Internet DRAFT - draft-pouwelse-perpass-shadow-internet
draft-pouwelse-perpass-shadow-internet
Internet Engineering Task Force J. Pouwelse, Ed.
Internet-Draft Delft University of Technology
Intended status: Standards Track February 14, 2014
Expires: August 18, 2014
The Shadow Internet: liberation from Surveillance, Censorship and
Servers
draft-pouwelse-perpass-shadow-internet-00
Abstract
This document describes some scenarios and requirements for Internet
hardening by creating what we term a shadow Internet, defined as an
infrastructure in which the ability of governments to conduct
indiscriminate eavesdropping or censor media dissemination is
reduced.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 18, 2014.
Copyright Notice
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Real world scenario: Arab Spring context . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Microblogging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Onion routing and bandwidth accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Driving scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. 20sec scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1.1. Adversary model: A simplistic attacker . . . . . . . . 8
6.1.2. Scenario details and architectural requirements . . . 8
6.2. Kill-switch scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2.1. Adversary model: An advanced attacker . . . . . . . . 10
6.2.2. Scenario details and architectural requirements . . . 10
6.3. Friend-to-friend scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.3.1. Adversary model: A powerful attacker . . . . . . . . . 11
6.3.2. Scenario details and architectural requirements . . . 12
6.4. Transmorph ability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.5. A single global conversation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.6. Spammers and hoaxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Design principles: simplicity and prior success . . . . . . . 14
8. Background rant: lack of coordination and fragmentation . . . 14
9. Current running code and related work . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. Open issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.1. Use cases and threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.2. System components, definitions and system architecture . . 17
10.3. Current technology and gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.4. Detailed system design and protocol specification . . . . 17
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
13.3. URL References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Introduction
The shadow Internet is an alternative communication infrastructure
specifically crafted to be resiliant to sniffing, blocking, filtering
and shutdown. We discuss usage scenarios, architectural requirements
and how it could be used to combat global surveillance and
censorship.
Pervasive monitoring is a widespread attack on privacy [ATTACK]. It
is defined as widespread (and often covert) surveillance through
intrusive gathering of protocol artefacts, including application
content, or protocol meta-data such as headers. Bits moving across
the Internet are under surveillance at an unprecedented scale.
Today, both Internet providers and governments possess the ability to
monitor the moves of their digital citizens from central
infrastructure points. The leaks by Edward Snowden show the
capabilities of the NSA through their ANT product catalog [CATALOG].
Internet routers from various vendors are easily compromised in their
entirety and "taps" may be inserted. Furthermore, some packets may
be re-routed to modify them, called man-in-the-middle Internet route
hijacking. The challenge is to make global pervasive surveillance
expensive again. We need to figure out how to re-engineer the
internet to prevent this kind of wholesale spying, see [SCHNEIER].
Censorship is another key threat to The Internet. We focus on media
censorship and anonymity. The largest source of Internet traffic is
video traffic. Video is a powerful medium for reaching and
mobilizing mass audiences, with unique potential to bring about
social change. Anonymous video distribution is needed to prevent
repressive governments from stifling the free exchange of information
that enables citizens to organize effective political opposition. As
such, it constitutes a key tool for allowing populations to establish
self-governance, and for safeguarding human rights around the world.
Yet current methods of video distribution are controlled by a small
number of gatekeepers, and are difficult to access privately or
anonymously. Anonymous video distribution depends on technical
structures to support the building of trust, community, and
cooperative relationships between users. Until now, the difficulty
of confronting this challenge has prevented any system from offering
an effective solution.
Servers also cause problems. Email provider Lavabit is in court
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appealing against a government order to hand over its encryption
keys. Owners of servers can be forced to cooperate to install a "pen
register", which tracks communication patterns. In the case of
Lavabit, authorities demanded he hand over the encryption keys for
its entire service and expose all customers. Essentially, a company
director can be forced to choose between committing sabotage on their
own security or goto jail. Therefore, servers are a key risk factor
in the shadow Internet architecture. Servers often keep extensive
logs, another risk factor. No privacy exists for the one billion
regular users of online video. Rather, their watching patterns are
meticulously recorded, including what they watched, when they watched
it, and with whom they shared it.
