Internet DRAFT - draft-perkins-sr-security
draft-perkins-sr-security
spring C. Perkins
Internet-Draft Futurewei
Intended status: Standards Track July 1, 2019
Expires: January 2, 2020
Security Considerations for Networks Using SRv6
draft-perkins-sr-security-00
Abstract
This document identifies various threats to networks employing
segment routing over an IPv6 transport. Segment Routing inherits
potential security vulnerabilities from source routing in general,
and from label-switching approaches such as MPLS. The document
discusses how common security vulnerabilities may be present in SRv6
networks, depending on the security policies that are imposed.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft SR-security July 2019
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Types of Vulnerabilities in SR Networks . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Loss of Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Tampering with Packet Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Loss of Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. Identity Theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.5. Hijacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.6. Denial of Origination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.7. Packet/Segment Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.8. Distributed DoS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.9. Malicious Packet Data in SR Networks . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Mechanisms for Misuse of Source Routed Networks . . . . . . . 7
5.1. SR insertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. SR deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. SR swapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. SID tampering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Effects of the above on SR Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Threats to SRv6 in the Small Office . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Threats to SRv6 in the Access Network . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.3. Threats to SRv6 in Data Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.4. Threats to SRv6 in Content Delivery Networks . . . . . . 10
6.5. Threats to SRv6 in Core Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.6. Threats to SRv6 in Mobile User Plane . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Some Trust Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. Trusted Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2. Closed Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3. Ingress Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Ameliorations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
This document identifies various threats to networks employing
segment routing. Segment Routing inherits potential security
vulnerabilities from source routing in general, and also from label-
switching approaches such as MPLS. The document discusses how common
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft SR-security July 2019
security vulnerabilities may be present in SRv6 networks, depending
on the security policies that are imposed.
o SR is a descendent of IPv6 routing header, and consequently its
security properties need to be understood in light of previous
work [RFC5095].
o SRv6 inherits some insecurities from label-switching architecture.
Some of the consequences have been outlined in [RFC8341].
SRv6 is envisioned for use in a number of important kinds of network
deployments (see [RFC8354], [I-D.ietf-dmm-srv6-mobile-uplane]):
SRv6 in the Small Office
SRv6 in the Access Network
SRv6 in Data Center
SRv6 in Content Delivery Networks
SRv6 in Core Networks
SRv6 for user-plane in mobile networks
Segments are currently being designed and applied to exploit SRv6 for
the above use cases (see [RFC8402],
[I-D.ietf-dmm-srv6-mobile-uplane]). Some of these segments are as
follows:
o IGP-Prefix
o IGP-Node
o IGP-Anycast
o IGP Adjacencies
o BGP-Prefix
o BGP Peering
o IGP Mirroring Context
o IGP-Prefix
o Args.Mob.Session
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft SR-security July 2019
o End.M.GTP6.E (GTP encapsulation)
o End.M.GTP6.D (GTP decapsulation)
o End.Limit
During the discussion in the following sections, the above segments
may be useful for more concrete understanding of the vulnerabilities.
In this document, we will consider the dangers from the following
kinds of threats:
o Loss of Confidentiality
o Tampering with Packet Data
o Packet data intending to cause harm
o Denial of Origination
o Packet Replay
o Loss of Connectivity
o Identity Theft
o Hijacking
o DoS, Distributed DoS
o
In the rest of this document, applicability for Segment Routing and
for the details of the security observations will first be described.
Then the terminology will be presented, followed by a review of
threats and network vulnerabilities as recently discussed at IETF
meetings. Some new mechanisms introduced by SR that can threaten
network security are outlined. Then, in order to have more concrete
understanding, some use cases envisioned for Segment Routing
architectures will be reviewed according to the descriptions in other
cited documents. Afterwards, several kinds of security policies
relevant to SR network administration will be outlined. This
collection of security policies is not intended to be comprehensive,
but at least representative of possible SR networks. Finally, some
ameliorations for some of the threats will be described as well as
known gaps in an effort to motivate future work.
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft SR-security July 2019
2. Applicability
"Segment Routing Architecture" [RFC8402] recommends that SR should be
restricted to operation within a trusted domain. In other words, the
SR routers in the domain are presumed to be operating without
malicious intent and also to conform to specification for the
protocols that they use.
