Internet DRAFT - draft-richardson-emu-eap-onboarding
draft-richardson-emu-eap-onboarding
anima Working Group A. Dekok
Internet-Draft FreeRADIUS
Intended status: Standards Track M. Richardson
Expires: 4 October 2023 Sandelman Software Works
2 April 2023
EAP defaults for devices that need to onboard
draft-richardson-emu-eap-onboarding-03
Abstract
This document describes a method by which an unconfigured device can
use EAP to join a network on which further device onboarding, network
attestation or other remediation can be done. While RFC 5216
supports EAP-TLS without a client certificate, that document defines
no method by which unauthenticated EAP-TLS can be used. This draft
addresses that issue. First, by defining the @eap.arpa domain, and
second by showing how it can be used to provide quarantined network
access for onboarding unauthenticated devices.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-richardson-emu-eap-
onboarding/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the anima Working Group
mailing list (mailto:anima@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/anima/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/mcr/eap-onboarding.git.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 October 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Characteristics of the Quarantine Network . . . . . . . . 5
4. Captive Portal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Use of eap.arpa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Domain Name Reservation Considerations . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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1. Introduction
There are a multitude of situations where a network device needs to
join a new (wireless) network but where the device does not yet have
the right credentials for that network. As the device does not have
credentials, it cannot access networks which typically require
authentication. However, since the device does not have network
access, it cannot download a new configuration which contains updated
credentials.
The process by which a device acquires these credentials has become
known as onboarding [I-D.irtf-t2trg-secure-bootstrapping]. There are
many onboarding protocols, including [RFC8995], [RFC9140], [dpp], CSA
MATTER, and OPC UA Part 21. Some of these protocols use WiFi Public
frames, or provide for provisioning as part of EAP, such as
[RFC7170]. Other systems require pre-existing IP connectivity in
order to configure credentials for a device, which causes a circular
dependancy.
This document defines a method where devices can use unauthenticated
EAP in order to obtain network access, albeit in a captive portal
[RFC8952]. Once the device is in a captive portal, it has access to
the full suite of Internet Protocol (IP) technologies, and can
proceed with onboarding. We believe that the method defined here is
clearer, safer, and easier to implement and deploy than alternatives.
This method also allows for multiple onboarding technologies to co-
exist, and for the technologies to evolve without requiring invasive
upgrades to layer-2 infrastructure.
The method detailed in this document uses the unauthenticated client
mode of EAP-TLS. While [RFC5216] defines EAP-TLS without a client
certificate, that document defines no method by which unauthenticated
EAP-TLS can be used.
This draft addresses that issue. First, by defining the @eap.arpa
domain, and second by showing how it can be used to provid network
access for onboarding unauthenticated devices.
Note that this specification does not specify the exact method used
for onboarding devices! There are many possibilities, with some
methods yet to be defined. Not all of them are enumerated here.
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The term _supplicant_ is used to refer to the network device which is
attempting to do EAP-TLS.
The term _pledge_ (from [RFC8995]) is used to refer to the network
device which has successfully performed unauthenticated client mode
EAP-TLS, and now has access to a network on which is may perform
onboarding.
3. Protocol Details
The onboarding is divided into the following phases:
* Discovery - the supplicant determines that a network can do
onboarding,
* Authentication - the supplicant connects to the network as an
unauthenticated device,
* Authorization - the network provides limited connectivity to the
device/pledge,
* Onboarding - the device/pledge uses standard IP protocols to
perform onboarding,
* Full network access - the device has provisioned credentials, and
can proceed with normal network access.
3.1. Discovery
The network should use 802.11u to signal that it can potentially
perform onboarding, by using 802.11u and indicating that it supports
the realm "eap.arpa".
When a supplicant which requires onboarding sees this realm, it knows
that the network may be suitable for onboarding.
Note that not all such networks are suitable for onboarding using the
technologies that a supplicant has. Some networks might have only a
captive portal, intended for human use. This is the "coffee shop"
case.
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There may be multiple such networks available, and only one (or none)
may be willing to onboard this particular device. Further, the
device does not necessarily trust any such network.
There are situations where there may be many hundreds of networks
which offer onboarding, and a supplicant device may need to try all
of them until it finds a network to which it can successfully
onboard. An example of such a situation is in a large (dozens to
hundreds of floors) apartment building in a downtown core, where
radio signals may leak from adjacent units, reflect off glass
windows, come from other floors, and even cross the street from
adjacent buildings. This document does not address this issue, but
anticipates future work in 802.11u, perhaps involving some filtering
mechanism using Bloom Filters.
Supplicants MUST limit their actions in the onboarding network to the
action of onboarding. If this process cannot be completed, the
device MUST disconnect from the onboarding network, and try again,
usually by selecting a different network.
As soon as the device has been onboarded, the device MUST disconnect
from the onboarding network, and use the provided configuration to
authenticate and connect to a fully-capable network.
3.2. Authentication
The supplicant presents itself as an unauthenticated peer, which is
allowed by EAP-TLS [RFC5216] Section 2.1.1. TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3
[RFC9190] may be used, but TLS 1.3 or higher is RECOMMENDED.
The supplicant uses an identity of onboarding@eap.arpa, and provides
no TLS client certificate. The use of the "eap.arpa" domain signals
to the network that the device wishes to use unauthenticated EAP-TLS.
3.3. Authorization
Upon receipt of a supplicant without any authentication, the AAA
server returns instructions to the authenticator to place the new
client into the quarantined or captive portal network. The exact
method is network-dependent, but it is usually done with a dedicated
VLAN which has limited network access.
