Internet DRAFT - draft-reddy-dots-telemetry
draft-reddy-dots-telemetry
DOTS T. Reddy
Internet-Draft McAfee
Intended status: Standards Track M. Boucadair
Expires: April 20, 2020 Orange
E. Doron
Radware Ltd.
M. Chen
CMCC
October 18, 2019
Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
draft-reddy-dots-telemetry-04
Abstract
This document aims to enrich DOTS signal channel protocol with
various telemetry attributes allowing optimal DDoS attack mitigation.
This document specifies the normal traffic baseline and attack
traffic telemetry attributes a DOTS client can convey to its DOTS
server in the mitigation request, the mitigation status telemetry
attributes a DOTS server can communicate to a DOTS client, and the
mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes a DOTS client can
communicate to a DOTS server. The telemetry attributes can assist
the mitigator to choose the DDoS mitigation techniques and perform
optimal DDoS attack mitigation.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 20, 2020.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. DOTS Telemetry: Overview & Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Generic Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. DOTS Client Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. DOTS Gateways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. DOTS Telemetry Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Pre-mitigation DOTS Telemetry Attributes . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.1. Total Traffic Normal Baseline . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.2. Total Pipe Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.3. Total Attack Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.4. Total Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.5. Total Connections Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.6. Total Attack Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1.7. Attack Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. DOTS Client to Server Mitigation Efficacy DOTS Telemetry
Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2.1. Total Attack Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.2. Attack Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3. DOTS Server to Client Mitigation Status DOTS Telemetry
Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3.1. Mitigation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. DOTS Telemetry Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. Convey DOTS Telemetry Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. Delete DOTS Telemetry Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. DOTS Telemetry YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. Tree Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.1. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . . 38
8.2. DOTS Signal Telemetry YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
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9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1. Introduction
The Internet security 'battle' between the adversary and security
countermeasures is an everlasting one. DDoS attacks have become more
vicious and sophisticated in almost all aspects of their maneuvers
and malevolent intentions. IT organizations and service providers
are facing DDoS attacks that fall into two broad categories: Network/
Transport layer attacks and Application layer attacks. Network/
Transport layer attacks target the victim's infrastructure. These
attacks are not necessarily aimed at taking down the actual delivered
services, but rather to eliminate various network elements (routers,
switches, firewalls, transit links, and so on) from serving
legitimate user traffic. The main method of such attacks is to send
a large volume or high PPS of traffic toward the victim's
infrastructure. Typically, attack volumes may vary from a few 100
Mbps/PPS to 100s of Gbps or even Tbps. Attacks are commonly carried
out leveraging botnets and attack reflectors for amplification
attacks, such as NTP, DNS, SNMP, SSDP, and so on. Application layer
attacks target various applications. Typical examples include
attacks against HTTP/HTTPS, DNS, SIP, SMTP, and so on. However, all
valid applications with their port numbers open at network edges can
be attractive attack targets. Application layer attacks are
considered more complex and hard to categorize, therefore harder to
detect and mitigate efficiently.
To compound the problem, attackers also leverage multi-vectored
attacks. These merciless attacks are assembled from dynamic attack
vectors (Network/Application) and tactics. As such, multiple attack
vectors formed by multiple attack types and volumes are launched
simultaneously towards a victim. Multi-vector attacks are harder to
detect and defend. Multiple and simultaneous mitigation techniques
are needed to defeat such attack campaigns. It is also common for
attackers to change attack vectors right after a successful
mitigation, burdening their opponents with changing their defense
methods.
The ultimate conclusion derived from these real scenarios is that
modern attacks detection and mitigation are most certainly
complicated and highly convoluted tasks. They demand a comprehensive
knowledge of the attack attributes, the targeted normal behavior/
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traffic patterns, as well as the attacker's on-going and past
actions. Even more challenging, retrieving all the analytics needed
for detecting these attacks is not simple to obtain with the
industry's current capabilities.
The DOTS signal channel protocol [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] is
used to carry information about a network resource or a network (or a
part thereof) that is under a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attack. Such information is sent by a DOTS client to one or multiple
DOTS servers so that appropriate mitigation actions are undertaken on
traffic deemed suspicious. Various use cases are discussed in
[I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].
Typically, DOTS clients can be integrated within a DDoS attack
detector, or network and security elements that have been actively
engaged with ongoing attacks. The DOTS client mitigation environment
determines that it is no longer possible or practical for it to
handle these attacks. This can be due to lack of resources or
security capabilities, as derived from the complexities and the
intensity of these attacks. In this circumstance, the DOTS client
has invaluable knowledge about the actual attacks that need to be
handled by the DOTS server. By enabling the DOTS client to share
this comprehensive knowledge of an ongoing attack under specific
circumstances, the DOTS server can drastically increase its abilities
to accomplish successful mitigation. While the attack is being
handled by the DOTS server associated mitigation resources, the DOTS
server has the knowledge about the ongoing attack mitigation. The
DOTS server can share this information with the DOTS client so that
the client can better assess and evaluate the actual mitigation
realized.
In some deployments, DOTS clients can send mitigation hints derived
from attack details to DOTS servers, with the full understanding that
the DOTS server may ignore mitigation hints, as described in
[RFC8612] (Gen-004). Mitigation hints will be transmitted across the
DOTS signal channel, as the data channel may not be functional during
an attack. How a DOTS server is handling normal and attack traffic
attributes, and mitigation hints is implementation-specific.
Both DOTS client and server can benefit this information by
presenting various information in relevant management, reporting, and
portal systems.
This document defines DOTS telemetry attributes the DOTS client can
convey to the DOTS server, and vice versa. The DOTS telemetry
attributes are not mandatory fields. Nevertheless, when DOTS
telemetry attributes are available to a DOTS agent, and absent any
policy, it can signal the attributes in order to optimize the overall
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mitigation service provisioned using DOTS. Some of the DOTS
telemetry data are not shared during an attack time.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [RFC8612].
