Internet DRAFT - draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-kem
draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-kem
COSE T. Reddy
Internet-Draft A. Banerjee
Intended status: Standards Track Nokia
Expires: 4 September 2024 H. Tschofenig
3 March 2024
Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ KEMs) for JOSE and COSE
draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-kem-00
Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using Post-Quantum Key
Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ-KEMs) within JOSE and COSE.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Key Encapsulation Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Design Rationales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. KEM PQC Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. ML-KEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. PQ-KEM Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. PQ-KEM Decapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Post-quantum KEM in JOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Direct Key Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Key Agreement with Key Wrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Post-Quantum KEM in COSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Single Recipient / One Layer Structure . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Key Agreement with Key Wrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. JOSE Ciphersuite Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. COSE Ciphersuite Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.1. JOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.2. COSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
Quantum computing is no longer perceived as a conjecture of
computational sciences and theoretical physics. Considerable
research efforts and enormous corporate and government funding for
the development of practical quantum computing systems are being
invested currently. As such, as quantum technology advances, there
is the potential for future quantum computers to have a significant
impact on current cryptographic systems.
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Researchers have developed Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
(PQ-KEMs) to provide secure key establishment resistant against an
adversary with access to a quantum computer.
As the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is still
in the process of selecting the new post-quantum cryptographic
algorithms that are secure against both quantum and classical
computers, the purpose of this document is to propose a PQ-KEMs to
protect the confidentiality of content encrypted using JOSE and COSE
against the quantum threat.
Although this mechanism could thus be used with any PQ-KEM, this
document focuses on Module-Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
(ML-KEMs). ML-KEM is a one-pass (store-and-forward) cryptographic
mechanism for an originator to securely send keying material to a
recipient using the recipient's ML-KEM public key. Three parameters
sets for ML-KEMs are specified by [FIPS203-ipd]. In order of
increasing security strength (and decreasing performance), these
parameter sets are ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, and ML-KEM-1024.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document makes use of the terms defined in
[I-D.ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology]. The following terms are
repeately used in this specification:
* KEM: Key Encapsulation Mechanism
* PQ-KEM: Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism
* CEK: Content Encryption Key
* ML-KEM: Module-Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism
For the purposes of this document, it is helpful to be able to divide
cryptographic algorithms into two classes:
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"Traditional Algorithm": An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm based
on integer factorisation, finite field discrete logarithms or
elliptic curve discrete logarithms. In the context of JOSE, examples
of traditional key exchange algorithms include Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman Ephemeral Static [RFC6090] [RFC8037]. In the context of
COSE, examples of traditional key exchange algorithms include
Ephemeral-Static (ES) DH and Static-Static (SS) DH [RFC9052].
"Post-Quantum Algorithm": An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm that
is believed to be secure against attacks using quantum computers as
well as classical computers. Post-quantum algorithms can also be
called quantum-resistant or quantum-safe algorithms. Examples of
Post-Quantum Algorithm include ML-KEM.
2.1. Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
For the purposes of this document, we consider a Key Encapsulation
Mechanism (KEM) to be any asymmetric cryptographic scheme comprised
of algorithms satisfying the following interfaces [PQCAPI].
* def kemKeyGen() -> (pk, sk)
* def kemEncaps(pk) -> (ct, ss)
* def kemDecaps(ct, sk) -> ss
where pk is public key, sk is secret key, ct is the ciphertext
representing an encapsulated key, and ss is shared secret.
KEMs are typically used in cases where two parties, hereby refereed
to as the "encapsulater" and the "decapsulater", wish to establish a
shared secret via public key cryptography, where the decapsulater has
an asymmetric key pair and has previously shared the public key with
the encapsulater.
3. Design Rationales
Section 4.6 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification, see
[RFC7518], defines two ways of using a key agreement:
* When Direct Key Agreement is employed, the shared secret
established through the Traditional Algorithm will be the content
encryption key (CEK).
* When Key Agreement with Key Wrapping is employed, the shared
secret established through the Traditional Algorithm will wrap the
CEK.
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For efficient use with multiple recipient the key wrap approach is
used since the content can be encrypted once with the CEK but each
CEK is encrypted per recipient. Similarly, Section 8.5.4 and
Section 8.5.5 of COSE [RFC9052] define the Direct Key Agreement and
Key Agreement with Key Wrap, respectively. This document proposes
the use of PQ-KEMs for these two modes.
