Internet DRAFT - draft-pauly-taps-transport-security
draft-pauly-taps-transport-security
Network Working Group T. Pauly
Internet-Draft Apple Inc.
Intended status: Informational C. Perkins
Expires: September 6, 2018 University of Glasgow
K. Rose
Akamai Technologies, Inc.
C. Wood
Apple Inc.
March 05, 2018
A Survey of Transport Security Protocols
draft-pauly-taps-transport-security-02
Abstract
This document provides a survey of commonly used or notable network
security protocols, with a focus on how they interact and integrate
with applications and transport protocols. Its goal is to supplement
efforts to define and catalog transport services [RFC8095] by
describing the interfaces required to add security protocols. It
examines Transport Layer Security (TLS), Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS), Quick UDP Internet Connections with TLS (QUIC +
TLS), MinimalT, CurveCP, tcpcrypt, Internet Key Exchange with
Encapsulating Security Protocol (IKEv2 + ESP), SRTP (with DTLS), and
WireGuard. This survey is not limited to protocols developed within
the scope or context of the IETF.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2018.
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Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Transport Security Protocol Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. Protocol Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.3. Protocol Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.1. Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.2. Protocol Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.3. Protocol Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. (IETF) QUIC with TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3.1. Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3.2. Protocol Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3.3. Protocol Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4. gQUIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4.1. Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4.2. Protocol Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.5. MinimalT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.5.1. Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.5.2. Protocol Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5.3. Protocol Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.6. CurveCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.6.1. Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.6.2. Protocol Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.6.3. Protocol Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.7. tcpcrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.7.1. Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.7.2. Protocol Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.7.3. Protocol Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.8. IKEv2 with ESP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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3.8.1. Protocol descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.8.2. Protocol features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.8.3. Protocol dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.9. WireGuard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.9.1. Protocol description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.9.2. Protocol features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.9.3. Protocol dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.10. SRTP (with DTLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.10.1. Protocol descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.10.2. Protocol features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.10.3. Protocol dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4. Common Transport Security Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1. Mandatory Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1.1. Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1.2. Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2. Optional Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.1. Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.2. Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Transport Security Protocol Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1. Configuration Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2. Handshake Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3. Record Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Introduction
This document provides a survey of commonly used or notable network
security protocols, with a focus on how they interact and integrate
with applications and transport protocols. Its goal is to supplement
efforts to define and catalog transport services [RFC8095] by
describing the interfaces required to add security protocols. It
examines Transport Layer Security (TLS), Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS), Quick UDP Internet Connections with TLS (QUIC +
TLS), MinimalT, CurveCP, tcpcrypt, Internet Key Exchange with
Encapsulating Security Protocol (IKEv2 + ESP), SRTP (with DTLS), and
WireGuard. This survey is not limited to protocols developed within
the scope or context of the IETF.
For each protocol, this document provides a brief description, the
security features it provides, and the dependencies it has on the
underlying transport. This is followed by defining the set of
transport security features shared by these protocols. Finally, we
distill the application and transport interfaces provided by the
transport security protocols.
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Authentication-only protocols such as TCP-AO [RFC5925] and IPsec AH
[RFC4302] are excluded from this survey. TCP-AO adds authenticity
protections to long-lived TCP connections, e.g., replay protection
with per-packet Message Authentication Codes. (This protocol
obsoletes TCP MD5 "signature" options specified in [RFC2385].) One
prime use case of TCP-AO is for protecting BGP connections.
Similarly, AH adds per-datagram authenticity and adds similar replay
protection. Despite these improvements, neither protocol sees
general use and both lack critical properties important for emergent
transport security protocols: confidentiality, privacy protections,
and agility. Thus, we omit these and related protocols from our
survey.
2. Terminology
The following terms are used throughout this document to describe the
roles and interactions of transport security protocols:
o Transport Feature: a specific end-to-end feature that the
transport layer provides to an application. Examples include
confidentiality, reliable delivery, ordered delivery, message-
versus-stream orientation, etc.
o Transport Service: a set of Transport Features, without an
association to any given framing protocol, which provides
functionality to an application.
o Transport Protocol: an implementation that provides one or more
different transport services using a specific framing and header
format on the wire. A Transport Protocol services an application.
o Application: an entity that uses a transport protocol for end-to-
end delivery of data across the network. This may also be an
upper layer protocol or tunnel encapsulation.
o Security Feature: a specific feature that a network security layer
provides to applications. Examples include authentication,
encryption, key generation, session resumption, and privacy. A
feature may be considered to be Mandatory or Optional to an
application's implementation.
o Security Protocol: a defined network protocol that implements one
or more security features. Security protocols may be used
alongside transport protocols, and in combination with other
security protocols when appropriate.
o Handshake Protocol: a protocol that enables peers to validate each
other and to securely establish shared cryptographic context.
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o Record Protocol: a security protocol that allows data to be
divided into manageable blocks and protected using a shared
cryptographic context.
o Session: an ephemeral security association between applications.
o Cryptographic context: a set of cryptographic parameters,
including but not necessarily limited to keys for encryption,
authentication, and session resumption, enabling authorized
parties to a session to communicate securely.
o Connection: the shared state of two or more endpoints that
persists across messages that are transmitted between these
endpoints. A connection is a transient participant of a session,
and a session generally lasts between connection instances.
o Connection Mobility: a property of a connection that allows it to
be multihomed or resilient across network interface or address
changes.
o Peer: an endpoint application party to a session.
o Client: the peer responsible for initiating a session.
o Server: the peer responsible for responding to a session
initiation.