"DOTS Telemetry" is defined as the collection of attributes that are
used to characterize normal traffic baseline, attacks and their
mitigation measures, and any related information that may help in
enforcing countermeasures. The DOTS Telemetry is an optional set of
attributes that can be signaled in the DOTS signal channel protocol.
The meaning of the symbols in YANG tree diagrams is defined in
[RFC8340].
3. DOTS Telemetry: Overview & Purpose
When signaling a mitigation request, it is most certainly beneficial
for the DOTS client to signal to the DOTS server any knowledge
regarding ongoing attacks. This can happen in cases where DOTS
clients are asking the DOTS server for support in defending against
attacks that they have already detected and/or mitigated. These
actions taken by DOTS clients are referred to as "signaling the DOTS
Telemetry".
If attacks are already detected and categorized by the DOTS client
domain, the DOTS server, and its associated mitigation services, can
proactively benefit this information and optimize the overall service
delivered. It is important to note that DOTS client and server
detection and mitigation approaches can be different, and can
potentially outcome different results and attack classifications.
The DDoS mitigation service treats the ongoing attack details from
the client as hints and cannot completely rely or trust the attack
details conveyed by the DOTS client.
A basic requirement of security operation teams is to be aware and
get visibility into the attacks they need to handle. The DOTS server
security operation teams benefit from the DOTS telemetry, especially
from the reports of ongoing attacks. Even if some mitigation can be
automated, operational teams can use the DOTS telemetry to be
prepared for attack mitigation and to assign the correct resources
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(operation staff, networking and mitigation) for the specific
service. Similarly, security operation personnel at the DOTS client
side ask for feedback about their requests for protection.
Therefore, it is valuable for the DOTS server to share DOTS telemetry
with the DOTS client. Thus mutual sharing of information is crucial
for "closing the mitigation loop" between the DOTS client and server.
For the server side team, it is important to realize that the same
attacks that the DOTS server's mitigation resources are seeing are
those that the DOTS client is asking to mitigate. For the DOTS
client side team, it is important to realize that the DOTS clients
receive the required service. For example: understanding that "I
asked for mitigation of two attacks and my DOTS server detects and
mitigates only one...". Cases of inconsistency in attack
classification between DOTS client and server can be high-lighted,
and maybe handled, using the DOTS telemetry attributes.
In addition, management and orchestration systems, at both DOTS
client and server sides, can potentially use DOTS telemetry as a
feedback to automate various control and management activities
derived from ongoing information signaled.
If the DOTS server's mitigation resources have the capabilities to
facilitate the DOTS telemetry, the DOTS server adopts its protection
strategy and activates the required countermeasures immediately
(automation enabled). The overall results of this adoption are
optimized attack mitigation decisions and actions.
The DOTS telemetry can also be used to tune the DDoS mitigators with
the correct state of the attack. During the last few years, DDoS
attack detection technologies have evolved from threshold-based
detection (that is, cases when all or specific parts of traffic cross
a pre-defined threshold for a certain period of time is considered as
an attack) to an "anomaly detection" approach. In anomaly detection,
the main idea is to maintain rigorous learning of "normal" behavior
and where an "anomaly" (or an attack) is identified and categorized
based on the knowledge about the normal behavior and a deviation from
this normal behavior. Machine learning approaches are used such that
the actual "traffic thresholds" are "automatically calculated" by
learning the protected entity normal traffic behavior during peace
time. The normal traffic characterization learned is referred to as
the "normal traffic baseline". An attack is detected when the
victim's actual traffic is deviating from this normal baseline.
In addition, subsequent activities toward mitigating an attack are
much more challenging. The ability to distinguish legitimate traffic
from attacker traffic on a per packet basis is complex. This
complexity originates from the fact that the packet itself may look
"legitimate" and no attack signature can be identified. The anomaly
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can be identified only after detailed statistical analysis. DDoS
attack mitigators use the normal baseline during the mitigation of an
attack to identify and categorize the expected appearance of a
specific traffic pattern. Particularly the mitigators use the normal
baseline to recognize the "level of normality" needs to be achieved
during the various mitigation process.
Normal baseline calculation is performed based on continuous learning
of the normal behavior of the protected entities. The minimum
learning period varies from hours to days and even weeks, depending
on the protected application behavior. The baseline cannot be
learned during active attacks because attack conditions do not
characterize the protected entities' normal behavior.
If the DOTS client has calculated the normal baseline of its
protected entities, signaling this attribute to the DOTS server along
with the attack traffic levels is significantly valuable. The DOTS
server benefits from this telemetry by tuning its mitigation
resources with the DOTS client's normal baseline. The DOTS server
mitigators use the baseline to familiarize themselves with the attack
victim's normal behavior and target the baseline as the level of
normality they need to achieve. Consequently, the overall mitigation
performances obtained are dramatically improved in terms of time to
mitigate, accuracy, false-negative, false-positive, and other
measures.
Mitigation of attacks without having certain knowledge of normal
traffic can be inaccurate at best. This is especially true for
recursive signaling (see Section 3.2.3 in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]).
In addition, the highly diverse types of use-cases where DOTS clients
are integrated also emphasize the need for knowledge of client
behavior. Consequently, common global thresholds for attack
detection practically cannot be realized. Each DOTS client can have
its own levels of traffic and normal behavior. Without facilitating
normal baseline signaling, it may be very difficult for DOTS servers
in some cases to detect and mitigate the attacks accurately. It is
important to emphasize that it is practically impossible for the
server's mitigators to calculate the normal baseline, in cases they
do not have any knowledge of the traffic beforehand. In addition,
baseline learning requires a period of time that cannot be afforded
during active attack. Of course, this information can provided using
out-of-band mechanisms or manual configuration at the risk to
maintain inaccurate information as the network evolves and "normal"
patterns change. The use of a dynamic and collaborative means
between the DOTS client and server to identify and share key
parameters for the sake of efficient DDoS protect is valuable.
