Internet DRAFT - draft-quigley-nfsv4-labreqs
draft-quigley-nfsv4-labreqs
NFSv4 D. Quigley
Internet-Draft Consultant
Intended status: Standards Track J. Morris
Expires: August 11, 2012 Red Hat
J. Lu
Oracle
S. Smalley
NSA
T. Haynes, Ed.
NetApp
February 08, 2012
Requirements for Labeled NFS
draft-quigley-nfsv4-labreqs-01.txt
Abstract
This Internet-Draft outlines high-level requirements for the
integration of flexible Mandatory Access Control (MAC) functionality
into NFSv4.2. It describes the level of protections that should be
provided over protocol components and the basic structure of the
proposed system. It also gives a brief explanation of what kinds of
protections MAC systems offer.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 11, 2012.
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Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Portability & Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Performance & Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Label Encoding, Label Format Specifiers, and Labeling
Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Modes of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5.1. Full Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5.2. Guest Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.6. Labeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.6.1. Client Labeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.6.2. Server Labeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.7. Policy Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.7.1. Full Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.7.2. Guest Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.8. Namespace Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9. Upgrading Existing Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Full MAC labeling support for remotely mounted
filesystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. MAC labeling of virtual machine images stored on the
network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) . . . . . 12
4.4. Legal Hold/eDiscovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.5. Simple security label storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.6. Diskless Linux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.7. Multi-Level Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.7.1. Full Mode - MAC functional Client and Server . . . . . 14
4.7.2. MAC functional Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7.3. MAC functional Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix B. RFC Editor Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Introduction
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) systems have been mainstreamed in
modern operating systems such as Linux (R), FreeBSD (R), Solaris
(TM), and Windows Vista (R). MAC systems bind security attributes to
subjects (processes) and objects within a system. These attributes
are used with other information in the system to make access control
decisions.
Access control models such as Unix permissions or Access Control
Lists are commonly referred to as Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
models. These systems base their access decisions on user identity
and resource ownership. In contrast MAC models base their access
control decisions on the label on the subject (usually a process) and
the object it wishes to access. These labels may contain user
identity information but usually contain additional information. In
DAC systems users are free to specify the access rules for resources
that they own. MAC models base their security decisions on a system
wide policy established by an administrator or organization which the
users do not have the ability to override. DAC systems offer no real
protection against malicious or flawed software due to each program
running with the full permissions of the user executing it.
Inversely MAC models can confine malicious or flawed software and
usually act at a finer granularity than their DAC counterparts.
People desire to use NFSv4 with these systems. A mechanism is
required to provide security attribute information to NFSv4 clients
and servers. This mechanism has the following requirements:
(1) Clients must be able to convey to the server the security
attribute of the subject making the access request. The server
may provide a mechanism to enforce MAC policy based on the
requesting subject's security attribute.
(2) Server must be able to store and retrieve the security attribute
of exported files as requested by the client.
(3) Server must provide a mechanism for notifying clients of
attribute changes of files on the server.
(4) Clients and Servers must be able to negotiate Label Formats and
provide a mechanism to translate between them as needed.
2. Definitions
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Label Format Specifier (LFS): is an identifier used by the client to
establish the syntactic format of the security label and the
semantic meaning of its components. These specifiers exist in a
registry associated with documents describing the format and
semantics of the label.
Label Format Registry: is the IANA registry containing all
registered LFS along with references to the documents that
describe the syntactic format and semantics of the security label.
Policy Identifier (PI): is an optional part of the definition of a
Label Format Specifier which allows for clients and server to
identify specific security policies.
Object: is a passive resource within the system that we wish to be
protected. Objects can be entities such as files, directories,
pipes, sockets, and many other system resources relevant to the
protection of the system state.
Subject: A subject is an active entity usually a process which is
requesting access to an object.
Multi-Level Security (MLS): is a traditional model where objects are
given a sensitivity level (Unclassified, Secret, Top Secret, etc)
and a category set [8].