3. Transport Security Protocol Descriptions
This section contains descriptions of security protocols that
currently used to protect data being sent over a network.
For each protocol, we describe the features it provides and its
dependencies on other protocols.
3.1. TLS
TLS (Transport Layer Security) [RFC5246] is a common protocol used to
establish a secure session between two endpoints. Communication over
this session "prevents eavesdropping, tampering, and message
forgery." TLS consists of a tightly coupled handshake and record
protocol. The handshake protocol is used to authenticate peers,
negotiate protocol options, such as cryptographic algorithms, and
derive session-specific keying material. The record protocol is used
to marshal (possibly encrypted) data from one peer to the other.
This data may contain handshake messages or raw application data.
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3.1.1. Protocol Description
TLS is the composition of a handshake and record protocol
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. The record protocol is designed to marshal an
arbitrary, in-order stream of bytes from one endpoint to the other.
It handles segmenting, compressing (when enabled), and encrypting
data into discrete records. When configured to use an AEAD
algorithm, it also handles nonce generation and encoding for each
record. The record protocol is hidden from the client behind a byte
stream-oriented API.
The handshake protocol serves several purposes, including: peer
authentication, protocol option (key exchange algorithm and
ciphersuite) negotiation, and key derivation. Peer authentication
may be mutual; however, commonly, only the server is authenticated.
X.509 certificates are commonly used in this authentication step,
though other mechanisms, such as raw public keys [RFC7250], exist.
The client is not authenticated unless explicitly requested by the
server with a CertificateRequest handshake message. Assuming strong
cryptography, an infrastructure for trust establishment, correctly-
functioning endpoints, and communication patterns free from side
channels, server authentication is sufficient to establish a channel
resistant to eavesdroppers.
The handshake protocol is also extensible. It allows for a variety
of extensions to be included by either the client or server. These
extensions are used to specify client preferences, e.g., the
application-layer protocol to be driven with the TLS connection
[RFC7301], or signals to the server to aid operation, e.g., Server
Name Indication (SNI) [RFC6066]. Various extensions also exist to
tune the parameters of the record protocol, e.g., the maximum
fragment length [RFC6066].
Alerts are used to convey errors and other atypical events to the
endpoints. There are two classes of alerts: closure and error
alerts. A closure alert is used to signal to the other peer that the
sender wishes to terminate the connection. The sender typically
follows a close alert with a TCP FIN segment to close the connection.
Error alerts are used to indicate problems with the handshake or
individual records. Most errors are fatal and are followed by
connection termination. However, warning alerts may be handled at
the discretion of the implementation.
Once a session is disconnected all session keying material must be
destroyed, with the exception of secrets previously established
expressly for purposes of session resumption. TLS supports stateful
and stateless resumption. (Here, "state" refers to bookkeeping on a
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per-session basis by the server. It is assumed that the client must
always store some state information in order to resume a session.)
3.1.2. Protocol Features
o Key exchange and ciphersuite algorithm negotiation.
o Stateful and stateless session resumption.
o Certificate- and raw public key-based authentication.
o Mutual client and server authentication.
o Byte stream confidentiality and integrity.
o Extensibility via well-defined extensions.
o 0-RTT data support (starting with TLS 1.3).
o Application-layer protocol negotiation.
o Transparent data segmentation.
3.1.3. Protocol Dependencies
o TCP for in-order, reliable transport.
o (Optionally) A PKI trust store for certificate validation.
3.2. DTLS
DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security) [RFC6347] is based on TLS,
but differs in that it is designed to run over UDP instead of TCP.
Since UDP does not guarantee datagram ordering or reliability, DTLS
modifies the protocol to make sure it can still provide the same
security guarantees as TLS. DTLS was designed to be as close to TLS
as possible, so this document will assume that all properties from
TLS are carried over except where specified.
3.2.1. Protocol Description
DTLS is modified from TLS to account for packet loss, reordering, and
duplication that may occur when operating over UDP. To enable out-
of-order delivery of application data, the DTLS record protocol
itself has no inter-record dependencies. However, as the handshake
requires reliability, each handshake message is assigned an explicit
sequence number to enable retransmissions of lost packets and in-
order processing by the receiver. Handshake message loss is remedied
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by sender retransmission after a configurable period in which the
expected response has not yet been received.
As the DTLS handshake protocol runs atop the record protocol, to
account for long handshake messages that cannot fit within a single
record, DTLS supports fragmentation and subsequent reconstruction of
handshake messages across records. The receiver must reassemble
records before processing.
DTLS relies on unique UDP 4-tuples to allow peers with multiple DTLS
connections between them to demultiplex connections, constraining
protocol design slightly more than UDP: application-layer
demultiplexing over the same 4-tuple is not possible without trial
decryption as all application-layer data is encrypted to a
connection-specific cryptographic context. Starting with DTLS 1.3
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13], a connection identifier extension to permit
multiplexing of independent connections over the same 4-tuple is
available [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id].
Since datagrams may be replayed, DTLS provides optional anti-replay
detection based on a window of acceptable sequence numbers [RFC6347].
3.2.2. Protocol Features
o Anti-replay protection between datagrams.
o Basic reliability for handshake messages.
o See also the features from TLS.