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During a high volume attack, DOTS client pipes can be totally
saturated. The DOTS client asks the DOTS server to handle the attack
upstream so that DOTS client pipes return to a reasonable load level
(normal pattern, ideally). At this point, it is essential to ensure
that the mitigator does not overwhelm the DOTS client pipes by
sending back "clean traffic", or what it believes is "clean". This
can happen when the mitigator has not managed to detect and mitigate
all the attacks launched towards the client. In this case, it can be
valuable to clients to signal to server the "Total pipe capacity",
which is the level of traffic the DOTS client domain can absorb from
the upstream network. Dynamic updating of the condition of pipes
between DOTS agents while they are under a DDoS attack is essential.
For example, for cases of multiple DOTS clients share the same
physical connectivity pipes. It is important to note, that the term
"pipe" noted here does not necessary represent physical pipe, but
rather represents the current level of traffic client can observe
from server. The server should activate other mechanisms to ensure
it does not saturate the client's pipes unintentionally. The rate-
limit action defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] can be a
reasonable candidate to achieve this objective; the client can ask
for the type of traffic (such as ICMP, UDP, TCP port 80) it prefers
to limit.
To summarize, timely and effective signaling of up-to-date DOTS
telemetry to all elements involved in the mitigation process is
essential and absolutely improves the overall service effectiveness.
Bi-directional feedback between DOTS agents is required for the
increased awareness of each party, supporting superior and highly
efficient attack mitigation service.
4. Generic Considerations
4.1. DOTS Client Identification
Following the rules in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], a unique
identifier is generated by a DOTS client to prevent request
collisions.
4.2. DOTS Gateways
DOTS gateways may be located between DOTS clients and servers. The
considerations elaborated in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] must be
followed. In particular, 'cdid' attribute is used to unambiguously
identify a DOTS client domain.
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5. DOTS Telemetry Attributes
There are two broad types of DDoS attacks, one is bandwidth consuming
attack, the other is target resource consuming attack. This section
outlines the set of DOTS telemetry attributes that covers both the
types of attacks. The ultimate objective of these attributes is to
allow for the complete knowledge of attacks and the various
particulars that can best characterize attacks.
The description and motivation behind each attribute were presented
in Section 3. DOTS telemetry attributes are optionally signaled and
therefore MUST NOT be treated as mandatory fields in the DOTS signal
channel protocol.
5.1. Pre-mitigation DOTS Telemetry Attributes
The pre-mitigation telemetry attributes are indicated by the path-
suffix '/telemetry'. The '/telemetry' is appended to the path-prefix
to form the URI used with a CoAP request to signal the DOTS
telemetry. The following pre-mitigation telemetry attributes can be
signaled from the DOTS client to the DOTS server.
o DISCUSSION NOTES: (1) Some telemetry can be communicated using
DOTS data channel. (2) Evaluate the risk of fragmentation,. Some
of the information is not specific to each mitigation request. (3)
Should we define other configuration parameters to be controlled
by a DOTS client, e.g., Indicate a favorite measurement unit?
Indicate a minimum notification interval?
5.1.1. Total Traffic Normal Baseline
The low percentile (10th percentile), mid percentile (50th
percentile), high percentile (90th percentile) and peak values (100th
percentile) of "Total traffic normal baselines" measured in packets
per second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per
Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second or
gigabytes per second. For example, 90th percentile says that 90% of
the time, the total normal traffic is below the limit specified. The
traffic normal baseline is represented for a target and is transport-
protocol specific.
5.1.2. Total Pipe Capability
The limit of traffic volume, in packets per second (PPS) or kilo
packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per Second (BPS), and in kilobytes
per second or megabytes per second or gigabytes per second. These
attributes represents the DOTS client domain pipe limit.
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o NOTE: Multi-homing case to be considered.
5.1.3. Total Attack Traffic
The total attack traffic can be identified by the DOTS client
domain's DDoS Mitigation System (DMS) or DDoS Detector. The low
percentile (10th percentile), mid percentile (50th percentile), high
percentile (90th percentile) and peak values of total attack traffic
measured in packets per second (PPS) or kilo packets per second
(Kpps) and Bits per Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or
megabytes per second or gigabytes per second. The total attack
traffic is represented for a target and is transport-protocol
specific.
5.1.4. Total Traffic
The low percentile (10th percentile), mid percentile (50th
percentile), high percentile (90th percentile) and peak values of
total traffic during a DDoS attack measured in packets per second
(PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per Second (BPS),
and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second gigabytes per
second. The total traffic is represented for a target and is
transport-protocol specific.
5.1.5. Total Connections Capacity
If the target is subjected to resource consuming DDoS attack, the
following optional attributes for the target per transport-protocol
are useful to detect resource consuming DDoS attacks:
o The maximum number of simultaneous connections that are allowed to
the target server. The threshold is transport-protocol specific
because the target server could support multiple protocols.
o The maximum number of simultaneous connections that are allowed to
the target server per client.
o The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections that are
allowed to the target server. The term "embryonic connection"
refers to a connection whose connection handshake is not finished
and embryonic connection is only possible in connection-oriented
transport protocols like TCP or SCTP.
o The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections that are
allowed to the target server per client.
o The maximum number of connections allowed per second to the target
server.
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o The maximum number of connections allowed per second to the target
server per client.
o The maximum number of requests allowed per second to the target
server.
o The maximum number of requests allowed per second to the target
server per client.
o The maximum number of partial requests allowed per second to the
target server.
o The maximum number of partial requests allowed per second to the
target server per client.
