Internet DRAFT - draft-ohba-pana-preauth
draft-ohba-pana-preauth
EAP Working Group Y. Ohba
Internet-Draft Toshiba
Expires: January 9, 2006 July 8, 2005
Pre-authentication Support for PANA
draft-ohba-pana-preauth-00
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
This document defines an extension to the PANA protocol used for
proactively establishing a PANA SA (Security Association) between a
PaC in an access network and a PAA in another access network to which
the PaC may move. The proposed method operates across multiple
administrative domains.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Pre-authentication Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. PANA Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Authorization and Accounting Considerations . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Introduction
The PANA protocol [I-D.ietf-pana-pana] carries EAP messages between a
PaC (PANA Client) and a PAA (PANA Authentication Agent) in the access
network. If the PaC is a mobile device and is capable of moving one
access network to another while running its applications, it is
critical for the PaC to perform a handover seamlessly without
degrading the performance of the applications during the handover
period. When the handover requires the PaC to establish a PANA
session with the PAA in the new access network, the signaling to
establish the PANA session should be completed as fast as possible.
There is an optimization method based on Context Transfer Protocol
(CTP) [I-D.ietf-seamoby-ctp] to reduce the signaling delay for
establishing a PANA session with a new PAA upon a handover [I-D.ietf-
pana-mobopts][I-D.bournelle-pana-ctp].
The CTP-based method have the following issues. First, it is not
readily applicable to handovers across multiple administrative
domains since having a security association between PAAs in different
administrative domains is practically difficult. Second, even within
a single administrative domain, the CTP-based method is difficult to
work when the previous and new access networks have different
authorization characteristics, e.g., on use of NAP and ISP separate
authentication. Third, the CTP-based method relies on deriving the
PANA_MAC_Key used between the PaC and the PAA in the new access
network from the AAA-Key used between the PaC and the PAA in the
previous access network, which does not provide perfect cryptographic
separation between the PAAs.
To address the issues on the CTP-based method, this document defines
an extension to the PANA protocol [I-D.ietf-pana-pana] used for
proactively executing EAP authentication and establishing a PANA SA
(Security Association) between a PaC in an access network and a PAA
in another access network to which the PaC may move. The proposed
method operates across multiple administrative domains. The proposed
method is used as the authentication protocol in the framework of MPA
(Media-independent Pre-authentication) [I-D.ohba-mobopts-mpa-
framework].
Although the proposed method covers the case that is also covered by
the CTP-based method (i.e., homogeneous authorization characteristics
in a single administrative domain), the purpose of this document is
not to replace the CTP-based method. Instead, the purpose of this
document is to provide a way to cover the cases that are not covered
by the other method. For the case covered by the CTP-based method,
the CTP-based method may be used.
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1.1 Specification of Requirements
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key
words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. Terminogy
The following terms are used in this document in addition to the
terms defined in [I-D.ietf-pana-pana].
Access Network:
A network through which a PaC can access to the Internet via one
or more EPs controlled by one or more PAAs. An access network may
consist of multiple IP links.
Local PAA:
A PAA that resides in the access network where the PaC is
connected. The term "local" is relative to the location of a
particular PaC.
Remote PAA:
A PAA that is not a local PAA for the PaC. The term "remote" is
relative to the location of a particular PaC. A PAA that is a
remote PAA for one PaC may be a local PAA for another PaC.
Local PaC:
A PaC that resides in the same access network as a particular PAA.
The term "local" is relative to the location of a specific PaC.
Remote PaC:
A PaC that is not a local PaC for a particular PAA. The term
"remote" is relative to the location of a particular PAA. A PaC
that is a remote PaC for one PAA may be a local PaC for another
PAA.
Active PAA:
A local PAA for which the PaC has a PANA session.
Preparing PAA:
A remote PAA which performs pre-authentication with the PaC. A
PAA that is serving as a preparing PAA for one PaC may be serving
as an active PAA for another PaC.
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Pre-authentication:
Authentication performed between the PaC and a preparing PAA.
Pre-authentication SA:
A PANA SA that is established between the PaC and a preparing PAA
as a result of successful pre-authentication.
Active SA:
A PANA SA that is established between the PaC and an active PAA.
Pre-authorization:
An authorization that is made for the PaC by a preparing PAA as a
result of successful pre-authentication.