3.4. Characteristics of the Quarantine Network
The quarantine network SHOULD be segregated at layer-two (ethernet),
and should not permit ethernet frames to any destination other than a
small set of specified routers.
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Specifically, the layer infrastructure should prevent one pledge from
attempting to connect to another pledge.
For some onboarding protocols such as [RFC8995], only IPv6 Link-Local
frames are needed. Such a network MUST provide a Join Proxy as
specified in [RFC8995], Section 4.
For other onboarding protocols more capabilities may be needed, in
particular there need for a DHCPv4 server may be critical for the
device to believe it has connected correctly. This is particularly
the case where a normal "smartphone" or laptop system will onboard
via a captive portal.
Once on the quarantine network, device uses other protocols [RFC6876]
to perform the onboarding action.
4. Captive Portal
While this document imposes no requirements on the rest of the
network, captive portals [RFC8952] have been used for almost two
decades. The administration and operation of captive portals is
typically within the authority of administrators who are responsible
for network access. As such, this document defines additional
behavior on, and requirements for, captive portals, so long as those
changes materially benefit the network access administrator.
5. Privacy Considerations
Devices should take care to hide all identifying information from the
onboarding network. Any identifying information MUST be sent
encrypted via a method such as TLS.
6. Security Considerations
Devices using an onboarding network MUST assume that the network is
untrusted. All network traffic SHOULD be encrypted in order to
prevent attackers from both eavesdropping, and from modifying any
provisioning information.
Similarly onboarding networks MUST assume that devices are untrusted,
and could be malicious. Networks MUST make provisions to prevent
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, such as when many devices attempt to
connect at the same time.
Networks MUST limit network access to onboarding protocols only.
Networks SHOULD also limit the bandwidth used by any device which is
being onboarded.
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The configuration information is likely to be small (megabytes at
most), and it is reasonable to require a second or two for this
process to take place.
Any device which cannot be onboarded within approximately 30 seconds
SHOULD be disconnected. Such a delay signals either a malicious
device / network, or a misconfigured device / network. If onboarding
cannot be finished within a short timer, the device should choose
another network.
6.1. Use of eap.arpa
Supplicants MUST use the "eap.arpa" domain only for onboarding and
related activities. Supplicant MUST use unauthenticated EAP-TLS.
Networks which support onboarding via the "eap.arpa" domain MUST
require that supplicants use unauthenticated EAP-TLS. The use of
other EAP types MUST result in rejection, and a denial of all network
access.
The "eap.arpa" domain MUST NOT be used in any other context, such as
in an NAI [RFC7542], etc. in any other protocol.
7. IANA Considerations
The special-use domain "eap.arpa" should be registered in the .arpa
registry (https://www.iana.org/domains/arpa
(https://www.iana.org/domains/arpa)). No A, AAAA, or PTR records are
requested.
7.1. Domain Name Reservation Considerations
This template is filled in, complying with [RFC6761] section 5.
Users: Human users are not expected to recognize this name as
special.
Application Software: Only writers of network connectivity sub-
systems (WiFi) are expected to see this new domain. No other
software (such browsers) should care about this name.
Name Resolution APIs and Libraries: Name Resolution APIs and
Libraries do not need to mark this name as special.
Caching DNS Servers: DNS Caches do not need to do any special
processing for this name.
Authoritative DNS Servers: Authoritative DNS servers do not need any
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special processing.
DNS Server Operators: ; DNS Server Opreators do not need to do
anything special.
DNS Registries/Registrars: DNS Registrars presently do not registar
any names in .arpa, and this name reservation will be no
different.
8. Acknowledgements
TBD.
9. Changelog
01 to 02: minor edits.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[BCP14] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC5216,
March 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5216>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9190] Preuß Mattsson, J. and M. Sethi, "EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the
Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3",
RFC 9190, DOI 10.17487/RFC9190, February 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9190>.
10.2. Informative References
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[dpp] "Device Provisioning Protocol Specification", n.d.,
<https://www.wi-fi.org/downloads-registered-guest/Device_P
rovisioning_Protocol_Draft_Technical_Specification_Package
_v0_0_23_0.zip/31255>.
[I-D.irtf-t2trg-secure-bootstrapping]
Sethi, M., Sarikaya, B., and D. Garcia-Carrillo,
"Terminology and processes for initial security setup of
IoT devices", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
irtf-t2trg-secure-bootstrapping-03, 26 November 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-t2trg-
secure-bootstrapping-03>.
[RFC6761] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Special-Use Domain Names",
RFC 6761, DOI 10.17487/RFC6761, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6761>.
[RFC6876] Sangster, P., Cam-Winget, N., and J. Salowey, "A Posture
Transport Protocol over TLS (PT-TLS)", RFC 6876,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6876, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6876>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[RFC7170] Zhou, H., Cam-Winget, N., Salowey, J., and S. Hanna,
"Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version
1", RFC 7170, DOI 10.17487/RFC7170, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7170>.
[RFC7542] DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7542>.
[RFC8952] Larose, K., Dolson, D., and H. Liu, "Captive Portal
Architecture", RFC 8952, DOI 10.17487/RFC8952, November
2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8952>.
[RFC8995] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8995>.
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[RFC9140] Aura, T., Sethi, M., and A. Peltonen, "Nimble Out-of-Band
Authentication for EAP (EAP-NOOB)", RFC 9140,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9140, December 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9140>.
Authors' Addresses
Alan DeKok
FreeRADIUS
Email: aland@freeradius.org
Michael Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
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