We outline scenarios for the shadow Internet and several
requirements. A key principle of the shadow Internet is that it
offers usable encryption without infrastructure. The shadow Internet
is required to protect the privacy of its users, allowing them to
remain anonymous if they wish, or to create digital personas for
sharing and commenting on videos. Privacy will be achieved by having
participants work together, each relaying the encrypted traffic of
others. For sustainability, participants will need to relay several
hours of traffic for each hour of video that they watch, so
encouraging cooperation is a key part of our scenario. The presented
scenarios strongly rely on a sense of community and mutual trust.
The potential user-base of our system is large: over 6 billion hours
of video are watched each month on YouTube alone. Our use-case and
scenarios are focused on large-scale penetration and uptake.
3. Real world scenario: Arab Spring context
Video footage of human rights violations can be a powerful catalyst
for change. Graphic depiction of atrocities for a world-wide
television audience can influence outcomes. However, global news
networks need to be able to obtain video footage from a hot zone.
Governments have demonstrated their ability to disable communications
networks in times of crisis. During the 2011 Arab Spring, Egyptian
authorities demanded that telecommunication companies sever their
broadband connections and mobile networks--both local and European
operators were forced to comply, and, as a result, digital Egypt
vanished. Despite the country's decentralized infrastructure, an
Internet blackout was relatively easy to carry out. The roles and
consequences of social media (e.g., Facebook and Twitter) during that
same period further illustrate the capacity governments have for
Internet censorship and the challenges activists face in combating
it. The April 6 Youth Movement from Egypt committed digital dissent
in full public view. According to The New York Times[YOUTH], the
movement "provided a structure for a new generation of Egyptians, who
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aren't part of the nation's small coterie of activists and opinion
makers, to assemble virtually and communicate freely about their
grievances." But moving protest organizations to social media
accessible to the public-at-large can hold surprising risks. On the
ground, the movement's organization of labor strikes and protests in
Facebook groups, many with thousands of followers, triggered arrest
and imprisonment. Protesters in other countries quickly took note of
Egypt's lesson and disabled their public Facebook profiles. In
response, one government initiated social media searches on incoming,
young, plane travelers by forcing them to login to Facebook upon
arrival, thereby revealing online activities and any anti-government
sympathies.[FORCEDLOGIN]
A glimmer of hope exists. The Arab Spring shows that a new
generation is claiming their right to express themselves.
Microblogging, social media in general and traditional satellite news
broadcast networks are perceived as critical catalysts for political
change. Generic computational fabric is soon getting in the hands of
two billion people with the growth of smartphones and increasingly
affordable communication. These smartphones are increasingly used to
record and spread disruptive audiovisual material, even in regions
without media freedom.
Democratic countries also face a dilemma. Restrictions on the free
information flow is the topic of several proposed laws by elected
representatives. The strength of copyright law impacts digital
information flow. Politicians must decide between weak copyright
law, as championed by civil rights activists versus strong copyright
enforcement, as promoted by numerous players in the creative
industries. Recent furor around SOPA, PIPA, etc. in the US plus the
European Parliament vote on ACTA is highly relevant in this context.
The uniqueness of The Internet lies in the IETF standards. Moving
certain bits to certain locations or offering a service requires no
prior official approval. However, Internet-deployed mechanisms now
exist which filter news and media in general for both surveillance
and censorship. The Internet has ceased to provide reliable
transport service for all users. The IETF can repeat its historical
inter-networking role again by setting the standard for reliable flow
of media packets.
4. Microblogging
Microblogging is an increasingly popular technology for lightweight
interaction over the Internet. It differs from traditional blogging
in that [OPENMICRO]:
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o Posts are short (typically less than 140 characters, which is the
limit in SMS).
o Posts are in plain text, but may contain links to photos or
videos, often taken and uploaded with a mobile device.
o People can reply to your posts, but not directly comment on them.
o People learn about your posts only if they have permission to view
them.
o Your microblogging feed is discovered based on your identity at a
domain or with a service.