It is essential to note that in the PQ-KEM, one needs to apply
Fujisaki-Okamoto [FO] transform or its variant [HHK] on the PQC KEM
part to ensure that the overall scheme is IND-CCA2 secure, as
mentioned in [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design]. The FO transform is
performed using the KDF such that the PQC KEM shared secret achieved
is IND-CCA2 secure. As a consequence, one can re-use PQC KEM public
keys but there is an upper bound that must be adhered to.
Note that during the transition from traditional to post-quantum
algorithms, there may be a desire or a requirement for protocols that
incorporate both types of algorithms until the post-quantum
algorithms are fully trusted. HPKE is an KEM that can be extended to
support hybrid post-quantum KEMs and the specifications for the use
of HPKE with JOSE and COSE are described in
[I-D.ietf-rha-jose-hpke-encrypt] and [I-D.ietf-cose-hpke],
respectively.
4. KEM PQC Algorithms
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started a
process to solicit, evaluate, and standardize one or more quantum-
resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms, as seen here
(https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography). Said
process has reached its first announcement
(https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/nistir/8413/final) in July
5, 2022, which stated which candidates to be standardized for KEM:
* Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs): CRYSTALS-Kyber (https://pq-
crystals.org/kyber/): ML-KEM, previously known as Kyber, is a
module learning with errors (MLWE)-based KEM. Three security
levels have been defined in the NIST PQC Project, namely Level 1,
3, and 5. These levels correspond to the hardness of breaking
AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256, respectively.
NIST announced as well that they will be opening a fourth round
(https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/post-quantum-
cryptography/documents/round-4/guidelines-for-submitting-tweaks-
fourth-round.pdf) to standardize an alternative KEM, and a call
(https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/pqc-dig-sig/documents/
call-for-proposals-dig-sig-sept-2022.pdf) for new candidates for a
post-quantum signature algorithm.
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4.1. ML-KEM
ML-KEM offers several parameter sets with varying levels of security
and performance trade-offs. This document specifies the use of the
ML-KEM algorithm at three security levels: ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768,
and ML-KEM-1024. ML-KEM key generation, encapsulation and
decaspulation functions are defined in [I-D.cfrg-schwabe-kyber]. The
main security property for KEMs standardized in the NIST Post-Quantum
Cryptography Standardization Project is indistinguishability under
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) (see Section 10.2 of
[I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers]). The public/private key sizes,
ciphertext key size, and PQ security levels of ML-KEM are detailed in
Section 12 of [I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers].
4.2. PQ-KEM Encapsulation
The encapsulation process is as follows:
1. Generate an inital shared secret SS' and the associated
ciphertext CT using the KEM encapsulation function and the
recipient's public key recipPubKey.
(SS', CT) = kemEncaps(recipPubKey)
1. Derive a final shared secret SS of length SSLen bytes from the
initial shared secret SS' using the underlying key derivation
function:
SS = KDF(SS', SSLen)
TBD: Discuss use of JOSE/COSE context specific data.
In Direct Key Agreement mode, the output of the KDF MUST be a key of
the same length as that used by encryption algorithm. In Key
Agreement with Key Wrapping mode, the output of the KDF MUST be a key
of the length needed for the specified key wrap algorithm.
When Direct Key Agreement is employed, SS is the CEK. When Key
Agreement with Key Wrapping is employed, SS is used to wrap the CEK.
4.3. PQ-KEM Decapsulation
The decapsulation process is as follows:
1. Decapsulate the ciphertext CT using the KEM decapsulation
function and the recipient's private key to retrieve the initial
shared secret SS':
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SS' = kemDecaps(recipPrivKey, CT)
If the decapsulation operation outputs an error, output "decryption error", and stop.
1. Derive the final shared secret SS of length SSLen bytes from the
inital secret SS' using the underlying key derivation function:
SS = KDF(SS', SSLen)
5. Post-quantum KEM in JOSE
As explained in Section 3 JWA defines two ways to use public key
cryptography with JWE:
* Direct Key Agreement
* Key Agreement with Key Wrapping
This specification describes these two modes of use for PQ-KEM in
JWE. Unless otherwise stated, no changes to the procedures described
in [RFC7516] have been made.