A network's vulnerability to each threat depends substantially on
whether or not the network border routers accept incoming packets
with segments. On the other hand, there are use cases for which an
incoming source route can be quite useful (e.g., for Mobile IP
[RFC6275]), and advances in SRv6 security would be beneficial to such
use cases.
It also has to be specified whether or not all routers in the network
(not just SR-capable) are all trusted. A network might allow
intermediate routers to handle interconnections between SRv6 routers.
These intermediate routers would not require any SRv6 capability, or
security associations with SRv6 routers. They would be configured so
that they would never insert or delete any SID.
It has been noted that AH and ESP are not directly applicable to
reducing the vulnerabilities of SR routing, due to the presence of
mutable fields in the SR Header. Future work to improve security in
SRv6 networks will be to include a new design so that SRv6 mutable
fields can be authenticated separately while still allowing use of
these basic IPv6 functions.
3. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119] and [RFC8174].
This document uses the terminology defined in [RFC8402] and
[RFC5095]. In addition, the following definitions are used.
trusted domain: A network in which all routers are known to be
trustworthy.
closed domain: A network in which border routers reject any incoming
packet that includes a SRv6 header.
ingress domain: A network in which border routers may accept certain
incoming packets that include a SRv6 header.
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft SR-security July 2019
4. Types of Vulnerabilities in SR Networks
Each vulnerability in the previous section requires particular
attention and evaluation within the context of the various security
policies for SRv6 considered in this document.
4.1. Loss of Confidentiality
As with practically all except the simplest networks, intermediate
routers and transit points might be able to eavesdrop on traffic in
an SR network unless measures are taken to hide the data in the
packet.
However, in the case of SR networks, the segments in the segment
stack are often used to express and carry out routing policies, which
can be tailored to the needs of individual flows. Allowing
inspection of the segments might allow a malicious party to infer
policy information which is not intended for distribution to
unauthorized parties.
4.2. Tampering with Packet Data
Packet data in an SR network is vulnerable to tampering unless all
intermediate routers and transit points are trustworthy.
4.3. Loss of Connectivity
SRv6 networks that make use of a centralized control plane may be
threatened by loss of connectivity (whether accidental or malicious)
between the central controller and the network nodes. This is
important since such networks depend on centralized controllers (PCE,
etc.) to calculate flow paths and resulting SID lists, and the
installation of the SID lists in edge/border routers.
4.4. Identity Theft
Does SRv6 create new vulnerability to Identity Theft in the network?
4.5. Hijacking
One of the main dangers from a compromised SR network router is that
data in the network can be hijacked and sent to an unintended
destination. Or, equally, selected data can be prevented from
reaching an intended destination, or may be sent along a path that
was not originally intended.
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft SR-security July 2019
4.6. Denial of Origination
In many situations, it is important to prove whether or not the
apparent source of a packet in fact originated that packet.
Otherwise, for example, the true source may claim that the packet was
forged and decline responsibility for a completed transaction. The
segments used in an SRv6 deployment should be analyzed to see if this
vulnerability is introduced.
4.7. Packet/Segment Replay
Replaying packets, to deceive the destination into thinking that the
source has repeated a transaction, is an ever-present danger. In SR
networks, there is the further danger of "replaying" segments from
previous packets without otherwise modifying the payload of the new
packet.
4.8. Distributed DoS
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks take many forms and can
effectively crash an entire network, or any part of the network. If
malicious segments could be configured into the SR routers, say for a
sensitive destination, then all such configured routers could be
triggered with instructions to repeatedly bombard that destination
while at the same time causing other network traffic to cease.
4.9. Malicious Packet Data in SR Networks
Suppose that an SRv6 network's infrastructure is known to be
vulnerable to particular sequences of network elements -- say,
because an adversary has discovered that the release of the SRv6
router's operating system has certain bugs, or poor configuration.
In this case, the SR network may be vulnerable to insertion of
segments tailored to trigger bugs in a nonlocal SRv6 router.