3.2.3. Protocol Dependencies
o Since DTLS runs over an unreliable, unordered datagram transport,
it does not require any reliability features.
o The DTLS record protocol explicitly encodes record lengths, so
although it runs over a datagram transport, it does not rely on
the transport protocol's framing beyond requiring transport-level
reconstruction of datagrams fragmented over packets.
o UDP 4-tuple uniqueness, or the connection identifier extension,
for demultiplexing.
o Path MTU discovery.
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3.3. (IETF) QUIC with TLS
QUIC (Quick UDP Internet Connections) is a new standards-track
transport protocol that runs over UDP, loosely based on Google's
original proprietary gQUIC protocol. (See Section 3.4 for more
details.) The QUIC transport layer itself provides support for data
confidentiality and integrity. This requires keys to be derived with
a separate handshake protocol. A mapping for QUIC over TLS 1.3
[I-D.ietf-quic-tls] has been specified to provide this handshake.
3.3.1. Protocol Description
As QUIC relies on TLS to secure its transport functions, it creates
specific integration points between its security and transport
functions:
o Starting the handshake to generate keys and provide authentication
(and providing the transport for the handshake).
o Client address validation.
o Key ready events from TLS to notify the QUIC transport.
o Exporting secrets from TLS to the QUIC transport.
The QUIC transport layer support multiple streams over a single
connection. The first stream is reserved specifically for a TLS
connection. The TLS handshake, along with further records, are sent
over this stream. This TLS connection follows the TLS standards and
inherits the security properties of TLS. The handshake generates
keys, which are then exported to the rest of the QUIC connection, and
are used to protect the rest of the streams.
Initial QUIC messages (packets) are encrypted using "fixed" keys
derived from the QUIC version and public packet information
(Connection ID). Packets are later encrypted using keys derived from
the TLS traffic secret upon handshake completion. The TLS 1.3
handshake for QUIC is used in either a single-RTT mode or a fast-open
zero-RTT mode. When zero-RTT handshakes are possible, the encryption
first transitions to use the zero-RTT keys before using single-RTT
handshake keys after the next TLS flight.
3.3.2. Protocol Features
o Handshake properties of TLS.
o Multiple encrypted streams over a single connection without head-
of-line blocking.
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o Packet payload encryption and complete packet authentication (with
the exception of the Public Reset packet, which is not
authenticated).
3.3.3. Protocol Dependencies
o QUIC transport relies on UDP.
o QUIC transport relies on TLS 1.3 for authentication and initial
key derivation.
o TLS within QUIC relies on a reliable stream abstraction for its
handshake.
3.4. gQUIC
gQUIC is a UDP-based multiplexed streaming protocol designed and
deployed by Google following experience from deploying SPDY, the
proprietary predecessor to HTTP/2. gQUIC was originally known as
"QUIC": this document uses gQUIC to unambiguously distinguish it from
the standards-track IETF QUIC. The proprietary technical forebear of
IETF QUIC, gQUIC was originally designed with tightly-integrated
security and application data transport protocols.
3.4.1. Protocol Description
((TODO: write me))
3.4.2. Protocol Dependencies
((TODO: write me))
3.5. MinimalT
MinimalT is a UDP-based transport security protocol designed to offer
confidentiality, mutual authentication, DoS prevention, and
connection mobility [MinimalT]. One major goal of the protocol is to
leverage existing protocols to obtain server-side configuration
information used to more quickly bootstrap a connection. MinimalT
uses a variant of TCP's congestion control algorithm.
3.5.1. Protocol Description
MinimalT is a secure transport protocol built on top of a widespread
directory service. Clients and servers interact with local directory
services to (a) resolve server information and (b) public ephemeral
state information, respectively. Clients connect to a local resolver
once at boot time. Through this resolver they recover the IP
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address(es) and public key(s) of each server to which they want to
connect.
Connections are instances of user-authenticated, mobile sessions
between two endpoints. Connections run within tunnels between hosts.
A tunnel is a server-authenticated container that multiplexes
multiple connections between the same hosts. All connections in a
tunnel share the same transport state machine and encryption. Each
tunnel has a dedicated control connection used to configure and
manage the tunnel over time. Moreover, since tunnels are independent
of the network address information, they may be reused as both ends
of the tunnel move about the network. This does however imply that
the connection establishment and packet encryption mechanisms are
coupled.
Before a client connects to a remote service, it must first establish
a tunnel to the host providing or offering the service. Tunnels are
established in 1-RTT using an ephemeral key obtained from the
directory service. Tunnel initiators provide their own ephemeral key
and, optionally, a DoS puzzle solution such that the recipient
(server) can verify the authenticity of the request and derive a
shared secret. Within a tunnel, new connections to services may be
established.
3.5.2. Protocol Features
o 0-RTT forward secrecy for new connections.
o DoS prevention by client-side puzzles.
o Tunnel-based mobility.
o (Transport Feature) Connection multiplexing between hosts across
shared tunnels.
o (Transport Feature) Congestion control state is shared across
connections between the same host pairs.
3.5.3. Protocol Dependencies
o A DNS-like resolution service to obtain location information (an
IP address) and ephemeral keys.
o A PKI trust store for certificate validation.
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3.6. CurveCP
CurveCP [CurveCP] is a UDP-based transport security protocol from
Daniel J. Bernstein. Unlike other transport security protocols, it
is based entirely upon highly efficient public key algorithms. This
removes many pitfalls associated with nonce reuse and key
synchronization.
