Internet DRAFT - draft-richardson-6tisch-table-of-contents
draft-richardson-6tisch-table-of-contents
Network Working Group M. Richardson
Internet-Draft SSW
Intended status: Informational July 4, 2014
Expires: January 5, 2015
table of contents for security architecture
draft-richardson-6tisch-table-of-contents-02
Abstract
This is a template for a security architecture.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 5, 2015.
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Table of Contents
1. security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. thread model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. implementation cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3. denial of service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. protocol requirements/constraints/assumptions . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. inline/offline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. time sequence diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. explanation of each step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. size of each packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. resulting security properties obtained from this process . . 3
5. deployment scenarios underlying protocol requirements . . . . 3
6. device identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6.1. PCE/Proxy vs Node identification . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6.2. Time source authentication / time validation . . . . . . 3
6.3. description of certificate contents . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6.4. privacy aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
7. slotframes to be used during join . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
8. configuration aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
9. authorization aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
9.1. how to determine a proxy/PCE from a end node . . . . . . 4
9.2. security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
10. security architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
11. Posture Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
13. Other Related Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
16. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. security requirements
1.1. thread model
1.2. implementation cost
(storage of security material, computational cost)
1.3. denial of service
other communication impacts of security protocol mechanics
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2. protocol requirements/constraints/assumptions
2.1. inline/offline
dependencies on centralized or external functionality, inline and
offline
3. time sequence diagram
3.1. explanation of each step
3.2. size of each packet
and number of frames needed to contain it.
4. resulting security properties obtained from this process
5. deployment scenarios underlying protocol requirements
6. device identification
6.1. PCE/Proxy vs Node identification
6.2. Time source authentication / time validation
Note: RPL Root authentication is a chartered item
6.3. description of certificate contents
6.4. privacy aspects
7. slotframes to be used during join
how is this communicated in the (extended) beacon.
8. configuration aspects
(allocation of slotframes after join, network statistics,
neighboetc.)
9. authorization aspects
lifecycle (key management, trust management)
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9.1. how to determine a proxy/PCE from a end node
9.2. security considerations
what prevents a node from transmitting when it is not their turn
(part one: jamming)
can a node successfully communicate with a peer at a time when not
supposed to, may be tied to link layer security, or will it be
policed by receiver?
10. security architecture
security architecture and fit of e.g. join protocol and provisioning
into this
11. Posture Maintenance
(SACM related work)
12. Security Considerations
13. Other Related Protocols
14. IANA Considerations
15. Acknowledgements
16. Normative references
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
Author's Address
Michael C. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
470 Dawson Avenue
Ottawa, ON K1Z 5V7
CA
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
URI: http://www.sandelman.ca/
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