5.1.6. Total Attack Connections
If the target is subjected to resource consuming DDoS attack, the low
percentile (10th percentile), mid percentile (50th percentile), high
percentile (90th percentile) and peak values of following optional
attributes for the target per transport-protocol are included to
represent the attack characteristics:
o The number of simultaneous attack connections to the target
server.
o The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to the target
server.
o The number of attack connections per second to the target server.
o The number of attack requests to the target server.
5.1.7. Attack Details
Various information and details that describe the on-going attacks
that needs to be mitigated by the DOTS server. The attack details
need to cover well-known and common attacks (such as a SYN Flood)
along with new emerging or vendor-specific attacks. The attack
details can also be signaled from the DOTS server to the DOTS client.
For example, the DOTS server co-located with a DDoS detector collects
monitoring information from the target network, identifies DDoS
attack using statistical analysis or deep learning techniques, and
signals the attack details to the DOTS client. The client can use
the attack details to decide whether to trigger the mitigation
request or not. Further, the security operation personnel at the
DOTS client domain can use the attack details to determine the
protection strategy and select the appropriate DOTS server for
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mitigating the attack. The DOTS client can receive asynchronous
notifications of the attack details from the DOTS server using the
Observe option defined in [RFC7641].
The following new fields describing the on-going attack are
discussed:
vendor-id: Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number as
registered with IANA [Enterprise-Numbers]. It is a four-byte
integer value.
This is a mandatory sub-attribute.
attack-id: Unique identifier assigned by the vendor for the attack.
This is a mandatory sub-attribute.
attack-name: Textual representation of attack description. Natural
Language Processing techniques (e.g., word embedding) can possibly
be used to map the attack description to an attack type. Textual
representation of attack solves two problems (a) avoids the need
to create mapping tables manually between vendors (2) Avoids the
need to standardize attack types which keep evolving.
This is a mandatory sub-attribute
attack-severity: Attack severity. Emergency (0), critical (1) and
alert (2).
This is an optional sub-attribute
start-time: The time the attack started. The attack start time is
expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time
(Section 2.4.1 of [RFC7049]). The CBOR encoding is modified so
that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.
This is a mandatory sub-attribute
end-time: The time the attack-id attack ended. The attack
end time is expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in
UTC time (Section 2.4.1 of [RFC7049]). The CBOR encoding is
modified so that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be
omitted.
This is an optional sub-attribute
The following existing fields are re-defined describing the on-going
attack are discussed:
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o The target resource is identified using the attributes 'target-
prefix', 'target-port-range', 'target-protocol', 'target-
fqdn','target-uri', or 'alias-name' defined in the base DOTS
signal channel protocol and at least one of the attributes
'target-prefix', 'target-fqdn','target-uri', or 'alias-name' MUST
be present in the attack details.
A. If the target is subjected to bandwidth consuming attack, the
attributes representing the low percentile (10th percentile),
mid percentile (50th percentile), high percentile (90th
percentile) and peak values of the attack-id attack traffic
measured in packets per second (PPS) or kilo packets per
second (Kpps) and Bits per Second (BPS), and kilobytes per
second or megabytes per second or gigabytes per second are
included.
B. If the target is subjected to resource consuming DDoS attacks,
the same attributes defined for Section 5.1.6 are applicable
for representing the attack.
This is an optional sub-attribute.
o A count of sources involved in the attack targeting the victim and
a list of top talkers among those sources. The top talkers are
represented using the 'source-prefix' defined in
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home]. If the top talkers are spoofed
IP addresses (e.g., reflection attacks) or not. If the target is
subjected to bandwidth consuming attack, the attack traffic from
each of the top talkers represented in the low percentile (10th
percentile), mid percentile (50th percentile), high percentile
(90th percentile) and peak values of traffic measured in packets
per second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per
Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second
gigabytes per second. If the target is subjected to resource
consuming DDoS attacks, the same attributes defined for
Section 5.1.6 are applicable here for representing the attack per
talker. This is an optional sub-attribute.
5.2. DOTS Client to Server Mitigation Efficacy DOTS Telemetry
Attributes
The mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes can be signaled from the
DOTS client to the DOTS server as part of the periodic mitigation
efficacy updates to the server.
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5.2.1. Total Attack Traffic
The low percentile (10th percentile), mid percentile (50th
percentile), high percentile (90th percentile), and peak values of
total attack traffic the DOTS client still sees during the active
mitigation service measured in packets per second (PPS) or kilo
packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per Second (BPS), and kilobytes
per second or megabytes per second or gigabytes per second.
5.2.2. Attack Details
The overall attack details as observed from the DOTS client
perspective during the active mitigation service. The same
attributes defined in Section 5.1.7 are applicable here.
5.3. DOTS Server to Client Mitigation Status DOTS Telemetry Attributes
The mitigation status telemetry attributes can be signaled from the
DOTS server to the DOTS client as part of the periodic mitigation
status update.
5.3.1. Mitigation Status
As defined in [RFC8612], the actual mitigation activities can include
several countermeasure mechanisms. The DOTS server SHOULD signal the
current operational status to each relevant countermeasure. A list
of attacks detected by each countermeasure. The same attributes
defined for Section 5.1.7 are applicable here for describing the
attacks detected and mitigated.
6. DOTS Telemetry Configuration
6.1. Convey DOTS Telemetry Configuration
PUT request is used to convey the configuration parameters for the
telemetry data (e.g., low, mid, or high percentile values). For
example, a DOTS client may contact its DOTS server to change the
default percentiles values used as baseline for telemetry data. In
reference to the example shown in Figure 1, the DOTS client modifies
all percentile reference values.
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Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "telemetry"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tcid=123"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-config": {
"low-percentile": 5.00,
"mid-percentile": 65.00,
"high-percentile": 95.00
}
}
Figure 1: PUT to Convey the DOTS Telemetry Configuration
'cuid' is a mandatory Uri-Path parameter for PUT requests.
The following additional Uri-Path parameter is defined:
tcid: Telemetry Configuration Identifier is an identifier for the
DOTS telemetry configuration data represented as an integer.
