I-D.moskowitz-hip-rg-dex]. The Host Identity Protocol
Diet EXchange (HIP DEX) is a lighter version of the HIP Base
Exchange (HIP BEX) [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] specifically
designed to be used in constrained devices (e.g., sensor
networks). In particular, HIP DEX may be used to authenticate two
IEEE 802.15.4 nodes and provide key material for a MAC layer
security protocol as supported in IEEE 802.15.4. However, by just
using the value of the public key and the private key is not
enough to carry out the authentication between nodes. In
particular, a node A and node B should not be able to successfully
finish HIP DEX execution if they both have not been authenticated
in Phase-1. Thus, HIP DEX will require the inclusion of the
certificate of each node to achieve full mutual authentication.
The information in the certificate must ensure that the node was
authenticated in Phase-1. In consequence, HIP DEX must include a
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CERT parameter for carrying this certificate. Once the HIP DEX
protocol has successfully finished a Pair-Wise Key SA is derived.
This SA is used to secure and authenticate user data, thus it can
be used to provide the required keys for protecting IEEE 802.15.4
unicast MAC frames. The same message is used to refresh the Pair-
Wise Key SA. So far HIP DEX only specifies how this key material
is used for protecting data traffic with ESP. To distribute
multicast keys HIP DEX may also use UPDATE message. For less
resource-constrained devices, HIP-BEX (Basic Exchange) is more
suitable than HIP-DEX since HIP-BEX has better security properties
(such as use of ephemeral Diffie-Hellman) than HIP-DEX at the cost
of increased complexity.
o PANA [RFC5191] and some certificate-based EAP method. Another
candidate is to use PANA between node A and node B. In this case,
one of the nodes (e.g. node A) acts as PaC while the other (e.g.
node B) is acting as PAA. Moreover the PAA will operate in
standalone mode [RFC4137]. That is, the EAP server is placed on
the PAA and not in a backend authentication server. Finally, the
selected EAP method must work with public key/private key
cryptography. Once the PAA authentication is complete, the PaC
and PAA can derive cryptographic material (for instance, from the
MSK) which can be used to protect unicast MAC frames.
Furthermore, by using the extension defined in [RFC6345] is
possible to distribute a multicast key encrypted with the PANA SA.
It is worth noting that, though this candidate solution leverages
the PaC implementation from Phase-1, each node needs to deploy a
PAA implementation, an EAP server and a specific EAP method, which
may be different from the one used for Phase-1.
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o DTLS [RFC6347]. Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) is being
considered in constrained devices for protecting application data
traffic (e.g. CoAP). It is not only being considered for unicast
application data traffic but also for multicast data traffic
[I-D.keoh-tls-multicast-security]. In particular, a multicast key
is distributed over an unicast DTLS channel established between
two nodes (node A and node B). This multicast key is used to
protect multicast traffic by using TLS records. The Phase2-KMP
should be able to export this key material to the IEEE 802.15.4
MAC layer so that the protection is carried out at link layer. In
[RFC5705], a mechanism for exporting key material after a TLS/DTLS
execution is defined. Nevertheless, the exported key material is
intended to be used in unicast communications for upper layers or
protocols at upper layers. However, a mechanism for exporting
multicast key is not specified. In principle, this exported key
material may be used for protecting unicast IEEE 802.15.4 MAC
frames. However, this usage and multicast key management using
DTLS for multicast IEEE 802.15.4 protection need further
investigation.
Authors' Addresses
Stephen Chasko
Landis+Gyr
3000 Mill Creek Ave.
Alpharetta, GA 30022
USA
Email: Stephen.Chasko@landisgyr.com
Subir Das
Applied Communication Sciences
1 Telcordia Drive
Piscataway, NJ 08854
USA
Email: sdas@appcomsci.com
Rafa Marin-Lopez
University of Murcia
Campus de Espinardo S/N, Faculty of Computer Science
Murcia 30100
Spain
Phone: +34 868 88 85 01
Email: rafa@um.es
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Yoshihiro Ohba (editor)
Toshiba Corporate Research and Development Center
1 Komukai-Toshiba-cho
Saiwai-ku, Kawasaki, Kanagawa 212-8582
Japan
Phone: +81 44 549 2127
Email: yoshihiro.ohba@toshiba.co.jp
Pascal Thubert
Cisco Systems, Inc
Village d'Entreprises Green Side
400, Avenue de Roumanille
Batiment T3
Biot - Sophia Antipolis 06410
FRANCE
Phone: +33 497 23 26 34
Email: pthubert@cisco.com
Alper Yegin
Samsung
Istanbul
Turkey
Email: alper.yegin@yegin.org
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