Internet DRAFT - draft-richardson-enrollment-roadmap
draft-richardson-enrollment-roadmap
ANIMA Working Group M. Richardson
Internet-Draft Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Informational October 07, 2020
Expires: April 10, 2021
Device Enrollment in IETF protocols -- A Roadmap
draft-richardson-enrollment-roadmap-03
Abstract
This document provides an overview of enrollment or imprinting
mechanisms in current IETF protocols.
This document is being worked on in the ANIMA-WG, and on github at:
https://github.com/anima-wg/enrollment-roadmap
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 10, 2021.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Components of enrollment solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Map of Enrollment solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. generic voucher semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. constrained voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. JSON format voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. COSE-8152 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.5. standard signature (CMS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.6. EDHOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.7. EST-COAPS 2/DTLS sec(urity) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.8. EST-HTTPS TLS sec(urity) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.9. constrained object security (OSCORE) . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.10. ultra-constrained enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.11. Pledge traffic proxy mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.11.1. COAP proxy,stateless . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.12. DTLS proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.13. IPIP proxy,stateless . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.14. circuit proxy stateful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. call-home ssh/tls/usbkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. manufacturer authorized signing authority (MASA) . . . . . . 8
7. Enrollment Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. NETCONF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. BRSKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.3. Transition to Constrained Bootstrap . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.4. Cloud-based Registrars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.5. BRSKY Asynchronous Enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.6. 6tisch Zero Touch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.7. 6tisch minimal security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. OPEN ISSUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
There are numerous mechanisms being proposed to solve the problem of
securely introducing a new devices into an existing managed network.
This document provides an overview of the different mechanisms
showing what technologies are common.
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The document starts with a diagram showing the various components and
how they go together to form five enrollment scenarios.
2. Components of enrollment solutions
This diagram is taken from [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra],
which is where this work started.
+------------------------+
+--------------Drop Ship--------------->| Vendor Service |
| +------------------------+
| | M anufacturer| |
| | A uthorized |Ownership|
| | S igning |Tracker |
| | A uthority | |
| +--------------+---------+
| ^
| | BRSKI-
V | MASA
+-------+ ............................................|...
| | . | .
| | . +------------+ +-----------+ | .
| | . | | | | | .
|Pledge | . | Circuit | | Domain <-------+ .
| | . | Proxy | | Registrar | .
| <-------->............<-------> (PKI RA) | .
| | | BRSKI-EST | | .
| | . | | +-----+-----+ .
|IDevID | . +------------+ | EST RFC7030 .
| | . +-----------------+----------+ .
| | . | Key Infrastructure | .
| | . | (e.g. PKI Certificate | .
+-------+ . | Authority) | .
. +----------------------------+ .
. .
................................................
"Domain" components
Five major components are described:
1. pledge: The node that is attempting to enroll.
2. proxy: A node that is within one layer-2 hop of the pledge that
is helping.
3. domain registrar: the Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC) that will
determine eligibility of the pledge.
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4. MASA: the representative of the manufacturer that has a pre-
established trust relationship with the pledge.
5. the domain PKI (if any)
3. Map of Enrollment solution
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.-------------------.
. generic (YANG) .
.----------------. voucher semantics .
| '-------------------'
| .---
| |
6tisch 6tisch Tran|ition to |
minimal zero Con|trained |
security touch Bo|tstrap BRSKI | Netconf
.----------..-----------..---|-------..------------. |-------------.
| || || v || | v |
| ||..................................................... |
| ||. constrained voucher . JSON format voucher . |
| ||. (anima) . (RFC8366) . |
| ||..................................................... |
| || || || | | |
| |.............| ...................................... |
| |. COSE .| . standard signature (CMS - RFC5652) . |
| |. rfc8152 .| ...................................... |
| |.............| || | | |
| || ............................| | |
| |......... . EST-COAPS .. EST-HTTPS .| | |
| |. EDHOC . . w/DTLS sec. .. TLS sec. .| | |
|..................................................| | |
|. constrained object . || || | | |
|. security (OSCORE) . || || | |.............|
|...................... || ||............| |. call-home .|
| || ||......... ||. circuit .| |. ssh/tls .|
|........................|. DTLS . ||. proxy .| |. .usbkey .|
|. CoAP proxy,stateless .|. proxy . ||. stateful .| |.............|
|..................................................| | |
| ||. IPIP proxy,stateless .| | |
| ||......................................| | |
'----------''-----------''-----------''------------' '-------------'
^ ^ ^ ^
| \ | |
| '. .--------------'
| | |
| | |
| | .--------------.
| | . manufacturer .
| | . authorized .