3. Requirements
The following initial requirements have been gathered from users,
developers, and from previous development efforts in this area such
as DTOS [9] and NSA's experimental NFSv3 enhancements [10].
3.1. Portability & Interoperability
LNFS must be designed with portability in mind, to facilitate
implementations on any operating system that supports mandatory
access controls.
LNFS must be designed and developed to facilitate interoperability
between different LNFS implementations.
LNFS modifications to standard NFSv4.2 implementations must not
adversely impact any existing interoperability of those
implementations.
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3.2. Performance & Scalability
Security mechanisms often impact on system performance. LNFS should
be designed and implemented in a way which avoids significant
performance impact where possible.
As NFSv4.2 is designed for large-scale distributed networking, LNFS
should also be capable of scaling in a similar manner to underlying
implementations where possible.
LNFS should be respond in a robust manner to system and network
outages associated with typical enterprise and Internet environments.
At the very least, LNFS should always operate in a fail-safe manner,
so that service disruptions do not cause or facilitate security
vulnerabilities.
3.3. Security Services
LNFS should ensure that the following security services are provided
for all NFSv4.2 messaging. These services may be provided by lower
layers even if NFS has to be aware of and leverage them:
o Authentication
o Integrity
o Privacy
Mechanisms and algorithms used in the provision of security services
must be configurable, so that appropriate levels of protection may be
flexibly specified per mandatory security policy.
Strong mutual authentication will be required between the server and
the client for Full Mode operation Section 3.5.1.
MAC security labels and any related security state must always be
protected by these security services when transferred over the
network; as must the binding of labels and state to associated
objects and subjects.
LNFS should support authentication on a context granularity so that
different contexts running on a client can use different
cryptographic keys and facilities.
3.4. Label Encoding, Label Format Specifiers, and Labeling Authorities
Encoding of MAC labels and attributes passed over the network must be
specified in a complete and unambiguous manner while maintaining the
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flexibility of MAC implementations. To accomplish this the labels
should consist of an opaque component bound with a Label Format
Specifier (LFS). The opaque component consists of the label which
will be interpreted by the MAC model on the other end while the LFS
provides a mechanism for identifying the structure and semantics of
the label's components.
MAC models base access decisions on security attributes bound to
subjects and objects. With a given MAC model, all systems have
semantically coherent labeling - a security label must always mean
exactly the same thing on every system. While this may not be
necessary for simple MAC models it is recommended that most label
formats assigned an LFS incorporate this concept into their label
format.
LNFS must provide a means for servers and clients to identify their
LFS for the purposes of authorization, security service selection,
and security label interpretation.
A negotiation scheme should be provided, allowing systems from
different label formats to agree on how they will interpret or
translate each others labels. Multiple concurrent agreements may be
current between a server and a client.
All security labels and related security state transferred across the
network must be tagged with a valid LFS.
If the LFS of a system changes, it should renegotiate agreements to
reflect these changes.
If a system receives any security label or security state tagged with
an LFS it does not recognize or cannot interpret, it must reject that
label or state.
NFSv4.2 includes features which may cause a client to cross an LFS
boundary when accessing what appears to be a single file system. If
LFS negotiation is supported by the client and the server, the server
should negotiate a new, concurrent agreement with the client, acting
on behalf of the externally located source of the files.
LNFS should define an initial negotiation scheme with the primary
aims of simplicity and completeness. This is to facilitate practical
deployment of systems without being weighed down by complex and over-
generalized global schemes. Future extensibility should also be
taken into consideration.
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3.5. Modes of Operation
LNFS must cater for two potentially concurrent operating modes,
depending on the state of MAC functionality:
3.5.1. Full Mode
Both the server and the client have MAC functionality enabled, and
full LNFS functionality is extended over the network between both
client and server.
An example of an operation in full mode is as follows. On the
initial lookup, the client requests access to an object on the
server. It sends its process security context over to the server.
The server checks all relevant local policies to determine if that
process context from that client is allowed to access the resource.
Once this has succeeded the object with its associated security
information is released to the client. Once the client receives the
object it determines if its local policy allows the process running
on the client access to the object.
