Internet DRAFT - draft-shin-nfvrg-service-verification
draft-shin-nfvrg-service-verification
NFVRG M-K. Shin
Internet-Draft ETRI
Intended status: Informational K. Nam
Expires: May 5, 2016 Friesty
S. Pack
KU
S. Lee
ETRI
R. Krishnan
Dell
T. Kim
LG U+
October 5, 2015
Verification of NFV Services : Problem Statement and Challenges
draft-shin-nfvrg-service-verification-04
Abstract
NFV relocates network functions from dedicated hardware appliances to
generic servers, so they can run in software. However, incomplete or
inconsistent configuration of virtualized network functions (VNF) and
forwarding graph (FG, aka service chain) could cause break-down of
the supporting infrastructure. In this sense, verification is
critical for network operators to check their requirements and
network properties are correctly enforced in the supporting
infrastructures. Recognizing these problems, we discuss key
properties to be checked on NFV-enabled services. Also, we present
challenging issues related to verification in NFV environments.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 2, 2016.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Problem statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Dependencies of network service components in NFV framework .3
2.2. Invariant and error check in VNF FGs . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Load Balancing and optimization among VNF Instances . . . . 4
2.4. Policy and state consistency on NFV services . . . . . . . . 4
2.5. Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.6. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Examples - NS policy conflict with NFVI policy . . . . . . . . 6
4. Requirements of verification framework . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Challenging issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Consistency check in distributed state . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Intent-based service composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. Finding infinite loops in VNF FGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. Real-time verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.5. Languages and their semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Gap analysis - open source projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. OPNFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. ODL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.3. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
NFV is a network architecture concept that proposes using IT
virtualization related technologies, to virtualize entire classes of
network service functions into building blocks that may be connected,
or chained, together to create network services. NFV service is
defined as a composition of network functions and described by its
functional and behavioral specification, where network functions
(i.e., firewall, DPI, SSL, load balancer, NAT, AAA, etc.) are well-
defined, hence both their functional behavior as well as their
external interfaces are described in each specifications.
In NFV, a VNF is a software package that implements such network
functions. A VNF can be decomposed into smaller functional modules or
APIs for scalability, reusability, and/or faster response [ETSI-NFV-
Arch],[ETSI-NFV-MANO]. This modular updates or composition for a
network function may lead to many other verification or security
issues. In addition, a set of ordered network functions which build
FGs may be connected, or chained, together to create an end-to-end
network service. Multiple of VNFs can be composed together to reduce
management and VNF FGs. While autonomic networking techniques could
be used to automate the configuration process including FG updates,
it is important to take into account that incomplete and/or
inconsistent configuration may lead to verification issues. Moreover,
automation of NFV process with integration of SDN may lead the
network services to be more error-prone. In this sense, we need to
identify and verify key properties to be correct before VNFs and FGs
are physically placed and realized in the supporting infrastructure.
1.1. Terminology
This document draws freely on the terminology defined in [ETSI-NFV-
Arch].
2. Problem statement
The verification services should be able to check the following
properties:
2.1. Dependencies of network service components in NFV framework
In NFV framework, there exist several network service components
including NFVI, VNFs, MANO, etc. as well as network controller and
switches to realize end-to-end network services. Unfortunately, these
components have intricate dependencies that make operation incorrect.
In this case, there is inconsistency between states stored and
managed in VNF FGs and network tables (e.g., flow tables), due to
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communication delays and/or configuration errors. For example, if a
VNF is replicated into the other same one for the purpose of load
balance and a new FG is established through the copied one, but all
the state/DBs replication is not finished yet due to delays, this can
be lead to unexpected behaviors or errors of the network service.
Therefore, these dependencies make it difficult to correctly compose
NFV-enabled end-to-end network services.
2.2. Invariant and error check in VNF FGs
In VNF FGs, an infinite loop construction should be avoided and
verified. Let us consider the example. Two VNF A and VNF B locate in
the same service node X whereas another VNF C resides in other
service node Y [SIGCOMM-Gember]. Also, the flow direction is from X
toY, and the given forwarding rule is A->C->B. In such a case,
service node Y can receive two ambiguous flows from VNF A: 1) one
flow processed by VNF A and 2) another flow processed by VNF A, B,
and C. For the former case, the flow should be processed by VNF C
whereas the latter flow should be further routed to next service
nodes. If these two flows cannot be distinguished, service node Y can
forward the flow to service node X even for the latter case and a
loop can be formed. To avoid the infinite loop formation, the
forwarding path over VNF FG should be checked in advance with the
consideration of physical placement of VNF among service nodes. Also,
reactive verification may be necessary, since infinite loop formation
may not be preventable in cases where configuration change is
happening with live traffic.
