Internet DRAFT - draft-sipos-dtn-udpcl
draft-sipos-dtn-udpcl
Delay-Tolerant Networking B. Sipos
Internet-Draft RKF Engineering
Intended status: Standards Track 25 March 2021
Expires: 26 September 2021
Delay-Tolerant Networking UDP Convergence Layer Protocol
draft-sipos-dtn-udpcl-01
Abstract
This document describes a UDP-based convergence layer (UDPCL) for
Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN). This version of the UDPCL protocol
clarifies requirements of RFC7122, adds discussion of multicast
addressing, and updates to the Bundle Protocol (BP) contents,
encodings, and convergence layer requirements in BP Version 7.
Specifically, the UDPCL uses CBOR-encoded BPv7 bundles as its service
data unit being transported and provides a reliable transport of such
bundles. This version of UDPCL also includes security and
extensibility mechanisms.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 September 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Use of CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Definitions Specific to the UDPCL Protocol . . . . . . . 5
2. General Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. Convergence Layer Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2. PKIX Environments and CA Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3. Fragmentation Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4. Error Checking Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5. Congestion Control Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. UDPCL Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1. IP Addressing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2. UDP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3. UDPCL Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4. UDPCL Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.5. UDPCL Extension Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.5.1. DTLS Initiation (STARTTLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.5.2. Bundle Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.5.3. Sender Listen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.5.4. Sender Node ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.6. Explicit Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.6.1. Bundle Transfer ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.6.2. Fragmentation and Reassembly . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.7. UDPCL Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.7.1. Entity Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.7.2. Certificate Profile for UDPCL . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.7.3. DTLS Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.7.4. DTLS Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.7.5. Policy Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.7.6. Example Secured and Bidirectional Transfers . . . . . 21
4. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1. Threat: Passive Leak of Node Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2. Threat: Passive Leak of Bundle Data . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.3. Threat: Transport Security Stripping . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4. Threat: Weak DTLS Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.5. Threat: Untrusted End-Entity Certificate . . . . . . . . 24
5.6. Threat: Certificate Validation Vulnerabilities . . . . . 25
5.7. Threat: BP Node Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.8. Threat: Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.9. Mandatory-to-Implement DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
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5.10. Alternate Uses of DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.10.1. DTLS Without Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.10.2. Non-Certificate DTLS Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.11. Predictability of Transfer IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.1. Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.2. UDPCL Extension Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appendix A. Significant changes from RFC7122 . . . . . . . . . . 33
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Introduction
This document describes the UDP-based convergence-layer protocol for
Delay-Tolerant Networking. Delay-Tolerant Networking is an end-to-
end architecture providing communications in and/or through highly
stressed environments, including those with intermittent
connectivity, long and/or variable delays, and high bit error rates.
More detailed descriptions of the rationale and capabilities of these
networks can be found in "Delay-Tolerant Network Architecture"
[RFC4838].
An important goal of the DTN architecture is to accommodate a wide
range of networking technologies and environments. The protocol used
for DTN communications is the Bundle Protocol Version 7 (BPv7)
[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis], an application-layer protocol that is used to
construct a store-and-forward overlay network. BPv7 requires the
services of a "convergence-layer adapter" (CLA) to send and receive
bundles using the service of some "native" link, network, or Internet
protocol. This document describes one such convergence-layer adapter
that uses the well-known User Datagram Protocol (UDP). This
convergence layer is referred to as UDP Convergence Layer (UDPCL).
For the remainder of this document, the abbreviation "BP" without the
version suffix refers to BPv7.
The locations of the UDPCL and the BP in the Internet model protocol
stack (described in [RFC1122]) are shown in Figure 1. In particular,
when BP is using UDP as its bearer with UDPCL as its convergence
layer, both BP and UDPCL reside at the application layer of the
Internet model.
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+-------------------------+
| DTN Application | -\
+-------------------------| |
| Bundle Protocol (BP) | -> Application Layer
+-------------------------+ |
| UDP Conv. Layer (UDPCL) | |
+-------------------------+ |
| DTLS (optional) | -/
+-------------------------+
| UDP | ---> Transport Layer
+-------------------------+
| IPv4/IPv6 | ---> Network Layer
+-------------------------+
| Link-Layer Protocol | ---> Link Layer
+-------------------------+
Figure 1: The Locations of the Bundle Protocol and the UDP
Convergence-Layer Protocol above the Internet Protocol Stack
1.1. Scope
This document describes the format of the protocol data units passed
between entities participating in UDPCL communications. This
document does not address:
* The format of protocol data units of the Bundle Protocol, as those
are defined elsewhere in [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis]. This includes the
concept of bundle fragmentation or bundle encapsulation. The
UDPCL transfers bundles as opaque data blocks.
* Mechanisms for locating or identifying other bundle entities
(peers) within a network or across an internet. The mapping of
Node ID to potential convergence layer (CL) protocol and network
address is left to implementation and configuration of the BP
Agent and its various potential routing strategies.
* Logic for routing bundles along a path toward a bundle's endpoint.
This CL protocol is involved only in transporting bundles between
adjacent entities in a routing sequence.
* Logic for performing rate control and congestion control of bundle
transfers, both incoming and outgoing from a UDPCL entity.
* Policies or mechanisms for issuing Public Key Infrastructure Using
X.509 (PKIX) certificates; provisioning, deploying, or accessing
certificates and private keys; deploying or accessing certificate
revocation lists (CRLs); or configuring security parameters on an
individual entity or across a network.
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* Uses of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) which are not
based on PKIX certificate authentication (see Section 5.10.2) or
in which authentication of both entities is not possible (see
Section 5.10.1).
Any UDPCL implementation requires a BP agent to perform those above
listed functions in order to perform end-to-end bundle delivery.
1.2. Use of CDDL
This document defines CBOR structure using the Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL) of [RFC8610]. The entire CDDL structure
can be extracted from the XML version of this document using the
XPath expression:
'//sourcecode[@type="cddl"]'
The following initial fragment defines the top-level symbols of this
document's CDDL.
start = udpcl-ext-map
1.3. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.4. Definitions Specific to the UDPCL Protocol
This section contains definitions specific to the UDPCL protocol.
UDPCL Entity: This is the notional UDPCL application that initiates
UDPCL transfers. This design, implementation, configuration, and
specific behavior of such an entity is outside of the scope of
this document. However, the concept of an entity has utility
within the scope of this document as the container and initiator
of transfers. The relationship between a UDPCL entity and UDPCL
sessions is defined as follows:
* A UDPCL Entity MAY actively perform any number of transfers and
should do so whenever the entity has a bundle to forward to
another entity in the network.