On subsequent operations where the client already has a handle for
the file, the order of enforcement is reversed. Since the client
already has the security context it may make an access decision
against its local policy first. This enables the client to avoid
sending requests to the server that it knows will fail regardless of
the server's policy. If the client passes the local policy check
then it sends the request to the server where the client's process
context is used to determine if the server will release that resource
to the client. If both checks pass, the client is given the resource
and everything succeeds.
In the event that the client does not trust the server, it may opt to
use an alternate labeling mechanism regardless of the server's
ability to return security information.
3.5.2. Guest Mode
Only one of the server or client has MAC functionality enabled.
In the case of the server only having MAC functionality enabled, the
server locally enforces its policy, and may selectively provide
standard NFS services to clients based on their authentication
credentials and/or associated network attributes (e.g. IP address,
network interface) according to security policy. The level of trust
and access extended to a client in this mode is configuration-
specific.
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In the case of the client only having MAC functionality enabled, the
client must operate as a standard NFSv4.2 client, and should
selectively provide processes access to servers based upon the
security attributes of the local process, and network attributes of
the server, according to policy. The client may also override
default labeling of the remote file system based upon these security
attributes, or other labeling methods such as mount point labeling.
In other words, Guest Mode is standard NFSv4.2 over the wire, with
the MAC-aware system mapping the MAC-unaware system's processes or
objects to security labels based on other characteristics in order to
preserve its local MAC guarantees.
3.6. Labeling
Implementations must validate security labels supplied over the
network to ensure that they are within a set of labels permitted from
a specific peer, and if not, reject them. Note that a system may
permit a different set of labels to be accepted from each peer.
3.6.1. Client Labeling
At the client, labeling semantics for NFS mounted file systems must
remain consistent with those for locally mounted file systems. In
particular, user-level labeling operations local to the client must
be enacted locally via existing APIs, to ensure compatibility and
consistency for applications and libraries.
Note that this does not imply any specific mechanism for conveying
labels over the network.
When an object is newly created by the client, it will calculate the
label for the object based on its local policy. Once that is done it
will send the request to the server which has the ability to deny the
creation of the object with that label based on the server's policy.
In creating the file the server must ensure that the label is bound
to the object before the object becomes visible to the rest of the
system. This ensures that any access control or further labeling
decisions are correct for the object.
3.6.2. Server Labeling
The server must provide the capability for clients to retrieve
security labels on all exported file system objects where possible.
This includes cases where only in-core and/or read-only security
labels are available at the server for any of its exported file
systems.
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The server must honor the ability for a client to specify the label
of an object on creation. If the server is MAC enabled it may choose
to reject the label specified by the client due to restrictions in
the server policy. The server should not attempt to find a suitable
label for an object in event of different labeling rules on its end.
The server is allowed to translate the label but should not change
the semantic meaning of the label.
3.7. Policy Enforcement
3.7.1. Full Mode
The server must enforce its local security policy over all exported
objects, for operations which originate both locally and remotely.
Requests from authenticated clients must be processed using security
labels and credentials supplied by the client as if they originated
locally.
As with labeling, the system must also take into account any other
volatile client security state, such as a change in process security
context via dynamic transition. Access decisions should also be made
based upon the current client security label accessing the object,
rather than the security label which opened it, if different.
The client must apply its own policy to remotely located objects,
using security labels for the objects obtained from the server. It
must be possible to configure the maximum length of time a client may
cache state regarding remote labels before re-validating that state
with the server.
The server must recall delegation of an object if the object's
security label changes.
A mechanism must exist to allow the client to obtain access, and
labeling decisions from the server for locally cached and delegated
objects, so that it may apply the server's policy to these objects.
If the server's policy changes, the client must flush all object
state back to the server. The server must ensure that any flushed
state received is consistent with current policy before committing it
to stable storage.
Any local security state associated with cached or delegated objects
must also be flushed back to the server when any other state of the
objects is required to be flushed back.
