Internet DRAFT - draft-peterson-acme-authority-token
draft-peterson-acme-authority-token
Network Working Group J. Peterson
Internet-Draft Neustar
Intended status: Informational M. Barnes
Expires: September 6, 2018 iconectiv
D. Hancock
C. Wendt
Comcast
March 5, 2018
ACME Challenges Using an Authority Token
draft-peterson-acme-authority-token-01.txt
Abstract
A number of proposed challenges for the Automated Certificate
Management Environment (ACME) effectively rely on an external
authority issuing a token according to a particular policy. This
document specifies a generic Authority Token challenge for ACME which
supports subtype claims different identifiers or namespaces that can
be defined to represent a specific application of this Authority
Token challenge.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Challenges for an Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Token Type Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Authority Token Type for ATC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
ACME [I-D.ietf-acme-acme] is a mechanism for automating certificate
management on the Internet. It enables administrative entities to
prove effective control over resources like domain names, and
automates the process of generating and issuing certificates.
In some cases, proving effective control over an identifier requires
an attestation from a third party who has authority over the
resource, for example, an external policy administrator for a
namespace other than the DNS application ACME was originally designed
to support. In order to automate the process of issuing certificates
for those resources, this specification defines a generic Authority
Token challenge that ACME servers can issue in order to acquire such
a token. The challenge contains a type indication that tells the
client what sort of token it needs to acquire. It is expected that
the Authority Token challenge will be usable for a variety of
identifier types.
For example, the system of [I-D.ietf-acme-service-provider] provides
a mechanism that allows service providers to acquire certificates
corresponding to a Service Provider Code (SPC) as defined in
[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates] by consulting an external authority
responsible for those codes. Furthermore, Communications Service
Providers (CSPs) can delegate authority over numbers to their
customers, and those CSPs who support ACME can then help customers to
acquire certificates for those numbering resources with ACME. This
can permit number acquisition flows compatible with those shown in
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[I-D.ietf-modern-problem-framework]. Another, similar example would
a mechanism that permits CSPs to delegate authority for particular
telephone numbers to customers, as described in
[I-D.ietf-acme-telephone].
2. Terminology
In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT
RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as
described in [RFC2119].
3. Challenges for an Authority Token
Proving that a device on the Internet has effective control over a
non-Internet resource is not as straightforward as proving control
over an Internet resources like a DNS zone or a web page. There has
been considerable interest in using ACME to issue certificates
associated with telephone numbers and service provider identifiers
used in the telephone network, for example. Provided that the issuer
of identifiers in a namespace, or someone acting on the issuer's
behalf, can implement a service that grants Authority Tokens to the
people to whom it has issued identifiers, a generic token could be
used as a response to an ACME challenge. This specification,
therefore, defines an Authority Token issued by authority over a
namespace to an ACME client for delivery to a CA in response to a
challenge. Authority over a hierarchical namespace can also be
delegated, so that delegates of a root authority can themselves act
as Token Authorities for certain types of names.
This architecture assumes a trust relationship between CAs and Token
Authorities: that CAs are willing to accept the attestation of Token
Authorities for particular types of identifiers as sufficient proof
to issue a credential. It furthermore assumes that ACME clients have
a relationship with Token Authorities which permits them to
authenticate and authorize the issuance of Authority Tokens to the
proper entities. This ACME challenge has no applicability to
identifiers or authorities where those pre-associations cannot be
assumed.
ACME challenges that support Authority Tokens therefore need to
specify the type of tkauth token they require; CAs can even provide a
hint in their challenges to ACME clients that tells them how to find
a Token Authority who can issue tokens for a given namespace. This
challenge type thus requires a new "tkauth-type" element, and may
optionally supply a "token-authority" designating a location where
tokens can be acquired. The set of "tkauth-type" values and the
semantic requirements for those tokens are tracked by an IANA
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registry. Here we as an example we use a token type of "ATC", for
the Authority Token Challenge, which is further documented below.
Taking the identifier example of TNAuthList from
[I-D.ietf-acme-service-provider], a challenge might look as follows:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Link: <https://example.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="directory"
{
"status": "pending",
"identifier": {
"type": "TNAuthList",
"value": ["1234"]
},
"challenges": [
{
"type": "tkauth-01",
"tkauth-type": "ATC",
"token-authority": "https://authority.example.org/authz",
"url": "https://boulder.example.com/authz/asdf/0"
"token": "IlirfxKKXAsHtmzK29Pj8A" }
],
}
Entities receiving this challenge know that they can as a proof
acquire a ATC token from the designated token authority, and that
this authority can provide tokens corresponding the identifier type
of "TNAuthList". Once the ATC has been acquired by the ACME Client,
it can be posted back to the URL given by the ACME challenge.
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POST /acme/authz/asdf/0 HTTP/1.1
Host: boulder.example.com
Content-Type: application/jose+json
{
"protected": base64url({
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": "https://boulder.example.com/acme/reg/asdf",
"nonce": "Q_s3MWoqT05TrdkM2MTDcw",
"url": "https://boulder.example.com/acme/authz/asdf/0"
}),
"payload": base64url({
"ATC": "evaGxfADs...62jcerQ"
}),
"signature": "5wUrDI3eAaV4wl2Rfj3aC0Pp--XB3t4YYuNgacv_D3U"
}
The "ATC" field in this response contains the Authority Token.
3.1. Token Type Requirements
The IANA will control a registry of token-types under a policy of
Specification Required. In order to register a new token-type,
specifications must meet the following requirements.
