Internet DRAFT - draft-sahib-domain-verification-techniques
draft-sahib-domain-verification-techniques
Network Working Group S. Sahib
Internet-Draft Brave Software
Intended status: Informational S. Huque
Expires: 8 September 2022 Salesforce
P. Wouters
Aiven
7 March 2022
Survey of Domain Verification Techniques using DNS
draft-sahib-domain-verification-techniques-03
Abstract
Many services on the Internet need to verify ownership or control of
a domain in the Domain Name System (DNS) [RFC1034] [RFC1035]. This
verification is often done by requesting a specific DNS record to be
visible in the domain. This document surveys various techniques in
wide use today, the pros and cons of each, and proposes some
practises to avoid known problems.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/ShivanKaul/draft-sahib-domain-verification-
techniques.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 September 2022.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Verification Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. TXT based . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.1. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. CNAME based . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Common Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.1. Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.2. RDATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Targeted Domain Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Targeted Service Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. TXT vs CNAME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. Time-bound checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Email sending authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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1. Introduction
Many providers of internet services need domain owners to prove that
they control a particular domain before they can operate a services
or grant some privilege to the associated domain. For instance,
certificate authorities like Let's Encrypt [LETSENCRYPT] ask
requesters of TLS certificates to prove that they operate the domain
they are requesting the certificate for. Providers generally allow
for several different ways of proving domain control. This document
describes and recommends common practises with using DNS based
techniques for domain verification. Other techniques such as email
or HTTP(S) based verification are out-of-scope.
In practice, DNS-based verification takes the form of the provider
generating a random value visible only to the requester, and then
asking the requester to create a DNS record containing this random
value and placing it at a location within the domain that the
provider can query for. Generally only one temporary DNS record is
sufficient for proving domain ownership, although sometimes the DNS
record must be kept in the zone to prove continued ownership of the
domain.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Provider: an internet-based provider of a service, for e.g., Let's
Encrypt provides a certificate authority service or GitHub provides
code-hosting services. These services often require a user to verify
that they control a domain.
3. Verification Techniques
3.1. TXT based
TXT record-based DNS domain verification is usually the default
option for DNS verification. The service provider asks the user to
add a DNS TXT record (perhaps through their domain host or DNS
provider) at the domain with a certain value. Then, the service
provider does a DNS TXT query for the domain being verified and
checks that the value exists. For example, this is what a DNS TXT
verification record could look like:
example.com. IN TXT "foo-verification=bar-237943648324687364"
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Here, the value "bar-237943648324687364" for the attribute "foo-
verification" serves as the randomly-generated TXT value being added
to prove ownership of the domain to Foo provider. Although the
original DNS protocol specifications did not associate any semantics
with the DNS TXT record, [RFC1464] describes how to use them to store
attributes in the form of ASCII text key-value pairs for a particular
domain. In practice, there is wide variation in the content of DNS
TXT records used for domain verification, and they often do not
follow the key-value pair model. Even so, the rdata portion of the
DNS TXT record has to contain the value being used to verify the
domain. The value is usually a randomly-generated token in order to
guarantee that the entity who requested that the domain be verified
(i.e. the person managing the account at Foo provider) is the one who
has (direct or delegated) access to DNS records for the domain. The
generated token typically expires in a few days. The TXT record is
placed at the domain being verified ("example.com" in the example
above). After a TXT record has been added, the service provider will
usually take some time to verify that the DNS TXT record with the
expected token exists for the domain.