3.6.1. Protocol Description
CurveCP is a UDP-based transport security protocol. It is built on
three principal features: exclusive use of public key authenticated
encryption of packets, server-chosen cookies to prohibit memory and
computation DoS at the server, and connection mobility with a client-
chosen ephemeral identifier.
There are two rounds in CurveCP. In the first round, the client
sends its first initialization packet to the server, carrying its
(possibly fresh) ephemeral public key C', with zero-padding encrypted
under the server's long-term public key. The server replies with a
cookie and its own ephemeral key S' and a cookie that is to be used
by the client. Upon receipt, the client then generates its second
initialization packet carrying: the ephemeral key C', cookie, and an
encryption of C', the server's domain name, and, optionally, some
message data. The server verifies the cookie and the encrypted
payload and, if valid, proceeds to send data in return. At this
point, the connection is established and the two parties can
communicate.
The use of only public-key encryption and authentication, or
"boxing", is done to simplify problems that come with symmetric key
management and synchronization. For example, it allows the sender of
a message to be in complete control of each message's nonce. It does
not require either end to share secret keying material. Furthermore,
it allows connections (or sessions) to be associated with unique
ephemeral public keys as a mechanism for enabling forward secrecy
given the risk of long-term private key compromise.
The client and server do not perform a standard key exchange.
Instead, in the initial exchange of packets, each party provides its
own ephemeral key to the other end. The client can choose a new
ephemeral key for every new connection. However, the server must
rotate these keys on a slower basis. Otherwise, it would be trivial
for an attacker to force the server to create and store ephemeral
keys with a fake client initialization packet.
Unlike TCP, the server employs cookies to enable source validation.
After receiving the client's initial packet, encrypted under the
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server's long-term public key, the server generates and returns a
stateless cookie that must be echoed back in the client's following
message. This cookie is encrypted under the client's ephemeral
public key. This stateless technique prevents attackers from
hijacking client initialization packets to obtain cookie values to
flood clients. (A client would detect the duplicate cookies and
reject the flooded packets.) Similarly, replaying the client's
second packet, carrying the cookie, will be detected by the server.
CurveCP supports a weak form of client authentication. Clients are
permitted to send their long-term public keys in the second
initialization packet. A server can verify this public key and, if
untrusted, drop the connection and subsequent data.
Unlike some other protocols, CurveCP data packets leave only the
ephemeral public key, the connection ID, and the per-message nonce in
the clear. Everything else is encrypted.
3.6.2. Protocol Features
o Forward-secure data encryption and authentication.
o Per-packet public-key encryption.
o 1-RTT session bootstrapping.
o Connection mobility based on a client-chosen ephemeral identifier.
o Connection establishment message padding to prevent traffic
amplification.
o Sender-chosen explicit nonces, e.g., based on a sequence number.
3.6.3. Protocol Dependencies
o An unreliable transport protocol such as UDP.
3.7. tcpcrypt
Tcpcrypt is a lightweight extension to the TCP protocol to enable
opportunistic encryption with hooks available to the application
layer for implementation of endpoint authentication.
3.7.1. Protocol Description
Tcpcrypt extends TCP to enable opportunistic encryption between the
two ends of a TCP connection [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt]. It is a
family of TCP encryption protocols (TEP), distinguished by key
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exchange algorithm. The use of a TEP is negotiated with a TCP option
during the initial TCP handshake via the mechanism described by TCP
Encryption Negotiation Option (ENO) [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno]. In the
case of initial session establishment, once a tcpcrypt TEP has been
negotiated the key exchange occurs within the data segments of the
first few packets exchanged after the handshake completes. The
initiator of a connection sends a list of supported AEAD algorithms,
a random nonce, and an ephemeral public key share. The responder
typically chooses a mutually-supported AEAD algorithm and replies
with this choice, its own nonce, and ephemeral key share. An initial
shared secret is derived from the ENO handshake, the tcpcrypt
handshake, and the initial keying material resulting from the key
exchange. The traffic encryption keys on the initial connection are
derived from the shared secret. Connections can be re-keyed before
the natural AEAD limit for a single set of traffic encryption keys is
reached.
Each tcpcrypt session is associated with a ladder of resumption IDs,
each derived from the respective entry in a ladder of shared secrets.
These resumption IDs can be used to negotiate a stateful resumption
of the session in a subsequent connection, resulting in use of a new
shared secret and traffic encryption keys without requiring a new key
exchange. Willingness to resume a session is signaled via the ENO
option during the TCP handshake. Given the length constraints
imposed by TCP options, unlike stateless resumption mechanisms (such
as that provided by session tickets in TLS) resumption in tcpcrypt
requires the maintenance of state on the server, and so successful
resumption across a pool of servers implies shared state.
Owing to middlebox ossification issues, tcpcrypt only protects the
payload portion of a TCP packet. It does not encrypt any header
information, such as the TCP sequence number.
Tcpcrypt exposes a universally-unique connection-specific session ID
to the application, suitable for application-level endpoint
authentication either in-band or out-of-band.
3.7.2. Protocol Features
o Forward-secure TCP payload encryption and integrity protection.
o Session caching and address-agnostic resumption.
o Connection re-keying.
o Application-level authentication primitive.