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3.7.2. Guest Mode
If the server is MAC aware and the client is not, the server must not
accept security labels provided by the client, and only enforce its
local policy to exported objects. In the event that the client is
MAC aware while the server is not then the client may deny access or
fall back on other methods for providing security labeling.
3.8. Namespace Access
The server should provide a means to authorize selective access to
the exported file system namespace based upon client credentials and
according to security policy.
This is a common requirement of MLS-enabled systems, which often need
to present selective views of namespaces based upon the clearances of
the subjects.
3.9. Upgrading Existing Server
Note that under the MAC model, all objects must have labels.
Therefore, if an existing server is upgraded to include LNFS support,
then it is the responsibility of the security system to define the
behavior for existing objects. For example, if the security system
is LFS 0, which means the server just stores and returns labels, then
existing files should return labels which are set to an empty value.
4. Use Cases
MAC labeling is meant to allow NFSv4.2 to be deployed in site
configurable security schemes. The LFS and opaque data scheme allows
for flexibility to meet these different implementations. In this
section, we provide some examples of how NFSv4.2 could be deployed to
meet existing needs. This is not an exhaustive listing.
4.1. Full MAC labeling support for remotely mounted filesystems
In this case, we assume a local networked environment where the
servers and clients are under common administrative control. All
systems in this network have the same MAC implementation and
semantically identical MAC security labels for objects (i.e. labels
mean the same thing on different systems, even if the policies on
each system may differ to some extent). Clients will be able to
apply fine-grained MAC policy to objects accessed via NFS mounts, and
thus improve the overall consistency of MAC policy application within
this environment.
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An example of this case would be where user home directories are
remotely mounted, and fine-grained MAC policy is implemented to
protect, for example, private user data from being read by malicious
web scripts running in the user's browser. With Labeled NFS, fine-
grained MAC labeling of the user's files will allow the local MAC
policy to be implemented and provide the desired protection.
4.2. MAC labeling of virtual machine images stored on the network
Virtualization is now a commonly implemented feature of modern
operating systems, and there is a need to ensure that MAC security
policy is able to to protect virtualized resources. A common
implementation scheme involves storing virtualized guest filesystems
on a networked server, which are then mounted remotely by guests upon
instantiation. In this case, there is a need to ensure that the
local guest kernel is able to access fine-grained MAC labels on the
remotely mounted filesystem so that its MAC security policy can be
applied.
4.3. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) is put forth by
the United States Department of State, Directorate of Defense and
Trade Controls. ITAR places strict requirements on the export and
thus access of defense articles and defense services. Organizations
that manage projects with articles and services deemed as within the
scope of ITAR must ensure the regulations are met. The regulations
require an assurance that ITAR information is accessed on a need-to-
know basis, thus requiring strict, centrally managed access controls
on items labeled as ITAR. Additionally, organizations must be able
to prove that the controls were adequately maintained and that
foreign nationals were not permitted access to these defense articles
or service. ITAR control applicability may be dynamic; information
may become subject to ITAR after creation (e.g., when the defense
implications of technology are recognized).
4.4. Legal Hold/eDiscovery
Increased cases of legal holds on electronic sources of information
(ESI) have resulted in organizations taking a pro-active approach to
reduce the scope and thus costs associated with these activities.
ESI Data Maps are increasing in use and require support in operating
systems to strictly manage access controls in the case of a legal
hold. The sizeable quantity of information involved in a legal
discovery request may preclude making a copy of the information to a
separate system that manages the legal hold on the copies; this
results in a need to enforce the legal hold on the original
information.
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Organizations are taking steps to map out the sources of information
that are most likely to be placed under a legal hold, these efforts
result in ESI Data Maps. ESI Data Maps specify the Electronic Source
of Information and the requirements for sensitivity and criticality.
In the case of a legal hold, the ESI data map and labels can be used
to ensure the legal hold is properly enforced on the predetermined
set of information. An ESI data map narrows the scope of a legal
hold to the predetermined ESI. The information must then be
protected at a level of security of which the weight and
admissibility of that evidence may be proved in a court of law.