The same domain name can have multiple distinct TXT records (a TXT
Record Set), where each TXT record may be associated with a distinct
service. Having many of these may cause operational issues, and it
is RECOMMENDED that providers use a prefix (eg "_foo.example.com")
instead of using the top of the domain ("APEX") directly, such as:
_foo.example.com. IN TXT "bar-237943648324687364"
3.1.1. Examples
3.1.1.1. Let's Encrypt
Let's Encrypt [LETSENCRYPT] has a challenge type DNS-01 that lets a
user prove domain ownership in accordance with the ACME protocol
[RFC8555]. In this challenge, Let's Encrypt asks you to create a TXT
record with a randomly-generated token at _acme-
challenge.<YOUR_DOMAIN>. For example, if you wanted to prove domain
ownership of example.com, Let's Encrypt could ask you to create the
DNS record:
_acme-challenge.example.com. IN TXT "cE3A8qQpEzAIYq-T9DWNdLJ1_YRXamdxcjGTbzrOH5L"
[RFC8555] (section 8.4) places requirements on the random value.
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3.1.1.2. Google Workspace
[GOOGLE-WORKSPACE-TXT] asks the user to sign in with their
administrative account and obtain their verification token as part of
the setup process for Google Workspace. The verification token is a
68-character string that begins with "google-site-verification=",
followed by 43 characters. Google recommends a TTL of 3600 seconds.
The owner name of the TXT record is the domain or subdomain neme
being verified.
3.1.1.3. GitHub
GitHub asks you to create a DNS TXT record under _github-challenge-
ORGANIZATION-<YOUR_DOMAIN>, where ORGANIZATION stands for the GitHub
organization name [GITHUB-TXT]. The code is a numeric code that
expires in 7 days.
3.2. CNAME based
Less commonly than TXT record verification, service providers also
provide the ability to verify domain ownership via CNAME records.
One reason for using CNAME is for the case where the user cannot
create TXT records. One common reason is that the domain name may
already have CNAME record that aliases it to a 3rd-party target
domain. CNAMEs have a technical restriction that no other record
types can be placed along side them at the same domain name
([RFC1034], Section 3.6.2).. The CNAME based domain verification
method typically uses a randomized label prepended to the domain name
being verified.
3.2.1. Examples
3.2.1.1. Google
[GOOGLE-WORKSPACE-CNAME] lets you specify a CNAME record for
verifying domain ownership. The user gets a unique 12-character
string that is added as "Host", with TTL 3600 (or default) and
Destination an 86-character string beginning with "gv-" and ending
with ".domainverify.googlehosted.com.".
To verify a subdomain, the unique 12-character string is appended
with the subdomain name for "Host" field for e.g.
JLKDER712AFP.subdomain where subdomain is the subdomain being
verified.
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3.2.1.2. AWS Certificate Manager (ACM)
To get issued a certificate by AWS Certificate Manager (ACM), you can
create a CNAME record to verify domain ownership [ACM-CNAME]. The
record name for the CNAME looks like:
`\_<random-token1>.example.com. IN CNAME \_RANDOM-TOKEN.acm-validations.aws.`
Note that if there are more than 5 CNAMEs being chained, then this
method does not work.
3.3. Common Patterns
3.3.1. Name
ACME and GitHub have a suffix of _PROVIDER_NAME-challenge in the Name
field of the TXT record challenge. For ACME, the full Host is _acme-
challenge.<YOUR_DOMAIN>, while for GitHub it is _github-challenge-
ORGANIZATION-<YOUR_DOMAIN>. Both these patterns are useful for doing
targeted domain verification, as discussed in section (#targeted-
domain-verification) because if the provider knows what it is looking
for (domain in the case of ACME, organization name + domain in case
of GitHub) it can specifically do a DNS query for that TXT record, as
opposed to having to do a TXT query for the apex.
ACME does the same name construction for CNAME records.
3.3.2. RDATA
One pattern that quite a few providers follow (Dropbox, Atlassian) is
constructing the rdata of the TXT DNS record in the form of PROVIDER-
SERVICE-domain-verification= followed by the random value being
checked for. This is in accordance with [RFC1464] which mandates
that attributes must be stored as key-value pairs.
4. Recommendations
4.1. Targeted Domain Verification
The TXT record being used for domain verification is most commonly
placed at the domain name being verified. For example, if
example.com is being verified, then the DNS TXT record will have
example.com in the Name section. Unfortunately, this practise does
not scale very well.