This identifier MUST be generated by DOTS clients. 'tcid'
values MUST increase monotonically (when a new PUT is generated
by a DOTS client to convey the configuration parameters for the
telemetry).
This is a mandatory attribute.
At least one configurable attribute MUST be present in the PUT
request.
Attributes and Uri-Path parameters with empty values MUST NOT be
present in a request and render the entire request invalid.
The PUT request with a higher numeric 'tcid' value overrides the DOTS
telemetry configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower
numeric 'tcid' value. To avoid maintaining a long list of 'tcid'
requests from a DOTS client, the lower numeric 'tcid' MUST be
automatically deleted and no longer available at the DOTS server.
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request
using CoAP response codes:
o If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not include
'cuid' or 'tcid' Uri-Path parameters, or contains one or more
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invalid or unknown parameters, 4.00 (Bad Request) MUST be returned
in the response.
o If the DOTS server does not find the 'tcid' parameter value
conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the
DOTS server has accepted the configuration parameters, then a
response code 2.01 (Created) MUST be returned in the response.
o If the DOTS server finds the 'tcid' parameter value conveyed in
the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS server
has accepted the updated configuration parameters, 2.04 (Changed)
MUST be returned in the response.
o If any of the enclosed configurable attribute values are not
acceptable to the DOTS server, 4.22 (Unprocessable Entity) MUST be
returned in the response.
The DOTS client may re-try and send the PUT request with updated
attribute values acceptable to the DOTS server.
A DOTS client may issue a GET message with 'tcid' Uri-Path parameter
to retrieve the negotiated configuration. The response does not need
to include 'tcid' in its message body.
Setting 'low-percentile' to '0.00' indicates that the DOTS client is
not interested in receiving low-percentiles. Likewise, setting 'mid-
percentile' (or 'high-percentile') to the same value as 'low-
percentile' (or 'mid-percentile') indicates that the DOTS client is
not interested in receiving mid-percentiles (or high-percentiles).
For example, a DOTS client can send the request depicted in Figure 2
to inform the server that it is interested in receiving only high-
percentiles.
Notes: Should the server be able to indicate its preference too?
If the DOTS server and client cannot agree on a common telemetry
config, the client does not have to send the telemetry (it will
anyway be ignored by the server).
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Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "telemetry"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tcid=569"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
{
"ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-config": {
"low-percentile": 0.00,
"mid-percentile": 0.00,
"high-percentile": 95.00
}
}
Figure 2: PUT to Disable Low- and Mid-Percentiles
6.2. Delete DOTS Telemetry Configuration
A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS telemetry
configuration data (Figure 3).
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "telemetry"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tcid=123"
Figure 3: Delete Telemetry Configuration
The DOTS server resets the DOTS telemetry configuration back to the
default values and acknowledges a DOTS client's request to remove the
DOTS telemetry configuration using 2.02 (Deleted) response code.
Upon bootstrapping or reboot, a DOTS client MAY send a DELETE request
to set the telemetry parameters to default values. Such a request
does not include any 'tcid'.
7. DOTS Telemetry YANG Module
7.1. Tree Structure
This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-telemetry".
Notes: (1) Check naming conflict to ease CBOR mapping (e.g, low-
percentile is defined as yang:gauge64, list, or container).
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Distinct names may be considered. (2) "protocol" is not indicated
in the telemetry data of "mitigation-scope" message type because
the mitigation request may include a "protocol". Similarly,
"target-*" attributes are not included in the in the telemetry
data of "mitigation-scope" message type because the mitigation
request must include at least one of the "target-*" attribute.
The "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module augments the "mitigation-scope"
type message defined in "ietf-dots-signal" with telemetry data as
depicted in following tree structure:
augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type
/ietf-signal:mitigation-scope/ietf-signal:scope:
+--rw total-attack-traffic* [unit] {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw low-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak? yang:gauge64
+--rw total-attack-connection {dots-telemetry}?
| +--rw low-percentile
| | +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile
| | +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile
| | +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw attack-detail {dots-telemetry}?
+--rw vendor-id? uint32
+--rw attack-id? string
+--rw attack-name? string
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+--rw attack-severity? attack-severity
+--rw start-time? uint64
+--rw end-time? uint64
+--rw source-count
| +--rw low-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak? yang:gauge64
+--rw top-talker
+--rw source-prefix* [source-prefix]
+--rw spoofed-status? boolean
+--rw source-prefix inet:ip-prefix
+--rw total-attack-traffic* [unit]
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw low-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak? yang:gauge64
+--rw total-attack-connection
+--rw low-percentile
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw mid-percentile
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw high-percentile
| +--rw connection? yang:gauge64
| +--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw peak
+--rw connection? yang:gauge64
+--rw embryonic? yang:gauge64
+--rw connection-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--rw partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
Also, the "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module augments the "ietf-dots-
signal" with a new message type called "telemetry". The tree
structure of the "telemetry" message type is shown below:
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augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type:
+--:(telemetry) {dots-telemetry}?
