Internet DRAFT - draft-richardson-opsawg-mud-iot-dns-considerations
draft-richardson-opsawg-mud-iot-dns-considerations
OPSAWG Working Group M. Richardson
Internet-Draft Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Best Current Practice 22 September 2020
Expires: 26 March 2021
Operational Considerations for use of DNS in IoT devices
draft-richardson-opsawg-mud-iot-dns-considerations-03
Abstract
This document details concerns about how Internet of Things devices
use IP addresses and DNS names. The issue becomes acute as network
operators begin deploying RFC8520 Manufacturer Usage Description
(MUD) definitions to control device access.
This document explains the problem through a series of examples of
what can go wrong, and then provides some advice on how a device
manufacturer can best make deal with these issues. The
recommendations have an impact upon device and network protocol
design.
{RFC-EDITOR, please remove. Markdown and issue tracker for this
document is at https://github.com/mcr/iot-mud-dns-considerations.git
}
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 March 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Strategies to map names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. DNS and IP Anti-Patterns for IoT device Manufacturers . . . . 6
4.1. Use of IP address literals in-protocol . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Use of non-deterministic DNS names in-protocol . . . . . 7
4.3. Use of a too inclusive DNS name . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. DNS privacy and outsourcing vs MUD controllers . . . . . . . 7
6. Recommendations to IoT device manufacturer on MUD and DNS
usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Consistently use DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Use primary DNS names controlled by the manufacturer . . 8
6.3. Use Content-Distribution Network with stable names . . . 9
6.4. Prefer DNS servers learnt from DHCP/Route
Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
[RFC8520] provides a standardized way to describe how a specific
purpose device makes use of Internet resources. Access Control Lists
(ACLs) can be defined in an RFC8520 Manufacturer Usage Description
(MUD) file that permit a device to access Internet resources by DNS
name.
Use of a DNS name rather than IP address in the ACL has many
advantages: not only does the layer of indirection permit the mapping
of name to IP address to be changed over time, it also generalizes
automatically to IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, as well as permitting
loading balancing of traffic by many different common ways, including
geography.
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At the MUD policy enforcement point - the firewall - there is a
problem. The firewall has only access to the layer-3 headers of the
packet. This includes the source and destination IP address, and if
not encrypted by IPsec, the destination UDP or TCP port number
present in the transport header. The DNS name is not present!
In theory, on TLS 1.2 connections the MUD policy enforcement point
might observe the Server Name Identifier (SNI), in practice it
involves active termination of the TCP connection (a forced circuit
proxy) in order to see enough of the traffic. And to what end? TLS
1.3 provides options to encrypt it (ESNI).
So in order to implement these name based ACLs, there must be a
mapping between the names in the ACLs and layer-3 IP addresses. The
first section of this document details a few strategies that are
used.
The second section of this document details how common manufacturer
anti-patterns get in the way this mapping.
The third section of this document details how current trends in DNS
presolution such as public DNS servers, DNS over TLS (DoT), and DNS
over HTTPS (DoH) cause problems for the strategies employed. Poor
interactions with content-distribution networks is a frequent
pathology that can result.
The fourth section of this document makes a series of recommendations
("best current practices") for manufacturers on how to use DNS, and
IP addresses with specific purpose IoT devices.
The Privacy Considerations section concerns itself with issues that
DNS-over-TLS and DNS-over-HTTPS are frequently used to deal with.
How these concerns apply to IoT devices located within a residence or
enterprise is a key concern.
The Security Considerations section covers some of the negative
outcomes should MUD/firewall managers and IoT manufacturers choose
not to cooperate.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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This document is a Best Current Practices (BCP) document. It uses
the above language where it needs to make a normative requirement on
implementations.
3. Strategies to map names
The most naive method is to try to map IP addresses to names using
the in-addr.arpa (IPv4), and ipv6.arpa (IPv6) mappings. This fails
for a number of reasons: 1) it can not be done fast enough, 2) it
reveals usage patterns of the devices, 3) the mapping are often
incomplete, 4) even if the mapping is present, due to virtual
hosting, it may not map back to the name used in the ACL. This is
not a successful strategy, and it is not used.
The simplest successful strategy for translating names is for a MUD
controller to take is to do a DNS lookup on the name (a forward
lookup), and then use the resulting IP addresses to populate the
physical ACLs.
There are still a number of failures possible.
The most important one is in the mapping of the names to IP addresses
may be non-deterministic. [RFC1794] describes the very common
mechanism that returns DNS A (or reasonably AAAA) records in a
permutted order. This is known as Round Robin DNS, and it has been
used for many decades. The device is intended to use the first IP
address that is returned, and each query returns addresses in a
different ordering, splitting the load among many servers.