Many services are now attempting to verify domain names, causing many
of these TXT records to be placed at that same location at the top of
the domain (the APEX).
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When a DNS administrator sees 15 DNS TXT records for their domain
based on only random letters, they can no longer determine for which
service or vendor the DNS TXT records were added. This causes
administrators to leave all DNS TXT records in there, as they want to
avoid breaking a service. Over time, the domain ends up with a lot
of no longer needed, unknown and untracable DNS TXT records.
An operational issue arises from the DNS protocol only being able to
query for "all TXT records" at a single location. If multiple
services all require TXT records, this can cause the DNS answer for
TXT records to become very large. It has been observed that some
well known domains had so many services deployed that their DNS TXT
answer did not fit in a single UDP DNS packet. This results in
fragmentation which is known to be vulnerable to various attacks
draft-ietf-dnsop-avoid-fragmentation-06. It can also lead to UDP
packet truncation, causing a retry over TCP. Not all networks
properly transport DNS over TCP and some DNS software mistakenly
believe TCP support is optional draft-ietf-dnsop-dns-tcp-
requirements-15.
4.2. Targeted Service Verification
One malicious service that promises to deliver something after domain
verification could surreptitiously ask another service provider to
start processing or sending mail for the target domain and then
present the victim domain administrator with this DNS TXT record
pretending to be for their service. Once the administrator has added
the DNS TXT record, instead of getting their service, their domain is
now certifying another service of which they are not aware they are
now a consumer.
If services use a clear description and name attribution in the
required DNS TXT record, this can be avoided. For example by
requiring a DNS TXT record at _vendorname.example.com instead of at
example.com, a malicious service could no longer replay this without
the DNS administrator noticing this. The LetsEncrypt ACME challenge
uses this method.
4.3. TXT vs CNAME
The inherent problem of a CNAME is that it cannot co-exist with any
other data. What happens when both a CNAME and other data such as a
TXT record or NS record exist depends on the DNS implementation. But
most likely, either the CNAME or the other records will be silently
ignored. The user interface for adding a record might not check for
this. It might also break in unexpected ways. If a CNAME is added
for continuous authorization, and for another service a TXT record is
added, the TXT record might work but the CNAME record might break.
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Operational experience has also shown a vendor that provides two
difference services, one requiring a CNAME and one requiring a TXT
record for authorization that needed to be deployed at the same
location. If both services would have used a TXT record, this would
not have caused any problems.
Another issues with CNAME records is that they MUST NOT point to
another CNAME. But where this might be true in an initial
deployment, if the target that the CNAME points to is changed from a
non-CNAME record to a CNAME record, some DNS software might no longer
resolve this as expected.
Early web based DNS administration tools did not always have the TXT
record available in a pulldown menu for DNS record types, while CNAME
would be available. However as many anti-spam meassures now require
TXT records, this support is now generally available. It is
recommended that the CNAME method is only used for delegating
authorization to an actual subdomain, for example:
recruitement.example.com. IN CNAME example.recruitement-vendor.com.
4.4. Time-bound checking
After domain verification is done, there is no need for the TXT or
CNAME record to continue to exist as the presence of the domain-
verifying DNS record for a service only implies that a user with
access to the service also has DNS control of the domain at the time
the code was generated. It should be safe to remove the verifying
DNS record once the verification is done and the service provider
doing the verification should specify how long the verification will
take (i.e. after how much time can the verifying DNS record be
deleted). However, despite this, some services ask the record to
exist in perpetuity [ATLASSIAN-VERIFY].