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3.7.3. Protocol Dependencies
o TCP
o TCP Encryption Negotiation Option (ENO)
3.8. IKEv2 with ESP
IKEv2 [RFC7296] and ESP [RFC4303] together form the modern IPsec
protocol suite that encrypts and authenticates IP packets, either as
for creating tunnels (tunnel-mode) or for direct transport
connections (transport-mode). This suite of protocols separates out
the key generation protocol (IKEv2) from the transport encryption
protocol (ESP). Each protocol can be used independently, but this
document considers them together, since that is the most common
pattern.
3.8.1. Protocol descriptions
3.8.1.1. IKEv2
IKEv2 is a control protocol that runs on UDP port 500. Its primary
goal is to generate keys for Security Associations (SAs). It first
uses a Diffie-Hellman key exchange to generate keys for the "IKE SA",
which is a set of keys used to encrypt further IKEv2 messages. It
then goes through a phase of authentication in which both peers
present blobs signed by a shared secret or private key, after which
another set of keys is derived, referred to as the "Child SA". These
Child SA keys are used by ESP.
IKEv2 negotiates which protocols are acceptable to each peer for both
the IKE and Child SAs using "Proposals". Each proposal may contain
an encryption algorithm, an authentication algorithm, a Diffie-
Hellman group, and (for IKE SAs only) a pseudorandom function
algorithm. Each peer may support multiple proposals, and the most
preferred mutually supported proposal is chosen during the handshake.
The authentication phase of IKEv2 may use Shared Secrets,
Certificates, Digital Signatures, or an EAP (Extensible
Authentication Protocol) method. At a minimum, IKEv2 takes two round
trips to set up both an IKE SA and a Child SA. If EAP is used, this
exchange may be expanded.
Any SA used by IKEv2 can be rekeyed upon expiration, which is usually
based either on time or number of bytes encrypted.
There is an extension to IKEv2 that allows session resumption
[RFC5723].
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MOBIKE is a Mobility and Multihoming extension to IKEv2 that allows a
set of Security Associations to migrate over different addresses and
interfaces [RFC4555].
When UDP is not available or well-supported on a network, IKEv2 may
be encapsulated in TCP [RFC8229].
3.8.1.2. ESP
ESP is a protocol that encrypts and authenticates IPv4 and IPv6
packets. The keys used for both encryption and authentication can be
derived from an IKEv2 exchange. ESP Security Associations come as
pairs, one for each direction between two peers. Each SA is
identified by a Security Parameter Index (SPI), which is marked on
each encrypted ESP packet.
ESP packets include the SPI, a sequence number, an optional
Initialization Vector (IV), payload data, padding, a length and next
header field, and an Integrity Check Value.
From [RFC4303], "ESP is used to provide confidentiality, data origin
authentication, connectionless integrity, an anti-replay service (a
form of partial sequence integrity), and limited traffic flow
confidentiality."
Since ESP operates on IP packets, it is not directly tied to the
transport protocols it encrypts. This means it requires little or no
change from transports in order to provide security.
ESP packets may be sent directly over IP, but where network
conditions warrant (e.g., when a NAT is present or when a firewall
blocks such packets) they may be encapsulated in UDP [RFC3948] or TCP
[RFC8229].
3.8.2. Protocol features
3.8.2.1. IKEv2
o Encryption and authentication of handshake packets.
o Cryptographic algorithm negotiation.
o Session resumption.
o Mobility across addresses and interfaces.
o Peer authentication extensibility based on shared secret,
certificates, digital signatures, or EAP methods.
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3.8.2.2. ESP
o Data confidentiality and authentication.
o Connectionless integrity.
o Anti-replay protection.
o Limited flow confidentiality.
3.8.3. Protocol dependencies
3.8.3.1. IKEv2
o Availability of UDP to negotiate, or implementation support for
TCP-encapsulation.
o Some EAP authentication types require accessing a hardware device,
such as a SIM card; or interacting with a user, such as password
prompting.
3.8.3.2. ESP
o Since ESP is below transport protocols, it does not have any
dependencies on the transports themselves, other than on UDP or
TCP where encapsulation is employed.
3.9. WireGuard
WireGuard is a layer 3 protocol designed to complement or replace
IPsec [WireGuard]. Unlike most transport security protocols, which
rely on PKI for peer authentication, WireGuard authenticates peers
using pre-shared public keys delivered out-of-band, each of which is
bound to one or more IP addresses. Moreover, as a protocol suited
for VPNs, WireGuard offers no extensibility, negotiation, or
cryptographic agility.
3.9.1. Protocol description
WireGuard is a simple VPN protocol that binds a pre-shared public key
to one or more IP addresses. Users configure WireGuard by
associating peer public keys with IP addresses. These mappings are
stored in a CryptoKey Routing Table. (See Section 2 of [WireGuard]
for more details and sample configurations.) These keys are used
upon WireGuard packet transmission and reception. For example, upon
receipt of a Handshake Initiation message, receivers use the static
public key in their CryptoKey routing table to perform necessary
cryptographic computations.
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WireGuard builds on Noise [Noise] for 1-RTT key exchange with
identity hiding. The handshake hides peer identities as per the
SIGMA construction [SIGMA]. As a consequence of using Noise,
WireGuard comes with a fixed set of cryptographic algorithms:
o x25519 [Curve25519] and HKDF [RFC5869] for ECDH and key
derivation.
o ChaCha20+Poly1305 [RFC7539] for packet authenticated encryption.
o BLAKE2s [BLAKE2] for hashing.
