Internet DRAFT - draft-sidrops-rpkimaxlen
draft-sidrops-rpkimaxlen
Network Working Group Y. Gilad
Internet-Draft S. Goldberg
Intended status: Best Current Practice Boston University
Expires: October 31, 2018 K. Sriram
USA NIST
J. Snijders
NTT
B. Maddison
Workonline Communications
April 29, 2018
The Use of Maxlength in the RPKI
draft-sidrops-rpkimaxlen-00
Abstract
This document recommends that operators avoid using the maxLength
attribute when issuing Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) in the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These recommendations
complement those in [RFC7115].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 31, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
Gilad, et al. Expires October 31, 2018 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft RPKI maxLength April 2018
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Forged Origin Subprefix Hijack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Measurements of Today's RPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Use Minimal ROAs without Maxlength . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. When a Minimal ROA Cannot Be Used? . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
The RPKI [RFC6480] uses Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) to create
a cryptographically verifiable mapping from an IP prefix to a set of
autonomous systems (ASes) that are authorized to originate this
prefix. Each ROA contains a set of IP prefixes, and an AS number of
an AS authorized originate all the IP prefixes in the set [RFC6482].
The ROA is cryptographically signed by the party that holds a
certificate for the set of IP prefixes.
The ROA format also supports a maxLength attribute. According to
[RFC6482], "When present, the maxLength specifies the maximum length
of the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise."
Thus, rather than requiring the ROA to list each prefix the AS is
authorized to originate, the maxLength attribute provides a shorthand
that authorizes an AS to originate a set of IP prefixes.
However, measurements of current RPKI deployments have found that use
of the maxLength in ROAs tends to lead to security problems.
Specifically, as of June 2017, 84% of the prefixes specified in ROAs
that use the maxLength attribute, are vulnerable to a forged-origin
subprefix hijack [HARMFUL]. The forged-origin subprefix hijack, as
described below, can be launched against any IP prefix that is
authorized in ROA but is not originated in BGP. The impact of such
an attack is the same as that of a subprefix hijack in the absence of
ROA-based protection.
Gilad, et al. Expires October 31, 2018 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft RPKI maxLength April 2018
For this reason, this document recommends that, whenever possible,
operators SHOULD use "minimal ROAs" that include only those IP
prefixes that are actually originated in BGP, and no other prefixes.
Operators SHOULD also avoid using the maxLength attribute in their
ROAS whenever possible. One ideal place to implement these
recommendations is in the user interfaces for configuring ROAs: thus
this document further recommends that designers and/or providers of
such user interfaces SHOULD provide warnings to draw the user's
attention to the risks of using the maxLength attribute.
The recommendations in this document clarify and extend the following
recommendation from [RFC7115]:
One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin
attack does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by
overly long max length. For example, if, instead of
10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues 10.0.0.0/16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged
origin attack cannot succeed against 10.0.666.0/24. They must
attack the whole /16, which is more likely to be noticed because
of its size.
This best current practice requires no changes to the RPKI
specification and will not increase the number of signed ROAs in the
RPKI, because ROAs already support lists of IP prefixes [RFC6482].
1.1. Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP [RFC4271], the RPKI
[RFC6480] Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482], RPKI-based
Prefix Validation [RFC6811], and BGPSEC [RFC8205].
3. Forged Origin Subprefix Hijack
The forged-origin subprefix hijack is relevant to a scenario in which
(1) the RPKI [RFC6480] is deployed, and (2) routers use RPKI origin
validation to drop invalid routes [RFC6811], but (3) BGPSEC [RFC8205]
(or any similar method to validate the truthfulness of the BGP
AS_PATH attribute) is not deployed.
We describe the forged-origin subprefix hijack [RFC7115] [GCHSS]
using a running example.
Gilad, et al. Expires October 31, 2018 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft RPKI maxLength April 2018
Consider the IP prefix 168.122.0.0/16 which is allocated to an
organization that also operates AS 64496. In BGP, AS 64496
originates the IP prefix 168.122.0.0/16 as well as its subprefix
168.122.225.0/24. Therefore, the RPKI should contain a ROA
authorizing AS 64496 to originate these two IP prefixes. That is,
the ROA should be
ROA:(168.122.0.0/16,168.122.225.0/24, AS 64496)
This ROA is "minimal" because it includes only those IP prefixes that
AS 64496 originates in BGP, but no other IP prefixes [RFC6907].
