Internet DRAFT - draft-reddy-dots-data-channel
draft-reddy-dots-data-channel
DOTS T. Reddy
Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track M. Boucadair
Expires: September 11, 2017 Orange
K. Nishizuka
NTT Communications
L. Xia
Huawei
P. Patil
Cisco
A. Mortensen
Arbor Networks, Inc.
N. Teague
Verisign, Inc.
March 10, 2017
Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
draft-reddy-dots-data-channel-05
Abstract
The document specifies a Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) data channel used for bulk exchange of data not
easily or appropriately communicated through the DOTS signal channel
under attack conditions. This is a companion document to the DOTS
signal channel specification.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2017.
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Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Notational Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. DOTS Data Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. DOTS Data Channel YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1. Identifier Model structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. Identifier Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3. Filter Model and structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.1. Create Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.2. Delete Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.3. Retrieving Installed Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3. Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3.1. Install Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3.2. Remove Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3.3. Retrieving Installed Filtering Rules . . . . . . . . 16
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1. DOTS Data Channel JSON Attribute Mappings Registry . . . 17
4.2. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.3. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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1. Introduction
A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make
machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users.
In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising
enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and
amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application
server, a client, a router, a firewall, or an entire network.
DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) defines two channels: signal and
data channels [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] (Figure 1). The DOTS
signal channel used to convey that a network is under a DDOS attack
to an upstream DOTS server so that appropriate mitigation actions are
undertaken on the suspect traffic is further elaborated in
[I-D.reddy-dots-signal-channel]. The DOTS data channel is used for
infrequent bulk data exchange between DOTS agents in the aim to
significantly augment attack response coordination.
+---------------+ +---------------+
| | <------- Signal Channel ------> | |
| DOTS Client | | DOTS Server |
| | <======= Data Channel ======> | |
+---------------+ +---------------+
Figure 1: DOTS Channels
Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] identifies that the DOTS
data channel is used to perform the tasks listed below:
o Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to install or
remove traffic filters, dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic
and permitting white-listed traffic. Sample use cases for
populating black- or white-list filtering rules are detailed
hereafter:
A. If a network resource (DOTS client) detects a potential DDoS
attack from a set of IP addresses, the DOTS client informs its
servicing router (DOTS gateway) of all suspect IP addresses
that need to be blocked or black-listed for further
investigation. The DOTS client could also specify a list of
protocols and ports in the black-list rule. That DOTS gateway
in-turn propagates the black-listed IP addresses to the DOTS
server which will undertake appropriate action so that traffic
from these IP addresses to the target network (specified by
the DOTS client) is blocked.
B. An enterprise network has partner sites from which only
legitimate traffic arrives and the enterprise network wants to
ensure that the traffic from these sites is not penalized
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during DDOS attacks. The DOTS client uses DOTS data channel
to convey the white-listed IP addresses or prefixes of the
partner sites to its DOTS server. The DOTS server uses this
information to white-list flows from such IP addresses or
prefixes reaching the enterprise network.
o Creating identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for
which mitigation may be requested:
A. The DOTS client may submit to the DOTS server a collection of
prefixes it wants to refer to by alias when requesting
mitigation, to which the server would respond with a success
status and the new prefix group alias, or an error status and
message in the event the DOTS client's data channel request
failed (see requirement OP-006 in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
and Section 2 in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]).
2. Notational Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in
[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].
For simplicity, all of the examples in this document use "/restconf"
as the discovered RESTCONF API root path. Many protocol header lines
and message-body text within examples throughout the document are
split into multiple lines for display purposes only. When a line
ends with backslash ('\') as the last character, the line is wrapped
for display purposes. It is to be considered to be joined to the
next line by deleting the backslash, the following line break, and
the leading whitespace of the next line.
3. DOTS Data Channel
The DOTS data channel is intended to be used for bulk data exchanges
between DOTS agents. Unlike the signal channel, which must operate
nominally even when confronted with despite signal degradation due to
packet loss, the data channel is not expected to be constructed to
deal with attack conditions.
As the primary function of the data channel is data exchange, a
reliable transport is required in order for DOTS agents to detect
data delivery success or failure. RESTCONF [RFC8040] over TLS
[RFC5246] over TCP is used for DOTS data channel (Figure 2).
RESTCONF uses HTTP methods to provide CRUD operations on a conceptual
datastore containing YANG-defined data, which is compatible with a
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server which implements NETCONF datastores. The HTTP POST, PUT,
PATCH, and DELETE methods are used to edit data resources represented
by DOTS data channel YANG data models. These basic edit operations
allow the DOTS data channel running configuration to be altered by a
DOTS client. DOTS data channel configuration data and state data can
be retrieved with the GET method. HTTP status codes are used to
report success or failure for RESTCONF operations. The DOTS client
will perform the root resource discovery procedure discussed in
Section 3.1 of [RFC8040] to determine the root of the RESTCONF API.