There is no cryptographic agility. If weaknesses are found in any of
these algorithms, new message types using new algorithms must be
introduced.
WireGuard is designed to be entirely stateless, modulo the CryptoKey
routing table, which has size linear with the number of trusted
peers. If a WireGuard receiver is under heavy load and cannot
process a packet, e.g., cannot spare CPU cycles for point
multiplication, it can reply with a cookie similar to DTLS and IKEv2.
This cookie only proves IP address ownership. Any rate limiting
scheme can be applied to packets coming from non-spoofed addresses.
3.9.2. Protocol features
o Optional PSK-based session creation.
o Mutual client and server authentication.
o Stateful, timestamp-based replay prevention.
o Cookie-based DoS mitigation similar to DTLS and IKEv2.
3.9.3. Protocol dependencies
o Datagram transport.
o Out-of-band key distribution and management.
3.10. SRTP (with DTLS)
SRTP - Secure RTP - is a profile for RTP that provides
confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection for
data and control packets [RFC3711]. SRTP packets are encrypted using
a session key, which is derived from a separate master key. Master
keys are derived and managed externally, e.g., via DTLS, as specified
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in RFC 5763 [RFC5763], under the control of a signaling protocol such
as SIP [RFC3261] or WebRTC [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security-arch].
3.10.1. Protocol descriptions
SRTP adds confidentiality and optional integrity protection to RTP
data packets, and adds confidentially and mandatory integrity
protection to RTP control (RTCP) packets. For RTP data packets, this
is done by encrypting the payload section of the packet and
optionally appending an authentication tag (MAC) as a packet trailer,
with the RTP header authenticated but not encrypted. The RTP header
itself is left unencrypted to enable RTP header compression
[RFC2508][RFC3545]. For RTCP packets, the first packet in the
compound RTCP packet is partially encrypted, leaving the first eight
octets of the header as cleartext to allow identification of the
packet as RTCP, while the remainder of the compound packet is fully
encrypted. The entire RTCP packet is then authenticated by appending
a MAC as packet trailer.
Packets are encrypted using session keys, which are ultimately
derived from a master key and some additional master salt and session
salt. SRTP packets carry a 2-byte sequence number to partially
identify the unique packet index. SRTP peers maintain a separate
rollover counter (ROC) for RTP data packets that is incremented
whenever the sequence number wraps. The sequence number and ROC
together determine the packet index. RTCP packets have a similar,
yet differently named, field called the RTCP index which serves the
same purpose.
Numerous encryption modes are supported. For popular modes of
operation, e.g., AES-CTR, the (unique) initialization vector (IV)
used for each encryption mode is a function of the RTP SSRC
(synchronization source), packet index, and session "salting key".
SRTP offers replay detection by keeping a replay list of already seen
and processed packet indices. If a packet arrives with an index that
matches one in the replay list, it is silently discarded.
DTLS [RFC5764] is commonly used as a way to perform mutual
authentication and key agreement for SRTP [RFC5763]. (Here,
certificates marshal public keys between endpoints. Thus, self-
signed certificates may be used if peers do not mutually trust one
another, as is common on the Internet.) When DTLS is used,
certificate fingerprints are transmitted out-of-band using SIP.
Peers typically verify that DTLS-offered certificates match that
which are offered over SIP. This prevents active attacks on RTP, but
not on the signaling (SIP or WebRTC) channel.
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3.10.2. Protocol features
o Optional replay protection with tunable replay windows.
o Out-of-order packet receipt.
o (RFC5763) Mandatory mutually authenticated key exchange.
o Partial encryption, protecting media payloads and control packets
but not data packet headers.
o Optional authentication of data packets; mandatory authentication
of control packets.
3.10.3. Protocol dependencies
o External key derivation and management mechanism or protocol,
e.g., DTLS [RFC5763].
o External signaling protocol to manage RTP parameters and locate
and identify peers, e.g., SIP [RFC3261] or WebRTC
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security-arch].
4. Common Transport Security Features
There exists a common set of features shared across the transport
protocols surveyed in this document. The mandatory features should
be provided by any transport security protocol, while the optional
features are extensions that a subset of the protocols provide. For
clarity, we also distinguish between handshake and record features.
4.1. Mandatory Features
4.1.1. Handshake
o Forward-secure segment encryption and authentication: Transit data
must be protected with an authenticated encryption algorithm.
o Private key interface or injection: Authentication based on public
key signatures is commonplace for many transport security
protocols.
o Endpoint authentication: The endpoint (receiver) of a new
connection must be authenticated before any data is sent to said
party.
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o Source validation: Source validation must be provided to mitigate
server-targeted DoS attacks. This can be done with puzzles or
cookies.
4.1.2. Record
o Pre-shared key support: A record protocol must be able to use a
pre-shared key established out-of-band to encrypt individual
messages, packets, or datagrams.
4.2. Optional Features
4.2.1. Handshake
o Mutual authentication: Transport security protocols must allow
each endpoint to authenticate the other if required by the
application.
o Application-layer feature negotiation: The type of application
using a transport security protocol often requires features
configured at the connection establishment layer, e.g., ALPN
[RFC7301]. Moreover, application-layer features may often be used
to offload the session to another server which can better handle
the request. (The TLS SNI is one example of such a feature.) As
such, transport security protocols should provide a generic
mechanism to allow for such application-specific features and
options to be configured or otherwise negotiated.
o Configuration extensions: The protocol negotiation should be
extensible with addition of new configuration options.
o Session caching and management: Sessions should be cacheable to
enable reuse and amortize the cost of performing session
establishment handshakes.