Now suppose an attacking AS 64511 originates a BGP announcement for a
subprefix 168.122.0.0/24. This is a standard "subprefix hijack".
In the absence of the minimal ROA above, AS 64511 could intercept
traffic for the addresses in 168.122.0.0/24. This is because routers
perform a longest-prefix match when deciding where to forward IP
packets, and 168.122.0.0/24 originated by AS 64511 is a longer prefix
than 168.122.0.0/16 originated by AS 64496.
However, the minimal ROA renders AS 64511's BGP announcement invalid,
because (1) this ROA "covers" the attacker's announcement (since
168.122.0.0/24 is a subprefix of 168.122.0.0/16), and (2) there is no
ROA "matching" the attacker's announcement (there is no ROA for AS
64511 and IP prefix 168.122.0.0/24) [RFC6811]. If routers ignore
invalid BGP announcements, the minimal ROA above ensures that the
subprefix hijack will fail.
Now suppose that the "minimal ROA" was replaced with a "loose ROA"
that used maxLength as a shorthand for set of IP prefixes that AS
64496 is authorized to originate. The "loose ROA" would be:
ROA:(168.122.0.0/16-24, AS 64496)
This "loose ROA" authorizes AS 64496 to originate any subprefix of
168.122.0.0/16, up to length /24. That is, AS 64496 could originate
168.122.225.0/24 as well as all of 168.122.0.0/17, 168.122.128.0/17,
..., 168.122.255.0/24 but not 168.122.0.0/25.
However, AS 64496 only originates two prefixes in BGP: 168.122.0.0/16
and 168.122.255.0/24. This means that all other prefixes authorized
by the "loose ROA" (for instance, 168.122.0.0/24), are vulnerable to
the following forged-origin subprefix hijack [RFC7115], [GCHSS]:
The hijacker AS 64511 sends a BGP announcement "168.122.0.0/24: AS
64511, AS 64496", falsely claiming that AS 64511 is a neighbor of
AS 64496 and falsely claiming that AS 64496 originates the IP
Gilad, et al. Expires October 31, 2018 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft RPKI maxLength April 2018
prefix 168.122.0.0/24. In fact, the IP prefix 168.122.0.0/24 is
not originated by AS 64496.
The hijacker's BGP announcement is valid according to the RPKI, since
the ROA (168.122.0.0/16-24, AS 64496) authorizes AS 64496 to
originate BGP routes for 168.122.0.0/24. Because AS 64496 does not
actually originate a route for 168.122.0.0/24, the hijacker's route
is the *only* route to the 168.122.0.0/24. Longest-prefix-match
routing ensures that the hijacker's route to the subprefix
168.122.0.0/24 is always preferred over the legitimate route to
168.122.0.0/16 originated by AS 64496. Thus, the hijacker's route
propagates through the Internet, the traffic destined for IP
addresses in 168.122.0.0/24 will be delivered to the hijacker.
The forged origin *subprefix* hijack would have failed if the
"minimal ROA" described above was used instead of the "loose ROA".
If the "minimal ROA" had been used instead, the attacker would be
forced to launch a forged origin *prefix* hijack in order to attract
traffic, as follows:
The hijacker AS 64511 sends a BGP announcement "168.122.0.0/16: AS
64511, AS 64496", falsely claiming that AS 64511 is a neighbor of
AS 64496.
This forged-origin *prefix* hijack is significantly less damaging
than the forged-origin *subprefix* hijack. With a forged-origin
*prefix* hijack, AS 64496 legitimately originates 168.122.0.0/16 in
BGP, so the hijacker AS 64511 is not presenting the *only* route to
168.122.0.0/16. Moreover, the path originated by AS 64511 is one hop
longer than the path originated by the legitimate origin AS 64496.
