Internet DRAFT - draft-shen-sidrops-region-verification
draft-shen-sidrops-region-verification
SIDROPS C. Shen
Internet-Draft CAICT
Intended status: Standards Track T. Zhou
Expires: 17 February 2023 Huawei Technologies
Y. Liu
China Mobile
W. Yu
CAICT
H. Wang
S. Zhuang
S. Chen
Huawei Technologies
16 August 2022
Verification of Routes Using Region Authorization
draft-shen-sidrops-region-verification-02
Abstract
BGP routing security is becoming a major issue that affects the
normal running of Internet services. Currently, there are many
solutions, including ROA authentication and ASPA authentication, to
prevent route source hijacking, path hijacking, and route leaking.
However, on an actual network, large ISPs with multiple ASes can use
carefully constructed routes to bypass ROA and ASPA authentication to
attack the target network.
This document defines an region-based authentication method for large
ISPs with many ASes to prevent traffic hijacking within ISPs.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Shen, et al. Expires 17 February 2023 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Verification of Routes Using Region Auth August 2022
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 February 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Route hijacking risk within a single ISP . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Route hijacking risk between multiple ISPs . . . . . . . 4
4. Region Based Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Region Based Verification Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Singe region verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Multiple region verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. Obtaining Region Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.4. Comparing with routing policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
The design of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) lacks a mechanism to
validate BGP attributes, which is prone to BGP hijacking and BGP
route leaks [RFC7908].
Shen, et al. Expires 17 February 2023 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Verification of Routes Using Region Auth August 2022
[RFC6811] defines a method for verifying the origin of BGP prefixes,
which can resolve the most common source AS hijacking.
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification] defines an AS-pairs based
authentication method to resolve AS-Path hijacking and route leaking.
However, even if these two technologies are deployed on large ISP
networks with many ASes, there are still risks of being attacked by
carefully constructed path hijacking.
2. Terminology
OV: Origin Validation
RPKI: Resource Public Key Infrastructure
RP: Relying Party
RBA: Region Based Authorization
3. Problem Statement
Currently, some large ISPs have more than one public ASes to
facilitate management. In these ISPs, only one or very few ASes are
used to connect to external ISPs. However, the sub-ASes of these
ISPs also exchange routes to provide services for different
customers. Therefore, the route access between these sub-ASes may
still be subjected to a well-crafted attack.
3.1. Route hijacking risk within a single ISP
Shen, et al. Expires 17 February 2023 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Verification of Routes Using Region Auth August 2022
/--------------------------\
| ISP1 |
+----+ | ,.., |
|user| | / \ |
| |-----| AS | |
+----+ | |65002 - |
| \ / `. |
| `'-` \ ,.., | /--------\
| `. / \ | | ISP10 |
| ' AS --------- |
| ,65001 | | | AS65500|
| / \ / | | |
| / `'-` | \--------/
| ,.., / |
| / \ / |
+----+ | | AS / |
|serv-------|65003 | |
|er | | \ / |
+----+ | `'-` |
| |
\--------------------------/
Figure 1 Route hijacking risk within a single ISP
As shown in the Figure 1. ISP1 has AS65001, AS65002, and AS65003 and
connects to an external ISP, such as AS65500. There is a server
connect to the AS65003, and a user connecte to the AS65002. AS65003
advertises the server's route to AS65002, and AS65002 uses the route
to provide services for users.
After the AS65500 obtains the route for the server, it can spoof the
route and change the source AS to AS65003. In this way, the spoofed
route is advertised to AS65001 with AS-Path AS65500 AS65003. AS65001
selects routes between the routes advertised by AS65003 and AS65500.
Therefore, AS65001 may preferentially select the forged routes of
AS65500. As a result, subsequent traffic from users to the server is
hijacked to AS65500.
IIn actual deployment, to facilitate traffic adjustment, the mask of
the address in the ROA database registered by ISP1 may be in a
certain range. In this case, the AS65500 can more easily hijack
traffic by using more specific prefixes and spoofing the source AS.
The scenario described here can be prevented by ASPA because the AS
pair (AS65500,AS65003) does not exist..
3.2. Route hijacking risk between multiple ISPs
Shen, et al. Expires 17 February 2023 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Verification of Routes Using Region Auth August 2022
/---------------------\ /--------------------\
| ISP1 | | ISP2 |
+----+ | ,-. | | ,-. |
|user| | / \ | | / \ |
| |-----| AS | | | | AS | |
+----+ | |65002\ | | |65106| |
| \ / \ ,-. | | ,-. .\ / |
| '-' \ / \ | | / \ ` '-' |
| '| AS | | | | AS |-` |
| ,-. .|65001------------|65104| ,-. |
| / \ ` \ / | | \ / `. / \ | +----+
| | AS -` '\' | | '\' '| AS | | |serv|
| |65003| \ | | , |65105|-----|er |
| \ / , | | / \ / | +----+
| '-' \ | | / '-' |
\------------------\--/ \-/------------------/
\ .'
\ /
\ /
/------\---/--------\
| '.-, |
| / \ |
| | AS | |
| |65500 | |
| \ / |
| `'-` |
| ISP3 |
\-------------------/
Figure 2 Route hijacking risk between multiple ISPs
As shown in Figure 2. ISP1 has AS65001, AS65002, and AS65003 and
connects to external ISPs, such as AS65500 and ISP2's AS65104. ISP2
has AS65104, AS65105, and AS65106, and connects to external ISPs such
as AS65500 and ISP1's AS65001. There is a server connect to AS65105,
and a user connect to AS65002. AS65105 advertises the server's route
to AS65002 through the BGP peer. AS65002 then provides services for
users.