+--rw telemetry* [cuid tcid]
+--rw cuid string
+--rw cdid? string
+--rw tcid uint32
+--rw telemetry-config
| +--rw low-percentile? percentile
| +--rw mid-percentile? percentile
| +--rw high-percentile? percentile
| +--rw unit-config* [unit]
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw status? boolean
+--rw total-pipe-capability* [unit]
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw pipe? uint64
+--rw pre-mitigation* [telemetry-id]
+--rw telemetry-id uint32
+--rw target
| +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
| +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port]
| | +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
| | +--rw upper-port? inet:port-number
| +--rw target-protocol* uint8
| +--rw target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
| +--rw target-uri* inet:uri
+--rw total-traffic-normal-baseline* [unit protocol]
| +--rw unit unit
| +--rw protocol uint8
| +--rw low-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--rw mid-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--rw high-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--rw peak? yang:gauge64
+--ro total-attack-traffic* [unit protocol]
| +--ro unit unit
| +--ro protocol uint8
| +--ro low-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--ro mid-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--ro high-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--ro peak? yang:gauge64
+--ro total-traffic* [unit protocol]
| +--ro unit unit
| +--ro protocol uint8
| +--ro low-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--ro mid-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--ro high-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--ro peak? yang:gauge64
+--rw total-connection-capacity* [protocol]
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| +--rw protocol uint8
| +--rw connection? uint64
| +--rw connection-client? uint64
| +--rw embryonic? uint64
| +--rw embryonic-client? uint64
| +--rw connection-ps? uint64
| +--rw connection-client-ps? uint64
| +--rw request-ps? uint64
| +--rw request-client-ps? uint64
| +--rw partial-request-ps? uint64
| +--rw partial-request-client-ps? uint64
+--ro total-attack-connection
| +--ro low-percentile* [protocol]
| | +--ro protocol uint8
| | +--ro connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro mid-percentile* [protocol]
| | +--ro protocol uint8
| | +--ro connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro high-percentile* [protocol]
| | +--ro protocol uint8
| | +--ro connection? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
| | +--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro peak* [protocol]
| +--ro protocol uint8
| +--ro connection? yang:gauge64
| +--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--ro attack-detail
+--ro vendor-id? uint32
+--ro attack-id? string
+--ro attack-name? string
+--ro attack-severity? attack-severity
+--ro start-time? uint64
+--ro end-time? uint64
+--ro source-count
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| +--ro low-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--ro mid-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--ro high-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--ro peak? yang:gauge64
+--ro top-talker
+--ro source-prefix* [source-prefix]
+--ro spoofed-status? boolean
+--ro source-prefix inet:ip-prefix
+--ro total-attack-traffic* [unit]
| +--ro unit unit
| +--ro low-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--ro mid-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--ro high-percentile? yang:gauge64
| +--ro peak? yang:gauge64
+--ro total-attack-connection
+--ro low-percentile* [protocol]
| +--ro protocol uint8
| +--ro connection? yang:gauge64
| +--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--ro mid-percentile* [protocol]
| +--ro protocol uint8
| +--ro connection? yang:gauge64
| +--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--ro high-percentile* [protocol]
| +--ro protocol uint8
| +--ro connection? yang:gauge64
| +--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
| +--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
| +--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--ro peak* [protocol]
+--ro protocol uint8
+--ro connection? yang:gauge64
+--ro embryonic? yang:gauge64
+--ro connection-ps? yang:gauge64
+--ro request-ps? yang:gauge64
+--ro partial-request-ps? yang:gauge64
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7.2. YANG Module
This module uses types defined in [RFC6991].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-telemetry@2019-10-14.yang"
module ietf-dots-telemetry {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-telemetry";
prefix dots-telemetry;
import ietf-dots-signal-channel {
prefix ietf-signal;
reference
"RFC SSSS: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
}
import ietf-dots-data-channel {
prefix ietf-data;
reference
"RFC DDDD: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification";
}
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference "Section 3 of RFC 6991";
}
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix inet;
reference "Section 4 of RFC 6991";
}
organization
"IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
WG List: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
Author: Mohamed Boucadair
<mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
Author: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
<mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>";
description
"This module contains YANG definitions for the signaling
of DOTS telemetry exchanged between a DOTS client and
a DOTS server, by means of the DOTS signal channel.
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
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authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2019-10-14 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry";
}
feature dots-telemetry {
description
"This feature means that the DOTS signal channel is able
to convey DOTS telemetry data between DOTS clients and
servers.";
}
typedef attack-severity {
type enumeration {
enum "emergency" {
value 1;
description
"The attack is severe: emergency.";
}
enum "critical" {
value 2;
description
"The atatck is critical.";
}
enum "alert" {
value 3;
description
"This is an alert.";
}
}
description
"Enumeration for attack severity.";
}
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typedef unit {
type enumeration {
enum "pps" {
value 1;
description
"Packets per second (PPS).";
}
enum "kilo-pps" {
value 2;
description
"Kilo packets per second (Kpps).";
}
enum "bps" {
value 3;
description
"Bits per Second (BPS).";
}
enum "kilobytes-ps" {
value 4;
description
"Kilobytes per second.";
}
enum "megabytes-ps" {
value 5;
description
"Megabytes per second.";
}
enum "gigabytes-ps" {
value 6;
description
"Gigabytes per second.";
}
}
description
"Enumeration to indicate which unit is used.";
}
typedef percentile {
type decimal64 {
fraction-digits 2;
}
description
"The nth percentile of a set of data is the
value at which n percent of the data is below it.";
}
grouping percentile-config {
description
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"Configuration of low, mid, and high percentile values.";
leaf low-percentile {
type percentile;
default "10.00";
description
"Low percentile. If set to '0', this means low-percentiles
are disabled.";
}
leaf mid-percentile {
type percentile;
must '. >= ../low-percentile' {
error-message
"The mid-percentile must be greater than
or equal to the low-percentile.";
}
default "50.00";
description
"Mid percentile. If set to the same value as low-percentiles,
this means mid-percentiles are disabled.";
}
leaf high-percentile {
type percentile;
must '. >= ../mid-percentile' {
error-message
"The high-percentile must be greater than
or equal to the mid-percentile.";
}
default "90.00";
description
"High percentile. If set to the same value as mid-percentiles,
this means high-percentiles are disabled.";
}
}
grouping percentile {
description
"Generic grouping for percentile.";
leaf low-percentile {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"Low traffic.";
}
leaf mid-percentile {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"Mid percentile.";
}
leaf high-percentile {
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type yang:gauge64;
description
"High percentile.";
}
leaf peak {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"Peak";
}
}
grouping traffic-unit {
description
"Grouping of traffic as a function of measurement unit.";
leaf unit {
type unit;
description
"The traffic can be measured in packets per
second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per
Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second
or gigabytes per second.";
}
uses percentile;
}
grouping traffic-unit-protocol {
description
"Grouping of traffic of a given transport protocol as
a function of measurement unit.";
leaf unit {
type unit;
description
"The traffic can be measured in packets per
second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per
Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second
or gigabytes per second.";
}
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.