The goal is creating a microblogging standard and facilitating a
reference implementation for portable devices which is capable of
operating in a hostile environment. This standard should be
resilient against all known forms of censorship. This proposed draft
standard SHALL provide: "information dissemination from a single
smartphone to an audience of millions in the form of microblogging,
enriched with pictures or streaming video which is guarded against
all known forms of censorship such as: cyberspace sabotage, digital
eavesdropping, infiltration, fraud, Internet kill switches, physical
checkpoints and lawyer-based attacks with the best known protective
methods".
The focus on microblogging is driven by feasibility. Creating a
standard for overcoming censorship for social networks, search
engines or web browsing in general is extremely challenging.
Mitigating the threats posed by Internet kill switches requires focus
on the most feasible viable standard. The related work listed in
this document shows existing operational systems. Existing systems
cover all functionality we desire, however none of them cover all
aspects and little interoperability exists.
As early as 2006, long before Arab spring events, it was reported
that individuals in wide swathes of the Arab world were using
Bluetooth technology to bypass police restrictions. According to
news reports[DATING], communication between men and women in this
region had been made possible by cellphone technology. When
Bluetooth-capable phones are in close proximity, they can engage
directly in digital and social chatter--no other infrastructure is
needed. Moreover, when sharing photos or bandwidth-hungry videos
with friends it also pays to be close. Government provided cellphone
networks might not be filtering you, but can still be dreadfully
slow. It therefore pays to use cell phones' Bluetooth-based, direct
file-transfer features--and it comes as no surprise that wireless-
transfer apps have seen millions of installs. A query of Google
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Trends for the phrase "Bluetooth transfer" reveals a geographical
spread of this interesting social phenomenon[TREND]. It seems
millions of mobile phone owners are already employing the social
practice of wireless data exchange. Viability is increased by
building upon this practice.
5. Onion routing and bandwidth accounting
Tor pioneered the technique of relaying traffic to improve privacy
and security. We extend their valuable work in our scenarios.
However, our attacker model differs significantly and our goal is
robust video streaming, instead of browsing. Another key difference
is our focus on communities and utilizing trust between participants.
Onion routing consumes a lot of bandwidth and processing capacity.
Within Tor there is no direct rational incentive to operate a relay
node or exit node. In our outlined scenario and mechanisms we reward
cooperating (bandwidth donating) individuals with priority over
freeriders. This is an old idea, yet never realized. Large-scale
uptake is a key challenge.
We believe bandwidth accounting is essential for anonymous streaming,
as it creates an incentive mechanism motivating people to participate
in a collective system and thus contributing to its sustenance.
This, in turn, makes pervasive surveillance harder. Within the
scenarios we strive to leave out design and implementation details.
However, incentive compatibility is a MUST HAVE requirement and
explicitly included.
In our scenario we assume that it is possible to create and
distribute proof-of-work certificates. Such certificates are the
technological basis for the incentives. Helping others with becoming
anonymous through onion routing yields a cryptographically signed
proof-of-work certificate. Such proof-of-work certificates somehow
provide cooperating individuals with priority or faster service.
6. Driving scenarios
Recent Arab spring events have shown the power of ubiquitous camera-
phones, new media and microblogging. This document proposes to uses
smartphones, wifi and USB sticks for multimedia transport and
playback. The architecture, features and driving scenarios are
specifically crafted to enable compliant implementations as a single
smartphone app without any additional server infrastructure.
Each scenario is focused on certain threats in a hostile environment.
The adversary becomes stronger in several of the following scenarios
and we also focus on the social media context.
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6.1. 20sec scenario
First scenario, called "20sec", defines an open microblogging
standard. This first scenario duplicates existing microblogging
practices with an open standard in a fully decentralized setting.
The scenario requirements are performance equal to central-server
based approach (e.g. the ability to reach 20 million people in 20
seconds).
6.1.1. Adversary model: A simplistic attacker
Eavesdropping is a common and easy passive attack in a hostile
environment. In this scenario we assume the attacker has full access
to the network between the user and any Internet server.
Specifically, the adversary can observe, block, delay, replay and
modify all traffic coming from any server. Furthermore, all servers
such as DNS servers, web servers, swarm trackers, CDN cloud servers
and access portals are assumed to be under direct or indirect control
of the adversary.