In addition, isolation between VNFs (e.g. confliction of properties
or interference between VNFs) and consistent ordering of VNF FGs
should be always checked and maintained.
2.3. Load balancing among VNF instances
In VNF FG, different number of VNF instances can be activated on
several service nodes to carry out the given task. In such a
situation, load balancing among the VNF instances is one of the most
important considerations. In particular, the status in resource usage
of each service node can be different and thus appropriate amount of
jobs should be distributed to the VNF instances. To guarantee well-
balanced load among VNF instances, the correctness of hash functions
for load balancing needs to be verified. Moreover, when VNF instances
locate in physically different service nodes, simple verification of
load balancing in terms of resource usage is not sufficient because
different service nodes experience diverse network conditions (e.g.,
different levels of network congestion)[ONS- Gember]. Therefore, it
is needed to monitor global network condition as well as local
resource condition to achieve the network-wide load balancing in VNF
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FGs. Also, whether the monitoring function for
network/compute/storage resources is correctly working should be
checked.
2.4. Policy and state consistency on NFV services
In VNF FG, policy to specific users can be dynamically changed. For
example, a DPI VNF can be applied only in the daytime in order to
prohibit from watching adult contents while no DPI VNFs applied
during the nighttime. When the policy is changed, the changed policy
should be reconfigured in VNF service nodes as soon as possible. If
the reconfiguration procedure is delayed, inconsistent policies may
exist in service nodes. Consequently, policy inconsistency or
confliction needs to be checked. Also in some situations, states for
VNF instances may be conflicted or inconsistent. Especially when a
new VNF instance is instantiated for scale-up and multiple VNF
instances are running, these multiple VNF instances may have
inconsistent states owing to inappropriate instantiation procedure
[SIGCOMM-Gember]. In particular, since the internal states of VNF
instances (e.g., the instantaneous state of CPU, register, and memory
in virtual machine) are not easily-visible, a new way to check the
VNF internal states should be devised.
2.5. Performance
In VNF FG, VNF instances can locate in different service nodes and
these service nodes have different load status and network
conditions. Consequently, the overall throughput of VNF FG is
severely affected by the service nodes running VNF instances. For
example, if a VNF instance locates in a heavily loaded service node,
the service time at the service node will be increased. In addition,
when a VNF FG includes a bottleneck link with network congestion, the
end-to-end performance (e.g., latency and throughput) in the VNF FG
can be degraded. Therefore, the identification of bottleneck link and
node is the first step for performance verification or guarantee of
the VNF FG [ONS-Gember]. After detecting the bottleneck link/node,
the VNF requiring scale up or down can be identified and the
relocation of VNF instance among service nodes can be determined
2.6. Security
How to verify security holes in VNF FG is another important
consideration. In terms of security services, authentication, data
integrity, confidentiality, and replay protection should be provided.
On the other hand, several VNFs (e.g., NAT) can modify or update
packet headers and payload. In these environments, it is difficult to
protect the integrity of flows traversing such VNFs. Another security
concern in the VNF FG is distributed denial of service (DDoS) to a
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specific service node. If an attacker floods packets to a target
service node, the target service node cannot perform its functions
correctly. Therefore, such security attacks in the VNF FG should be
detected and handled in an efficient manner. In the case of DDoS,
adding a DDoS appliance as the first element in the service chain
would help alleviate the problem. Moreover, unknown or unauthorized
VNFs can run and thus how to identify those problems is another
security challenge.
3. Examples - NS policy conflict with NFVI policy
Another target of NFV verification is conflict of NS policies against
global network policy, called NFVI policy.
NFV allocates and manages NFVI resources for a network service
according to an NS policy given in the network service descriptor
(NSD), which describes how to govern NFVI resources for VNF instances
and VL instances to support KPIs of the network service. Example
factors of the NS policy are resource constraints (or deployment
flavor), affinity/anti-affinity, scaling, fault and performance
management, NS topology, etc.
For a network-wide (or NS-wide) management of NFVI, NFVI policy (or
global network policy) can be provided to describe how to govern the
NFVI resources for optimized use of the infrastructure resources
(e.g., energy efficiency and load balancing) rather than optimized
performance of a single network service. Example factors of the NFVI
policy are NFVI resource access control, reservation and/or
allocation policies, placement optimization based on affinity and/or
anti-affinity rules, geography and/or regulatory rules, resource
usage, etc.