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* A UDPCL Entity MAY support zero or more passive listening
elements that listen for transfers from other entities in the
network, including non-unicast transfers.
These relationships are illustrated in Figure 2. For the
remainder of this document, the term "entity" without the prefix
"UDPCL" refers to a UDPCL entity.
UDP Conversation: This refers to datagrams exchanged between two
network peers, with each peer identified by a (unicast IP address,
UDP port) tuple. Because UDP is connectionless, there is no
notion of a conversation being "opened" or "closed" and some
conversations are uni-directional.
Transfer: This refers to the procedures and mechanisms for
conveyance of an individual bundle from one entity to one or more
destinations. This version of UDPCL includes a fragmentation
mechanism to allow transfers which are larger than the allowable
UDP datagram size.
Transmit: This refers to a transfer outgoing from an entity as seen
from that transmitting entity.
Receive: This refers to a transfer incoming to an entity as seen
from that receiving entity.
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+----------------------------------------+
| UDPCL Entity |
| | +----------------+
| +--------------------------------+ | | |-+
| | Actively Initiated Transfer #1 |--------->| Other | |
| +--------------------------------+ | | UDPCL Entity's | |
| ... | | Passive | |
| +--------------------------------+ | | Listener | |
| | Actively Initiated Transfer #n |--------->| | |
| | | | | |
| | Sender Listen |<---------| | |
| +--------------------------------+ | +----------------+ |
| | +-----------------+
| +---------------------------+ |
| | +---------------------------+ | +----------------+
| | | Optional Passive | | | |-+
| +-| Listener(s) |<---------+ Other | |
| +---------------------------+ | | UDPCL Entity's | |
| ^ | | Active | |
| | | | Initiator(s) | |
| +-------------| | |
+----------------------------------------+ +----------------+ |
+-----------------+
Figure 2: The relationships between UDPCL entities
2. General Protocol Description
The service of this protocol is the transmission of DTN bundles via
the User Datagram Protocol (UDP). This document specifies the
optional fragmentation of bundles, procedures for DTLS setup and
teardown, and a set of messages and entity requirements. The general
operation of the protocol is as follows.
Fundamentally, the UDPCL is a (logically) unidirectional "transmit
and forget" protocol which itself maintains no long-term state and
provides no feedback to the transmitter. The only long-term state
related to UDPCL is used by DTLS in its session keeping (which is
bound to a UDP conversation). An entity receiving a bundle from a
particular source address-and-port does not imply that the
transmitter is willing to accept bundle transfers on that same
address-and-port. It is the obligation of a BP agent and its routing
schemes to determine a bundle return path.
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2.1. Convergence Layer Services
This version of the UDPCL provides the following services to support
the over-laying Bundle Protocol agent. In all cases, this is not an
API definition but a logical description of how the CL can interact
with the BP agent. Each of these interactions can be associated with
any number of additional metadata items as necessary to support the
operation of the CL or BP agent.
Begin Transmission: The principal purpose of the UDPCL is to allow a
BP agent to transmit bundle data to one or more other entities.
The receiver of each transfer is identified by an (destination)
IPv4 or IPv6 address and a UDP port number (see Section 3 for
details). The CL does not necessarily perform any transmission
queueing, but may block while transmissions are being processed at
the UDP layer. Any queueing of transmissions is the obligation of
the BP agent.
Transmission Started: The UDPCL entity indicates to the BP agent
when a bundle transmission begins sending UDP datagrams. Once
started, there is no notion of a UDPCL transmission failure; a BP
agent has to rely on bundle-level status reporting to track bundle
progress through the network. Because of potential queueing or
DTLS setup time, this may be delayed from the BP agent providing
the bundle-to-transmit.
Transmission Finished: The UDPCL entity indicates to the BP agent
when a bundle has been fully transmitted. This is not a positive
indication that any next-hop receiver has either received or
processed the transfer.
Reception Started: The UDPCL entity indicates to the BP agent when a
bundle transfer has begun, which may include information about the
total size of a fragmented transfer.
Reception Success: The UDPCL entity indicates to the BP agent when a
bundle has been fully transferred from a peer entity. The
transmitter of each transfer is identified by an (source) IP
address and a UDP port number (see Section 3 for details).
Reception Failure: The UDPCL entity indicates to the BP agent on
certain reasons for reception failure, notably upon an unfinished
transfer timeout (see Section 3.5.2).
Attempt DTLS Session: The UDPCL allows a BP agent to preemptively
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attempt to establish a DTLS session with a peer entity (see
Section 3.5.1 and Section 3.7). Each session attempt can send a
different set of session negotiation parameters as directed by the
BP agent.
Close DTLS Session: The UDPCL allows a BP agent to preemptively
close an established DTLS session with a peer entity. The closure
request is on a per-session basis.
DTLS Session State Changed: The UDPCL entity indicates to the BP
agent when a DTLS session state changes. The possible DTLS
session states are defined in [RFC6347].
Begin Sender Listen: The UDPCL allows a BP agent to indicate when
packets on a particular address-and-port is listened for (see
Section 3.5.3). The Sender Listen interval is configurable for
each peer address-and-port.
End Sender Listen: The UDPCL allows a BP agent to indicate when
packets on a particular address-and-port are no longer be
accepted.
Sender Listen Received: The UDPCL entity indicates to the BP agent
when a Sender Listen extension has been received from a peer. The
Sender Node ID, if present, is part of this indication.
2.2. PKIX Environments and CA Policy
This specification gives requirements about how to use PKIX
certificates issued by a Certificate Authority (CA), but does not
define any mechanisms for how those certificates come to be. The
UDPCL uses the exact same mechanisms and makes the same assumptions
as TCPCL in Section 3.4 of [I-D.ietf-dtn-tcpclv4].
2.3. Fragmentation Policies
It is a implementation matter for a sending entity to determine the
path maximum transmit unit (PMTU) to be used as a target upper-bound
UDP datagram size. Some techniques to perform MTU discovery are
defined in [RFC8899]. All IP packets sent by a UDPCL entity SHOULD
have the "don't fragment" bit set to allow detection of PMTU issues.
The priority order of fragmentation is the following:
1. When possible, bundles too large to fit in one PMTU-sized packet
SHOULD be fragmented at the BP layer. Bundle payload
fragmentation does not help a large bundle if extension blocks
are a major contributor to bundle size, so in some circumstances
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BP layer fragmentation will not reduce the bundle size
sufficiently. It is outside the scope of UDPCL to manage BP
agent fragmentation policies; bundles are received from the BP
agent either already fragmented or not.