This situation does not result in failures as long as all possible A/
AAAA records are returned. The MUD controller and the device get a
matching set, and the ACLs that are setup cover all possibilities.
There are a number of circumstances in which the list is not
exhaustive. The simplest is when the round robin does not return all
addresses. This is routinely done by geographical DNS load balancing
system. It can also happen if there are more addresses than will
conveniently fit into a DNS reply. The reply will be marked as
truncated. (If DNSSEC resolution will be done, then the entire RR
must be retrieved over TCP (or using a larger EDNS(0) size) before
being validated)
However, in a geographical DNS load balancing system, different
answers are given based upon the locality of the system asking.
There may also be further layers of round-robin indirection.
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Aside from the list of records being incomplete, the list may have
changed between the time that the MUD controller did the lookup and
the time that the IoT device does the lookup, and this change can
result in a failure for the ACL to match.
In order to compensate for this, the MUD controller SHOULD regularly
do DNS lookups. These lookups need to be rate limited in order to
avoid load. It may be necessary to avoid recursive DNS servers in
order to avoid receiving cached data. Properly designed recursive
servers should cache data for many minutes to days, while the
underlying DNS data can change at a higher frequency, providing
different answers to different queries!
A MUD controller that is aware of which recursive DNS server that the
IoT device will use can instead query that server on a periodic
basis. Doing so provides three advantages:
1. any geographic load balancing will base the decision on the
geolocation of the recursive DNS server, and the recursive name
server will provide the same answer to the MUD controller as to
the IoT device.
2. the resulting name to IP address mapping in the recursive name
server will be cached, and will remain the same for the entire
advertised Time-To-Live reported in the DNS query return. This
also allows the MUD controller to avoid doing unnecessary
queries.
3. if any addresses have been omitted in a round-robin DNS process,
the cache will have the set of addresses that were returned.
The solution of using the same caching recursive resolver as the
target device is very simple when the MUD controllers is located in a
residential CPE device. The device is usually also the policy
enforcement point for the ACLs, and a caching resolver is typically
located on the same device. In addition the convenience, there is a
shared fate advantage: as all three components are running on the
same device, if the device is rebooted, clearing the cache, then all
three components will get restarted when the device is restarted.
Where the solution is more complex is when the MUD controller is
located elsewhere in an Enteprise, or remotely in a cloud such as
when a Software Defines Network (SDN) is used to manage the ACLs.
The DNS servers for a particular device may not be known to the MUD
controller, nor the MUD controller be even permitted to make recusive
queries that server if it is known. In this case, additional
installation specific mechanisms are probably needed to get the right
view of DNS.
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4. DNS and IP Anti-Patterns for IoT device Manufacturers
This section describes a number of things with IoT manufacturers have
been observed to do in the field, each of which presents difficulties
for MUD enforcement points.
4.1. Use of IP address literals in-protocol
A common pattern for a number of devices is to look for firmware
updates in a two step process. An initial query is made (often over
HTTPS, sometimes with a POST, but the method is immaterial) to an
authoritatve server. The current firmware model of the device is
sometimes provided and then the authoritative server provides a
determination if a new version is required, and if so, what version.
In simpler cases, an HTTPS end point is queried which provides the
name and URL of the most recent firmware.
The more complex case supports situations in which the device needs
to be running the latest patch release before it can apply the next
major release. For instance, a device running 1.4 must upgrade to at
least version 1.9 before it is able to download version 2.0 of the
firmware.
The authoritative upgrade server then responds with a URL of a
firmware blob that the device should download and install. Best
practice is that firmware is either signed internally
([I-D.ietf-suit-architecture]) so that it can be verified, or a hash
of the blob is provided.
The challenge for a MUD controller is in the details of the URL that
is provided. An authoritative server might be tempted to provided an
IP address literal inside the protocol: there are two arguments for
doing this.
One is that it eliminates problems to firmware updates that might be
caused by lack of DNS, or incompatibilities with DNS. For instance
the bug that causes interoperability issues with some recursive
servers would become unpatchable for devices that were forced to use
that recursive resolver type.
A second reason to avoid a DNS in the URL is when an inhouse content-
distribution system is involved that involves on-demand instances
being added (or removed) from a cloud computing architecture. This
model is typical of on-demand video systems including Netflix (see
[LOOKING FOR NETFLIX REF], [WINDOWS UPDATE REF]), but this can occur
in quite a number of other situations. Third-party content-
distribution networks (CDN) tend to use DNS names in order to isolate
the content-owner from changes to the distribution network.
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[BEHAVE-BCP-REF] gives other good reasons why IP address literals are
bad ideas; in particular they work very poorly when devices have IPv6
capabilities, and are on IPv6-only networks with NAT64 (see
[RFC6146]).