After discovering the RESTCONF API root, the DOTS client MUST use
this value as the initial part of the path in the request URI, in any
subsequent request to the DOTS server. The DOTS server can
optionally support retrieval of the YANG modules it supports
(Section 3.7 in [RFC8040]), for example, DOTS client can use RESTCONF
to retreive the company proprietary YANG model supported by the DOTS
server.
Note: This document uses RESTCONF, a protocol based on HTTP
[RFC7230], for configuring data defined in YANG version 1 [RFC6020]
or YANG version 1.1 [RFC7950], using the datastore concepts defined
in the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [RFC6241]. RESTCONF
combines the simplicity of the HTTP protocol with the predictability
and automation potential of a schema-driven API. RESTCONF offers a
simple subset of NETCONF functionality and provides a simplified
interface using REST-like API which addresses the needs of the DOTS
data channel and hence an optimal choice.
+--------------+
| DOTS |
+--------------+
| RESTCONF |
+--------------+
| TLS |
+--------------+
| TCP |
+--------------+
| IP |
+--------------+
Figure 2: Abstract Layering of DOTS data channel over RESTCONF over
TLS
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] payload is used to
propogate data channel specific payload messages that convey request
parameters and response information such as errors. This
specification uses the encoding rules defined in [RFC7951] for
representing DOTS data channel configuration data defined using YANG
(Section 3.1) as JSON text.
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A DOTS client registers itself to its DOTS server(s) in order to set
up DOTS data channel related configuration data on the DOTS server
and receive state data (i.e., non-configuration data) from the DOTS
server. A single DOTS data channel between DOTS agents can be used
to exchange multiple requests and multiple responses. To reduce DOTS
client and DOTS server workload, DOTS client SHOULD re-use the TLS
session. While the communication to the DOTS server is quiescent,
the DOTS client MAY probe the server to ensure it has maintained
cryptographic state. Such probes can also keep alive firewall or NAT
bindings. A TLS heartbeat [RFC6520] verifies the DOTS server still
has TLS state by returning a TLS message.
3.1. DOTS Data Channel YANG Model
3.1.1. Identifier Model structure
This document defines a YANG [RFC6020] data model for creating
identifers, such as names or aliases, for resources for which
mitigation may be requested. Such identifiers may then be used in
subsequent DOTS signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to
the resources under attack.
This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-data-channel-
identifier", which has the following structure:
module: ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier
+--rw identifier
+--rw alias* [alias-name]
+--rw alias-name string
+--rw ip* inet:ip-address
+--rw prefix* inet:ip-prefix
+--rw port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
| +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
| +--rw upper-port inet:port-number
+--rw traffic-protocol* uint8
+--rw FQDN* inet:domain-name
+--rw URI* inet:uri
+--rw E.164* string
3.1.2. Identifier Model
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier@2016-11-28.yang"
module ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier {
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier";
prefix "alias";
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix "inet";
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}
organization "Cisco Systems, Inc.";
contact "Tirumaleswar Reddy <tireddy@cisco.com>";
description
"This module contains YANG definition for
configuring identifiers for resources using DOTS data channel";
revision 2016-11-28 {
reference
"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dots-data-channel";
}
container identifier {
description "top level container for identifiers";
list alias {
key alias-name;
description "list of identifiers";
leaf alias-name {
type string;
description "alias name";
}
leaf-list ip {
type inet:ip-address;
description "IP address";
}
leaf-list prefix {
type inet:ip-prefix;
description "prefix";
}
list port-range {
key "lower-port upper-port";
description "Port range. When only lower-port is present,
it represents a single port.";
leaf lower-port {
type inet:port-number;
mandatory true;
description "lower port";
}
leaf upper-port {
type inet:port-number;
must ". >= ../lower-port" {
error-message
"The upper-port must be greater than or
equal to lower-port";
}
description "upper port";
}
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}
leaf-list traffic-protocol {
type uint8;
description "Internet Protocol number";
}
leaf-list FQDN {
type inet:domain-name;
description "FQDN";
}
leaf-list URI {
type inet:uri;
description "URI";
}
leaf-list E.164 {
type string;
description "E.164 number";
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
3.1.3. Filter Model and structure
This document uses the Access Control List (ACL) YANG data model
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] for the configuration of filtering rules.
ACL is explained in Section 1 of [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model].