2. Bundles too large to fit in one PMTU-sized packet SHALL be
fragmented as a UDPCL transfer (see Section 3.6). Fragmentation
at this level treats bundle transfers as opaque data, so it is
independent of bundle block sizes or counts.
3. All IP packets larger than expected PMTU SHALL be fragmented by
the transmitting entity to fit within one PMTU. Because of the
issues listed in Section 3.2 of [RFC8085] and [RFC8900], it is
best to avoid IP fragmentation as much as possible.
A UDPCL entity SHOULD NOT proactively drop an outgoing transfer due
to datagram size. If intermediate network nodes drop IP packets it
is an implementation matter to receive network feedback (e.g. ICMP
Packet Too Big).
2.4. Error Checking Policies
The core Bundle Protocol specification assumes that bundles are
transferring over an erasure channel, i.e., a channel that either
delivers packets correctly or not at all.
A UDP transmitter SHALL NOT disable UDP checksums. A UDP receiver
SHALL NOT disable the checking of received UDP checksums.
Even when UDP checksums are enabled, a small probability of UDP
packet corruption remains. In some environments, it may be
acceptable for a BP agent to occasionally receive corrupted input.
In general, however, a UDPCL entity SHOULD insure the a bundle's
blocks are either covered by a CRC or a BPSec integrity check.
2.5. Congestion Control Policies
The applications using UDPCL for bundle transport SHALL conform to
the congestion control requirements of Section 3.1 of [RFC8085]. The
application SHALL either perform active congestion control of bundles
or behave as the Low Data-Volume application as defined in
Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085].
When nodes have bidirectional transfer capability, the bundle
deletion reason code "traffic pared" can be used by a receiving agent
to signal to the bundle source application that throttling of bundles
along that path SHOULD occur.
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3. UDPCL Operation
This section defines the UDPCL protocol and its interactions with
under-layers (IP and UDP) and over-layers (BP), as illustrated in
Figure 1. The section is organized from the network layer up toward
the BP layer. It also discusses behavior within the UDPCL layer,
which is illustrated in Figure 3.
+------------------------------------------+
| Bundle Transfer | Extension Signaling | <- Sequencing /
+------------------------------------------+ fragmentation
| Bundle | Ext. Map | ... | Padding | <- Messaging
+------------------------------------------+
| UDPCL Packet | <- Packetization
+------------------------------------------+
Figure 3: Breakdown of sub-layers within the UDPCL
3.1. IP Addressing
The earlier UDPCL specification in [RFC7122] did not include guidance
on IP addressing, interface sourcing, or potential use of multicast,
though the architecture of [RFC4838] explicitly includes multicast
and anycast as expected network modes.
The BP agent determines the mapping from destination EID to next-hop
CL parameters, including transfer destination address and transfer
source interface. Some EIDs represent unicast destinations and
others non-unicast destinations as defined in Section 4.2.5.1 of
[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis]. The unicast-ness of an EID does not
necessarily correspond with the unicast-ness, as some bundle routing
schemes involve attempting multiple parallel paths to a unicast
endpoint.
For unicast transfers to a single node, the destination address SHALL
be a non-multicast IPv4 or IPv6 address (which does include link-
local addresses). For unicast transfers, the source interface
address MAY be supplied by the BP agent or otherwise determined by
the operating system IP routing. When performing unicast transfers,
a UDPCL entity SHOULD require DTLS use (see Section 3.7) or restrict
the network to one protected by IPsec or some other under-layer
security mechanism (e.g., a virtual private network).
For multicast transfers to one or more nodes, the destination address
SHALL be a multicast IPv4 [IANA-IPv4-MCAST] or IPv6 [IANA-IPv6-MCAST]
address. For multicast transfers, the source interface address MUST
be supplied by the BP agent rather than inferred by the UDPCL entity.
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3.2. UDP Header
Destination port number 4556 has been assigned by IANA [IANA-PORTS]
as the Registered Port number for the UDP convergence layer and SHALL
be used as a default. Other destination port numbers MAY be used per
local configuration. Determining a passive entity's destination port
number (if different from the registered UDPCL port number) is up to
the implementation.
Any source port number MAY be used for UDPCL transfers. Typically an
operating system assigned number in the UDP Ephemeral range
(49152-65535) is used. For repeated messaging to the same
destination address-and-port, the active entity SHOULD reuse the same
source address-and-port. Reusing source address-and-port allows
simplifies network monitoring and analysis and also enables bi-
directional messaging as defined in Section 3.5.3.
3.3. UDPCL Packets
The lowest layer of UDPCL communication are individual-datagram
packets. To exchange UDPCL data, an active entity SHALL transmit a
UDP datagram to a listening passive entity in accordance with
[RFC0768], typically by using the services provided by the operating
system. For backward compatibility with [RFC7122], UDPCL has no
explicit message type identifier.
Each UDP datagram SHALL contain one or more UDPCL message as defined
in Section 3.4. Each type of message defines additional restrictions
on how it may be used in a packet.
The following are special cases of UDPCL packet uses.
Unframed Transfer: An unframed transfer packet SHALL consist of a
single encoded BPv6 or BPv7 bundle with no padding. This provides
backward compatibility with [RFC7122] and a allows a trivial use
of UDPCL which is just embedding an encoded bundle in a UDP
datagram.
Keepalive A keepalive packet SHALL consist of exactly four octets of
padding with no preceding message. This behavior maintains
backward compatibility with [RFC7122].
3.4. UDPCL Messages
The middle layer of UDPCL communication are unframed, but self-
delimited, messages. Specific message types MAY be concatenated
together into a single packet, each message type indicates any
restrictions on how it can be used within a packet.
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For backward compatibility with [RFC7122], UDPCL has no explicit
message type identifier. The message type is inferred by the
inspecting the data contents according to the following rules:
BPv6 Bundle: All encoded BP version 6 bundles begin with the version
identifier octet 0x06 in accordance with [RFC5050]. A message
with a leading octet value of 0x06 SHALL be treated as a BPv6
bundle. Multiple BPv6 Bundles SHOULD NOT be present in one UDPCL
packet to maintain compatibility with [RFC7122].
BPv7 Bundle: All encoded BP version 7 bundles begin with a CBOR
array head in accordance with [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis]. A message
with a leading octet value indicating CBOR array (major type 4)
SHALL be treated as a BPv7 bundle.