If a provider will use the DNS TXT record only for a one-time
verification, it is RECOMMENDED that they clearly indicate this in
the RDATA of the TXT record, so a DNS administrator at the target
domain can easilly spot an obsolete record in the future. For
example:
_provider-token.example.com. IN TXT "type=activation_only
expiry=2023-10-12 token=TOKENDATA"
If a provider requires the continued precense of the TXT record as
proof that the domain owner is still authorizing the service, this
should also be clear from the TXT record RDATA. For example:
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_provider-service.example.com. IN TXT "type=continued_service
expiry=never token=TOKENDATA"
5. Email sending authorization
Some vendors use a hosted service that wants to generate emails that
appear to be from the customer. When a customer has deployed anti-
spam meassures such as DKIM [RFC6376], DMARC [RFC7489] or SPF
[RFC7208], the vendor's mail service needs to be added to the list of
allowed mail servers. However, some customers might not want to give
permission for a vendor to send emails from their entire domain. It
is recommended that a vendor uses a subdomain. If the vendor's
domain is example-vendor.com, and the customer domain is example-
customer.com, the vendor could use the subdomain example-
customer.example-vendor.com to send emails. Alternatively, the
customer could delegate a subdomain example-vendor.example-
customer.com to the vendoer for email sending, as those email
addresses would have a stronger origin appearance of being emails
send by the customer to their clients.
Besides requiring proof of ownership of the domain, the customer
needs to authorize the hosted service to send email on their behalf.
6. Security Considerations
Both the provider and the service being authenticated and authorized
should be obvious from the TXT content to prevent malicious services
from misleading the domain owner into certifying a different provider
or service.
It is RECOMMENDED that DNSSEC [RFC4033] is employed by the domain
owner. A service provider MUST enable DNSSEC validation when
verifying doman name challanges to protect against domain name
spoofing.
7. Operational Considerations
It is often consumers of the provider services that are not DNS
experts that need to relay information from a provider's website to
their local DNS administrators. The exact DNS record type, content
and location is often not clear when the DNS administrator receives
the information. It is RECOMMENDED that providers offer extremely
detailed help pages, that are accessible without needing a login on
the provider website, as the DNS adminstrator often has no login
account on the provider service website. It is recommended that any
instructions given by the provider contains the entire DNS record
using a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN).
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8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1035>.
[RFC1464] Rosenbaum, R., "Using the Domain Name System To Store
Arbitrary String Attributes", RFC 1464,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1464, May 1993,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1464>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References
[ACM-CNAME]
AWS, "Option 1: DNS Validation", n.d.,
<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/acm/latest/userguide/dns-
validation.html>.
[ATLASSIAN-VERIFY]
Atlassian, "Verify over DNS", n.d.,
<https://support.atlassian.com/user-management/docs/
verify-a-domain-to-manage-
accounts/#Verifyadomainforyourorganization-VerifyoverDNS>.
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[GITHUB-TXT]
GitHub, "Verifying your organization's domain", n.d.,
<https://docs.github.com/en/github/setting-up-and-
managing-organizations-and-teams/verifying-your-
organizations-domain>.
[GOOGLE-WORKSPACE-CNAME]
Google, "CNAME record values", n.d.,
<https://support.google.com/a/answer/112038>.
[GOOGLE-WORKSPACE-TXT]
Google, "TXT record values", n.d.,
<https://support.google.com/a/answer/2716802>.
[LETSENCRYPT]
Let's Encrypt, "Challenge Types: DNS-01 challenge", 2020,
<https://letsencrypt.org/docs/challenge-types/#dns-
01-challenge>.
[RFC6376] Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed.,
"DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76,
RFC 6376, DOI 10.17487/RFC6376, September 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376>.
[RFC7208] Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for
Authorizing Use of Domains in Email, Version 1", RFC 7208,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7208, April 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7208>.
[RFC7489] Kucherawy, M., Ed. and E. Zwicky, Ed., "Domain-based
Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
(DMARC)", RFC 7489, DOI 10.17487/RFC7489, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7489>.
[RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8555>.
Acknowledgments
TODO
Authors' Addresses
Shivan Sahib
Brave Software
Email: shivankaulsahib@gmail.com
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Shumon Huque
Salesforce
Email: shuque@gmail.com
Paul Wouters
Aiven
Email: paul.wouters@aiven.io
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