Examples of such configuration include:
o Black-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the
DOTS server about sources from which traffic should be suppressed.
o White-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the
DOTS server about sources from which traffic should always be
accepted.
o Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to install or
remove traffic filters, dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic
and permitting white-listed traffic.
3.2. Identifiers
3.2.1. Create Identifiers
A POST request is used to create identifiers, such as names or
aliases, for resources for which a mitigation may be requested. Such
identifiers may then be used in subsequent DOTS signal channel
exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack
(Figure 3).
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POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Format: "application/yang.api+json"
{
"ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier": {
"alias": [
{
"alias-name": "string",
"ip": [
"string"
],
"prefix": [
"string"
],
"port-range": [
{
"lower-port": integer,
"upper-port": integer
}
],
"traffic-protocol": [
integer
],
"FQDN": [
"string"
],
"URI": [
"string"
],
"E.164": [
"string"
]
}
]
}
}
Figure 3: POST to create identifiers
The header parameters are described below:
alias-name: Name of the alias. This is a mandatory attribute.
traffic-protocol: Internet Protocol numbers. This is an optional
attribute.
port-range: The port range, lower-port for lower port number and
upper-port for upper port number. For TCP, UDP, SCTP, or DCCP:
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the range of ports (e.g., 80 to 8080). This is an optional
attribute.
ip: IP addresses are separated by commas. This is an optional
attribute.
prefix: Prefixes are separated by commas. This is an optional
attribute.
FQDN: Fully Qualified Domain Name, is the full name of a system,
rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is a
hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN. This is an optional
attribute.
URI: Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). This is an optional
attribute.
E.164: E.164 number. This is an optional attribute.
In the POST request at least one of the attributes ip or prefix or
FQDN or URI MUST be present. DOTS agents can safely ignore Vendor-
Specific parameters they don't understand.
Figure 4 shows a POST request to create alias called "https1" for
HTTP(S) servers with IP addresses 2002:db8:6401::1 and
2002:db8:6401::2 listening on port 443.
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Content-Format: "application/yang.api+json"
{
"ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier": {
"alias": [
{
"alias-name": "Server1",
"traffic-protocol": [
6
],
"ip": [
"2002:db8:6401::1",
"2002:db8:6401::2"
],
"port-range": [
{
"lower-port": 443
}
]
}
]
}
}
Figure 4: POST to create identifiers
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The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
using HTTP response codes. HTTP 2xx codes are success, HTTP 4xx
codes are some sort of invalid requests and 5xx codes are returned if
the DOTS server has erred or it is incapable of accepting the alias.
Response code 201 (Created) will be returned in the response if the
DOTS server has accepted the alias. If the request is missing one or
more mandatory attributes then 400 (Bad Request) will be returned in
the response or if the request contains invalid or unknown parameters
then 400 (Invalid query) will be returned in the response. The HTTP
response will include the JSON body received in the request.
The DOTS client can use the PUT request (Section 4.5 in [RFC8040]) to
create or modify the aliases in the DOTS server.
3.2.2. Delete Identifiers
A DELETE request is used to delete identifiers maintained by a DOTS
server (Figure 5).
DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier\
/alias=Server1 HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Figure 5: DELETE identifier
In RESTCONF, URI-encoded path expressions are used. A RESTCONF data
resource identifier is encoded from left to right, starting with the
top-level data node, according to the "api-path" rule defined in
Section 3.5.3.1 of [RFC8040]. The data node in the above path
expression is a YANG list node and MUST be encoded according to the
rules defined in Section 3.5.1 of [RFC8040].
If the DOTS server does not find the alias name conveyed in the
DELETE request in its configuration data, then it responds with a 404
(Not Found) error response code. The DOTS server successfully
acknowledges a DOTS client's request to remove the identifier using
204 (No Content) in the response.
3.2.3. Retrieving Installed Identifiers
A GET request is used to retrieve the set of installed identifiers
from a DOTS server (Section 3.3.1 in [RFC8040]). Figure 6 shows how
to retrieve all the identifiers that were instantiated by the DOTS
client. The content parameter and its permitted values are defined
in Section 4.8.1 of [RFC8040].
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GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier?\
content=config HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Accept: application/yang-data+json
Figure 6: GET to retrieve all the installed identifiers
Figure 7 shows response for all identifiers on the DOTS server.