The adversary cannot compromise traffic between smartphones or other
participating devices. The adversary cannot compromise smartphones
or other participating devices. The adversary cannot break standard
cryptographic primitives, such as block ciphers and message-
authentication codes.
6.1.2. Scenario details and architectural requirements
Smartphone owner Alice with wifi-based Internet access records an
eye-witness video. She attaches this video to a microblog entry and
shares the story and the video content automatically with friends Bob
and Charlie, who are subscribers of her news feed. Alice does not
need to trust any central server with her credentials, nor has to
prove her identity to a central (web) server. Bob and Charlie are
both behind a NAT middlebox compliant to the BEHAVE recommendations
[RFC4787]. No assistance of a coordinating server (e.g. STUN or
TURN) is required to traverse this NAT box using UDP messages. This
scenario assumes direct or NAT-based Internet access (the next
scenario deals with packet forwarding).
Performance should be equal to a central-server based approach,
providing the ability to reach 20 million people in 20 seconds. This
first scenario duplicates existing microblogging practices with an
open standard in a fully decentralized setting. The 20sec scenario
requires that solutions provide seamless backwards compatibility with
existing leading solutions (e.g. Twitter, Sina Weibo, chyrp, heello)
by using content import tools. Proposed open solutions MUST permit
easy bulk transcoding and ingest of existing news feeds into this
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open standard.
An essential feature of the 20sec scenario is all central gatekeepers
or communication to them is possibly compromised. Ownership of data
is fundamental to autonomy. To meet the anti-censorship goal, 20sec
assumes an infrastructure which is not dependent and completely
decoupled from potentially hostile servers such as DNS servers and
web servers. 20sec MUST be based on full self-organization. The
infrastructure consists purely of devices running compliant
implementations. No central server requires installation or
maintenance, making this infrastructure independent on any type of
funding or business model. 20sec requires an overlay which is highly
resilient. Smartphones, tablets and PCs are able to utilize this P2P
overlay for microblogging. Existing solutions such as [OPENMICRO]
require a central webserver and OAuth-like authentication primitives.
This prior work is not suitable for our 20sec scenario, as we aim to
remove all server, ultrapeer or superpeer reliance and equality of
all participants in the overlay.
When Alice downloads the smartphone app and runs it for the first
time, the application performs a bootstrap phase. On this initial
startup, the microblogging software looks for at least one other peer
in the overlay. The simplest method of bootstrapping is to use a
list of peers currently online, together with their port number. See
the example below.
# file: Central-Bootstrap-Servers.txt
# default bootstrap peers
server1.always-online.org 6420
host1.never-offline.ro 6420
sealand.routed.org 6420
168.0.0.13 6420
A file sharing program needs a fresh list of peers to bootstrap.
Thus a pre-defined list of peers is included in the software
installer. As peers can go offline it is important that at least one
peer out of possibly thousands on the list is still online. This
pre-existing address list of possibly working peers must therefore
remain valid for as long as possible. Bootstrapping is done by
contacting peers in the list, possibly in parallel. If a single
peers replies, the smartphone app of Alice is connected. Once
connected, a fresh list of working peer Internet addresses COULD be
requested. Several ideas have been proposed on bootstrapping systems
without an "online bootstrap server" list. For instance, simply by
smart brute force pinging, as described by the University of Denver
[BOOTSTRAP].
It is RECOMMENDED compliant implementations explore and implement
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efficient alternatives for decentralized initial bootstrapping.
6.2. Kill-switch scenario
This scenario describes a situation without any Internet access. We
assume the government has essentially "killed" the Internet, in an
Arab spring like scenario. It is focused on ad-hoc packet forwarding
between smartphones.
6.2.1. Adversary model: An advanced attacker
The adversary has disabled all Internet-based communication.
We assume the adversary cannot eavesdrop, jam, delay, replay, modify
or spoof wireless communication between smartphones. The adversary
cannot compromise smartphones or other participating devices. The
adversary cannot break standard cryptographic primitives, such as
block ciphers and message-authentication codes.