As discussed in [LSG16], this means that the hijacker will attract
less traffic than he would have in the forged origin *subprefix*
hijack, where the hijacker presents the *only* route to the hijacked
subprefix.
In sum, a forged-origin subprefix hijack has the same impact as a
regular subprefix hijack. A forged-origin *subprefix* hijack is also
more damaging than forged-origin *prefix* hijack.
4. Measurements of Today's RPKI
Network measurements from June 1, 2017 show that 12% of the IP
prefixes authorized in ROAs have a maxLength longer than their prefix
length. The vast majority of these (84%) of these are vulnerable to
forged-origin subprefix hijacks. Even large providers are vulnerable
to these attacks. See [GSG17] for details.
Gilad, et al. Expires October 31, 2018 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft RPKI maxLength April 2018
These measurements suggest that operators commonly misconfigure the
maxLength attribute, and unwittingly open themselves up to forged-
origin subprefix hijacks.
5. Use Minimal ROAs without Maxlength
Operators SHOULD avoid using the maxLength attribute in their ROAs.
Operators SHOULD use "minimal ROAs" whenever possible. A minimal ROA
contains only those IP prefixes that are actually originated by an AS
in BGP, and no other IP prefixes. (See Section 3 for an example.)
This practice requires no changes to the RPKI specification and will
not increase the number of signed ROAs in the RPKI, because ROAs
already support lists of IP prefixes [RFC6482]. See also [GSG17] for
further discussion of why this practice will have minimal impact on
the performance of the RPKI ecosystem.
5.1. When a Minimal ROA Cannot Be Used?
Sometimes, it is not possible to use a "minimal ROA", because an
operator wants to issue a ROA that includes an IP prefix that is
sometimes (but not always) originated in BGP.
In this case, the ROA SHOULD include (1) the set of IP prefixes that
are always originated in BGP, and (2) the set IP prefixes that are
sometimes, but not always, originated in BGP. The ROA SHOULD NOT
include any IP prefixes that the operator knows will not be
originated in BGP. Whenever possible, the ROA SHOULD also avoid the
use of the maxlength attribute.
We now extend our running example to illustrate one situation where
where it is not possible to issue a minimal ROA.
Consider the following scenario prior to deployment of RPKI. Suppose
AS 64496 announced 168.122.0.0/16 and has a contract with a DDoS
mitigation service provider that holds AS 64500. Further, assume
that the DDoS mitigation service contract applies to all IP addresses
covered by 168.122.0.0/22. When a DDoS attack is detected and
reported by AS 64496, AS 64500 immediately originates 168.122.0.0/22,
thus attracting all the DDoS traffic to itself. The traffic is
scrubbed at AS 64500 and then sent back to AS 64496 over a backhaul
data link. Notice that, during a DDoS attack, the DDoS mitigation
service provider AS 64500 originates a /22 prefix that is longer than
than AS 64496's /16 prefix, and so all the traffic (destined to
addresses in 168.122.0.0/22) that normally goes to AS 64496 goes to
AS 64500 instead.
Gilad, et al. Expires October 31, 2018 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft RPKI maxLength April 2018
First, suppose the RPKI only had the minimal ROA for AS 64496, as
described in Section 3. But, if there is no ROA authorizing AS 64500
to announce the /22 prefix, then the traffic-scrubbing scheme would
not work. That is, if AS 64500 originates the /22 prefix in BGP
during a DDoS attack, the announcement would be invalid [RFC6811].
Therefore, the RPKI should have two ROAs: one for AS 64496 and one
for AS 64500.
ROA:(168.122.0.0/16,168.122.225.0/24, AS 64496)
ROA:(168.122.0.0/22, AS 64500)
Neither ROA uses the maxLength attribute. But, the second ROA is not
"minimal" because it contains a /22 prefix that is not originated by
anyone in BGP during normal operations. The /22 prefix is only
originated by AS 64500 as part of its DDoS mitigation service during
a DDoS attack.
Notice, however, that this scheme does not come without risks.