Current systems use application level controls and do not adequately
meet the requirements. Labels may be used in advance when an ESI
data map exercise is conducted with controls being applied at the
time of a hold or labels may be applied to data sets during an
eDiscovery exercise to ensure the data protections are adequate
during the legal hold period.
Note that this use case requires multi-attribute labels, as both
information sensitivity (e.g., to disclosure) and information
criticality (e.g., to continued business operations) need to be
captured.
4.5. Simple security label storage
In this case, a mixed and loosely administered network is assumed,
where nodes may be running a variety of operating systems with
different security mechanisms and security policies. It is desired
that network file servers be simply capable of storing and retrieving
MAC security labels for clients which use such labels. The Labeled
NFS protocol would be implemented here solely to enable transport of
MAC security labels across the network. It should be noted that in
such an environment, overall security cannot be as strongly enforced
as in case (a), and that this scheme is aimed at allowing MAC-capable
clients to function with local MAC security policy enabled rather
than perhaps disabling it entirely.
4.6. Diskless Linux
A number of popular operating system distributions depend on a
mandatory access control (MAC) model to implement a kernel-enforced
security policy. Typically, such models assign particular roles to
individual processes, which limit or permit performing certain
operations on a set of files, directories, sockets, or other objects.
While the enforcing of the policy is typically a matter for the
diskless NFS client itself, the filesystem objects in such models
will typically carry MAC labels that are used to define policy on
access. These policies may, for instance, describe privilege
transitions that cannot be replicated using standard NFS ACL based
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models.
For instance on a SYSV compatible system, if the 'init' process
spawns a process that attempts to start the 'NetworkManager'
executable, there may be a policy that sets up a role transition if
the 'init' process and 'NetworkManager' file labels match a
particular rule. Without this role transition, the process may find
itself having insufficient privileges to perform its primary job of
configuring network interfaces.
In setups of this type, a lot of the policy targets (such as sockets
or privileged system calls) are entirely local to the client. The
use of RPCSEC_GSSv3 for enforcing compliance at the server level is
therefore of limited value. The ability to permanently label files
and have those labels read back by the client is, however, crucial to
the ability to enforce that policy.
4.7. Multi-Level Security
In a MLS system objects are generally assigned a sensitivity level
and a set of compartments. The sensitivity levels within the system
are given an order ranging from lowest to highest classification
level. Read access to an object is allowed when the sensitivity
level of the subject "dominates" the object it wants to access. This
means that the sensitivity level of the subject is higher than that
of the object it wishes to access and that its set of compartments is
a super-set of the compartments on the object.
The rest of the section will just use sensitivity levels. In general
the example is a client that wishes to list the contents of a
directory. The system defines the sensitivity levels as Unclassified
(U), Secret (S), and Top Secret (TS). The directory to be searched
is labeled Top Secret which means access to read the directory will
only be granted if the subject making the request is also labeled Top
Secret.
4.7.1. Full Mode - MAC functional Client and Server
In the first part of this example a process on the client is running
at the Secret level. The process issues a readdir system call which
enters the kernel. Before translating the readdir system call into a
request to the NFSv4.2 server the host operating system will consult
the MAC module to see if the operation is allowed. Since the process
is operating at Secret and the directory to be accessed is labeled
Top Secret the MAC module will deny the request and an error code is
returned to user space.
Consider a second case where instead of running at Secret the process
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is running at Top Secret. In this case the sensitivity of the
process is equal to or greater than that of the directory so the MAC
module will allow the request. Now the readdir is translated into
the necessary NFSv4.2 call to the server. For the RPC request the
client is using the proper credential to assert to the server that
the process is running at Top Secret.
When the server receives the request it extracts the security label
from the RPC session and retrieves the label on the directory. The
server then checks with its MAC module if a Top Secret process is
allowed to read the contents of the Top Secret directory. Since this
is allowed by the policy then the server will return the appropriate
information back to the client.