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{
"ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier": [
{
"alias": [
{
"alias-name": "Server1",
"traffic-protocol": [
6
],
"ip": [
"2002:db8:6401::1",
"2002:db8:6401::2"
],
"port-range": [
{
"lower-port": 443
}
]
}
]
},
{
"alias": [
{
"alias-name": "Server2",
"traffic-protocol": [
6
],
"ip": [
"2002:db8:6401::10",
"2002:db8:6401::20"
],
"port-range": [
{
"lower-port": 80
}
]
}
]
}
]
}
Figure 7: Response body
If the DOTS server does not find the alias name conveyed in the GET
request in its configuration data, then it responds with a 404 (Not
Found) error response code.
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3.3. Filtering Rules
The DOTS server either receives the filtering rules directly from the
DOTS client or via the DOTS gateway. If the DOTS client signals the
filtering rules via the DOTS gateway then the DOTS gateway validates
if the DOTS client is authorized to signal the filtering rules and if
the client is authorized propagates the rules to the DOTS server.
Likewise, the DOTS server validates if the DOTS gateway is authorized
to signal the filtering rules. To create or purge filters, the DOTS
client sends HTTP requests to the DOTS gateway. The DOTS gateway
validates the rules in the requests and proxies the requests
containing the filtering rules to a DOTS server. When the DOTS
gateway receives the associated HTTP response from the DOTS server,
it propagates the response back to the DOTS client.
The following APIs define means for a DOTS client to configure
filtering rules on a DOTS server.
3.3.1. Install Filtering Rules
A POST request is used to push filtering rules to a DOTS server.
Figure 8 shows a POST request example to block traffic from
10.10.10.1/24, destined to 11.11.11.1/24. The ACL JSON configuration
for the filtering rule is generated using the ACL YANG data model
defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] and the ACL configuration XML
for the filtering rule is specified in Section 4.3 of
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]. This specification updates the ACL YANG
data model defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] to support rate-
limit action.
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POST /restconf/data/ietf-access-control-list HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Content-Format: "application/yang.api+json"
{
"ietf-access-control-list:access-lists": {
"acl": [
{
"acl-name": "sample-ipv4-acl",
"acl-type": "ipv4",
"access-list-entries": {
"ace": [
{
"rule-name": "rule1",
"matches": {
"source-ipv4-network": "10.10.10.1/24",
"destination-ipv4-network": "11.11.11.1/24"
},
"actions": {
"deny": [null]
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
Figure 8: POST to install filterng rules
The header parameters defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] are
discussed below:
acl-name: The name of access-list. This is a mandatory attribute.
acl-type: Indicates the primary intended type of match criteria
(e.g. IPv4, IPv6). This is a mandatory attribute.
protocol: Internet Protocol numbers. This is an optional
attribute.
source-ipv4-network: The source IPv4 prefix. This is an optional
attribute.
destination-ipv4-network: The destination IPv4 prefix. This is an
optional attribute.
actions: "deny" or "permit" or "rate-limit". "permit" action is
used to white-list traffic. "deny" action is used to black-list
traffic. "rate-limit" action is used to rate-limit traffic, the
allowed traffic rate is represented in bytes per second indicated
in IEEE floating point format [IEEE.754.1985]. If actions
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attribute is not specified in the request then the default action
is "deny". This is an optional attribute.
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
using HTTP response codes. HTTP 2xx codes are success, HTTP 4xx
codes are some sort of invalid requests and 5xx codes are returned if
the DOTS server has erred or it is incapable of configuring the
filtering rules. Response code 201 (Created) will be returned in the
response if the DOTS server has accepted the filtering rules. If the
request is missing one or more mandatory attributes then 400 (Bad
Request) will be returned in the response or if the request contains
invalid or unknown parameters then 400 (Invalid query) will be
returned in the response.
The DOTS client can use the PUT request to create or modify the
filtering rules in the DOTS server.
3.3.2. Remove Filtering Rules
A DELETE request is used to delete filtering rules from a DOTS server
(Figure 9).
DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-access-control-list:access-lists/acl-name\
=sample-ipv4-acl&acl-type=ipv4 HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Figure 9: DELETE to remove the filtering rules
If the DOTS server does not find the access list name and access list
type conveyed in the DELETE request in its configuration data, then
it responds with a 404 (Not Found) error response code. The DOTS
server successfully acknowledges a DOTS client's request to withdraw
the filtering rules using 204 (No Content) response code, and removes
the filtering rules as soon as possible.
3.3.3. Retrieving Installed Filtering Rules
The DOTS client periodically queries the DOTS server to check the
counters for installed filtering rules. A GET request is used to
retrieve filtering rules from a DOTS server. Figure 10 shows how to
retrieve all the filtering rules programmed by the DOTS client and
the number of matches for the installed filtering rules.