If the 'alg' header parameter is set to the 'PQ-Direct' value, a PQ-
KEM is used in Direct Key Agreement mode; otherwise, if the PQ-KEM is
used in Key Agreement with Key Wrapping mode. See Section 10 for the
IANA registration of this new algorithm value.
5.1. Direct Key Agreement
* The "alg" header parameter MUST be set to "PQ-Direct". The "enc"
(Encryption Algorithm) header parameter MUST be a PQ-KEM algorithm
chosen from the JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms
registry defined in [JOSE-IANA]. Both header parameters, "alg"
and "enc", MUST be placed in the JWE Protected Header.
* The CEK will be generated using the process explained in
Section 4.2. Subsequently, the plaintext will be encrypted using
the CEK, as detailed in Step 15 of Section 5.1 of [RFC7516].
* The JWE Ciphertext MUST include the concatenation of the output
('ct') from the PQ-KEM algorithm, encoded using base64url, along
with the base64url-encoded ciphertext output obtained by
encrypting the plaintext using the CEK. This encryption process
corresponds to step 15 of [RFC7518].
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* The recipient MUST separate the 'ct' (output from the PQ-KEM
algorithm) from the JWE Ciphertext to decode it and then use it to
derive the CEK using the process defined in Section 4.3. The
ciphertext sizes of ML-KEMs are discussed in Section 12 of
[I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers].
* The JWE Encrypted Key MUST be absent.
5.2. Key Agreement with Key Wrapping
* The derived key is generated using the process explained in
Section 4.2 and used to encrypt the CEK.
* The JWE Encrypted Key MUST include the concatenation of the output
('ct') from the PQ-KEM algorithm, encoded using base64url, along
with the base64url-encoded encrypted CEK.
* The 'enc' (Encryption Algorithm) header parameter MUST specify a
content encryption algorithm from the JSON Web Signature and
Encryption Algorithms registry, as defined in [JOSE-IANA].
* The recipient MUST separate the 'ct' (output from the PQ KEM
Encaps algorithm) from the JWE Encrypted Key to decode it.
Subsequently, it is used to derive the key, through the process
defined in Section 4.3. The derived key will then be used to
decrypt the CEK.
6. Post-Quantum KEM in COSE
This specification supports two uses of PQ-KEM in COSE, namely
* PQ-KEM in a single recipient setup. This use case utilizes a one
layer COSE structure.
* PQ-KEM in a multiple recipient setup. This use case requires a
two layer COSE structure.
6.1. Single Recipient / One Layer Structure
With the one layer structure the information carried inside the
COSE_recipient structure is embedded inside the COSE_Encrypt0.
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The CEK will be generated using the process explained in Section 4.2.
Subsequently, the plaintext will be encrypted using the CEK. The
resulting ciphertext is either included in the COSE_Encrypt0 or is
detached. If a payload is transported separately then it is called
"detached content". A nil CBOR object is placed in the location of
the ciphertext. See Section 5 of [RFC9052] for a description of
detached payloads.
The sender MUST set the alg parameter in the protected header, which
indicates the use of PQ-KEM.
Although the use of the 'kid' parameter in COSE_Encrypt0 is
discouraged by [RFC9052], this documents RECOMMENDS the use of the
'kid' parameter (or other parameters) to explicitly identify the
recipient public key used by the sender. If the COSE_Encrypt0
contains the 'kid' then the recipient may use it to select the
appropriate private key.
6.2. Key Agreement with Key Wrapping
With the two layer structure the PQ-KEM information is conveyed in
the COSE_recipient structure, i.e. one COSE_recipient structure per
recipient.
In this approach the following layers are involved:
* Layer 0 (corresponding to the COSE_Encrypt structure) contains the
content (plaintext) encrypted with the CEK. This ciphertext may
be detached, and if not detached, then it is included in the
COSE_Encrypt structure.
* Layer 1 (corresponding to a recipient structure) contains
parameters needed for PQ-KEM to generate a shared secret used to
encrypt the CEK. This layer conveys the concatenation of the
output ('ct') from the PQ KEM Encaps algorithm and encrypted CEK
in the encCEK structure. The unprotected header MAY contain the
kid parameter to identify the static recipient public key the
sender has been using with PQ-KEM.
This two-layer structure is used to encrypt content that can also be
shared with multiple parties at the expense of a single additional
encryption operation. As stated above, the specification uses a CEK
to encrypt the content at layer 0.