While Authority Token types do not need to be specific to a
namespace, every token must carry enough information for a CA to
determine the name that it will issue a certificate for. Some types
of Authority Tokens might be reusable for a number of different
namespaces; other authority tokens might be specific to a particular
type of name. Therefore, in defining token-types, future
specifications must indicate how a token conveys to the CA the name
that the Token Authority is attesting that the ACME client controls.
In most cases, an ACME client will need a protocol to request and
retrieve an Authority Token. The Token Authority will require
certain information from an ACME client in order to ascertain that it
is the right entity to request a certificate for a particular name.
The protocols used to request an Authority Token MUST convey to the
Token Authority the identifier type and value from the ACME
challenge, as well as the nonce, and those MUST be reflected in the
Authority Token. Exactly how the Token Authority authenticates and
authorizes ACME clients to receive Authority Tokens is out of the
scope of this document.
Because the assignment of resources can change over time,
demonstrations of authority must be regularly refreshed. Definitions
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of a token-type MUST specify how they manage the freshness of
authority assignments. Typically, a CA will expect a regular
refreshing of the token.
3.2. Authority Token Type for ATC
This specification pre-populates the token-type registry with a
token-type for "ATC".
Here the "ATC" token-type signifies a standard JWT token [RFC7519]
using a JWS-defined signature string [RFC7515]. This may be used for
any number of different identifier types given in ACME challenges.
For this ACME Authority Token usage of JWT, the payload of the JWT
OPTIONALLY contain an "iss" indicating the Token Authority that
generated the token, if the "x5u" element in the header does not
already convey that information; typically, this will be the same
location that appeared in the "token-authority" field of the ACME
challenge. In order to satisfy the requirement for replay prevention
the JWT MUST contain a "jti" element, and an "exp" claim.
The JWT payload must also contain a new JWT claim, "atc", for
Authority Token Challenge, which contains three elements in an array:
the identifier type, the identifier value, and the nonce. The
identifier type and value are those given in the ACME challenge and
conveyed to the Token Authority by the ACME client. Again, following
the example of [I-D.ietf-acme-service-provider], this could be the
TNAuthList, as defined in [RFC8226], that the Token Authority is
attesting. Practically speaking, that may contain a list of Service
Provider Code elements, telephone number range elements, and/or
individual telephone numbers. The nonce is taken from the original
Replay-Nonce header field of the ACME challenge.
So for example:
{ "typ":"JWT",
"alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://authority.example.org/cert"}
{
"iss":"https://authority.example.org/authz",
"exp":1300819380,
"jti":"id6098364921",
"atc":{"TnAuthList","1234","Q_s3MWoqT05TrdkM2MTDcw"} }
[More TBD. Need to add how the JWT reflects that the resource is
delegatable. Need to show the request to the Token Authority as
well.]
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4. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank you for your contributions to this problem
statement and framework.
5. IANA Considerations
Future versions of this specification will include registrations for
the ACME Challenge type registries here. It will also create a
registry for "token types" as used in these challenges.
6. Security Considerations
The capture of Authority Tokens by an adversary could enable an
attacker to acquire a certificate from a CA. Therefore, all
Authority Tokens MUST contain a field that identifies to the CA which
ACME client requested the token from the authority. All Authority
Tokens must specify an expiry (of the token itself as proof for a CA,
as opposed to the expiry of the name), and for some application, it
may make sense of that expiry to be quite short. Authority Tokens
must also contain a nonce that will enable a CA to detect a replayed
Authority Token. Any protocol used to retrieve Authority Tokens from
an authority MUST use confidentiality to prevent eavesdroppers from
acquiring an Authority Token.
More TBD.
7. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme]
Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-acme-09 (work in progress),
December 2017.
[I-D.ietf-acme-service-provider]
Barnes, M. and C. Wendt, "ACME Identifiers and Challenges
for VoIP Service Providers", draft-ietf-acme-service-
provider-02 (work in progress), October 2017.
[I-D.ietf-acme-star]
Sheffer, Y., Lopez, D., Dios, O., Pastor, A., and T.
Fossati, "Support for Short-Term, Automatically-Renewed
(STAR) Certificates in Automated Certificate Management
Environment (ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-star-03 (work in
progress), March 2018.
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[I-D.ietf-acme-telephone]
Peterson, J. and R. Barnes, "ACME Identifiers and
Challenges for Telephone Numbers", draft-ietf-acme-
telephone-01 (work in progress), October 2017.
[I-D.ietf-modern-problem-framework]
Peterson, J. and T. McGarry, "Modern Problem Statement,
Use Cases, and Framework", draft-ietf-modern-problem-
framework-03 (work in progress), July 2017.
[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates]
Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
Credentials: Certificates", draft-ietf-stir-
certificates-18 (work in progress), December 2017.
[I-D.ietf-stir-passport]
Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "Personal Assertion Token
(PASSporT)", draft-ietf-stir-passport-11 (work in
progress), February 2017.
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]
Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-16
(work in progress), February 2017.
[I-D.rescorla-stir-fallback]
Rescorla, E. and J. Peterson, "STIR Out of Band
Architecture and Use Cases", draft-rescorla-stir-
fallback-02 (work in progress), June 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
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[RFC8226] Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>.
Authors' Addresses
Jon Peterson
Neustar, Inc.
1800 Sutter St Suite 570
Concord, CA 94520
US
Email: jon.peterson@team.neustar
Mary Barnes
iconectiv
Email: mary.ietf.barnes@gmail.com
David Hancock
Comcast
Email: davidhancock.ietf@gmail.com
Chris Wendt
Comcast
One Comcast Center
Philadelphia, PA 19103
USA
Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
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