6.2.2. Scenario details and architectural requirements
Smartphone owner Alice has no Internet access. She records a video,
attaches this video to a microblog entry in her phone app. Friends
Bob and Charlie are subscribed to her news feed. Bob and Charlie are
at some point within range of the wifi, bluetooth or other wireless
capability of Alice. This fresh microblog entry plus video is shared
automatically. Bob obtained the message from Alice using a
smartphone app which is periodically scanning if other devices are
around and if they possibly have fresh news. This periodic
synchronization SHOULD be energy-efficient. Bob sees no noticeable
decrease in battery lifetime after he obtained unconstrained news
access. Charlie later goes to a square where numerous people have
gathered, most of which are highly interested in the latest videos.
The fresh messages automatically spreads in this crowd.
Note that this scenario differs from Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN),
as being investigated by a Working Group within the Internet Research
Task Force [RFC4838] and scientists[BUBBLE]. The DTN focus is on
finding routes to an explicitly given destination, usually by
maintaining routing tables. Their system model and terminology
cannot be applied in our context, for instance, "Endpoint
Identifiers" which identify the original sender and final
destination. In our Internet-Free scenario sender Alice does NOT
explicitly send a message with destination Bob.
A wealth of related work exists in this area. General solutions are
found in mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), which provide self-organized
IP routing among wireless devices, and delay-tolerant networks (DTN),
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which use a simple store-and-forward primitive to communicate over
heterogeneous links. Mobile ad hoc networks have been studied within
the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) since 1997, leading to
several standards published by the IETF's MANET Working Group, while
delay-tolerant networks are currently the focus of the IRTF's DTN
Research Group. We hope that much of that knowledge can be reused,
despite our scenario differing slightly from DTN (as being
investigated by the IRTF [RFC4838])
6.3. Friend-to-friend scenario
This third scenario uses friend-to-friend networking to remove the
requirement for active networking and wifi sensing. The smartphones
of Alice and Bob need to be synced manually. This scenario SHOULD
deliver a privacy-by-design type of microblogging service.
6.3.1. Adversary model: A powerful attacker
We must assume from the Arab Spring scenario the existence of a
powerful adversary. For instance, the adversary has disabled all
Internet-based communication. The adversary even actively monitors
wireless communication. Protocol designers have identified the
following threats [BRIAR] for similar circumstances:
o The adversary can observe, block, delay, replay, and modify
traffic on the underlying network. Thus, the microblogging
service must ensure end-to-end security without relying on the
security of the underlying network.
o Wireless communication is regularly monitored. Responding to any
wireless requests from a stranger is a direct threat to the user
and extremely harmful.
o Possession of encrypted electronic messages or encryption
technology in general is extremely harmful to the smartphone
owner.
o The adversary has a limited ability to compromise smartphones or
other participating devices. If a device is compromised, the
adversary can access any information held in the device's volatile
memory or persistent storage.
o The adversary can choose the data written to the microblogging
layer by higher protocol layers.
o The adversary cannot break standard cryptographic primitives, such
as block ciphers and message-authentication codes.
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Encryption is not a sufficient requirement of the friend-to-friend
scenario, everything MUST be hidden. Possession of smartphones apps
with encryption is already dangerous for the owner.
6.3.2. Scenario details and architectural requirements
Reports from repressive regions indicate that USB sticks are commonly
used to transport sensitive information. See for instance this
extensive report on North-Korea [NKOREA]. In the friend-to-friend
scenario a network of friends is trusted to transport news manually,
by simply carrying it around. Smartphones with NFC capability or
manual USB transfer are used to duplicate and move messages. Thus
Alice delivers her fresh news message to Bob, which is later given
manually to Charlie.
As direct social connections are sparse and proximity of friends is
not continuous, this scenario SHOULD facilitate usage of friends-of-
friends or further removed social ties to relay news messages. This
requires the development of a decentralized social network, for
instance, with digital signatures of friendship certificates. In
effect this would create a "decentralized social network", completely
autonomous and owned by all participants. We assume Alice only has
Bob in her friendlist and Bob only has Charlie in his friendlist. An
OPTIONAL feature is that the smartphone apps running on the
smartphone Alice and Charlie detect that they have friendship path
through Bob. Fresh news is thus exchanged.