BPv7 bundles transmitted via UDPCL SHALL NOT include any leading
CBOR tag. If the BP agent provides bundles with such tags the
transmitting UDPCL entity SHALL remove them.
Extension Map: All UDPCL extensions SHALL be contained in a CBOR map
in accordance with the definitions of Section 3.5. The encoded
Extension Map SHALL NOT have any CBOR tags. A message with a
leading octet value indicating CBOR map (major type 5) SHALL be
treated as an Extension Map.
Padding: Padding data SHALL be a sequence of octets all with value
0x00. A message with a leading octet value of 0x00 SHALL be
treated as padding.
Padding is used to ensure a UDP datagram is exactly a desired
size. Because padding has no intrinsic length indication, if
present it SHALL be the last contents of any UDPCL packet. A
receiving UDPCL entity SHALL ignore all padding, including any
trailing non-zero octets.
DTLS Record: In addition to the UDPCL specific messaging,
immediately after a DTLS Initiation (see Section 3.5.1) the DTLS
handshake sequence will begin. Data with a leading octet value of
0x16 SHALL be treated as a DTLS handshake record in accordance
with Section 4.1 of [RFC6347].
If the datagram with the DTLS Initiation extension is not received
by an entity, the entity SHOULD still detect the DTLS handshake
records and start the handshake sequence at that point. Data with
a leading octet value of 0x17--0x19 SHALL be treated as a DTLS
sequencing failure; DTLS non-handshake records should never be
seen by the UDPCL messaging layer.
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A summary of how a receiving UDPCL entity can interpret the first
octet of a datagram is listed in Table 1. When inspecting using CBOR
major types, the range of values is caused by the CBOR head encoding
of [RFC8949].
+=============+===================================+
| Octet Value | Message Content |
+=============+===================================+
| 0x00 | Padding (remainder of packet) |
+-------------+-----------------------------------+
| 0x06 | BPv6 Bundle |
+-------------+-----------------------------------+
| 0x16--0x19 | DTLS Record (remainder of packet) |
+-------------+-----------------------------------+
| 0x80--0x9F | BPv7 Bundle (CBOR array) |
+-------------+-----------------------------------+
| 0xA0--0xBF | Extension Map (CBOR map) |
+-------------+-----------------------------------+
| others | unused |
+-------------+-----------------------------------+
Table 1: First-Octet Contents
3.5. UDPCL Extension Items
Extensions to UDPCL are encoded per-datagram in a single CBOR map as
defined in Section 3.4. Each UDPCL extension item SHALL be
identified by a unique Extension ID used as a key in the Extension
Map. Extension ID values SHALL be a CBOR int item no longer than
16-bits. Extension ID assignments are listed in Section 6.2.
Unless prohibited by particular extension type requirements, a single
Extension Map MAY contain any combination of extension items.
Receivers SHALL ignore extension items with unknown Extension ID and
continue to process known extension items.
; Map structure requiring non-zero-int keys.
; CDDL cannot enforce type-specific requirements about other items
; being present (or not present) in the same map.
udpcl-ext-map = $udpcl-ext-map .within udpcl-ext-map-structure
$udpcl-ext-map = {
* $$udpcl-ext-item
}
udpcl-ext-map-structure = {
* ext-key => any
}
ext-key = (int .size 2) .ne 0
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Figure 4: Extension Map structure CDDL
The following subsections define the initial UDPCL extension types.
3.5.1. DTLS Initiation (STARTTLS)
This extension item indicates that the transmitter is about to begin
a DTLS handshake sequence in accordance with Section 3.7.
The DTLS Initiation value SHALL be an untagged null value. There are
no DTLS parameters actually transmitted as part of this extension, it
only serves to indicate to the recipient that the next datagram will
be a DTLS ClientHello. Although the datagram containing this
extension is not retransmitted, the DTLS handshake itself will
retransmit ClientHello messages until confirmation is received.
$$udpcl-ext-item //= (
5: null
)
Figure 5: DTLS Initiation CDDL
If the entity is configured to enable exchanging messages according
to DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] or any successors which are compatible with
that DTLS ClientHello, the first message in any sequence to a unicast
recipient SHALL be an Extension Map with the DTLS Initiation item.
The RECOMMENDED policy is to enable DTLS for all unicast recipients,
even if security policy does not allow or require authentication.
This follows the opportunistic security model of [RFC7435], though an
active attacker could interfere with the exchange in such cases (see
Section 5.3).
The Extension Map containing a DTLS Initiation item SHALL NOT contain
any other items. A DTLS Initiation item SHALL NOT be present in any
message transmitted within a DTLS session. A receiver of a DTLS
Initiation item within a DTLS session SHALL ignore it. Between
transmitting a DTLS Initiation item and finishing a DTLS handshake
(either success or failure) an entity SHALL NOT transmit any other
UDP datagrams in that same conversation.
3.5.2. Bundle Transfer
This extension item allows CL-layer fragmentation of bundle transfers
as defined in Section 3.6.
The Transfer value SHALL be an untagged CBOR array of four items.
The items are defined in the following order:
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Transfer ID: This field SHALL be a CBOR uint item no larger than
32-bits, which is used to correlate multiple fragments.
Total Length: This field SHALL be a CBOR uint item no larger than
32-bits, which is used to indicate the total length (in octets) of
the transfer. If multiple Transfer items for the same Transfer ID
are received with differing Total Length values, the receiver
SHALL treat the transfer as being malformed and refuse to handle
any further fragments associated with the transfer.
Fragment Offset: This field SHALL be a CBOR uint item no larger than
32-bits, which is used to indicate the offset (in octets) into the
transfer for the start of this fragment.
Fragment Data: This field SHALL be a CBOR bstr item no larger than
2^32-1 octets, in which the fragment data is contained. The bstr
itself indicates the length of the fragment data.
$$udpcl-ext-item //= (
2: [
transfer-id: uint .size 4,
total-length: uint .size 4,
fragment-offset: uint .size 4,
fragment-data: bstr,
]
)
Figure 6: Transfer CDDL
3.5.3. Sender Listen
This extension item indicates that the transmitter is listening for
UDPCL packets on the source address-and-port used to transmit the
message containing this extension item. This is different from
simply listening on a UDP port (either the default or any other) when
the entity is behind a NAT or firewall which will not allow
unsolicited UDP/IP datagrams. Although the packet containing this
extension is not retransmitted, the time interval is finite and the
extension is sent repeatedly while the transmitter continues to
listen for packets. There is no positive indication that packets are
no longer accepted; the Sender Listen just stops being transmitted.