5. Mechanisms for Misuse of Source Routed Networks
As a packet traverses a SRv6 network, it visits a path of SRv6
routers. The path is determined by the placement of SRv6 segments on
the segment stack in the IPv6 SRv6 header. The following malicious
behaviors are related to the operation of SRv6 networks.
o SR insertion: hijacking, loss of confidentiality, packet drops,
man-in-the-middle.
o SR deletion: defeats traffic management
o SR swapping: defeats traffic management
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft SR-security July 2019
o Address modification: DoS, otherwise same threats as insertion
5.1. SR insertion
By inserting an unauthorized segment in the segment stack, an
attacker could cause the packet to be routed for processing by an
unaware or compromised router. If the spurious segment were placed
farther down in the segment stack, the effect of the insertion would
be non-local, and thus detection of the malicious node would be more
difficult. Since the SID also determines the processing steps that
are taken by an SRv6 router, an attacker that is aware of the meaning
of the SIDs at any particular point along the segment path, could
insert particular unwanted processing steps for the packet. For
instance, unauthorized traffic handling or charging could be applied
to the packet.
5.2. SR deletion
By deleting a segment in the segment stack, an attacker could cause
the packet to avoid various processing steps including inspection or
accounting. If the deleted segment was placed farther down in the
segment stack, the effect of the deletion would be non-local, and
thus detection of the malicious node would be more difficult.
5.3. SR swapping
Segment swapping can be accomplished by deletion and subsequent
reinsertion, possibly done twice. Such swapping would not be
detectable by any non-cryptographic checksum mechanism.
5.4. SID tampering
Every router along the routing path of a packet in an SRv6 network
has the opportunity to tamper with the segments that are present in
the segment stack. This is possible even for routers that are not
SRv6 routers, because each such router could inspect the IPv6 packet
header to determine whether or not the SR header is present.
By tampering with the Segment ID or the data associated with the
Segment ID, each such router along the path could cause unwanted
processing steps, or defeat traffic management for the packet.
6. Effects of the above on SR Use Cases
In the following sections we describe the effects of the above-
mentioned threats in terms of applicability statement and the use
cases given in [RFC8354] and [I-D.ietf-dmm-srv6-mobile-uplane].
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft SR-security July 2019
SRv6 in the Small Office
SRv6 in the Access Network
SRv6 in Data Center
SRv6 in Content Delivery Networks
SRv6 in Core Networks
SRv6 in Mobile User Plane [I-D.ietf-dmm-srv6-mobile-uplane]
Almost by the very nature of Segment Routing, hijacking of traffic
flows is possible by inserting an unauthorized segment into an
existing segment stack, or by modifying the destination address of
one of the segments already on the stack. This threat has to be
considered for each one of these use cases. In fact, almost all
networks are vulnerable to hijacking attacks if one of the routers is
compromised. What is new with SRv6 networks, is that the actual
hijacking can occur at a point in the routing path that is
arbitrarily distant from the point at which the unauthorized segment
was inserted. This could complicate attempts to identify the source
of the attack.
6.1. Threats to SRv6 in the Small Office
According to [RFC8354], "A SPRING-enabled SOHO provides the ability
to steer traffic into a specific path from end hosts in the SOHO or
from a customer edge router in the SOHO".
A malicious node might be able to steer particular traffic flows into
a more favorable or less favorable path. This could include sending
packets originated by an end host within the SOHO out through an
unauthorized edge router.
6.2. Threats to SRv6 in the Access Network
Access networks are typically required to provide efficient service
to a wide variety of traffic flows. Some flows may consume only a
small amount of network capacity, but require very low latency for
packet delivery. Other flows may be resilient against packet loss
but have requirement for high capacity. There may be regulatory
requirements in place, and sometimes the nature of traffic between
two endpoints can change, requiring a dynamic readjustment for
handling by the service provider.
A malicious node might be able to disrupt the orderly classification
or modify the segment path through the access network. This could
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft SR-security July 2019
enable particular flows to evade regulatory requirements, or to avoid
proper billing for use of resources.
6.3. Threats to SRv6 in Data Center
SRv6 is attractive for use by data center operators in order to
provide a scalable platform for multiple (or many) tenants. The path
taken by information through the data center interconnection can be
closely controlled by segment routing and tailored to the needs of
specific tenants.