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GET /restconf/data/ietf-access-control-list:access-lists?content=all HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Accept: application/yang-data+json
Figure 10: GET to retrieve the configuration data and state data for
the filtering rules
If the DOTS server does not find the access list name and access list
type conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data, then it
responds with a 404 (Not Found) error response code.
4. IANA Considerations
This specification registers new parameters for the DOTS data channel
and establishes registries for mappings to JSON attributes.
4.1. DOTS Data Channel JSON Attribute Mappings Registry
A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "DOTS data
channel JSON attribute Mappings Registry". The registry is to be
created as Expert Review Required.
4.2. Registration Template
JSON Attribute:
JSON attribute name.
Description:
Brief description of the attribute.
Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
included but is not required.
4.3. Initial Registry Contents
o JSON Attribute: "alias-name"
o Description: Name of alias.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "traffic-protocol"
o Description: Internet protocol numbers.
o Change Controller: IESG
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o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "port-range"
o Description: The port range, lower-port for lower port number and
upper-port for upper port number. For TCP, UDP, SCTP, or DCCP:
the range of ports (e.g., 80 to 8080).
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "lower-port"
o Description: Lower port number for port range.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "upper-port"
o Description: Upper port number for port range.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "ip"
o Description: IP address.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "prefix"
o Description: IP prefix
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "FQDN"
o Description: Fully Qualified Domain Name, is the full name of a
system, rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is a
hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "URI"
o Description: Uniform Resource Identifier (URI).
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
o JSON Attribute: "E.164"
o Description: E.164 number.
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): this document
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5. Contributors
The following individuals have contributed to this document:
Dan Wing Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com
6. Security Considerations
Authenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and
message integrity. TLS based on client certificate MUST be used for
mutual authentication. The interaction between the DOTS agents
requires Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a cipher suite offering
confidentiality protection and the guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST
be followed to avoid attacks on TLS.
An attacker may be able to inject RST packets, bogus application
segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS authentication is used.
Because the application data is TLS protected, this will not result
in the application receiving bogus data, but it will constitute a DoS
on the connection. This attack can be countered by using TCP-AO
[RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then any bogus packets injected by an
attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO integrity check and therefore
will never reach the TLS layer.
Special care should be taken in order to ensure that the activation
of the proposed mechanism won't have an impact on the stability of
the network (including connectivity and services delivered over that
network).
Involved functional elements in the cooperation system must establish
exchange instructions and notification over a secure and
authenticated channel. Adequate filters can be enforced to avoid
that nodes outside a trusted domain can inject request such as
deleting filtering rules. Nevertheless, attacks can be initiated
from within the trusted domain if an entity has been corrupted.
Adequate means to monitor trusted nodes should also be enabled.
7. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Christian Jacquenet, Roland Dobbins, Andrew Mortensen,
Roman Danyliw, Ehud Doron and Gilbert Clark for the discussion and
comments.
8. References
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8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]
Mortensen, A., Andreasen, F., Reddy, T.,
christopher_gray3@cable.comcast.com, c., Compton, R., and
N. Teague, "Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Architecture", draft-ietf-dots-
architecture-01 (work in progress), October 2016.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]
Bogdanovic, D., Koushik, K., Huang, L., and D. Blair,
"Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model",
draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-09 (work in progress), October
2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925,
June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC7951] Lhotka, L., "JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",
RFC 7951, DOI 10.17487/RFC7951, August 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7951>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
8.2. Informative References
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[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and T. Reddy, "Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-03 (work in
progress), October 2016.
[I-D.reddy-dots-signal-channel]
Reddy, T., Boucadair, M., and P. Patil, "Distributed
Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal
Channel", draft-reddy-dots-signal-channel-09 (work in
progress), March 2017.
[IEEE.754.1985]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
"Standard for Binary Floating-Point Arithmetic", August
1985.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6520] Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport
Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", RFC 6520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6520, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6520>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
Authors' Addresses
Tirumaleswar Reddy
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Cessna Business Park, Varthur Hobli
Sarjapur Marathalli Outer Ring Road
Bangalore, Karnataka 560103
India
Email: tireddy@cisco.com
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Mohamed Boucadair
Orange
Rennes 35000
France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Kaname Nishizuka
NTT Communications
GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku
Tokyo 108-8118
Japan
Email: kaname@nttv6.jp
Liang Xia
Huawei
101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012
China
Email: frank.xialiang@huawei.com
Prashanth Patil
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Email: praspati@cisco.com
Andrew Mortensen
Arbor Networks, Inc.
2727 S. State St
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
United States
Email: amortensen@arbor.net
Nik Teague
Verisign, Inc.
United States
Email: nteague@verisign.com
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