The Sender Listen value SHALL be an untagged uint value representing
the interval of time (in milliseconds) that the entity is willing to
accept UDPCL packets on the source address-and-port used for the
associated transmitted message. After transmitting a Sender Listen,
the entity SHALL listen for and accept datagrams on the source
address-and-port used for the associated transmitted message. As
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long as the entity is still willing to accept packets, at the end of
one accept interval the entity SHALL transmit another Sender Listen
item. This repetition continues until the entity is no longer
willing to listen for packets.
A receiving entity SHOULD treat a peer as no longer listening after
an implementation-defined timeout since the last received Sender
Listen item. A RECOMMENDED Sender Listen timeout is three (3) times
the associated time duration; this allows a single dropped datagram
to not interrupt a continuous sequence.
$$udpcl-ext-item //= (
3: time-duration,
)
time-duration = uint
Figure 7: Sender Listen CDDL
Unlike the generic source port requirement in Section 3.2, when
repeated Sender Listen are transmitted in a sequence a consistent
source address-and-port SHALL be used.
The Sender Listen interval SHOULD be no shorter than 1 second and no
longer than 60 seconds.
An entity SHOULD include a Sender Node ID item along with a Sender
Listen item if the conditions of Section 3.5.4 are met. An entity
MAY include any other extension type along with a Sender Listen item.
An entity SHALL NOT transmit a Sender Listen item before or along
with a DTLS Initiate if DTLS is desired for a conversation.
This extension is not a neighbor discovery mechanism and does not
indicate an entity listening generally on a particular UDP port.
Sender Listen applies only to UDP datagrams from the the peer
address-and-port. An entity SHALL NOT include a Sender Listen item
in a message transmitted to a multicast address.
3.5.4. Sender Node ID
This extension item indicates the Node ID of the transmitter. For
DTLS-secured sessions (see Section 3.7.4) this extension can be used
to disambiguate an end-entity certificate which has multiple NODE-ID
values.
The Sender Node ID value SHALL be an untagged tstr value containing a
Node ID. Every Node ID SHALL be a URI consistent with the
requirements of [RFC3986] and the URI schemes of the IANA "Bundle
Protocol URI Scheme Type" registry [IANA-BUNDLE].
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$$udpcl-ext-item //= (
4: nodeid,
)
nodeid = tstr
Figure 8: Sender Node ID CDDL
An entity SHOULD NOT include a Sender Node ID item if a DTLS session
has already been established and the presented end-entity certificate
contains a single NODE-ID. In this case there is no ambiguity about
which Node ID is identified by the certificate.
If an entity receives a peer Node ID which is not authenticated (by
the procedure of Section 3.7.4) that Node ID SHOULD NOT be used by a
BP agent for any discovery or routing functions. Trusting an
unauthenticated Node ID can lead to the threat described in
Section 5.7.
3.6. Explicit Transfers
This version of UDPCL supports CL-layer fragmentation of bundles
larger than the PMTU would otherwise allow. Policies related to
fragmentation at, above, or below the UDPCL layer are defined in
Section 2.3. The entire fragmented bundle is referred to as a
Transfer and individual fragments of a transfer are encoded as
Transfer extension items in accordance with Section 3.5.2.
This mechanism also allows a bundle transfer to be transmitted along
with additional extension items, which the unframed bundle-in-
datagram data does not. This specification does not define any
extension items which augment an associated transfer.
3.6.1. Bundle Transfer ID
Each Transfer item contains a Transfer ID which is used to correlate
messages for a single bundle transfer. A Transfer ID does not
attempt to address uniqueness of the bundle data itself and has no
relation to concepts such as bundle fragmentation. Each invocation
of UDPCL by the BP agent, requesting transmission of a bundle
(fragmentary or otherwise), can cause the initiation of a single
UDPCL transfer.
Because UDPCL operation is connectionless, Transfer IDs from each
entity SHALL be unique for the operating duration of the entity. In
practice, the ID needs only be unique for the longest receiver
reassembly time window; but because that information is not part of
the protocol there is no way for an transmitting entity to know the
reassembly time window of any receiver (see Section 3.6.2). When
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there are bidirectional bundle transfers between UDPCL entities, an
entity SHOULD NOT rely on any relation between Transfer IDs
originating from each side of the conversation.
Although there is not a strict requirement for Transfer ID initial
values or ordering (see Section 5.11), in the absence of any other
mechanism for generating Transfer IDs an entity SHALL use the
following algorithm: the initial Transfer ID from each entity is
zero; subsequent Transfer ID values are incremented from the prior
Transfer ID value by one; upon exhaustion of the entire 32-bit
Transfer ID space, the subsequent Transfer ID value is zero.
3.6.2. Fragmentation and Reassembly
The full data content of a transfer SHALL be an unframed (BPv6 or
BPv7) bundle as defined in Section 3.4. A receiving entity SHALL
discard any reassembled transfer which does not properly contain a
bundle.
A transmitting entity MAY produce a Transfer with a single fragment
(i.e., a Fragment Data size identical to the Total Length). A
transmitting entity SHALL NOT produce Transfer fragments with
overlapping span. A transmitting entity SHOULD transmit Transfer
fragments in order of Fragment Offset; this makes the behavior
deterministic.
Because of the nature of UDP transport, there is no guaranteed order
or timing of received Transfer items. A receiving entity SHALL
consider a transport as finished when Fragment Data has been received
which fully covers the Total Length of the transfer.
A receiving entity SHALL discard any Transfer item containing
different CBOR types than defined in this document. A receiving
entity SHALL discard any Transfer item containing a fragment with an
overlapping span. Because there is no feedback indication at the
UDPCL layer, a transmitter has no indication when a transfer is
discarded by the receiver.
A receiving entity SHOULD discard unfinished transfer state after an
implementation-defined timeout since the last received fragment.
Entities SHOULD choose a transfer timeout interval no longer than one
minute (60 seconds). Discarding an unfinished transfer causes no
indication to the transmitting entity, but does indicate this to the
BP agent. This timeout is purely receiver-side and represents the
maximum allowed time between sequential received datagrams (in any
order), which should be short if the datagrams take a similar network
path.
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3.7. UDPCL Security
This version of the UDPCL supports establishing a DTLS session within
an existing UDP conversation. When DTLS is used within the UDPCL it
affects the entire conversation. There is no concept of a plaintext
message being sent in a conversation after a DTLS session is
established.