For example, this field contains 6 for TCP,
17 for UDP, 33 for DCCP, or 132 for SCTP.";
}
uses percentile;
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}
grouping total-connection-capacity {
description
"Total Connections Capacity. If the target is subjected
to resource consuming DDoS attack, these attributes are
useful to detect resource consuming DDoS attacks";
leaf connection {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of simultaneous connections that
are allowed to the target server. The threshold is
transport-protocol specific because the target server
could support multiple protocols.";
}
leaf connection-client {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of simultaneous connections that
are allowed to the target server per client.";
}
leaf embryonic {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections
that are allowed to the target server. The term 'embryonic
connection' refers to a connection whose connection handshake
is not finished and embryonic connection is only possible in
connection-oriented transport protocols like TCP or SCTP.";
}
leaf embryonic-client {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections
that are allowed to the target server per client.";
}
leaf connection-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of connections allowed per second
to the target server.";
}
leaf connection-client-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of connections allowed per second
to the target server per client.";
}
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leaf request-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of requests allowed per second
to the target server.";
}
leaf request-client-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of requests allowed per second
to the target server per client.";
}
leaf partial-request-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of partial requests allowed per
second to the target server.";
}
leaf partial-request-client-ps {
type uint64;
description
"The maximum number of partial requests allowed per
second to the target server per client.";
}
}
grouping connection {
description
"A set of attributes which represent the attack
characteristics";
leaf connection {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of simultaneous attack connections to
the target server.";
}
leaf embryonic {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to
the target server.";
}
leaf connection-ps {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of attack conenctions per second to
the target server.";
}
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leaf request-ps {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of attack requests per second to
the target server.";
}
leaf partial-request-ps {
type yang:gauge64;
description
"The number of attack partial requests to
the target server.";
}
}
grouping connection-percentile {
description
"Total attack connections.";
container low-percentile {
description
"Low percentile of attack connections.";
uses connection;
}
container mid-percentile {
description
"Mid percentile of attack connections.";
uses connection;
}
container high-percentile {
description
"High percentile of attack connections.";
uses connection;
}
container peak {
description
"Peak attack connections.";
uses connection;
}
}
grouping connection-protocol-percentile {
description
"Total attack connections.";
list low-percentile {
key "protocol";
description
"Low percentile of attack connections.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
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description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
uses connection;
}
list mid-percentile {
key "protocol";
description
"Mid percentile of attack connections.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
uses connection;
}
list high-percentile {
key "protocol";
description
"Highg percentile of attack connections.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
uses connection;
}
list peak {
key "protocol";
description
"Peak attack connections.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
uses connection;
}
}
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grouping attack-detail {
description
"Various information and details that describe the on-going
attacks that needs to be mitigated by the DOTS server.
The attack details need to cover well-known and common attacks
(such as a SYN Flood) along with new emerging or vendor-specific
attacks.";
leaf vendor-id {
type uint32;
description
"Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number.";
}
leaf attack-id {
type string;
description
"Unique identifier assigned by the vendor for the attack.";
}
leaf attack-name {
type string;
description
"Textual representation of attack description. Natural Language
Processing techniques (e.g., word embedding) can possibly be used
to map the attack description to an attack type.";
}
leaf attack-severity {
type attack-severity;
description
"Severity level of an attack";
}
leaf start-time {
type uint64;
description
"The time the attack started. Start time is represented in seconds
relative to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z in UTC time.";
}
leaf end-time {
type uint64;
description
"The time the attack ended. End time is represented in seconds
relative to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z in UTC time.";
}
container source-count {
description
"Indicates the count of unique sources involved
in the attack.";
uses percentile;
}
}
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grouping top-talker-aggregate {
description
"Top attack sources.";
list source-prefix {
key "source-prefix";
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
leaf spoofed-status {
type boolean;
description
"Indicates whether this address is spoofed.";
}
leaf source-prefix {
type inet:ip-prefix;
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
}
list total-attack-traffic {
key "unit";
description
"Total attack traffic issued from this source.";
uses traffic-unit;
}
container total-attack-connection {
description
"Total attack connections issued from this source.";
uses connection-percentile;
}
}
}
grouping top-talker {
description
"Top attack sources.";
list source-prefix {
key "source-prefix";
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
leaf spoofed-status {
type boolean;
description
"Indicates whether this address is spoofed.";
}
leaf source-prefix {
type inet:ip-prefix;
description
"IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
}
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list total-attack-traffic {
key "unit";
description
"Total attack traffic issued from this source.";
uses traffic-unit;
}
container total-attack-connection {
description
"Total attack connections issued from this source.";
uses connection-protocol-percentile;
}
}
}
grouping pre-mitigation {
description
"Grouping for the telemetry data.";
list total-traffic-normal-baseline {
key "unit protocol";
description
"Total traffic normal baselines.";
uses traffic-unit-protocol;
}
list total-attack-traffic {
key "unit protocol";
config false;
description
"Total attack traffic per protocol.";
uses traffic-unit-protocol;
}
list total-traffic {
key "unit protocol";
config false;
description
"Total traffic.";
uses traffic-unit-protocol;
}
list total-connection-capacity {
key "protocol";
description
"Total connection capacity.";
leaf protocol {
type uint8;
description
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
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uses total-connection-capacity;
}
container total-attack-connection {
config false;
description
"Total attack connections.";
uses connection-protocol-percentile;
}
container attack-detail {
config false;
description
"Attack details.";
uses attack-detail;
container top-talker {
description
"Top attack sources.";
uses top-talker;
}
}
}
augment "/ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type/"
+ "ietf-signal:mitigation-scope/ietf-signal:scope" {
if-feature "dots-telemetry";
description
"Extends mitigation scope with telemetry update data.";
list total-attack-traffic {
key "unit";
description
"Total attack traffic.";
uses traffic-unit;
}
container total-attack-connection {
description
"Total attack connections.";
uses connection-percentile;
}
container attack-detail {
description
"Atatck details";
uses attack-detail;
container top-talker {
description
"Top attack sources.";
uses top-talker-aggregate;
}
}
}
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augment "/ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type" {
if-feature "dots-telemetry";
description
"Add a new choice to enclose telemetry data in DOTS
signal channel.";
case telemetry {
description
"Indicates the message is about telemetry.";
list telemetry {
key "cuid tcid";
description
"The telemetry data per DOTS client.";
leaf cuid {
type string;
description
"A unique identifier that is
generated by a DOTS client to prevent
request collisions. It is expected that the
cuid will remain consistent throughout the
lifetime of the DOTS client.";
}
leaf cdid {
type string;
description
"The cdid should be included by a server-domain
DOTS gateway to propagate the client domain
identification information from the
gateway's client-facing-side to the gateway's
server-facing-side, and from the gateway's
server-facing-side to the DOTS server.