The AS65500 can also obtain the route for the server from AS65104.
The AS65500 can spoof the route of the server and change the source
AS to AS65105. In this way, the AS65500 constructs a more specific
prefix, which AS-Path is AS65500 AS65104 AS65105, and advertises the
route to AS65001. The traffic from the user to the server will be
hijacked to AS65500.
In this scenario it also can't be prevented by ASPA.
Shen, et al. Expires 17 February 2023 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Verification of Routes Using Region Auth August 2022
4. Region Based Authorization
An RBA is a digital signature object that contains two types of data.
One type is to bind multiple ASNs of an ISP to an region ID. The
region ID represents the ISP and is signed by the administrator of
the ISP. The RBA certifies which ASNs an ISP has. An AS should
belongs to only one ISP. The second type is to bind an ISP's region
ID to a region confederation ID, which is signed by the ISP's
administrator. The region ID and region confederation ID introduced
here can be allocated and managed by a unified structure.
5. Region Based Verification Procedure
To solve this problem, a region-based verification is introduced.
This method is applicable to large ISPs with multiple ASes. In
addition to OV verification, region-based verification is performed
to prevent the attack scenarios mentioned in section 3.
5.1. Singe region verification
As shown in Figure 1, ISP1 can be set to area 1, including AS65001,
AS65002, and AS65003.
When a device learns a route, it will verifie whether the route is a
local region route based on basic OV verification.
The verification process is as follows:
1) Perform OV verification on the route. If the OV verification
result is valid, then perform area verification.
2) Check whether the route's origin AS is belong to local region.
3) If not, it indicates that the route is not a local region route.
No additional verification is required in single region scenarios..
4) If the route's origin AS is belong to local region, check whether
the peer that learns the route is belong to local region.
5) If the peer that learns a route is not belong to local region, the
route verification result is invalid.
If the route verification result is invalid, the route can be
consider as an invalid route and is not involved in route selection.
This prevents routes belong to local region from being learned by
external ASs and prevents possible route hijacking.
Shen, et al. Expires 17 February 2023 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Verification of Routes Using Region Auth August 2022
5.2. Multiple region verification
For the case of Figure 2, region confederations can be set. ISP1 is
set to region 1, including AS65001, AS65002, and AS65003. ISP2 is
set to region 2, including AS65104, AS65105, and AS6. In addition,
the region of ISP1 and ISP2 form a regional confederation, which is
set to regional confederation 1.
The verification process is as follows:
1) First, perform the step of region verification. After single
region verification step 2, if the route's origin AS is not belong to
local region, then check whether the route belongs to the local
confederation.
2) If the route belongs to the local confederation, check whether the
peer that learned the route is belong to the local confederation.
3) If the peer is not belong to the local confederation, the route
verification result is invalid.
4) Optionally, further checking whether the peer is the region to
which the route belongs maybe done. If the region to which the route
belongs does not match the region to which the learned peer belongs,
the route may be considered as the lowest preference.
If the route verification result is invalid, the route can be
consider as an invalid route and is not involved in route selection.
This prevents routes belong to local region from being learned by
external ASs and prevents possible route hijacking.
5.3. Obtaining Region Information
The region information and region confederation information can be
obtained in either of the following ways:
1) Obtained through the RP. When the region information is
registered through RPKI, it can be obtained through RP.
2) Static configuration. When RP is not ready, this can be achieved
through manual configuration.
Generally, the RPKI mode is recommended..
5.4. Comparing with routing policy
The verification here can also be implemented through routing
policies.
Shen, et al. Expires 17 February 2023 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Verification of Routes Using Region Auth August 2022
For region verification scenarios, regular expression-based
policies，such as denying all routes whose origin AS is the
local ISP's ASes, can be configured by the external peers to filter
routes.
However, in this mode, complex policies need to be configured based
on the AS planning of the ISP. In addition, these policies need to
be integrated with existing routing policies, which is complex to
use.
The RPKI mechanism can be used to verify the area information
obtained from the RP, which simplifies the deployment.
6. Security Considerations
NA
7. Acknowledgements
NA
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification]
Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., and J.
Snijders, "BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Autonomous System
Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-09,
11 July 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-
sidrops-aspa-verification-09.txt>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
Shen, et al. Expires 17 February 2023 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Verification of Routes Using Region Auth August 2022
[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
Authors' Addresses
Chen Shen
CAICT
No.52, Hua Yuan Bei Road
Beijing
100191
China
Email: shenchen@caict.ac.cn
Tianran Zhou
Huawei Technologies
Huawei Campus, No. 156 Beiqing Road
Beijing
100095
China
Email: zhoutianran@huawei.com
Yisong Liu
China Mobile
32 Xuanwumenxi Ave.
Beijing
100032
China
Email: liuyisong@chinamobile.com
Wenyan Yu
CAICT
No.52, Hua Yuan Bei Road
Beijing
100191
China
Email: yuwenyan@caict.ac.cn
Shen, et al. Expires 17 February 2023 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Verification of Routes Using Region Auth August 2022
Haibo Wang
Huawei Technologies
Huawei Campus, No. 156 Beiqing Road
Beijing
100095
China
Email: rainsword.wang@huawei.com
Shunwan Zhuang
Huawei Technologies
Huawei Campus, No. 156 Beiqing Road
Beijing
100095
China
Email: zhuangshunwan@huawei.com
Shuanglong Chen
Huawei Technologies
Huawei Campus, No. 156 Beiqing Road
Beijing
100095
China
Email: chenshuanglong@huawei.com
Shen, et al. Expires 17 February 2023 [Page 10]