Post-authorization:
An authorization that was made for the PaC by a PAA that was
acting as a preparing PAA and has become the active PAA.
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3. Pre-authentication Procedure
A PaC that supports pre-authentication may have one or more PANA
sessions for preparing PAAs in addition to the PANA session for one
of local PAAs.
There may be a number of ways to discover a remote PAA, however,
remote PAA discovery and remote PaC discovery is out of the scope of
this proposal.
There may be a number of criteria as to when and with which remote
PAA pre-authentication is performed. Such criteria can be
implementation specific and thus are outside the scope of this
document.
Pre-authentication may be initiated by both a PaC and a preparing
PAA. A new flag P-flag is defined in the PANA header. When pre-
authentication is performed, the P-flag of PANA messages are set in
order to indicate whether this PANA run is for establishing a pre-
authentication SA. Pre-authentication is negotiated in the PANA
discovery and handshake phase as follows.
o When a PaC initiates pre-authentication, it sends a PANA-PAA-
Discover message with the P-flag set. The PANA-PAA-Discover
message MUST be unicast. The PAA responds with a PANA-Start-
Request message with the P-flag set only when it supports pre-
authentication. Otherwise, it MUST silently discard the message.
o When a preparing PAA initiates pre-authentication, it sends a
PANA-Start-Request message with the P-flag set. The PaC responds
with a PANA-Start-Answer message with the P-flag set only when it
supports pre-authentication. Otherwise, it MUST silently discard
the message.
o Once the PaC and preparing PAA have agreed on performing pre-
authentication during the discovery and handshake phase, the
subsequent PANA messages exchanged between them MUST have the
P-flag set.
When the preparing PAA becomes an active PAA due to movement of the
PaC, the PaC performs an IP address update procedure using PANA-
Update exchange in order to update the PAA with the PaC's new address
obtained from the remote network where the PAA resides. The
completion of the PANA-Update procedure will change the pre-
authentication SA to the active SA. The P-flag is not set in the
PANA-Update messages and subsequent PANA messages.
When the PaC having an active SA with an active PAA as well as a pre-
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authentication SA with a preparing PAA changes its active PAA but
without changing the preparing PAA, the PaC performs an IP address
update procedure using PANA-Update exchange in order to update the
PAA of the PaC's new address obtained from the remote network where
the new active PAA resides. The completion of the PANA-Update
procedure will not change the pre-authentication SA to the active SA.
The P-flag is set in the PANA-Update messages and subsequent PANA
messages.
The pre-authentication SA and corresponding PANA session between the
PaC and the pre-authenticated PAA can be deleted by entering the
termination phase of the PANA protocol and performing the required
procedure for that phase.
An example call flow for PaC-initiated pre-authentication is shown in
Figure 1.
A PaC in an access network establishes a PANA session with a local
PAA (l-PAA). At some point, it receives a trigger for pre-
authenticating to a remote PAA (r-PAA) in another access network.
The PaC then initiates a pre-authentication procedure by sending a
PANA-PAA-Discover message with the P-bit set. PANA messages are
exchanged between the PaC and r-PAA, with the P-bit set for all
messages. On successful completion of the PANA exchanges for pre-
authentication and pre-authorization, a pre-authentication SA will be
established between the PaC and l-PAA. On the other hand, the active
SA established between the PaC and l-PAA stays active.
At some point after establishing the pre-authentication SA, the PaC
moves to the access network of the r-PAA. Then the PaC initiates a
PANA-Update exchange to inform the PAA of the IP address change. In
this PANA-Update exchange, the P-bit is unset. On successful
completion of the PANA-Update exchange and post-authorization
procedure, the pre-authentication SA becomes the active SA. The
active SA between the PaC and l-PAA may stay active for a while to
deal with the case in which the PaC immediately switches back to the
previous access network.
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PaC l-PAA r-PAA
| | |
| PANA w/o P-bit set | |
|<---------------------->| |
| | |
. . .
. . .
+------------------+ | |
|Pre-authentication| | |
|trigger | | |
+------------------+ | |
| PDI w/P-bit set |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| PSR w/P-bit set |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| PSA w/P-bit set |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| PAR-PAN exchange w/P-bit set |
|<----------------------------------------------->|
| | +------------------+
| | |pre-authorization |
| | +------------------+
| PBR-PBA exchange w/P-bit set |
|<----------------------------------------------->|
. . .
