Internet DRAFT - draft-raza-6lo-ipsec
draft-raza-6lo-ipsec
6Lo Working Group S. Raza
Internet-Draft S. Duquennoy
Intended Status: Standard Track SICS, Stockholm
G. Selander
Ericsson, Stockholm
Expires: September 19, 2016 March 18, 2016
Compression of IPsec AH and ESP Headers for 6LoWPAN Networks
draft-raza-6lo-ipsec-04
Abstract
This document describes the header compression mechanisms for IPsec
[RFC4301] based on the encoding scheme standardized in [RFC6282]. The
IPsec Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulated Security Payload
(ESP) headers are compressed using Next Header Compression (NHC)
defined in [RFC6282]. This document does not invalidate any encoding
schemes proposed in 6LoWPAN [RFC6282] but rather complements it with
compressed IPsec AH and ESP headers using the free bits in the IPv6
Extension Header encoding. Also, this document does not require any
changes in a conventional IPsec host on the Internet; the header
compression is applied only at the 6LoWPAN layer and is effective
within 6LoWPAN networks.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 19, 2016.
Copyright and License Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 AH in 6LoWPAN Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 IPsec and RPL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Linking IPsec Headers Compression with 6LoWPAN . . . . . . . . 5
3. LOWPAN_NHC for Authentication Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. LOWPAN_NHC for Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) . . . . . . 7
5. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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1 Introduction
[RFC6282] defines how IPv6 datagrams can be routed over IEEE 802.15.4
[IEEE802.15.4]-based networks. [RFC6282] defines header compression
schemes that can significantly reduce the size of IP, IP extension,
and UDP headers. This enables the routing of heavy-weight IP traffic
to resource-constrained [IEEE802.15.4]-based wireless networks. The
security in [IEEE802.15.4]-based IP networks or what is more commonly
known as 6LoWPAN networks is particularly important when we connect
vulnerable wireless networks with the insecure Internet. The
standardized and SHOULD be supported security solution for IPv6 is IP
security (IPsec) [RFC4301][RFC6434]. This means that every IPv6 host
on the Internet SHOULD be able to process IP packets secured with
IPsec. IPsec, in transport mode, can provide end-to-end (E2E) secure
communication between two hosts in the Internet. Thus, it is
beneficial to extend 6LoWPAN so that IPsec communication between an
IPv6 device (e.g. a sensor node) in 6LoWPAN networks and a IPv6 host
on the Internet becomes possible. This document does not cover the
tunnel mode of IPsec.
There are previous proposals to compress IPsec headers. Those
compression schemes are applicable to any Internet host and are not
specific to resource-constrained 6LoWPAN networks. Migault et al.
[draft-mglt-6lo-diet-esp-01][draft-mglt-6lo-aes-implicit-iv-01]
propose compressing IPsec but require corresponding modifications in
the conventional Internet host. Similarly, the RObust Header
Compression (ROHC) [RFC5795][RFC5856] is an efficient and flexible
header compression concept but targets any Internet host and is not
specific to 6LoWPAN network. These previous schemes plus Generic
Header Compression [RFC7400] are complementary to our approach. Our
header compression mechanisms are confined to 6LoWPAN networks and do
not require any change in the IPsec AH and ESP standards or in a
conventional IPsec host on the Internet.
It is desirable to complement 6LoWPAN header compression with IPsec
to keep packet sizes reasonable in resource constrained
[IEEE802.15.4]-based network. There are no header compression
specified for IPsec's AH[RFC4302] and ESP[RFC4303] extension headers
for 6LoWPAN networks. This draft therefore proposes AH and ESP
extension header encoding schemes.
1.1 AH in 6LoWPAN Networks
AH is underused in the Internet due a number of reason. First, AH is
incompatible with Network Address Translation (NAT) that changes the
source IP address, which invalidates the integrity check and results
in packet rejection by the IPSec peer. Second, ESP can provide both
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Integrity protection and encryption. However, ESP can only
authenticate the ESP header and application data but not the IP
header part. This is not an issue when the IPsec tunnel mode is use
because the inner IP header, ESP header and the application data is
both integrity and confidentiality protected.
In the IPv6-connected IoT there are no NATs and the transport mode
that provides end-to-end security is favorable. Therefore, the use of
ESP along with AH makes more sense in the IoT. As the IP address is a
part of IPsec AH integrity check, IPsec can protect against the IP
spoofing attack that is one of the most likely attacks against
constrained nodes running IPv6. Though IPv6 stateless address auto-
configuration is proposed, it is not a requirement for IPv6 hosts.