Once established, the lifetime of a DTLS session SHALL be bound by
the DTLS session ticket lifetime or either peer sending a Closure
Alert record.
Subsequent DTLS session attempts to the same passive entity MAY
attempt to use the DTLS session resumption feature. There is no
guarantee that the passive entity will accept the request to resume a
DTLS session, and the active entity cannot assume any resumption
outcome.
3.7.1. Entity Identification
The UDPCL uses DTLS for certificate exchange in both directions to
identify each entity and to allow each entity to authenticate its
peer. Each certificate can potentially identify multiple entities
and there is no problem using such a certificate as long as the
identifiers are sufficient to meet authentication policy (as
described in later sections) for the entity which presents it.
The types and priorities of identities used by DTLS in UDPCL is the
same as those for TLS in TCPCL as defined in Section 4.4.1 of
[I-D.ietf-dtn-tcpclv4].
3.7.2. Certificate Profile for UDPCL
All end-entity certificates used by a UDPCL entity SHALL conform to
the profile defined in Section 4.4.2 of [I-D.ietf-dtn-tcpclv4].
3.7.3. DTLS Handshake
The signaling for DTLS Initiation is described in Section 3.5.1.
After sending or receiving an Extension Map containing a DTLS
Initiation item, an entity SHALL begin the handshake procedure of
Section 4.2 of [RFC6347]. By convention, this protocol uses the
entity which sent the DTLS Initiation (the active peer) as the
"client" role of the DTLS handshake request.
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Upon receiving an unexpected ClientHello record outside of a DTLS
session, an entity SHALL begin the DTLS handshake procedure as if a
DTLS Initiation had been received. This allows recovering from a
dropped packet containing DTLS Initiation.
3.7.4. DTLS Authentication
The function and mechanism of DTLS authentication in UDPCL is the
same as for TLS in TCPCL as defined in Section 4.4.4 of
[I-D.ietf-dtn-tcpclv4], with the exception that Node ID
Authentication is based on an optional Sender Node ID extension (see
Section 3.5.4) used to disambiguate when an end-entity certificate
contains multiple NODE-ID values.
3.7.5. Policy Recommendations
The policy recommendations given here are are the same as those for
TCPCL in Section 4.4.5 of [I-D.ietf-dtn-tcpclv4]. They are restated
in this document for clarity.
A RECOMMENDED security policy is to enable the use of OCSP checking
during DTLS handshake. A RECOMMENDED security policy is that if an
Extended Key Usage is present that it needs to contain "id-kp-
bundleSecurity" of [IANA-SMI] to be usable with UDPCL security. A
RECOMMENDED security policy is to require a validated NODE-ID and to
ignore any network-level DNS-ID or IPADDR-ID.
This policy relies on and informs the certificate requirements in
Section 3.7.2. This policy assumes that a DTN-aware CA (see
Section 2.2) will only issue a certificate for a Node ID when it has
verified that the private key holder actually controls the DTN node;
this is needed to avoid the threat identified in Section 5.7. This
policy requires that a certificate contain a NODE-ID and allows the
certificate to also contain network-level identifiers. A tailored
policy on a more controlled network could relax the requirement on
Node ID validation and allow just network-level identifiers to
authenticate a peer.
3.7.6. Example Secured and Bidirectional Transfers
This simple example shows a sequence of pre-transfer setup followed
by a set of (unrelated) bundle transfers. All messaging in this
example occurs between the same Entity A address-and-port and Entity
B address-and-port.
The example Entity A has a policy to only send or receive bundles
within a DTLS session, so any outgoing bundles to Entity B are queued
until the DTLS session is established. Because Entity A is willing
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to accept transfers on its ephemeral UDP port, the first outgoing
message after the DTLS handshake contains the Sender Listen extension
(along with a Sender Node ID indicating its identity to Entity B).
Entity A Entity B
active peer passive peer
+-------------------------+
| Initiate DTLS Ext. | ->
+-------------------------+
+-------------------------+ +-------------------------+
| DTLS Negotiation | -> <- | DTLS Negotiation |
| (as client) | | (as server) |
+-------------------------+ +-------------------------+
DNS-ID and IPADDR-ID authentication occurs.
Secured UDPCL messaging can begin.
+-------------------------+
| Sender Listen Ext. | ->
| Sender Node ID Ext. |
+-------------------------+
NODE-ID authentication occurs.
DTLS session is established, transfers can begin.
+-------------------------+
| Unframed Transfer | -> +-------------------------+
+-------------------------+ <- | Unframed Transfer |
+-------------------------+ +-------------------------+
| Unframed Transfer | ->
+-------------------------+
Figure 9: An example of the flow of protocol messages on a single UDP
conversation between two entities
4. Implementation Status
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
[NOTE to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before
publication, as well as the reference to [RFC7942],
[github-dtn-demo-agent], and [github-dtn-wireshark].]
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
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assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations can
exist.
An example implementation of the this draft of UDPCL has been created
as a GitHub project [github-dtn-demo-agent] and is intended to use as
a proof-of-concept and as a possible source of interoperability
testing. This example implementation uses D-Bus as the CL-BP Agent
interface, so it only runs on hosts which provide the Python "dbus"
library.
A wireshark dissector for UDPCL has been created as a GitHub project
[github-dtn-wireshark] and has been kept in-sync with the latest
encoding of this specification.
5. Security Considerations
This section separates security considerations into threat categories
based on guidance of BCP 72 [RFC3552].
5.1. Threat: Passive Leak of Node Data
When used without DTLS security, the UDPCL can expose the Node ID and
other configuration data to passive eavesdroppers. This can occur
even if no bundle transfers are transmitted. This can be avoided by
always using DTLS, even if authentication is not available (see
Section 5.10).
5.2. Threat: Passive Leak of Bundle Data
UDPCL can be used to provide point-to-point unicast transport
security, but does not provide multicast security, security of data-
at-rest, and does not guarantee end-to-end bundle security. In those
cases the bundle security mechanisms defined in [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec]
are to be used instead.
When used without DTLS security, the UDPCL exposes all bundle data to
passive eavesdroppers. This can be avoided by always using DTLS for
unicast messaging, even if authentication is not available (see
Section 5.10).
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5.3. Threat: Transport Security Stripping
When security policy allows non-DTLS messaging, UDPCL does not
protect against active network attackers. It is possible for a on-
path attacker to drop or alter packets containing Extension Map and/
or DTLS handshake records, which will cause the receiver to not
negotiate a DTLS session. This leads to the "SSL Stripping" attack
described in [RFC7457].