. . .
+----------+ | |
| Movement | | |
+----------+ | |
| PUR w/o P-bit set |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| | +------------------+
| | |post-authorization|
| | +------------------+
| PUA w/o P-bit set |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| | |
Figure 1: PaC-initiated Pre-authentication Call Flow
An example call flow for PAA-initiated pre-authentication is shown in
Figure 2.
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PaC l-PAA r-PAA
| | |
| PANA w/o P-bit set | |
|<---------------------->| |
| | |
. . .
. . .
| | +------------------+
| | |Pre-authentication|
| | |trigger |
| | +------------------+
| PSR w/P-bit set |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| PSA w/P-bit set |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| PAR-PAN exchange w/P-bit set |
|<----------------------------------------------->|
| | +------------------+
| | |pre-authorization |
| | +------------------+
| PBR-PBA exchange w/P-bit set |
|<----------------------------------------------->|
. . .
. . .
+----------+ | |
| Movement | | |
+----------+ | |
| PUR w/o P-bit set |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| | +------------------+
| | |post-authorization|
| | +------------------+
| PUA w/o P-bit set |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| | |
Figure 2: PAA-initiated Pre-authentication Call Flow
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4. PANA Extensions
A new P-flag is defined in Flags field of PANA header as follows.
0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|R S N P r r r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
P(re-authentication)
When pre-authentication is performed, the P-flag of PANA messages
are set in order to indicate whether this PANA run is for
establishing a pre-authentication SA. The exact usage of this
flag is described in Section 3. This flag is to be assigned by
IANA.
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5. Authorization and Accounting Considerations
A pre-authorization and a post-authorization for the PaC may have
different authorization policies. For example, the pre-authorization
policy may not allow the PaC to sent or receive packets through the
EP(s) under control of the preparing PAA, while both the pre-
authorization and post-authorization policies may allow installing
credentials to the EP(s), where the credentials are used for
establishing a security association for per-packet cryptographic
filtering.
Depending on the pre-authorization policy, the PAA that has an pre-
authentication SA for a PaC may start accounting immediately after
the pre-authentication SA is established or may not start accounting
until the pre-authentication SA becomes the active SA.
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6. Security Considerations
Since the mechanism described in this document is designed to work
across multiple access networks, each EP (Enforcement Point) SHOULD
be configured to allow PANA messages to be forwarded between a PaC
and a preparing PAA in a different access network only if the PaC has
an active SA with a local PAA in order to avoid an unauthorized PaC
to initiate pre-authentication.
When pre-authentication is initiated by a remote PAA, it is possible
that the PaC simultaneously communicates with multiple remote PAAs
initiating pre-authentication. In order to avoid possible resource
consumption attacks on the PaC caused by a blind attacker initiating
pre-authentication for the PaC by changing source addresses, the PaC
SHOULD limit the maximum number of PAAs allowed to communicate.
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7. IANA Considerations
As described in Section 4, a new flag in the Flags field of PANA
Header needs to be assigned by IANA. The new flag is bit 3 ('P're-
authentication).
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8. Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Alper Yegin and Ashutosh Dutta for
their valuable comments.
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9. References
9.1 Normative References
[I-D.ietf-pana-pana]
Forsberg, D., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA)", draft-ietf-pana-pana-08 (work in
progress), May 2005.
9.2 Informative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[I-D.ohba-mobopts-mpa-framework]
Ohba, Y., "A Framework of Media-Independent Pre-
Authentication (MPA)", draft-ohba-mobopts-mpa-framework-00
(work in progress), February 2005.
[I-D.ietf-pana-mobopts]
Forsberg, D., "PANA Mobility Optimizations",
draft-ietf-pana-mobopts-00 (work in progress),
January 2005.
[I-D.bournelle-pana-ctp]
Bournelle, J., "Use of Context Transfer Protocol (CxTP)
for PANA", draft-bournelle-pana-ctp-03 (work in progress),
June 2005.
[I-D.ietf-seamoby-ctp]
Loughney, J., "Context Transfer Protocol",
draft-ietf-seamoby-ctp-11 (work in progress), August 2004.
Author's Address
Yoshihiro Ohba
Toshiba America Research, Inc.
1 Telcordia Drive
Piscateway, NJ 08854
USA
Phone: +1 732 699 5365
Email: yohba@tari.toshiba.com
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