In this example the policy on the client and server were both the
same. In the event that they were running different policies a
translation of the labels might be needed. In this case it could be
possible for a check to pass on the client and fail on the server.
The server may consider additional information when making its policy
decisions. For example the server could determine that a certain
subnet is only cleared for data up to Secret classification. If that
constraint was in place for the example above the client would still
succeed, but the server would fail since the client is asserting a
label that it is not able to use (Top Secret on a Secret network).
4.7.2. MAC functional Client
With a client that is MAC functional and a server which is not, this
example is identical to the first part of the previous example. A
process on the client labeled Secret wishes to access a Top Secret
directory. As in the previous example, this is denied since Secret
does not dominate Top Secret. If the process were operating at Top
Secret it would pass the local access control check and the NFSv4.2
operation would proceed as in a normal NFSv4.2 environment.
4.7.3. MAC functional Server
With a MAC functional server and a client which is not, the client
behaves as if it were in a normal NFSv4.2 environment. Since the
process on the client does not provide a security attribute the
server must define a mechanism for labeling all requests from a
client. Assume that the server is using the same criteria used in
the first example. The server sees the request as coming from a
subnet that is a Secret network. The server determines that all
clients on that subnet will have their requests labeled with Secret.
Since the directory on the server is labeled Top Secret and Secret
does not dominate Top Secret the server would fail the request with
NFS4ERR_ACCESS.
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5. Security Considerations
When either the client or server is operating in guest mode it is
important to realize that one side is not enforcing MAC protections.
Alternate methods are being used to handle the lack of MAC support
and care should be taken to identify and mitigate threats from
possible tampering outside of these methods.
6. IANA Considerations
It is requested that IANA creates a registry of Label Formats to
describe the syntactic format and semantics of the security label.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", March 1997.
[2] Eisler, M., Chiu, A., and L. Ling, "RPCSEC_GSS Protocol
Specification", RFC 2203, September 1997.
[3] Haynes, T. and N. Williams, "Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
Security Version 3", draft-williams-rpcsecgssv3 (work in
progress), 2011.
[4] Quigley, D. and J. Lu, "Registry Specification for MAC Security
Label Formats", draft-quigley-label-format-registry (work in
progress), 2011.
[5] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, May 2008.
[6] Eisler, M., "XDR: External Data Representation Standard",
RFC 4506, May 2006.
[7] Shepler, S., Eisler, M., and D. Noveck, "Network File System
(NFS) Version 4 Minor Version 1 Protocol", RFC 5661,
January 2010.
7.2. Informative References
[8] "Section 46.6. Multi-Level Security (MLS) of Deployment Guide:
Deployment, configuration and administration of Red Hat
Enterprise Linux 5, Edition 6", 2011.
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[9] Smalley, S., "The Distributed Trusted Operating System (DTOS)
Home Page",
<http://www.cs.utah.edu/flux/fluke/html/dtos/HTML/dtos.html>.
[10] Carter, J., "Implementing SELinux Support for NFS",
<http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/papers/nfsv3-abs.cfm>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
Kathleen Moriarty provided the use cases for ITAR and Legal Hold/
eDiscovery.
Dan Walsh provided use cases for Secure Virtualization, Sandboxing,
and NFS homedir labeling to handle process separation.
Trond Myklebust provided use cases for secure diskless NFS clients.
Appendix B. RFC Editor Notes
[RFC Editor: please remove this section prior to publishing this
document as an RFC]
[RFC Editor: prior to publishing this document as an RFC, please
replace all occurrences of RFCTBD10 with RFCxxxx where xxxx is the
RFC number of this document]
Authors' Addresses
David Quigley
Consultant
Email: dpquigl@davequigley.com
James Morris
Red Hat, Inc.
Email: jmorris@namei.org
Jarrett Lu
Oracle
Email: jarrett.lu@oracle.com
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Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
Email: sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Thomas Haynes (editor)
NetApp
9110 E 66th St
Tulsa, OK 74133
USA
Phone: +1 918 307 1415
Email: thomas@netapp.com
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