'---------------|--. signing .
. authority .
. (MASA) .
'--------------'
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4. Components
4.1. generic voucher semantics
The abstract semantics of the voucher, described in YANG, are in
[RFC8366].
4.2. constrained voucher
The semantics of the constrained voucher, represented in CBOR, are
described in [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher].
4.3. JSON format voucher
The semantics of the basic voucher, represented in JSON, are
described in [RFC8366].
4.4. COSE-8152
In constrained systems the voucher is signed using the COSE mechanism
described in [RFC8152]. This is to be replaced with
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] (now in RFC-EDITOR Q) and
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct] (in WGLC, being revised to remove
countersignatures).
4.5. standard signature (CMS)
In un-constrained systems the voucher is signed using the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) described in [RFC5652].
4.6. EDHOC
On constrained and challenged networks, the session key management
can be formed by [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc].
This document has a WG called LAKE.
The CoAP-EST layer on top is described by [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]
4.7. EST-COAPS 2/DTLS sec(urity)
On unconstrained networks, the session key management is provided by
[RFC6347]. The CoAP-EST layer on top is described by
[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est], which is in the RFC-EDITOR Q, waiting for
DTLS 1.3.
The ACE WG adopted this document, and published it.
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4.8. EST-HTTPS TLS sec(urity)
On unconstrained networks with unconstrained nodes, the EST layer and
session key management is described by [RFC7030] as modified by
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] (BRSKI).
BRSKI is in the RFC-EDITOR Q, waiting for
[I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane], which is awaiting IESG go-
ahead.
4.9. constrained object security (OSCORE)
On constained networks with constrained nodes, the CoAP transactions
are secured by [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] using symmetric keys.
The symmetric key may be pre-shared (for 6tisch minimal security), or
MAY be derived using EDHOC.
4.10. ultra-constrained enrollment
The document [I-D.selander-ace-ake-authz]. Version -01 expired in
September 2020, but is expected to be reposted for discussion in the
ACE WG.
4.11. Pledge traffic proxy mechanisms
Traffic between the Pledge and the JRC does not flow directly as the
pledge does not typically have a globally reachable address, nor does
it have any network access keys (whether WEP, WPA, 802.1x, or
802.15.4 keys).
Communication between the pledge and JRC is mediated by a proxy.
This is primarily to protect the network against attacks. The proxy
mechanism is provided by as many nodes as can afford to as a benefit
to the network, and therefore MUST be as light weight as possible.
There are therefore stateless mechanisms and stateful mechanisms.
The costs of the various methods is analysized in
[I-D.richardson-anima-state-for-joinrouter].
4.11.1. COAP proxy,stateless
The CoAP proxy mechanism uses the OSCORE Context Hint to statelessly
store the address of the proxy within the CoAP structure. It is
described in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security].
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4.12. DTLS proxy
A DTLS specific mechanism for COAPS, is described in
[I-D.vanderstok-anima-constrained-join-proxy].
4.13. IPIP proxy,stateless
An IPIP proxy mechanism uses a layer of IP-in-IP header (protocol 98)
to encapsulate the traffic between Join Proxy and JRC. It has some
complexities to implement on typical POSIX platforms.
At one point, it was described in
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join], in an Appendix. Another
home for the text is desired.
4.14. circuit proxy stateful
The circuit proxy method utilitizes either an application layer
gateway (which in canonical 1990-era implementation requires a
process per connection), or the use of NAT66. It maintains some
state for each connection whether TCP or UDP.
It is this most expensive and most easily abused, but also the most
widely available, code-wise.
5. call-home ssh/tls/usbkey
The NETCONF call-home mechanism assumes that the device can get basic
connectivity, enough for an out "outgoing" TCP connection to the
manufacturer.
6. manufacturer authorized signing authority (MASA)
The MASA is the manufacturers anchor of the manufacturer/pledge trust
relationship that is established at the factory where the pledge is
built.
7. Enrollment Mechanisms
7.1. NETCONF
The NETCONF WG is describing this in [I-D.ietf-netconf-zerotouch]
document.
The NETCONF Zerotouch mechanism provides configuration and ownership
information by having the pledge "call home" to a location determined
by a mix of local hints (DHCPv4, DHCPv6, and mDNS), as well as built-
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in anchors. Additionally, ownership vouchers can be alternatively
distributed by portable storage such as USB key.