The interception of a single smartphone MUST NOT expose the app
itself, any friend list or worse: the entire social network. We
assume Alice is placing herself in danger with electronic tools for
"subversive activities against the democratic republic". Information
hiding techniques are essential or even life-critical. Possibly
based on Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) protocols [ZEROKNOW]. The
smartphone app MUST pose as a harmless entertainment feature of a
smartphone or use another mechanism to become a "stealth app". The
requirement of such a stealth app is that a somewhat knowledgeable
person will not detect the presence of the app and will not discover
any video content, hence making the app checkpoint-proof. The app
itself should be hidden, i.e., it should not be visible in the app
list of the phone but, for example, be activated by dialing a secret
telephone number. In addition, the app should be able to virally
spread and be able to bypass any governmental restrictions on the
official app store.
This scenario requires modification and enhancement based on real-
world experience from human rights activist [EGYPTSTUDY].
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6.4. Transmorph ability
Prior scenarios expanded the threat model. This and the following
scenarios are focused on the social media context. News is created
in a region without freedom and then needs to travel to the outside
world. We refer to this simply as the freedom/non-freedom border.
Different transport protocols, dynamics and different solutions are
needed on the two sides of this border.
We now expand the friend-to-friend scenario with a transmorph
ability, the ability of news to cross the freedom/non-freedom border.
Alice is a well known blogger in an region with extreme censorship.
Her identity on Twitter has millions of followers. However, she has
no direct ability to reach a Twitter.com server or Internet in
general. We assume Alice only has Bob in her friendlist and Bob only
has Charlie in his friendlist. Charlie is able to smuggle a
collection of messages out of the country. The messages originating
from Alice should be transmorphed into a series of Twitter post
belonging to her.
The identities used in Twitter are highly identifiable labels, with a
certain trust level. This hard identity with millions of followers
is a stark contrasts with anonymity. Current anti-censorship
technology lacks the ability to first have stealth encrypted
transport of news, cross the freedom/non-freedom border and then
transmorph this news into a public accessible form with a highly
identifiable label.
6.5. A single global conversation
Existing technologies, such as [TOR] in combination with XMPP or the
Orbot smartphone app facilitate protected point-to-point
communication. However, a desired scenario is to facilitate more
current the Twitter-like social media practices, best typified as a
"global conversation".
Furthermore, current social media revolves around video-rich, real-
time interaction with groups, hashtag-based discovery and social
networking. All of these aspects are not offered or are incompatible
with current-generation of privacy enhancing technology. More
knowledge is needed about reputation models in news reporting and
information flows. In the current microblogging age, can the number
of real-person followers be seen as your reputation? Do several news
sources of moderate reputation which report the same news story yield
together an increased reputation score?
This work should combine privacy enhancement with microblogging.
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6.6. Spammers and hoaxes
This final scenario is focused on spam. All technology addressing
one of the above scenarios MUST also have the capability to deal with
spam. Unfortunately, this ability to deal with spam is in conflict
with simplicity.
Alice and Bob are exchanging the fresh messages from their social
network (similar to Internet-free or Friends-only). Eve is actively
trying to disrupt the system by injecting news channels with a mix of
genuine news, obviously fake messages (consuming valuable system
resources and user attention) and hoaxes. These falsehoods made to
masquerade as truth result in erosion of overall trust in the system.
Systems SHOULD offer capabilities to report spam, mechanisms for fact
validation and reputations of (pseudo) identities.
7. Design principles: simplicity and prior success
Designing and crafting software which is completely self-organizing
has clear limits [CAPLIMIT] and requires a certain level of expertise
[LEVELS]. In order to avoid repeating mistakes from the past, this
document aims to base its design principles on existing new media
successes. For microblogging this means following market leading
solutions and enhance them with censorship resilience. We recognize
the following success factors: Simplicity, Real-time responsiveness,
Near-effortless news creation, News items are bundled in channels,
combine public broadcasting and person-to-person private messaging,
following a channel is single direction, more followers yields more
visibility, keyword search with push of updates and ability to deal
with spam.