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7. JOSE Ciphersuite Registration
This specification registers a number of PQ-KEM ciphersuites for use
with JOSE. A ciphersuite is a group of algorithms, often sharing
component algorithms such as hash functions, targeting a security
level.
An PQ-KEM ciphersuite, is composed of the following choices:
* PQ-KEM Algorithm
* KDF Algorithm
* AEAD Algorithm
All security levels of ML-KEM internally utilize SHA3-256, SHA3-512,
SHAKE256, and SHAKE512. This internal usage influences the selection
of the Key Derivation Function (KDF) within this document.
ML-KEM-512 MUST be used with a KDF capable of outputting a key with
at least 128 bits of security and with a key wrapping algorithm with
a key length of at least 128 bits.
ML-KEM-768 MUST be used with a KDF capable of outputting a key with
at least 192 bits of security and with a key wrapping algorithm with
a key length of at least 192 bits.
ML-KEM-1024 MUST be used with a KDF capable of outputting a key with
at least 256 bits of security and with a key wrapping algorithm with
a key length of at least 256 bits.
For readability the algorithm ciphersuites labels are built according
to the following scheme:
PQ-<PQ-KEM>-<KDF>-<AEAD>
* In Direct key agreement, the parameter "enc" MUST be specified,
and its value MUST be one of the values specified in Figure 1.
(Note that future specifications MAY extend the list of
algorithms.)
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+===============================+===================================+
| alg | Description |
+===============================+===================================+
| PQ-MLKEM512-SHA3-256-AES128 | ML-KEM-512 + SHA3-256 + AES128 |
+===============================+===================================+
| PQ-MLKEM768-SHA3-384-AES256 | ML-KEM-768 + SHA3-384 + AES256 |
+===============================+===================================+
| PQ-MLKEM1024-SHA3-512-AES256 | ML-KEM-1024 + SHA3-512 + AES256 |
+===============================+===================================+
Figure 1: Direct Key Agreement: Algorithms.
* In Key Agreement with Key Wrapping, the parameter "alg" MUST be
specified, and its value MUST be one of the values specified in
the table above.
The specification allows a small number of "known good" PQ-KEM
ciphersuites instead of allowing arbitrary combinations of PQC
algorithms, HKDF and AEAD Algorithms. It follows the recent trend in
protocols to only allow a small number of "known good" configurations
that make sense, instead of allowing arbitrary combinations of
individual configuration choices that may interact in dangerous ways.
8. COSE Ciphersuite Registration
Figure 2 maps the JOSE algorithm names to the COSE algorithm values
(for the PQ-KEM ciphersuites defined by this document).
+===============================+=========+=================================+=============+
| JOSE | COSE ID | Description | Recommended |
+===============================+=========+======================---========+=============+
| PQ-MLKEM512-SHA3-256-AES128 | TBD1 | ML-KEM-512 + SHA3-256 + AES128 | No |
+-------------------------------+---------+---------------------------------+-------------+
| PQ-MLKEM768-SHA3-384-AES256 | TBD2 | ML-KEM-768 + SHA3-384 + AES256 | No |
+-------------------------------+---------+---------------------------------+-------------+
| PQ-MLKEM768-SHA3-512-AES256 | TBD3 | ML-KEM-1024 + SHA3-512 + AES256 | No |
+-------------------------------+---------+---------------------------------+-------------+
Figure 2: Mapping between JOSE and COSE PQ-KEM Ciphersuites.
9. Security Considerations
PQC KEMs used in the manner described in this document MUST
explicitly be designed to be secure in the event that the public key
is reused, such as achieving IND-CCA2 security. ML-KEM has such
security properties.
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10. IANA Considerations
10.1. JOSE
The following entries are added to the "JSON Web Signature and
Encryption Algorithms" registry:
* Algorithm Name: PQ-Direct
* Algorithm Description: Post Quantum Direct Key Agreement.
* Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
* JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
* Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): [[TBD: This RFC]]
* Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): TODO
* Algorithm Name: PQ-MLKEM512-SHA3-256-AES128
* Algorithm Description: Cipher suite for PQ-KEM that uses ML-
KEM-512 PQ-KEM, the SHA3-256 KDF and the AES-128-GCM AEAD.
* Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg, enc"
* JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
* Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): [[TBD: This RFC]]
* Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): TODO
* Algorithm Name: PQ-MLKEM768-SHA3-384-AES256
* Algorithm Description: Cipher suite for PQ-KEM that uses ML-
KEM-768 PQ-KEM, the SHA3-384 KDF and the AES-256-GCM AEAD.
* Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg, enc"
* JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
* Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): [[TBD: This RFC]]
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* Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): TODO
* Algorithm Name: PQ-MLKEM1024-SHA3-512-AES256
* Algorithm Description: Cipher suite for PQ-KEM that uses ML-
KEM-1024 PQ-KEM, the SHA3-512 KDF and the AES-256-GCM AEAD.
* Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg, enc"
* JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
* Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): [[TBD: This RFC]]
* Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): TODO
10.2. COSE
The following has to be added to the "COSE Algorithms" registry:
* Name: PQ-MLKEM512-SHA3-256-AES128
* Value: TBD1
* Description: Cipher suite for PQ-KEM that uses ML-KEM-512 PQ-KEM,
the SHA3-256 KDF and the AES-128-GCM AEAD.
* Reference: This document (TBD)
* Recommended: No
* Name: PQ-MLKEM768-SHA3-384-AES256
* Value: TBD2
* Description: Cipher suite for PQ-KEM that uses ML-KEM-768 PQ-KEM,
the SHA3-384 KDF and the AES-256-GCM AEAD.
* Reference: This document (TBD)
* Recommended: No
* Name: PQ-MLKEM1024-SHA3-512-AES256
* Value: TBD3
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* Description: Cipher suite for PQ-KEM that uses ML-KEM-1024 PQ-KEM,
the SHA3-512 KDF and the AES-256-GCM AEAD.
* Reference: This document (TBD)
* Recommended: No
Acknowledgments
Add your name here.
References
Normative References
[JOSE-IANA]
IANA, "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms",
n.d., <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/jose.xhtml>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7516>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
Informative References
[FIPS203-ipd]
"Module-Lattice-based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism
Standard", <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.203.ipd.pdf>.
[FO] "Secure Integration of Asymmetric and Symmetric Encryption
Schemes", <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/
s00145-011-9114-1>.
[HHK] "A Modular Analysis of the Fujisaki-Okamoto
Transformation", <https://link.springer.com/
chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-70500-2_12>.
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[I-D.cfrg-schwabe-kyber]
Schwabe, P. and B. Westerbaan, "Kyber Post-Quantum KEM",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-cfrg-schwabe-
kyber-04, 2 January 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cfrg-schwabe-
kyber-04>.
[I-D.ietf-cose-hpke]
Tschofenig, H., Steele, O., Daisuke, A., and L. Lundblade,
"Use of Hybrid Public-Key Encryption (HPKE) with CBOR
Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-cose-hpke-07, 22 October 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
hpke-07>.
[I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers]
Banerjee, A., Reddy.K, T., Schoinianakis, D., and T.
Hollebeek, "Post-Quantum Cryptography for Engineers", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-
engineers-03, 22 February 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-pquip-
pqc-engineers-03>.
[I-D.ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology]
D, F., "Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid
Schemes", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology-02, 2 February 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-pquip-
pqt-hybrid-terminology-02>.
[I-D.ietf-rha-jose-hpke-encrypt]
"*** BROKEN REFERENCE ***".
[I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design]
Stebila, D., Fluhrer, S., and S. Gueron, "Hybrid key
exchange in TLS 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-09, 7 September 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
hybrid-design-09>.
[PQCAPI] "PQC - API notes",
<https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Post-Quantum-
Cryptography/documents/example-files/api-notes.pdf>.
[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6090>.
Reddy, et al. Expires 4 September 2024 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft PQ KEM for JOSE and COSE March 2024
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7518>.
[RFC8037] Liusvaara, I., "CFRG Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
and Signatures in JSON Object Signing and Encryption
(JOSE)", RFC 8037, DOI 10.17487/RFC8037, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8037>.
[RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.
Authors' Addresses
Tirumaleswar Reddy
Nokia
Bangalore
Karnataka
India
Email: kondtir@gmail.com
Aritra Banerjee
Nokia
Munich
Germany
Email: aritra.banerjee@nokia.com
Hannes Tschofenig
Germany
Email: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
Reddy, et al. Expires 4 September 2024 [Page 16]