Upon reaching a validated call-home server, Zerotouch typically
"reverses" the connection providing either an SSH or TLS connection
_to_ the pledge device such that it can be configured automatically.
Zerotouch relies upon either open or very easy access to network
connectivity, along with the ability to make an outgoing TCP
connection to the Internet, or to the provided local configuration
agent.
Zerotouch is seen as an updated version of TR-69 by some, appropriate
for configuration of residential appliances which are drop-shiped by
ISPs or other service providers to homes. That is not the only
targetted use.
7.2. BRSKI
The ANIMA WG is describing BRSKI in
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] document.
The ANIMA WG does enrollment with the aim of creating a secure
channel with a public-key infrastructure (PKI) Registrar. The
secured channel is used to perform Enrollment over Secure Transport
(EST, RFC7030). The real goal is the enrollment a new device which
was probably been drop-shipped into ANIMA's Autonomic Control Plane.
That is, after the pledge has been assigned a certificate within the
(autonomic) domain, the device (no longer a pledge) will then form
secure channels (typically using IKEv2 to key an IPsec channel). On
top of that channel a routing protocol (RPL) is run to form the
Autonomic Control Plane (ACP). The ACP is then used as a management
network with which to configure the new device.
BRSKI is therefore step one of a number of steps, the ultimate goal
of which is to bring the pledge into the ACP as a new device.
BRSKI itself does not provide for any direct keying of the network
(802.11 WEP/WPA, or 802.15.4 security). The provision of a domain
certificate at each node can, however, be used to do that kind of
keying: for instance 802.15.9 provides for use of HIP and IKEv2 to
key 802.15.4 networks.
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7.3. Transition to Constrained Bootstrap
It is distinguished from BRSKI in that it uses DTLS (rather than TLS)
and constrained (CBOR) vouchers. It is distinguished from 6tisch
Zero Touch in that uses CMS to sign rather than COSE.
The ACE WG has adopted [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est], but this is not a
sufficient.
The constrained version of BRSKI is current described as part of
[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher].
The use of this technology slice is attractive to IoT deployments
where the devices are not battery powered (lighting for instance, AMI
for electric meters). In such situations, the processors in each
device have significantly more resources, and in particular far more
code space available. The use of DTLS to secure application traffic
(as described in the ACE documents) is already common, and so reuse
of DTLS is desireable from a code point of view.
However, the network capacity is still limited so TCP and CBOR are
still important. The network may also contain extremely constrained
devices (kinetically powered light switches for n instance).
7.4. Cloud-based Registrars
BRSKI depends upon a local join proxy to direct the pledge device to
the location of the Registrar. Not only does this require that a
join proxy be widely available, but it also assumes that the owner is
able to operate a Registrar.
[I-D.friel-anima-brski-cloud] deals with two use cases:
1. where there is a Registrar, but no join proxy. A redirection
through a manufacturer or VAR operated register points the device
to a Registrar located on the Internet.
2. where there is no Registrar (yet), but the network operator does
have an RFC7030 EST server. The cloud registrar provides a
voucher connecting the pledge to the appropriate EST server.
7.5. BRSKY Asynchronous Enrollment
BRSKI depends the join proxy being available in the location where
the devices are installed, and for that proxy to also be able to
communicate to the Registrar (possibly over the Internet).
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In a number of environments, such as new construction, a number of
devices need to go through an onboarding process, but there is no
connectivity available. (Possibly not even LTE/3G due to metal
walls, lack of towers, etc.).
The [I-D.ietf-anima-brski-async-enroll] proposes two amendments to
BRSKI:
1. the use of CMP rather than EST for enrollment, which eliminates
the need to keep a live TLS connection between pledge and
Registrar.
2. a discovery, store-and-forward mechanism for moving voucher
requests and vouchers between the Registrar and Pledge, including
a batch mechanism that aims to reduce the amount of walking that
an installer might have to do.
7.6. 6tisch Zero Touch
The 6tisch WG is describing this in
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join] document.
The 6tisch use case consists of very constrained devices with very
constrained networks. Code space in the devices is larger than
typical class 2, but the devices are typically battery powered and
wish to sleep significantly.
The use of CBOR for vouchers, COSE to sign the vouchers saves
significant network bandwidth and code space. Both CBOR, COSE and
OSCORE are typically already in use for the application support. The
addition of EDHOC to provide asymmetric bootstrap of OSCORE completes
the suite of constrained security protocols.