8. Background rant: lack of coordination and fragmentation
Computers communicating on equal footing has been part of the IETF
standards for many decades. Recently several loosely connected
standard initiated around explicitly driven by the P2P paradigm for
applications such as Internet telephony video streaming. An
essential problem in this domain is the lack of coordination and
standard setting for P2P technology. A large part of the innovation
around P2P seems to happen in single-person Open Source projects and
small groups which lack the engineering capacity to make generic, re-
usable and documented components. Given their running code-driven
nature, money and time is not available for attending standards-
setting meetings, writing formal specifications and defining quality
control testing suites. Profit-driven organizations should have the
resources to overcome these resource shortage issues. However, due
to the dynamic, disruptive and litigious nature of P2P few examples
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exist of companies which are capable of supporting an IETF standard
setting activity for several years.
As presented during IETF 81 area directorate, there is "not a clear
long-term architecture yet for you to build actual classes of P2P
applications using IETF technologies". Forming an overlay is hard
and scalable privacy-preserving unstructured search solutions are
only barely out of the scientific research community.
From the above we conclude that a key obstacle to the success of this
proposal is implementation and uptake. A draft document, active
community and reference implementation ideally evolve together over
time. To overcome this issue a continuous incremental improvement
approach is advised. The preferred way is incremental development of
single a reference implementation, based on free software.
9. Current running code and related work
DISCLAIMER: this section needs significant expansion and listing of
projects with running code and self-organization.
Several Open Source projects have running code and partially
implemented the above four scenarios. We will briefly list them
here.
[TOR] A free software implementation of second-generation onion
routing, a mechanism enabling users to communicate anonymously over
the Internet. This flagship project has boosted online anonymity for
over a decade and is the key example for the cat and mouse dynamics
of privacy/surveillance technologies. The Orbot project provides an
Android implementation of Tor. Due to the usage of the client server/
model, exit node principle plus lack of reputations this architecture
is not compatible with our scenarios.
[DIASPORA] A free personal web platform implementing a distributed
social networking service. This partially operational system is
based on a client/server model and thus not compatible with our ad-
hoc scenarios.
[BRIAR] Briar is a secure news and discussion system designed to be
used by journalists, activists and civil society groups in
authoritarian countries. Briar differs from existing circumvention
tools and mesh networks in three significant ways: needs no external
infrastructure, can operate over any mixture of available media and
builds on social relationships. The aims of this project are similar
to our scenarios, but this project lacks running code and has few
active developers.
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[BUBBLE] DTN researchers have simulated closely related scenarios.
Dissemination in the Arab Spring scenario is likely to involve an
explicit copy between people who trust each other, referred to as
social-based forwarding in this study.
[TWIMIGHT] The Twimight project by ETH-Zurich university shows that
decentralized microblogging already exists. Researchers developed an
Android application that uses Twitter servers in normal conditions,
but switches to a Bluetooth-based disaster mode when Internet
connectivity is lost.
[MUSUBI] The Musubi smartphone app represents another key,
censorship-free, technology advancement. Developed by Stanford
University, it offers instant messaging service and media sharing
capabilities similar to WhatsApp, Ping, and Blackberry Messenger.
What makes it unique is that all data and processing resides on the
smartphones, not in the cloud. This decentralization removes the
need for central processing and provides significant decoupling from
the underlying infrastructure. Exchange of cryptographic keys is
integrated in the friending process--Musubi essentially builds a
decentralized social graph. Unfortunately, Musubi is also limited--
all data transfers go through central servers, as it lacks NAT-
traversal capability.
[TRIBLER] DISCLAIMER2: this project is coordinated by the author.
This project has created Open Source firmware for a Samsung Internet-
connected television which gives it the ability to find, share and
stream news videos within a fully self-organizing overlay; operated
only by remote control [REBELLIONTV]. It is also available as
generic zero-server file sharing software for the PC which has been
installed by 1.2 million users. It uses the Dispersy elastic
database for providing: keyword search, content discovery, content
voting and spam prevention using crowd sourcing [DISPERSY]. For
swarm-based streaming and generic message transport it uses the IETF
protocol developed within the PPSP working group, called Libswift
[LIBSWIFT]. All this code is created by a single team and
specifically designed to facilitate evolution into the prior
described scenarios. An Libswift demo streaming app is available on
the Android market.
10. Open issues
Deliverables planned and issues which need to be addressed.