When DTLS is available on an entity, it is strongly encouraged that
the security policy disallow non-DTLS messaging for unicast purposes.
This requires that the DTLS handshake occurs before any other UDPCL
messaging, regardless of the policy-driven parameters of the
handshake and policy-driven handling of the handshake outcome.
One mechanism to mitigate the possibility of DTLS stripping is the
use of DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) [RFC6698]
toward the passive peer. This mechanism relies on DNS and is
unidirectional, so it doesn't help with applying policy toward the
active peer, but it can be useful in an environment using
opportunistic security. The configuration and use of DANE are
outside of the scope of this document.
The negotiated use of DTLS is identical behavior to STARTTLS use in
[RFC2595], [RFC4511], and others.
5.4. Threat: Weak DTLS Configurations
Even when using DTLS to secure the UDPCL session, the actual
ciphersuite negotiated between the DTLS peers can be insecure.
Recommendations for ciphersuite use are included in BCP 195
[RFC7525]. It is up to security policies within each UDPCL entity to
ensure that the negotiated DTLS ciphersuite meets transport security
requirements.
5.5. Threat: Untrusted End-Entity Certificate
The profile in Section 3.7.4 uses end-entity certificates chained up
to a trusted root CA. During DTLS handshake, either entity can send
a certificate set which does not contain the full chain, possibly
excluding intermediate or root CAs. In an environment where peers
are known to already contain needed root and intermediate CAs there
is no need to include those CAs, but this has a risk of an entity not
actually having one of the needed CAs.
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5.6. Threat: Certificate Validation Vulnerabilities
Even when DTLS itself is operating properly an attacker can attempt
to exploit vulnerabilities within certificate check algorithms or
configuration to establish a secure DTLS session using an invalid
certificate. An invalid certificate exploit could lead to bundle
data leaking and/or denial of service to the Node ID being
impersonated.
There are many reasons, described in [RFC5280] and [RFC6125], why a
certificate can fail to validate, including using the certificate
outside of its valid time interval, using purposes for which it was
not authorized, or using it after it has been revoked by its CA.
Validating a certificate is a complex task and can require network
connectivity outside of the primary UDPCL network path(s) if a
mechanism such as OCSP [RFC6960] is used by the CA. The
configuration and use of particular certificate validation methods
are outside of the scope of this document.
5.7. Threat: BP Node Impersonation
The certificates exchanged by DTLS enable authentication of peer DNS
name and Node ID, but it is possible that a peer either not provide a
valid certificate or that the certificate does not validate either
the DNS-ID/IPADDR-ID or NODE-ID of the peer (see Section 2.2).
Having a CA-validated certificate does not alone guarantee the
identity of the network host or BP node from which the certificate is
provided; additional validation procedures in Section 3.7.3 bind the
DNS-ID/IPADDR-ID or NODE-ID based on the contents of the certificate.
The DNS-ID/IPADDR-ID validation is a weaker form of authentication,
because even if a peer is operating on an authenticated network DNS
name or IP address it can provide an invalid Node ID and cause
bundles to be "leaked" to an invalid node. Especially in DTN
environments, network names and addresses of nodes can be time-
variable so binding a certificate to a Node ID is a more stable
identity.
NODE-ID validation ensures that the peer to which a bundle is
transferred is in fact the node which the BP Agent expects it to be.
In circumstances where certificates can only be issued to DNS names,
Node ID validation is not possible but it could be reasonable to
assume that a trusted host is not going to present an invalid Node
ID. Determining when a DNS-ID/IPADDR-ID authentication can be
trusted to validate a Node ID is also a policy matter outside of the
scope of this document.
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One mitigation to arbitrary entities with valid PKIX certificates
impersonating arbitrary Node IDs is the use of the PKIX Extended Key
Usage key purpose "id-kp-bundleSecurity" of [IANA-SMI]. When this
Extended Key Usage is present in the certificate, it represents a
stronger assertion that the private key holder should in fact be
trusted to operate as a DTN Node.
5.8. Threat: Denial of Service
The behaviors described in this section all amount to a potential
denial-of-service to a UDPCL entity. The denial-of-service could be
limited to an individual UDPCL entity, or could affect all entities
on a host or network segment.
An entity can send a large amount of data to a UDPCL entity,
requiring the receiving entity to handle the data. The victim entity
can block UDP packets from network peers which are thought to be
incorrectly behaving within network.
An entity can also send only one fragment of a seemingly valid
transfer and never send the remaining fragments, which will cause
resources on the receiver to be wasted on transfer reassembly state.
The victim entity can either block packets from network peers or
intentionally keep a short unfinished transfer timeout (see
Section 3.6.2).
The keepalive mechanism can be abused to waste throughput within a
network link which would otherwise be usable for bundle
transmissions.
5.9. Mandatory-to-Implement DTLS
Following IETF best current practice, DTLS is mandatory to implement
for all UDPCL implementations but DTLS is optional to use for a any
given transfer. The recommended configuration of Section 3.5.1 is to
always attempt DTLS, but entities are permitted to disable DTLS based
on local configuration. The configuration to enable or disable DTLS
for an entity or a session is outside of the scope of this document.
The configuration to disable DTLS is different from the threat of
DTLS stripping described in Section 5.3.
5.10. Alternate Uses of DTLS
This specification makes use of PKIX certificate validation and
authentication within DTLS. There are alternate uses of DTLS which
are not necessarily incompatible with the security goals of this
specification, but are outside of the scope of this document. The
following subsections give examples of alternate DTLS uses.
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5.10.1. DTLS Without Authentication
In environments where PKI is available but there are restrictions on
the issuance of certificates (including the contents of
certificates), it may be possible to make use of DTLS in a way which
authenticates only the passive entity of a UDPCL transfer or which
does not authenticate either entity. Using DTLS in a way which does
not successfully authenticate some claim of both peer entities of a
UDPCL transfer is outside of the scope of this document but does have
similar properties to the opportunistic security model of [RFC7435].
5.10.2. Non-Certificate DTLS Use
In environments where PKI is unavailable, alternate uses of DTLS
which do not require certificates such as pre-shared key (PSK)
authentication [RFC5489] and the use of raw public keys [RFC7250] are
available and can be used to ensure confidentiality within UDPCL.
Using non-PKI node authentication methods is outside of the scope of
this document.