7.7. 6tisch minimal security
The 6tisch WG is describing this in
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] document. This mechanism does
enrollment in a single request/response message, but requires at
least one "touch" to pre-share symmetric keys.
The 6tisch WG felt that the number of round trips required to do
EDHOC, and the size of the vouchers required an even simpler
protocol. As existing 6tisch-type technology is typically deployed
with network keys built-in at manufacturer time (no "drop-ship"), the
switch from a static network key to a PSK for authenticaiton is
considered an incremental improvement.
All other methods are considered zero "touch".
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[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] is in the RFC-EDITOR Q, waiting
for core-stateless on which is depends to leave the WG.
8. Discussion
A goal of this document is to provide some guidance in selecting
which enrollment profile to use for a given scenario. This section
tries to provide some constrasting comments between the various
mechanisms.
(BUT, it does not yet do that..)
9. OPEN ISSUE
1. insufficient guidance if there is no internet connection.
2. classes of devices where the manufacturer will never have an HSM/
PKI. so, it will only be a self-signed key.
3. how does a supply-chain manage BRSKI?
10. Security Considerations
This document includes a tradeoff of the security attributes of the
different protocols, and so the entire document contains security
advice.
11. IANA Considerations
This document does not define any new protocols, and therefore does
not have any IANA Considerations.
12. Acknowledgements
TBD
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join]
Richardson, M., "6tisch Zero-Touch Secure Join protocol",
draft-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join-04 (work in
progress), July 2019.
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[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]
Vucinic, M., Simon, J., Pister, K., and M. Richardson,
"Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) for 6TiSCH", draft-ietf-
6tisch-minimal-security-15 (work in progress), December
2019.
[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]
Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., Richardson, M., and S. Raza,
"EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)", draft-ietf-ace-coap-
est-18 (work in progress), January 2020.
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-
keyinfra-44 (work in progress), September 2020.
[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher]
Richardson, M., Stok, P., and P. Kampanakis, "Constrained
Voucher Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols", draft-
ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-08 (work in progress), July
2020.
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", draft-ietf-core-object-security-16 (work in
progress), March 2019.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-zerotouch]
Watsen, K., Abrahamsson, M., and I. Farrer, "Secure Zero
Touch Provisioning (SZTP)", draft-ietf-netconf-
zerotouch-29 (work in progress), January 2019.
[I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J., and F. Palombini, "Ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", draft-selander-ace-
cose-ecdhe-14 (work in progress), September 2019.
[ieee802-1AR]
IEEE Standard, ., "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",
2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
[RFC8366] Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
"A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366>.
13.2. Informative References
[I-D.friel-anima-brski-cloud]
Friel, O., Shekh-Yusef, R., and M. Richardson, "BRSKI
Cloud Registrar", draft-friel-anima-brski-cloud-03 (work
in progress), September 2020.
[I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]
Eckert, T., Behringer, M., and S. Bjarnason, "An Autonomic
Control Plane (ACP)", draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane-29 (work in progress), September 2020.
[I-D.ietf-anima-brski-async-enroll]
Fries, S., Brockhaus, H., and E. Lear, "Support of
asynchronous Enrollment in BRSKI (BRSKI-AE)", draft-ietf-
anima-brski-async-enroll-00 (work in progress), July 2020.
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[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Initial Algorithms", draft-ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs-12
(work in progress), September 2020.
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", draft-ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-
struct-14 (work in progress), September 2020.
[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J., and F. Palombini, "Ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", draft-ietf-lake-
edhoc-01 (work in progress), August 2020.
[I-D.richardson-anima-state-for-joinrouter]
Richardson, M., "Considerations for stateful vs stateless
join router in ANIMA bootstrap", draft-richardson-anima-
state-for-joinrouter-03 (work in progress), September
2020.
[I-D.selander-ace-ake-authz]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Vucinic, M., Richardson, M.,
and A. Schellenbaum, "Lightweight Authorization for
Authenticated Key Exchange.", draft-selander-ace-ake-
authz-01 (work in progress), March 2020.
[I-D.vanderstok-anima-constrained-join-proxy]
Richardson, M., Stok, P., and P. Kampanakis, "Constrained
Join Proxy for Bootstrapping Protocols", draft-vanderstok-
anima-constrained-join-proxy-04 (work in progress),
September 2020.
[pledge] Dictionary.com, ., "Dictionary.com Unabridged", 2015,
<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pledge>.
Author's Address
Michael Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
Richardson Expires April 10, 2021 [Page 15]