4.2. Use of non-deterministic DNS names in-protocol
A second pattern is for a control protocol to connect to a known HTTP
end point. This is easily described in MUD. Within that control
protocol references are made to additional content at other URLs.
The values of those URLs do not fit any easily described pattern and
may point at arbitrary names.
Those names are often within some third-party Content-Distribution-
Network (CDN) system, or may be arbitrary names in a cloud-provider
storage system such as Amazon S3 (such [AmazonS3], or [Akamai]).
*INSERT* examples of non-deterministic CDN content.
Since it is not possible to predict a name for where the content will
be, it is not possible to include that into the MUD file.
This applies to the firmware update situation as well.
4.3. Use of a too inclusive DNS name
Some CDNs make all customer content at a single URL (such as
s3.amazonaws.com). This seems to be ideal from a MUD point of view:
a completely predictable URL. The problem is that a compromised
device could then connect to any S3 bucket, potentially attacking
other buckets.
The MUD ACLs provide only for permitting end points and do not filter
URLs (nor could filtering be enforced within HTTPS).
5. DNS privacy and outsourcing vs MUD controllers
[RFC7858] and [RFC8094] provide for DNS over TLS and DTLS.
[I-D.ietf-dnsop-terminology-ter] details the terms. But, even with
traditional DNS over Port-53 (Do53), it is possible to oursource DNS
queries to other public services, such as those operated by Google,
CloudFlare, Verisign, etc.
There are significant privacy issues with having IoT devices sending
their DNS queries to an outside entity. Doing it over a secure
transport (DoT/DoH) is clearly better than doing so on port 53. The
providers of the secure resolver service will, however, still see the
IoT device queries.
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A described above in Section 3 the MUD controller needs to have
access to the same resolver(s) as the IoT device. Use of the QuadX
resolvers at first seems to present less of a problem than use of
some other less well known resolver. While any system may use QuadX,
in most cases those services are massively replicated via anycast:
there is no guarantee that a MUD controller will speak to the same
instance, or get the same geographic anycast result.
6. Recommendations to IoT device manufacturer on MUD and DNS usage
Inclusion of a MUD file with IoT devices is operationally quite
simple. It requires only a few small changes to the DHCP client code
to express the MUD URL. It can even be done without code changes via
the use of a QR code affixed to the packaging (see
[I-D.richardson-opsawg-securehomegateway-mud]).
The difficult part is determining what to put into the MUD file
itself. There are currently tools that help with the definition and
analysis of MUD files, see [mudmaker]. The remaining difficulty is
now the semantic contents of what is in the MUD file. An IoT
manufacturer must now spend some time reviewing what the network
communications that their device does.
This document has discussed a number of challenges that occur
relating to how DNS requests are made and resolved, and it is the
goal of this section to make recommendations on how to modify IoT
systems to work well with MUD.
6.1. Consistently use DNS
The first recommendation is to avoid using IP address literals in any
protocol. Names should always be used.
6.2. Use primary DNS names controlled by the manufacturer
The second recommendation is to allocate and use names within zones
controlled by the manufacturer. These names can be populated with an
alias (see [RFC8499] section 2) that points to the production system.
Ideally, a different name is used for each logical function, allowing
for different rules in the MUD file to be enabled and disabled.
While it used to be costly to have a large number of aliases in a web
server certificate, this is no longer the case. Wildcard
certificates are also commonly available which allowed for an
infinite number of possible names.
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6.3. Use Content-Distribution Network with stable names
When aliases point to a Content-Distribution Network (CDN), prefer to
use stable names that point to appropriately load balanced targets.
CDNs that employ very low time-to-live (TTL) values for DNS make it
harder for the MUD controller to get the same answer as the IoT
Device. A CDN that always returns the same set of A and AAAA
records, but permutes them to provide the best one first provides a
more reliable answer.
6.4. Prefer DNS servers learnt from DHCP/Route Advertisements
IoT Devices should prefer doing DNS to the network provided DNS
servers. Whether this is restricted to Classic DNS (Do53) or also
includes using DoT/DoH is a local decision, but a locally provided
DoT server SHOULD be used, as recommended by
[I-D.reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server] and [I-D.peterson-doh-dhcp].
Use of public QuadX resolver instead of the provided DNS resolver,
whether Do53, DoT or DoH is discouraged. Should the network provide
such a resolver for use, then there is no reason not to use it, as
the network operator has clearly thought about this.
Some manufacturers would like to have a fallback to using a public
resolver to mitigate against local misconfiguration. There are a
number of reasons to avoid this, or at least do this very carefully.
The recommendation here is to do this only when the provided
resolvers provide no answers to any queries at all, and do so
repeatedly. The use of the operator provided resolvers SHOULD be
retried on a periodic basis, and once they answer, there should be no
further attempts to contact public resolvers.