IPv6 addresses are assigned to resource-constrained nodes in 6LoWPAN
networks at the deployment time and they most likely stay the same
during the lifetime of a nodes unless manually changed through
software/firmware updates. Address auto-configurations for 6LoWPAN
networks that ensure end-to-end connectivity is in fact out of
question unless an efficient and suitable mechanism is developed
targeting 6loWPAN networks. Though mostly there is only one
application running in a 6LoWPAN node, IPv6 offers potentially
unlimited address space which allows using multiple IPv6 addresses
for a single 6LoWPAN node, hence allowing unique IPsec security
association per application. Also, if IPsec is using IKE [RFC7427]
unique security association per application can be dynamically
established.
Also, for a number of use cases in 6LoWPAN networks, such as sensing
and transmitting temperature data, only integrity protection is
required. For these use cases, AH-only is a favorable solution.
1.2 IPsec and RPL
Unlike IPv4, IPv6 ICMPv6 messages are protected by IPsec. As the RPL
Control Message [RFC6550] is an ICMPv6 message, it is therefore
possible to protect it with IPsec. However, all RPL Control
Messages, except DAO / DAO-ACK messages in non-storing mode, are
exchanged between two neighboring devices and have the scope of a
link. Though IPsec security associations can be created between two
neighboring devices, IEEE 802.15.4 security at the link layer is more
suitable for per-hop protection, and IPsec in transport mode can be
used to protect DAO/DAO-ACK messages in non-storing mode.
1.3 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
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document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Linking IPsec Headers Compression with 6LoWPAN
[RFC6282] defines the general format of NHC that can be used to
encode IP extension headers. [RFC6282] already defines an NHC
encoding for IPv6 Extension Headers (NHC_EH) that can be used to link
uncompressed AH and ESP headers to the 6LoWPAN header compression. In
order to compress the IP extension headers a GHC byte for Extension
Header (GHC_EH) [RFC7400] is proposed which has the same layout as
NHC_EH with different ID bits. NHC_EH and GHC_EH consist of an octet
where three bits (bits 4, 5 and 6) are used to encode the IPv6
Extension Header ID (EID). Out of eight possible values for the EID,
six are assigned and the remaining two slots (101 and 110) are
currently unassigned. As AH and ESP are IP extension headers it makes
sense to use one of these unassigned slots for the IPsec headers. We
propose to use the reserved slot 101 for the IPsec headers, AH or
ESP. The corresponding ID field in the AH or ESP will distinguish
these headers from each other. It is also necessary to set the NH bit
in NHC_EH or GHC_EH to 1 to specify that the next header (a header
after AH or ESP, e.g. UDP) is NHC-encoded.
3. LOWPAN_NHC for Authentication Header
6LoWPAN can be used to compress a significant number of bits in AH.
The next header is decided based on the value of NH bit in the IPv6
Extension Header Encoding in [RFC6282]. This draft proposes to always
elide the length field. The payload length field (the length of AH
header in 32-bit words units minus "2" [RFC4302]) in the AH header is
always elided, as it can be inferred from the lower layers: either
from the IEEE 802.15.4 header or the 6LoWPAN header. The size of ICV
can be obtained from the SPI value because the length of the
authenticating data depend on the the algorithm used and are fixed
for any input size. The RESERVED field in the AH header is also
always elided. The SPI and SN are compressed using the proposed NHC
encoding for the AH header shown in Figure 1 and are explained
below.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | SPI | SN |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Figure 1: Proposed LOWPAN NHC encoding for AH
o The first four bits in the NHC AH represent the NHC ID we define
for AH or ESP. These are set to 1101.
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o If SPI = 00: the default SPI for the IEEE 802.15.4 network is used
and the SPI field is omitted. We set the default SPI value to 1.
This does not mean that all nodes use the same security
association (SA), but that every node has a single preferred SA,
identified by SPI 1. If SPI = 01: the least significant 8 bits of
the SPI are carried inline; the remaining 24 bits are elided. If
SPI = 10: the least significant 16 bits of the SPI are carried
inline; the remaining 16 bits are elided. If SPI = 11: All 32
bits of the SPI are carried inline.
o If SN = 00: the least significant 8 bits of sequence number are
carried inline. The remaining bits are elided. If SN = 01: the
least significant 16 bits of the SN are carried inline; the
remaining 16 bits are elided. If SN = 10: the least significant
24 bits of the SPI are carried inline; the remaining 8 bits are
elided. If SN = 11: All 32 bits of the SPI are carried inline.