A malicious node might be able to divert traffic from one tenant
network into a different routing space. It would also be possible to
divert traffic to take advantage of resources that are paid for by
some other tenant, and have the next segment on the segment stack
restore the packet to its original path after making unauthorized use
of the other tenant's resources.
6.4. Threats to SRv6 in Content Delivery Networks
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) have placed new requirements for
supplying video traffic to consumers across operator networks and
infrastructure. Some of the traffic is real time; for example,
television programming, news, and sports events. Other traffic may
require higher bandwidth but also allow more buffering for resilience
against temporary bottlenecks, such as high definition movies. In
the future, the requirements for special handling of video content
will only increase, especially as virtual and augmented reality
applications become more popular.
Caching is an important technique for delivering video content to
many customers at the same time. The caches can be provisioned
hierarchically. In such a system, segment routing can be designed
for beneficial use to proceed along a path of cached data in the
hierarchy until a cache hit provides the desired content.
A malicious node might be able to cause major disruption and service
outage to many paying customers by misdirection of cache requests
along the service hierarchy. Other threats are similar to those
listed against SRv6 deployment in access networks.
6.5. Threats to SRv6 in Core Networks
In order to meet the divergent demands for different kinds of
service, network operators have been buying more specialized
equipment for deployment within their core infrastructure. Some of
the equipment has extremely high bandwidth compared to existing
equipment, so that the network as a whole supports network paths with
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft SR-security July 2019
widely varying capacities. Some lower-bandwidth paths through the
core infrastructure may be connected to allow very low-latency
communications. Some portions of the network may be set up to handle
very predictable traffic in a more efficient manner. Detnet
[RFC8557], [RFC8558] is likely to create new requirements for
diversity, resilience, and low latency.
A malicious node that could make changes to a segment path through a
core network would be able to cause major damage to the network and
to perhaps millions of customers. By inserting unauthorized
segments, diversion to a hostile node could be accomplished for
traffic analysis, delay, hijacking, or almost arbitrary disruption to
the customers' network communications. By the nature of segment
handling, this disruption could occur in places of the network not
immediately traceable to the malicious device inserting the
unauthorized segment.
6.6. Threats to SRv6 in Mobile User Plane
It has been proposed to use Segment Routing to gain tenant isolation
and support traffic management for user plane architectures designed
for 5G mobile networks [I-D.ietf-dmm-srv6-mobile-uplane]). In
particular, segments have been defined to allow re-use of existing
user=plane equipment by instructing the segment router to perform GTP
encapsulation and decapsulation steps. Other mobility-related
activities are possible to support rapid handover. Moreover, even
within an IPv6-only mobile infrastructure, there will be a long-
standing need for support of IPv4 GTP tunneling.
A malicious node might be able to change the endpoint for
decapsulation of GTP traffic, or target particular mobile devices for
eavesdropping or mismanagement. Since many people use their mobile
devices for financial transactions and personal data, this would
represent a major loss of privacy and financial risk for all such
customers.
7. Some Trust Models
Depending upon the trust model enforced by the administration of the
SRv6 network, the previously mentioned threats may be largely
countered and/or prevented. In this section, some observations will
be offered about specific effects of the trust model. Some
recommendations will be made about work that might be undertaken to
further diminish the dangers from those threats.
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft SR-security July 2019
7.1. Trusted Domain
Many of the threats to a trusted domain Section 3 are effectively
nullified by the tight administration required to configure and
maintain the security associations between all the routing elements
in the domain.
Since all of the routing elements are presumed to not be malicious,
none of them will attempt to hijack the traffic.
Also, since the routing elements are presumed to not be malicious,
there is no danger that the routers would tamper with the packet data
or the segment stack in the SR header.
There might still be a danger of loss of confidentiality, if packets
are visible to other nodes on the subnets upon which the routers
reside.
7.2. Closed Domain
In a closed domain Section 3 all of the known Segment Routers are
presumed not to be malicious, but some of the other routers may have
a lesser level of assurance against compromise.
Unfortunately, a non-SR router might misperform by pretending to be
an SR-router. In that case, the compromised router could attempt to
modify the contents of the segment stack in some arbitrary manner.