While both of the policies define the requirements for resource
allocation, scheduling, and management, the NS policy is about a
single network service; and the NFVI policy is about the shared NFVI
resources, which may affect all of the given network services
globally. Thus, some of NS and NFVI policies may be inconsistency
with each other when they have contradictive resource constraints on
the shared NFVI resources. Examples of the policy conflicts are as
follows:
<Example conflict case #1>
o NS policy of NS_A (composed of VNF_A and VNF_B)
- Resource constraints: 3 CPU core for VNF_A and 2 CPU core for VNF_B
- Affinity rule between VNF_A and VNF_B
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o NFVI policy
- No more than 4 CPU cores per physical host
o Conflict case
- The NS policy cannot be met within the NFVI policy
<Example conflict case #2>
o NS policy of NS_B (composed of VNF_A and VNF_B)
- Affinity rule between VNF_A and VNF_B
o NFVI policy
- Place VM whose outbound traffic is larger than 100Mbps at POP_A
- Place VM whose outbound traffic is smaller than 100Mbps at POP_B
o Conflict case
- If VNF_A and VNF_B generate traffic in 150Mbps and 50Mbps,
respectively,
- VNF_A and VNF_B need to be placed at POP_A and POP_B, respectively
according to the NFVI policy
- But it will violate the affinity rule given in the NS policy
<Example conflict case #3>
o NS policy of NS_C (composed of VNF_A and VNF_B)
- Resource constraints: VNF_A and VNF_B exist in the same POP
- Auto-scaling policy: if VNF_A has more than 300K CPS, scale-out
o NFVI policy
- No more than 10 VMs per physical host in POP_A
o Conflict case
- If CPS of VNF_A in POP_A gets more than 300K CPS,
- and if there is no such physical host in the POP_A whose VMs are
smaller than 10,
- VNF_A need to be scaled-out to other POP than POP_A according to
the NFVI policy
- But it will violate the NS policy
4. Requirements of verification framework
A verification framework for NFV-based services needs to satisfy the
following requirements:.
o R1 : It should be able to check global and local properties and
invariants. Global properties and invariants relate to the
entire VNFs, and local properties and invariants relates to
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the specific domain or resources that some of the VNFs are
using. For example, Loop-freeness and isolation between VNFs
can be regarded as global. The policies that are related
only to the specific network controllers or devices are
local.
o R2 : It should be able to access to the entire network states
whenever verification tasks are started. It can directly
manage the states of network and NFV-based services
through databases or any solution that specializes in
dealing with the network topology and configurations, or
can utilize the functions provided by NFV M&O and VNFI
solutions to get or set the states at any time.
o R3 : It should be independent from specific solutions and
frameworks, and provide standard APIs.
o R4 : It should process standard protocols such as NetConf,
YANG, OpenFlow, and northbound and southbound interfaces
that are related network configurations, and used by OSS.
5. Challenging issues
There are emerging challenges that the verification services face
with.
5.1. Consistency check in distributed state
Basically, NFV states as well as SDN controllers are distributed.
writing code that works correctly in a distributed setting is very
hard. Therefore, distributed state management and consistency check
has challenging issues. Some open source project such as ONOS offers
a core set of primitives to manage this complexity. RAFT algorithm
[RAFT] is used for distribution and replication. Similarly, Open
daylight project has a clustering concept to management distributed
state. There is no "one-size-fits-all" solution for control plane
data consistency.
5.2. Intent-based service composition
Recently, Intent-based high-level language is newly proposed and
discussed in open source project. The Intent allows for a descriptive
way to get what is desired from the infrastructure, unlike the
current NFV description and SDN interfaces which are based on
describing how to provide different services. This Intent will
accommodate orchestration services and network and business oriented
SDN/NFV applications, including OpenStack Neutron, Service Function
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Chaining, and Group Based Policy. A Intent compiler that translates
and compiles it into low level instructions (e.g., SDN
controller/OpenStack primitives) for network service components. In
this sense, error checking and debugging are critical for reliable
Intent-based service composition.
5.3. Finding infinite loops
General solutions for the infinite loop can lead to intractable
problem (e.g. the halting problem). To make the verification
practical and minimize the complexity, some of the restrictions are
required. Finding cycle can be processed in polynomial time but the
restriction could be too much for some cases that service functions
or network flows requires finite loops.