The sequence number field in the AH header [RFC4302] contains a
value 1 for the first packet sent using a given Security
Association (SA), and it is incremented sequentially for the
subsequent packets. Note that by using 8-bit sequence number we do
not limit the size of sequence number to 255, but propose to use 8
bits for the sequence number prior to the transmission of the
256th packet on an SA. From the 2^8 to 2^(16-1) we propose to use
16-bit sequence number. Follow the same procedure for the 24-bit
sequence number as well. However, the sender and the receiver
sequence number counters must be reset prior to sending 2^32nd
packet as proposed in [RFC4302].
Note that even when used in 6LoWPAN, AH calculates the ICV on the
uncompressed IP header, thus allowing authenticated communication
with Internet hosts. The minimum length of a standard AH, supporting
the mandatory HMAC-SHA1-96[RFC4835], consists of 12 bytes of header
fields plus 12 bytes of ICV. Figure 2 shows a sample NHC compressed
IP/UDP packet secured with AH. Using NHC encoding for the AH we can
reduce the AH header overhead from 24 bytes to 14 bytes: 1 byte of
next header, 1 byte of length, 2 bytes of Reserved field, 4 bytes of
SPI, and 2 bytes of sequence number. However, two additional bytes
are used to define NHC_EH and NHC_AH. Therefore, in the best case,
with AES-XCBC-MAC-96 [RFC3566] or HMAC-SHA1-96 ciphers (when 12 bytes
are used for ICV), applying NHC encoding for AH saves 8 bytes in each
data packet secured with IPsec AH.
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| octet 1 | octet 2 | octet 1 | octet 1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LOWPAN_IPHC | Hop Limit | Source Address|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Address| Destination Address | LOWPAN_NHC_EH |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LOWPAN_NHC_AH | Seq. No | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
| |
+ +
| Integrity Check Value-ICV (Variable) |
+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | LOWPAN_NHC_UDP|S Port | D Port|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| UDP Payload (Variable) |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: A sample NHC compressed IP/UDP packet secured with AH.
4. LOWPAN_NHC for Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP)
The encryption in the IPsec ESP includes Payload Data, Padding, Pad
Length and Next Header fields in the ESP. Therefore, we cannot
compress these fields at the 6LoWPAN layer, and these fields are
always carried inline. Also, when using ESP the UDP header and
payload is also encrypted, hence cannot be compressed using NHC
encodings for UDP defined in the [RFC6282]. However, we can compress
the SPI and and sequence number (SN) fields in the ESP header. Figure
3 shows a proposed NHC encodings for the ESP that are explained
below.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | SPI | SN |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Figure 3: Proposed LOWPAN NHC encoding for ESP
o The first four bits in the NHC ESP represent the NHC ID we define
for ESP. These are set to 1001.
o The SPI and SN bits are encoded exactly the same way as in
Section 3 for the AH header.
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In case of ESP we cannot skip the next header unless the end hosts
are able to execute 6LoWPAN compression/decompression and
encryption/decryption jointly. The nodes in the 6LoWPAN network make
their decision about the next header based on the NH value not the
actual header that is carried inline. In the case of ESP we MUST set
the NH value in the NHC_EH or GHC_EH to zero to indicate that the
full 8 bits of next header field are carried inline.
| octet 1 | octet 2 | octet 1 | octet 1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LOWPAN_IPHC | Hop Limit | Source Address|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Address| Destination Address | LOWPAN_NHC_EH |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LOWPAN_NHC_ESP| Seq No | IV |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IV [Variable Size] | Source Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination Port | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Checksum | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
| UDP Payload (Variable) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Pad | Pad Length | Next Header |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| Integrity Check Value (Variable) |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: A sample NHC compressed IP/UDP packet secured with ESP.
With perfect block alignment, the minimum ESP overhead without
authentication is 10 bytes [RFC4303]. After optimal compression this
header overhead is reduced to 6 bytes, considering that two bytes are
used for NHC_EH and NHC_ESP. ESP also includes an IV which is equal
to the size of an encryption block; 16 bytes in the case of AES. If
authentication is enabled in the ESP, additional 12 bytes of ICV are
also required. Figure 4 shows an UDP/IP packet secured with
compressed ESP.