TODO: ADD REF Privacy definition:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-iab-privacy-terminology-01
TODO: REF
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http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-iab-privacy-considerations-03.txt
TODO: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/search/ P2P
TODO: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4981/ SEARCH survey
TODO: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-p2psip-reload/
10.1. Use cases and threat model
10.2. System components, definitions and system architecture
10.3. Current technology and gap
10.4. Detailed system design and protocol specification
11. Security Considerations
tbd.
12. IANA Considerations
tbd.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
13.2. Informative References
[RFC4787] Audet, F. and C. Jennings, "Network Address
Translation (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast
UDP", BCP 127, RFC 4787, January 2007.
[RFC4838] Cerf, V., Burleigh, S., Hooke, A., Torgerson, L.,
Durst, R., Scott, K., Fall, K., and H. Weiss, "Delay-
Tolerant Networking Architecture", RFC 4838,
April 2007.
13.3. URL References
[ATTACK] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/
draft-farrell-perpass-attack, "Pervasive Monitoring is
an Attack".
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[CATALOG] http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/
catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-
devices-a-940994.html, "Shopping for Spy Gear: Catalog
Advertises NSA Toolbox".
[SCHNEIER] http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/
government-betrayed-internet-nsa-spying, "The US
government has betrayed the internet. We need to take
it back".
[YOUTH] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/magazine/
25bloggers-t.html, "Revolution, Facebook-Style".
[FORCEDLOGIN] http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB125978649644673331.html, "Iranian Crackdown Goes
Global".
[NKOREA] http://audiencescapes.org/sites/default/files/
Report_Summary_Quiet_Opening_North%
20Korea_InterMedia.pdf, "A QUIET OPENING: NORTH
KOREANS IN A CHANGING MEDIA ENVIRONMENT".
[EGYPTSTUDY] http://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2011/docs/p1.pdf,
"Analysis of country-wide internet outages caused by
censorship".
[OPENMICRO] http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0277.html, "XEP-0277:
Microblogging over XMPP".
[DATING] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/08/05/AR2006080500930.html, "Saudi Youth Use
Cellphone Savvy To Outwit the Sentries of Romance".
[TREND] http://www.google.com/trends/?q=bluetooth+transfer,
"Google Trends query".
[BOOTSTRAP] http://grothoff.org/christian/dasp2p.pdf,
"Bootstrapping Peer-to-Peer Networks".
[ZEROKNOW] http://www.cse.ust.hk/~liu/luli/PT_Trans_final.pdf,
"Pseudo trust: Zero-knowledge based authentication in
anonymous peer-to-peer protocols".
[CAPLIMIT] http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MC.2012.54,
"The CAP Theorem's Growing Impact".
[LEVELS] http://blog.incubaid.com/2012/03/28/
the-game-of-distributed-systems-programming-which-
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level-are-you/, "The Game of Distributed Systems
Programming. Which Level Are You?".
[TOR] http://www.torproject.org, "Tor Project: Anonymity
Online".
[DIASPORA] http://diasporaproject.org/, "Diaspora is a fun and
creative community that puts you in control.".
[BRIAR] https://fulpool.org/btp.pdf, "Secure communication
over diverse transports".
[BUBBLE] http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TMC.2010.246, "BUBBLE Rap:
Social-Based Forwarding in Delay-Tolerant Networks".
[TWIMIGHT] http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2159576.2159601,
"Twitter in disaster mode: smart probing for
opportunistic peers".
[MUSUBI] http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2187866, "Musubi:
disintermediated interactive social feeds for mobile
devices".
[TRIBLER] http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2206767, "Tribler:
P2P search, share and stream".
[REBELLIONTV] http://www.tribler.org/trac/wiki/SwiftTV, "RebellionTV
a.k.a. Libswift on a television project".
[DISPERSY] www.frayja.com/pub/
dispersypaper2012.pdf:donotdistribute, "Dispersy
elastic database".
[LIBSWIFT] http://www.libswift.org, "IETF PPSP streaming protocol
implementation".
Author's Address
Johan Pouwelse (editor)
Delft University of Technology
Mekelweg 4
Delft
The Netherlands
Phone: +31 15 278 2539
EMail: J.A.pouwelse@tudelft.nl
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