Namely, all IP addresses in 168.122.0.0/22 are vulnerable to a
forged-origin subprefix hijack during normal operations, when the /22
prefix is not originated. (The hijacker AS 64511 would send the BGP
announcement "168.122.0.0/22: AS 64511, AS 64500", falsely claiming
that AS 64511 is a neighbor of AS 64500 and falsely claiming that AS
64500 originates 168.122.0.0/22.)
In some situations, the DDoS mitigation service at AS 64500 might
want to limit the amount of DDoS traffic that it attracts and scrubs.
Suppose that a DDoS attack only targets IP addresses in
168.122.0.0/24. Then, the DDoS mitigation service at AS 64500 only
wants to attract the traffic designated for the /24 prefix that is
under attack, but not the entire /22 prefix. To allow for this, the
RPKI should have two ROAs: one for AS 64496 and one for AS 64500.
ROA:(168.122.0.0/16,168.122.225.0/24, AS 64496)
ROA:(168.122.0.0/22-24, AS 64500)
The second ROA uses the maxLength attribute because it is designed to
explicitly enable AS 64500 to originate *any* /24 subprefix of
168.122.0.0/22.
As before, the second ROA is also not "minimal" because it contains
prefixes that are not originated by anyone in BGP during normal
operations. As before, all IP addresses in 168.122.0.0/22 are
vulnerable to a forged-origin subprefix hijack during normal
operations, when the /22 prefix is not originated.
Gilad, et al. Expires October 31, 2018 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft RPKI maxLength April 2018
The use of maxLength in this second ROA also comes with an additional
risk. While it permits the DDoS mitigation service at AS 64500 to
originate prefix 168.122.0.0/24 during a DDoS attack in that space,
it also makes the *other* /24 prefixes covered by the /22 prefix
(i.e., 168.122.1.0/24, 168.122.2.0/24, 168.122.3.0/24) vulnerable to
a forged-origin subprefix attacks.
6. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the following people for their review
and contributions to this document: Omar Sagga (Boston University)
and Aris Lambrianidis (AMS-IX).
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
7.2. Informative References
[GCHSS] Gilad, Y., Cohen, A., Herzberg, A., Schapira, M., and H.
Shulman, "Are We There Yet? On RPKI's Deployment and
Security", in NDSS 2017, February 2017,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1010.pdf>.
Gilad, et al. Expires October 31, 2018 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft RPKI maxLength April 2018
[GSG17] Gilad, Y., Sagga, O., and S. Goldberg, "Maxlength
Considered Harmful to the RPKI", in ACM CoNEXT 2017,
December 2017, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1015.pdf>.
[HARMFUL] Gilad, Y., Sagga, O., and S. Goldberg, "MaxLength
Considered Harmful to the RPKI", 2017,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1015.pdf>.
[LSG16] Lychev, R., Shapira, M., and S. Goldberg, "Rethinking
Security for Internet Routing", in Communications of the
ACM, October 2016, <http://cacm.acm.org/
magazines/2016/10/207763-rethinking-security-for-internet-
routing/>.
[RFC6907] Manderson, T., Sriram, K., and R. White, "Use Cases and
Interpretations of Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) Objects for Issuers and Relying Parties", RFC 6907,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6907, March 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6907>.
[RFC7115] Bush, R., "Origin Validation Operation Based on the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185,
RFC 7115, DOI 10.17487/RFC7115, January 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7115>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
Authors' Addresses
Yossi Gilad
Boston University
111 Cummington St, MCS135
Boston, MA 02215
USA
EMail: yossigi@bu.edu
Sharon Goldberg
Boston University
111 Cummington St, MCS135
Boston, MA 02215
USA
EMail: goldbe@cs.bu.edu
Gilad, et al. Expires October 31, 2018 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft RPKI maxLength April 2018
Kotikalapudi Sriram
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
USA
EMail: kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov
Job Snijders
NTT Communications
Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
Amsterdam 1065 SZ
The Netherlands
EMail: job@ntt.net
Ben Maddison
Workonline Communications
30 Waterkant St
Cape Town 8001
South Africa
EMail: benm@workonline.co.za
Gilad, et al. Expires October 31, 2018 [Page 10]