5.4. Live traffic verification
It is known fact that the complexity of verification tasks for the
real and big problem is high. A few invariants can be checked in
real-time but it would be impossible if the size of VNFs increases or
properties to be checked are complex.
5.5. Languages and their semantics
For the verification, configurations and states of VNFs need to be
precisely expressed using formal semantics. There are many languages
and models, and it is impractical for the verification frameworks to
support all of the existing languages and models. Languages and
semantic models optimized to the verification framework need to
selected or newly developed.
6. Gap analysis - open source projects
Recently, the Open Platform for NFV (OPNFV) community is
collaborating on a carrier-grade, integrated, open source platform to
accelerate the introduction of new NFV products and services [OPNFV].
Open Daylight (ODL) is also being tightly coupled with this OPNFV
platform to integrate SDN controller into NFV framework [ODL].
This clause analyzes the existing open source projects including
OPNFV and ODL related to verification of NFV services.
6.1. OPNFV
6.1.1. Doctor
The Doctor project provides a NFVI fault management and maintenance
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framework on top of the virtualized infrastructure. The key feature
is to notify unavailability of virtualized resources and to recover
unavailable VNFs.
While the Doctor project focuses only on faults in NFVI including
compute, network, and storage resources, the document discusses
broader fault management issues such as break-down of the supporting
infrastructure due to incomplete or inconsistent configuration of NFV
services.
6.1.2. Prediction
The Prediction project provides a data collection for failure
prediction framework. The failure prediction framework diagnoses or
verifies which entity is suspected to be progressing towards a
failure and which VNFs might be affected due to the predicted
anomaly.
While the Prediction project focuses only on fault prediction in NFVI
compute, network, and storage resources, the document includes
broader fault management and prediction issues such as faults in the
NFV service deployment and operation.
6.1.3. Resource Scheduler
The Resource Scheduler project provides an enhanced scheduler for
optimizing the performance of the VNFs. In particular, this project
supports resource isolation. For example, when a VNF strictly
requires low latency, strongly isolated compute resources can be
allocated to the VNF.
The Resource Scheduler project only focuses on optimizing the
performance of individual VNFs without considering the end-to-end
performance (e.g., latency and throughput) in NFV services.
6.1.4. Moon
The Moon project implements a security management system for the
cloud computing infrastructure. The project also enforces the
security managers through various mechanisms, e.g., authorization for
access control, firewall for networking, isolation for storage, and
logging for tractability.
Note that the main interest of the Moon project is the DDoS attack to
a service node and the IDS management for VNFs. A wider range of
security issues in the NFV service verification need to be
discussed.
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6.1.5 Bottlenecks
The Bottlenecks project aims to find system bottlenecks by testing
and verifying OPNFV infrastructure in a staging environment before
committing it to a production environment. Instead of debugging the
deployment in production environment, an automatic method for
executing benchmarks to validate the deployment during staging is
adopted. For example, the system measures the performance of each VNF
by generating workload on VNFs.
The Bottlenecks project does not consider incomplete or inconsistent
configurations on NFV services that might cause the system
bottlenecks. Furthermore, the Bottlenecks project aims to find system
bottlenecks before committing it to a production environment.
Meanwhile, the draft also considers how to find bottlenecks in real
time.
6.2. ODL
6.2.1. Network Intent Composition
The Network Intent Composition project enables the controller to
manage and direct network services and network resources based on
intent for network behaviors and network policies. Intents are
described to the controller through a new northbound interface, which
provides generalized and abstracted policy semantics. Also, the
Network Intent Composition project aims to provide advanced
composition logic for identifying and resolving intent conflicts
across the network applications.
When the reconfiguration upon the policy (i.e, intent) is delayed,
policy inconsistency in service nodes may occur after the policy is
applied to service nodes. While the Network Intent Composition
project resolves such intent conflicts only before they are
translated into service nodes, this document covers intent conflicts
and inconsistency issues in a broader sense.
6.2.2. Controller Shield
The Controller Shield project proposes to create a repository called
unified-security plugin (USecPlugin). The unified-security plugin is
a general purpose plugin to provide the controller security
information to northbound applications. The security information
could be for various purposes such as collating source of different
attacks reported in southbound plugins and suspected controller
intrusions. Information collected at this plugin can also be used to
configure firewalls and create IP blacklists for the network.