Finally, the list of public resolvers that might be contacted MUST be
listed in the MUD file as destinations that are to be permitted!
This should include the port numbers (53, 853 for DoT, 443 for DoH)
that will be used as well.
7. Privacy Considerations
The use of non-local DNS servers exposes the list of names resolved
to a third parties, including passive eavesdroppers.
The use of DoT and DoH eliminates the minimizes threat from passive
eavesdropped, but still exposes the list to the operator of the DoT
or DoH server.
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The use of unencrypted (Do53) requests to a local DNS server exposes
the list to any internal passive eavesdroppers, and for some
situations that may be significant, particularly if unencrypted WiFi
is used. Use of DoT to a local DNS recursive resolver is a preferred
choice, assuming that the trust anchor for the local DNS server can
be obtained, such as via [I-D.reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server].
IoT devices that reach out to the manufacturer at regular intervals
to check for firmware updates are informing passive eavesdroppers of
the existence of a specific manufacturer's device being present at
the origin location. While possession of a Large (Kitchen) Appliance
at a residence may be uninteresting to most, possession of intimate
personal devices (e.g., "sex toys") may be a cause for embarassment.
IoT device manufacturers are encouraged to anonymizing ways to do
update queries. For instance, contracting out the update
notification service to a third party that deals with a large variety
of devices would provide a level of defense against passive
eavesdropping. Other update mechanisms should be investigated,
including use of DNSSEC signed TXT records with current version
information. This would permit DoT or DoH to provide the update
notification. This is particularly powerful if a local recursive DoT
server is used, which then communicates using DoT over the Internet.
The more complex case of section {{inprotocol} postulates that the
version number needs to be provided to an intelligent agent that can
decided the correct route to do upgrades. The current
[I-D.ietf-suit-architecture] specification provides a wide variety of
ways to accomplish the same thing without having to divulge the
current version number.
The use of a publically specified firmware update protocol would also
enhance privacy of IoT devices. In such a system the IoT device
would never contact the manufacturer for version information or for
firmware itself. Instead, details of how to query and where to get
the firmware would be provided as a MUD extension, and a Enterprise-
wide mechanism would retrieve firmware, and then distribute it
internally. Aside from the bandwidth savings of downloading the
firmware only once, this also makes the number of devices active
confidential, and provides some evidence about which devices have
been upgraded and which ones might still be vulnerable. (The
unpatched devices might be lurking, powered off, lost in a closet)
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8. Security Considerations
This document deals with conflicting Security requirements: devices
which an operator wants to manage using [RFC8520] vs requirements for
the devices to get access to network resources that may be critical
to their continued safe operation.
This document takes the view that the two requirements do not need to
be in conflict, but resolving the conflict requires some advance
planning by all parties.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[Akamai] "Akamai", 2019,
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akamai_Technologies>.
[AmazonS3] "Amazon S3", 2019,
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amazon_S3>.
[I-D.ietf-dnsop-terminology-ter]
Hoffman, P., "Terminology for DNS Transports and
Location", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
dnsop-terminology-ter-02, 3 August 2020,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsop-
terminology-ter-02.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-suit-architecture]
Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Brown, D., and M. Meriac, "A
Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-architecture-
12, 17 September 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-
drafts/draft-ietf-suit-architecture-12.txt>.
[I-D.peterson-doh-dhcp]
Peterson, T., "DNS over HTTP resolver announcement Using
DHCP or Router Advertisements", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-peterson-doh-dhcp-01, 21 October
2019, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-peterson-
doh-dhcp-01.txt>.
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[I-D.reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server]
Reddy.K, T., Wing, D., Richardson, M., and M. Boucadair,
"A Bootstrapping Procedure to Discover and Authenticate
DNS-over-TLS and DNS-over-HTTPS Servers", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-
dns-server-08, 6 March 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/
internet-drafts/draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-
08.txt>.
[RFC1794] Brisco, T., "DNS Support for Load Balancing", RFC 1794,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1794, April 1995,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1794>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6146] Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful
NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, DOI 10.17487/RFC6146,
April 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6146>.
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
[RFC8094] Reddy, T., Wing, D., and P. Patil, "DNS over Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 8094,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8094, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8094>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8499] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.
[RFC8520] Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
Description Specification", RFC 8520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8520>.
9.2. Informative References
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[I-D.richardson-opsawg-securehomegateway-mud]
Richardson, M., Latour, J., and H. Gharakheili, "On
loading MUD URLs from QR codes", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-richardson-opsawg-securehomegateway-
mud-05, 8 September 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-
drafts/draft-richardson-opsawg-securehomegateway-mud-
05.txt>.
[mudmaker] "Mud Maker", 2019, <https://mudmaker.org>.
Appendix A. Appendices
Author's Address
Michael Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
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