4.2.2. Record
o Connection mobility: Sessions should not be bound to a network
connection (or 5-tuple). This allows cryptographic key material
and other state information to be reused in the event of a
connection change. Examples of this include a NAT rebinding that
occurs without a client's knowledge.
5. Transport Security Protocol Interfaces
This section describes the interface surface exposed by the security
protocols described above, with each interface. Note that not all
protocols support each interface.
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5.1. Configuration Interfaces
Configuration interfaces are used to configure the security protocols
before a handshake begins or the keys are negotiated.
o Identity and Private Keys
The application can provide its identities (certificates) and
private keys, or mechanisms to access these, to the security
protocol to use during handshakes.
Protocols: TLS, DTLS, QUIC + TLS, MinimalT, CurveCP, IKEv2,
WireGuard, SRTP
o Supported Algorithms (Key Exchange, Signatures, and Ciphersuites)
The application can choose the algorithms that are supported for
key exchange, signatures, and ciphersuites.
Protocols: TLS, DTLS, QUIC + TLS, MinimalT, tcpcrypt, IKEv2, SRTP
o Session Cache
The application provides the ability to save and retrieve session
state (such as tickets, keying material, and server parameters)
that may be used to resume the security session.
Protocols: TLS, DTLS, QUIC + TLS, MinimalT
o Authentication Delegation
The application provides access to a separate module that will
provide authentication, using EAP for example.
Protocols: IKEv2, SRTP
5.2. Handshake Interfaces
Handshake interfaces are the points of interaction between a
handshake protocol and the application, record protocol, and
transport once the handshake is active.
o Send Handshake Messages
The handshake protocol needs to be able to send messages over a
transport to the remote peer to establish trust and to negotiate
keys.
Protocols: All (TLS, DTLS, QUIC + TLS, MinimalT, CurveCP, IKEv2,
WireGuard, SRTP (DTLS))
o Receive Handshake Messages
The handshake protocol needs to be able to receive messages from
the remote peer over a transport to establish trust and to
negotiate keys.
Protocols: All (TLS, DTLS, QUIC + TLS, MinimalT, CurveCP, IKEv2,
WireGuard, SRTP (DTLS))
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o Identity Validation
During a handshake, the security protocol will conduct identity
validation of the peer. This can call into the application to
offload validation. Protocols: All (TLS, DTLS, QUIC + TLS,
MinimalT, CurveCP, IKEv2, WireGuard, SRTP (DTLS))
o Source Address Validation
The handshake protocol may delegate validation of the remote peer
that has sent data to the transport protocol or application. This
involves sending a cookie exchange to avoid DoS attacks.
Protocols: QUIC + TLS, DTLS, WireGuard
o Key Update
The handshake protocol may be instructed to update its keying
material, either by the application directly or by the record
protocol sending a key expiration event.
Protocols: TLS, DTLS, QUIC + TLS, MinimalT, tcpcrypt, IKEv2
o Pre-Shared Key Export
The handshake protocol will generate one or more keys to be used
for record encryption/decryption and authentication. These may be
explicitly exportable to the application, traditionally limited to
direct export to the record protocol, or inherently non-exportable
because the keys must be used directly in conjunction with the
record protocol.
* Explict export: TLS (for QUIC), tcpcrypt, IKEv2, DTLS (for
SRTP)
* Direct export: TLS, DTLS, MinimalT
* Non-exportable: CurveCP
5.3. Record Interfaces
Record interfaces are the points of interaction between a record
protocol and the application, handshake protocol, and transport once
in use.
o Pre-Shared Key Import
Either the handshake protocol or the application directly can
supply pre-shared keys for the record protocol use for encryption/
decryption and authentication. If the application can supply keys
directly, this is considered explicit import; if the handshake
protocol traditionally provides the keys directly, it is
considered direct import; if the keys can only be shared by the
handshake, they are considered non-importable.
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* Explict import: QUIC, ESP
* Direct import: TLS, DTLS, MinimalT, tcpcrypt, WireGuard
* Non-importable: CurveCP
o Encrypt application data
The application can send data to the record protocol to encrypt it
into a format that can be sent on the underlying transport. The
encryption step may require that the application data is treated
as a stream or as datagrams, and that the transport to send the
encrypted records present a stream or datagram interface.
* Stream-to-Stream Protocols: TLS, tcpcrypt
* Datagram-to-Datagram Protocols: DTLS, ESP, SRTP, WireGuard
* Stream-to-Datagram Protocols: QUIC ((Editor's Note: This
depends on the interface QUIC exposes to applications.))
o Decrypt application data
The application can receive data from its transport to be
decrypted using record protocol. The decryption step may require
that the incoming transport data is presented as a stream or as
datagrams, and that the resulting application data is a stream or
datagrams.
* Stream-to-Stream Protocols: TLS, tcpcrypt
* Datagram-to-Datagram Protocols: DTLS, ESP, SRTP, WireGuard
* Datagram-to-Stream Protocols: QUIC ((Editor's Note: This
depends on the interface QUIC exposes to applications.))
o Key Expiration
The record protocol can signal that its keys are expiring due to
reaching a time-based deadline, or a use-based deadline (number of
bytes that have been encrypted with the key). This interaction is
often limited to signaling between the record layer and the
handshake layer.