It may be used by the final DOTS server
for policy enforcement purposes.";
}
leaf tcid {
type uint32;
description
"An identifier for the DOTS telemetry configuration
data.";
}
container telemetry-config {
description
"Uses to set low, mid, and high percentile values.";
uses percentile-config;
list unit-config {
key "unit";
description
"Controls which units are allowed when sharing telemetry
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data.";
leaf unit {
type unit;
description
"The traffic can be measured in packets per
second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per
Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second
or gigabytes per second.";
}
leaf status {
type boolean;
description
"Enable/disable the use of the measurement unit.";
}
}
}
list total-pipe-capability {
key "unit";
description
"Total pipe capacity of a DOTS client domain.";
leaf unit {
type unit;
description
"The traffic can be measured in packets per
second (PPS) or kilo packets per second (Kpps) and Bits per
Second (BPS), and kilobytes per second or megabytes per second
or gigabytes per second.";
}
leaf pipe {
type uint64;
description
"Mid traffic percentile.";
}
}
list pre-mitigation {
key "telemetry-id";
description
"Pre-mitigation telemetry.";
leaf telemetry-id {
type uint32;
description
"An identifier to uniquely demux telemetry data send using
the same message.";
}
container target {
description
"Indicates the target.";
uses ietf-data:target;
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}
uses pre-mitigation;
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry
This specification registers the DOTS telemetry attributes in the
IANA "DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings" registry established by
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].
The DOTS telemetry attributes defined in this specification are
comprehension-optional parameters.
o Note to the RFC Editor: Please delete (TBD1)-(TBD5) once CBOR keys
are assigned from the 0x8000 - 0xBFFF range.
+-------------------+------------+--------+---------------+--------+
| Parameter Name | YANG | CBOR | CBOR Major | JSON |
| | Type | Key | Type & | Type |
| | | | Information | |
+-------------------+------------+--------+---------------+--------+
| TODO | | | | |
+-------------------+------------+--------+---------------+--------+
8.2. DOTS Signal Telemetry YANG Module
This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "ns"
subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-telemetry
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in
the "YANG Module Names" subregistry [RFC7950] within the "YANG
Parameters" registry.
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name: ietf-dots-telemetry
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-telemetry
maintained by IANA: N
prefix: dots-telemetry
reference: RFC XXXX
9. Security Considerations
Security considerations in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] need to be
taken into consideration.
10. Contributors
The following individuals have contributed to this document:
o Li Su, CMCC, Email: suli@chinamobile.com
o Jin Peng, CMCC, Email: pengjin@chinamobile.com
11. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Flemming Andreasen, Liang Xia, and
Kaname Nishizuka co-authors of https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-
doron-dots-telemetry-00 draft and everyone who had contributed to
that document.
Authors would like to thank Kaname Nishizuka, Jon Shallow, Wei Pan
and Yuuhei Hayashi for comments and review.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[Enterprise-Numbers]
"Private Enterprise Numbers", 2005, <http://www.iana.org/
assignments/enterprise-numbers.html>.
[I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]
Boucadair, M. and R. K, "Distributed Denial-of-Service
Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification",
draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-31 (work in progress), July
2019.
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home]
K, R., Boucadair, M., and J. Shallow, "Distributed Denial-
of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel
Call Home", draft-ietf-dots-signal-call-home-06 (work in
progress), September 2019.
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[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]
K, R., Boucadair, M., Patil, P., Mortensen, A., and N.
Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification", draft-
ietf-dots-signal-channel-37 (work in progress), July 2019.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC7641] Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7641>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
12.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]
Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Moskowitz, R., Teague, N., Xia,
L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS Open Threat
Signaling", draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-20 (work in
progress), September 2019.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
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[RFC8612] Mortensen, A., Reddy, T., and R. Moskowitz, "DDoS Open
Threat Signaling (DOTS) Requirements", RFC 8612,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8612, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8612>.
Authors' Addresses
Tirumaleswar Reddy
McAfee, Inc.
Embassy Golf Link Business Park
Bangalore, Karnataka 560071
India
Email: kondtir@gmail.com
Mohamed Boucadair
Orange
Rennes 35000
France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Ehud Doron
Radware Ltd.
Raoul Wallenberg Street
Tel-Aviv 69710
Israel
Email: ehudd@radware.com
Meiling Chen
CMCC
32, Xuanwumen West
BeiJing, BeiJing 100053
China
Email: chenmeiling@chinamobile.com
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