5. Implementation Considerations
We provide an open source implementation of the proposed compression
scheme in the Contiki operating system. The implementation is
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released under BSD license and can be obtained through the
contikiprojects repository at the following URI:
svn://svn.code.sf.net/p/contikiprojects/code/sics.se/ipsec
6. Security Considerations
The compression scheme proposed in this document does not compromise
any security properties provided by IPsec AH and ESP. In particular,
the SN field is compressed in an on-demand fashion, as described in
Section 3. In order to overcome replay attacks, it is recommended
that the communication end-points should re-establish a security
association before the sequence number overflows. However, in
constrained environments, different implementations can decide the
overflow size; 2^8, 2^16, 2^24, or 2^32. This leads to a trade-off
between the overhead incurred by establishing a new security
association and by sending more bits of sequence number. The
Initialization Vector (IV) and Integrity Check Value (ICV) are also
not compressed to take full advantage of IPsec AH and ESP security.
7. IANA Considerations
[RFC6282] creates a new IANA registry for the LOWPAN_NHC header type
where the two slots, 1110101N and 1110110N, in LOWPAN_NHC for the
IPv6 Extension Header are unassigned. This document requests the
assignment of one of these two unassigned values, 1110101N, to IPsec
AH and ESP. This document also requests the assignment of following
contents:
1101XXYY: The 6LOWPAN_NHC encoding for the IPsec Authentication
Header.
1001XXYY: The 6LOWPAN_NHC encoding for the IPsec Encapsulated
Security Payload Header.
Capital letters in bit positions represent class-specific bit
assignments. The letters XX and YY represent SPI and SN
respectively, as defined in Section 3.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, DOI
10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc4302>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC6282] Hui, J., Ed., and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6
Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6282, September 2011, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6282>.
[RFC6434] Jankiewicz, E., Loughney, J., and T. Narten, "IPv6 Node
Requirements", RFC 6434, DOI 10.17487/RFC6434, December
2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6434>.
[RFC7400] C. Bormann , "6LoWPAN-GHC: Generic Header Compression for
IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks
(6LoWPANs)", RFC 7400, November 2014
9.2. Informative References
[draft-mglt-6lo-diet-esp-01] Migault, D., Guggemos, T., "Diet-ESP: a
flexible and compressed format for IPsec/ESP", August
2015, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-6lo-diet-
esp-01>
[draft-mglt-6lo-aes-implicit-iv-01] Migault, D., Guggemos, T,
"Implicit IV for AES-CBC, AES-CTR, AES-CCM and AES-GCM",
August 2015, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mglt-6lo-
aes-implicit-iv-01>
[RFC3095] Bormann, C., Burmeister, C., Degermark, M., Fukushima, H.,
Hannu, H., Jonsson, L-E., Hakenberg, R., Koren, T., Le,
K., Liu, Z., Martensson, A., Miyazaki, A., Svanbro, K.,
Wiebke, T., Yoshimura, T., and H. Zheng, "RObust Header
Compression (ROHC): Framework and four profiles: RTP, UDP,
ESP, and uncompressed", RFC 3095, DOI 10.17487/RFC3095,
July 2001, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3095>.
[RFC3566] Frankel, S. and H. Herbert, "The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm
and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 3566, DOI 10.17487/RFC3566,
September 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3566>.
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[RFC5856] Ertekin, E., Jasani, R., Christou, C., and C. Bormann,
"Integration of Robust Header Compression over IPsec
Security Associations", RFC 5856, DOI 10.17487/RFC5856,
May 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5856>.
[RFC7427] Kivinen, T. and J. Snyder, "Signature Authentication in
the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 7427,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7427, January 2015, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc7427>.
[RFC7400] Bormann, C., "6LoWPAN-GHC: Generic Header Compression for
IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks
(6LoWPANs)", RFC 7400, DOI 10.17487/RFC7400, November
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7400>.
Authors' Addresses
Shahid Raza
SICS Swedish ICT AB (SICS)
Isafjordsgatan 22, 16440 Kista
SWEDEN
Phone: +46-(0)768831797
EMail: shahid@sics.se
Simon Duquennoy
SICS Swedish ICT AB (SICS)
Isafjordsgatan 22, 16440 Kista
SWEDEN
Phone: +46-(0)702021482
EMail: simonduq@sics.se
Goeran Selander
Ericsson
Farogatan 6, 16480 Kista
SWEDEN
Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com
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