This could leave the closed domain vulnerable to most of the threats
described in Section 4.
In particular there are the dangers of hijacking, packet replay, and
loss of confidentiality. The first two can be triggered "remotely",
so that none of the routers adjacent to the malicious action can be
identified as responsible for executing the threat.
7.3. Ingress Domain
In an ingress domain Section 3 some of the border routers are
configured to accept incoming packets that already contain an IPv6 SR
header.
In such domains, it is important to exert tight control over the
types of segments that may be included in the incoming packet. The
syntax and semantics of any such incoming segment has to be well
specified and conformant with the routing policy of the ingress
domain. For example, source routes used for the purposes of Mobile
IP [RFC6275] have very specific restrictions and are not intended to
be forwarded past the target of the incoming source route. The
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft SR-security July 2019
destinations reachable by way of the SR header in the incoming packet
should also be tightly controlled so that random internal targets are
not visible except by careful prearrangement.
If sufficient control is not exerted over the type or the intended
destination of a source route, then many of the threats in Section 4
might become viable and, even worse, established by malicious agents
external to the domain. Such external agents are typically not at
all under the control of the SR network administrator.
8. Security Considerations
The subject of this draft is to improve understanding of the security
model and vulnerabilities associated with Segment Routing.
9. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Andy Malis for his early review of this document.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dmm-srv6-mobile-uplane]
Matsushima, S., Filsfils, C., Kohno, M., Camarillo, P.,
daniel.voyer@bell.ca, d., and C. Perkins, "Segment Routing
IPv6 for Mobile User Plane", draft-ietf-dmm-srv6-mobile-
uplane-04 (work in progress), March 2019.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5095] Abley, J., Savola, P., and G. Neville-Neil, "Deprecation
of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6", RFC 5095,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5095, December 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5095>.
[RFC6275] Perkins, C., Ed., Johnson, D., and J. Arkko, "Mobility
Support in IPv6", RFC 6275, DOI 10.17487/RFC6275, July
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6275>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft SR-security July 2019
[RFC8300] Quinn, P., Ed., Elzur, U., Ed., and C. Pignataro, Ed.,
"Network Service Header (NSH)", RFC 8300,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8300, January 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8300>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
[RFC8354] Brzozowski, J., Leddy, J., Filsfils, C., Maglione, R.,
Ed., and M. Townsley, "Use Cases for IPv6 Source Packet
Routing in Networking (SPRING)", RFC 8354,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8354, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8354>.
[RFC8402] Filsfils, C., Ed., Previdi, S., Ed., Ginsberg, L.,
Decraene, B., Litkowski, S., and R. Shakir, "Segment
Routing Architecture", RFC 8402, DOI 10.17487/RFC8402,
July 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8402>.
[RFC8557] Finn, N. and P. Thubert, "Deterministic Networking Problem
Statement", RFC 8557, DOI 10.17487/RFC8557, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8557>.
[RFC8558] Hardie, T., Ed., "Transport Protocol Path Signals",
RFC 8558, DOI 10.17487/RFC8558, April 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8558>.
10.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-spring-segment-routing-policy]
Filsfils, C., Sivabalan, S., daniel.voyer@bell.ca, d.,
bogdanov@google.com, b., and P. Mattes, "Segment Routing
Policy Architecture", draft-ietf-spring-segment-routing-
policy-03 (work in progress), May 2019.
Appendix A. Ameliorations
This section lists ameliorations for the previosly mentioned list of
threats. It is likely to be deleted prior to publication. The
purpose is simply to open up discussion about known approaches to
minimize the threats listed in this document.
o Ameliorations in core networks.
o Ameliorations in RAN.
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft SR-security July 2019
o Ameliorations in transit networks.
o The use of ACLs.
o How many security associations are needed if the SR network is not
a "trusted domain"?
o Classes of security associations.
o Danger of segment stack exhaustion.
Author's Address
Charles E. Perkins
Futurewei
2330 Central Expressway
Santa Clara 95050
Unites States
Email: charlie.perkins@futurewei.com
Perkins Expires January 2, 2020 [Page 15]