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In terms of security services, the document covers authentication,
data integrity, confidentiality, and replay protection. However, the
Controller Shield project only covers authentication, data integrity,
and replay protection services where the confidentiality service is
not considered.
6.2.3. Defense4All
The Defense4All project proposes a SDN application for detecting and
mitigating DDoS attacks. The application communicates with ODL
controller via the northbound interface and performs the two main
tasks; 1) Monitoring behavior of protected traffic and 2) Diverting
attacked traffic to selected attack mitigation systems (AMSs).
While the Defense4All project only focuses on defense system at the
controller, this document includes broader defense issues at the
service node as well as the controller.
6.3. Summary
The verification functions should spreads over the platforms to
accomplish the requirements mentioned in clause 3. The correctness of
NFV- based services and their network configurations can be checked
in the NFV MANO layer which has the entire states of the VNFs. Each
NFVI needs to provide verification layer which composed of policy
manager, network database and interfaces (e.g. REST APIs). Local
properties and invariants can be verified inside the specific NFVI,
and the global properties and invariants can be checked by merging
local verification results from the related NFVIs.
The verification service provides verification functions to NFV MANO,
NFVI, and any other low-level modules such as SDN controllers. For
the platform independency, it provides standard APIs to process the
verification tasks. It also uses standard APIs provided by OSS such
as OpenStack (Neutron) and Open Daylight. The compiler and
interpreter translate standard description languages and protocols
into the internal model which optimized to the verification tasks. It
can process user-defined properties to be checked as well. The
properties to be checked whether they are user-defined or pre-defined
invariants are managed by property library. The verifier maintains a
set of verification algorithms to check the properties. The network
database inside the verification service manages the global network
states directly or indirectly.
A PoC can be implemented using OpenStack (Neutron) and Open Daylight.
The modules related to verification framework can reside in between
network virtualization framework (e.g. OpenStack Neutron) and SDN
controller (e.g. Open Daylight). Neutron and Open Daylight uses
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standard APIs provided by verification service to accomplish
verification tasks. The initial use case for the PoC could be, in
particular, any of security, performance, etc as mentioned in clause
2.
7. Security Considerations
As already described in clause 2.6, how to verify security holes in
VNF FG is very important consideration. In terms of security
services, authentication, data integrity, confidentiality, and replay
protection should be provided. On the other hand, potential security
concern should be also carefully checked since several VNFs (e.g.,
NAT) can modify or update packet headers and payload.
8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank formal methods lab members in Korea
University for their verification theory support.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
9.2. Informative References
[ETSI-NFV-Arch] ETSI, "Network Function Virtualisation (NFV);
Architectural Framework," 2014.
[ETSI-NFV-MANO] ETSI, "Network Function Virtualiztion (NFV)
Management and Orchestration," 2014.
[SIGCOMM-Qazi] Z. Qazi, C. Tu, L. Chiang, R. Miao, V. Sekar, and M.
Yu, "SIMPLE-fying Middlebox Policy Enforcement Using SDN,"
in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM 2013, August 2013.
[ONS-Gember] A. Gember, R. Grandl, A. Anand, T. Benson, and A.
Akella, "Stratos: Virtual Middleboxes as First-Class
Entities," ONS 2013 and TR.
[SIGCOMM-Gember] A. Gember, R. Viswanathan, C. Prakash, R. Grandl, J.
Khalid, S. Das, and A. Akella, "OpenNF: Enabling
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Innovation in Network Function Control," in Proc. ACM
SIGCOMM 2014, August 2014.
[RAFT] https://raftconsensus.github.io/.
[ODL] "OpenDaylight SDN Controller, "http://www.opendaylight.org/
[OPNFV] "Open Platform for NFV, "https://www.opnfv.org/
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Authors' Addresses
Myung-Ki Shin
ETRI
161 Gajeong-dong Yuseng-gu
Daejeon, 305-700
Korea
Phone: +82 42 860 4847
Email: mkshin@etri.re.kr
Ki-Hyuk Nam
Friesty
Email: nam@friesty.com
Sangheon Pack
Korea University
Email: shpack@korea.ac.kr
Seungik Lee
ETRI
161 Gajeong-dong Yuseng-gu
Daejeon, 305-700
Korea
Phone: +82 42 860 1483
Email: seungiklee@etri.re.kr
Ramki Krishnan
Dell
Email: Ramki_Krishnan@dell.com
Tae-wan Kim
LG U+
Phone: +82 10 8080 6603
Email: dm24ks@lguplus.co.kr
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