Protocols: ESP ((Editor's note: One may consider TLS/DTLS to also
have this interface))
o Transport mobility
The record protocol can be signaled that it is being migrated to
another transport or interface due to connection mobility, which
may reset address and state validation.
Protocols: QUIC, MinimalT, CurveCP, ESP, WireGuard (roaming)
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6. IANA Considerations
This document has no request to IANA.
7. Security Considerations
This document summarizes existing transport security protocols and
their interfaces. It does not propose changes to or recommend usage
of reference protocols.
8. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Mirja Kuehlewind, Brian Trammell,
Yannick Sierra, Frederic Jacobs, and Bob Bradley for their input and
feedback on earlier versions of this draft.
9. Normative References
[BLAKE2] "BLAKE2 -- simpler, smaller, fast as MD5", n.d..
[Curve25519]
"Curve25519 - new Diffie-Hellman speed records", n.d..
[CurveCP] "CurveCP -- Usable security for the Internet", n.d..
[I-D.ietf-quic-tls]
Thomson, M. and S. Turner, "Using Transport Layer Security
(TLS) to Secure QUIC", draft-ietf-quic-tls-10 (work in
progress), March 2018.
[I-D.ietf-quic-transport]
Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic-transport-10 (work
in progress), March 2018.
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security-arch]
Rescorla, E., "WebRTC Security Architecture", draft-ietf-
rtcweb-security-arch-13 (work in progress), October 2017.
[I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt]
Bittau, A., Giffin, D., Handley, M., Mazieres, D., Slack,
Q., and E. Smith, "Cryptographic protection of TCP Streams
(tcpcrypt)", draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt-11 (work in
progress), November 2017.
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[I-D.ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno]
Bittau, A., Giffin, D., Handley, M., Mazieres, D., and E.
Smith, "TCP-ENO: Encryption Negotiation Option", draft-
ietf-tcpinc-tcpeno-18 (work in progress), November 2017.
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., Fossati, T., and T. Gondrom,
"The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Connection
Identifier", draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-00 (work in
progress), December 2017.
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-26 (work in progress), March
2018.
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26 (work in progress),
March 2018.
[MinimalT]
"MinimaLT -- Minimal-latency Networking Through Better
Security", n.d..
[Noise] "The Noise Protocol Framework", n.d..
[RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5
Signature Option", RFC 2385, DOI 10.17487/RFC2385, August
1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2385>.
[RFC2508] Casner, S. and V. Jacobson, "Compressing IP/UDP/RTP
Headers for Low-Speed Serial Links", RFC 2508,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2508, February 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2508>.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC3545] Koren, T., Casner, S., Geevarghese, J., Thompson, B., and
P. Ruddy, "Enhanced Compressed RTP (CRTP) for Links with
High Delay, Packet Loss and Reordering", RFC 3545,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3545, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3545>.
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[RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
RFC 3711, DOI 10.17487/RFC3711, March 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3711>.
[RFC3948] Huttunen, A., Swander, B., Volpe, V., DiBurro, L., and M.
Stenberg, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets",
RFC 3948, DOI 10.17487/RFC3948, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3948>.
[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC4555] Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
(MOBIKE)", RFC 4555, DOI 10.17487/RFC4555, June 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4555>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5723] Sheffer, Y. and H. Tschofenig, "Internet Key Exchange
Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Session Resumption", RFC 5723,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5723, January 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5723>.
[RFC5763] Fischl, J., Tschofenig, H., and E. Rescorla, "Framework
for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
(SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS)", RFC 5763, DOI 10.17487/RFC5763, May
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5763>.
[RFC5764] McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure
Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 5764,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5764, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5764>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
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[RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925,
June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>.
[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[RFC7539] Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF
Protocols", RFC 7539, DOI 10.17487/RFC7539, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7539>.
[RFC8095] Fairhurst, G., Ed., Trammell, B., Ed., and M. Kuehlewind,
Ed., "Services Provided by IETF Transport Protocols and
Congestion Control Mechanisms", RFC 8095,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8095, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8095>.
[RFC8229] Pauly, T., Touati, S., and R. Mantha, "TCP Encapsulation
of IKE and IPsec Packets", RFC 8229, DOI 10.17487/RFC8229,
August 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8229>.
[SIGMA] "SIGMA -- The 'SIGn-and-MAc' Approach to Authenticated
Diffie-Hellman and Its Use in the IKE-Protocols", n.d..
Pauly, et al. Expires September 6, 2018 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft transport security survey March 2018
[WireGuard]
"WireGuard -- Next Generation Kernel Network Tunnel",
n.d..
Authors' Addresses
Tommy Pauly
Apple Inc.
1 Infinite Loop
Cupertino, California 95014
United States of America
Email: tpauly@apple.com
Colin Perkins
University of Glasgow
School of Computing Science
Glasgow G12 8QQ
United Kingdom
Email: csp@csperkins.org
Kyle Rose
Akamai Technologies, Inc.
150 Broadway
Cambridge, MA 02144
United States of America
Email: krose@krose.org
Christopher A. Wood
Apple Inc.
1 Infinite Loop
Cupertino, California 95014
United States of America
Email: cawood@apple.com
Pauly, et al. Expires September 6, 2018 [Page 29]