5.11. Predictability of Transfer IDs
The only requirement on Transfer IDs is that they are unique from the
transmitting peer only. The trivial algorithm of the first transfer
starting at zero and later transfers incrementing by one causes
absolutely predictable Transfer IDs. Even when UDPCL is not DTLS
secured and there is a on-path attacker altering UDPCL messages,
there is no UDPCL feedback mechanism to interrupt or refuse a
transfer so there is no benefit in having unpredictable Transfer IDs.
6. IANA Considerations
Registration procedures referred to in this section are defined in
[RFC8126].
6.1. Port Number
Within the port registry of [IANA-PORTS], UDP port number 4556 has
been previously assigned as the default port for the UDP convergence
layer in [RFC7122]. This assignment to UDPCL is unchanged, but the
assignment reference is updated to this specification. There is no
UDPCL version indication on-the-wire but this specification is a
superset of [RFC7122] and is fully backward compatible. The related
assignment for DCCP port 4556 (registered by [RFC7122]) is unchanged.
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+========================+============================+
| Parameter | Value |
+========================+============================+
| Service Name: | dtn-bundle |
+------------------------+----------------------------+
| Transport Protocol(s): | UDP |
+------------------------+----------------------------+
| Assignee: | IESG <iesg@ietf.org> |
+------------------------+----------------------------+
| Contact: | IESG <iesg@ietf.org> |
+------------------------+----------------------------+
| Description: | DTN Bundle UDP CL Protocol |
+------------------------+----------------------------+
| Reference: | This specification. |
+------------------------+----------------------------+
| Port Number: | 4556 |
+------------------------+----------------------------+
Table 2
6.2. UDPCL Extension Types
EDITOR NOTE: sub-registry to-be-created upon publication of this
specification.
IANA will create, under the "Bundle Protocol" registry [IANA-BUNDLE],
a sub-registry titled "Bundle Protocol UDP Convergence-Layer
Extension Types" and initialize it with the contents of Table 3. For
positive code points the registration procedure is Specification
Required. Negative code points are reserved for use on private
networks for functions not published to the IANA.
Specifications of new extension types need to define the CBOR item
structure of the extension data as well as the purpose and
relationship of the new extension to existing session/transfer state
within the baseline UDPCL sequencing. Receiving entities will ignore
items with unknown Extension ID, and that behavior needs to be
considered by new extension types.
Expert(s) are encouraged to be biased towards approving registrations
unless they are abusive, frivolous, or actively harmful (not merely
aesthetically displeasing, or architecturally dubious).
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+==============+==========================+=====================+
| Extension ID | Name | References |
+==============+==========================+=====================+
| negative | Private/Experimental Use | This specification. |
+--------------+--------------------------+---------------------+
| 0 | Reserved | This specification. |
+--------------+--------------------------+---------------------+
| 2 | Transfer | Section 3.5.2 of |
| | | this specification. |
+--------------+--------------------------+---------------------+
| 3 | Sender Listen | Section 3.5.3 of |
| | | this specification. |
+--------------+--------------------------+---------------------+
| 4 | Sender Node ID | Section 3.5.4 of |
| | | this specification. |
+--------------+--------------------------+---------------------+
| 5 | DTLS Initiation | Section 3.5.1 of |
| | (STARTTLS) | this specification. |
+--------------+--------------------------+---------------------+
| 6-65535 | Unassigned | |
+--------------+--------------------------+---------------------+
Table 3: Extension Type Codes
7. Acknowledgments
TBD
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[IANA-BUNDLE]
IANA, "Bundle Protocol",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/bundle/>.
[IANA-PORTS]
IANA, "Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number
Registry", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-
names-port-numbers/>.
[IANA-IPv4-MCAST]
IANA, "IPv4 Multicast Address Space Registry",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/multicast-addresses/>.
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[IANA-IPv6-MCAST]
IANA, "IPv6 Multicast Address Space Registry",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-multicast-
addresses/>.
[IANA-SMI] IANA, "Structure of Management Information (SMI) Numbers",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/>.
[RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, August 1980,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>.
[RFC1122] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1122, October 1989,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1122>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC5050] Scott, K. and S. Burleigh, "Bundle Protocol
Specification", RFC 5050, DOI 10.17487/RFC5050, November
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5050>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
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[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC8085] Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage
Guidelines", BCP 145, RFC 8085, DOI 10.17487/RFC8085,
March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8085>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis]
Burleigh, S., Fall, K., and E. Birrane, "Bundle Protocol
Version 7", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
dtn-bpbis-31, 25 January 2021,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-31>.
[I-D.ietf-dtn-tcpclv4]
Sipos, B., Demmer, M., Ott, J., and S. Perreault, "Delay-
Tolerant Networking TCP Convergence Layer Protocol Version
4", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dtn-
tcpclv4-24, 7 December 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dtn-tcpclv4-24>.
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8.2. Informative References
[RFC2595] Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP",
RFC 2595, DOI 10.17487/RFC2595, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2595>.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
[RFC4511] Sermersheim, J., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP): The Protocol", RFC 4511,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4511, June 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4511>.
[RFC4838] Cerf, V., Burleigh, S., Hooke, A., Torgerson, L., Durst,
R., Scott, K., Fall, K., and H. Weiss, "Delay-Tolerant
Networking Architecture", RFC 4838, DOI 10.17487/RFC4838,
April 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4838>.
[RFC5489] Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, "ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5489,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5489, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5489>.
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.
[RFC7122] Kruse, H., Jero, S., and S. Ostermann, "Datagram
Convergence Layers for the Delay- and Disruption-Tolerant
Networking (DTN) Bundle Protocol and Licklider
Transmission Protocol (LTP)", RFC 7122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7122, March 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7122>.
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.
[RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.
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[RFC7457] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing
Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, DOI 10.17487/RFC7457,
February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7457>.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
[RFC8899] Fairhurst, G., Jones, T., Tüxen, M., Rüngeler, I., and T.
Völker, "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery for
Datagram Transports", RFC 8899, DOI 10.17487/RFC8899,
September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8899>.
[RFC8900] Bonica, R., Baker, F., Huston, G., Hinden, R., Troan, O.,
and F. Gont, "IP Fragmentation Considered Fragile",
BCP 230, RFC 8900, DOI 10.17487/RFC8900, September 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8900>.
[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec]
Birrane, E. and K. McKeever, "Bundle Protocol Security
Specification", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-dtn-bpsec-26, 8 January 2021,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-26>.
[github-dtn-demo-agent]
Sipos, B., "UDPCL Example Implementation",
<https://github.com/BSipos-RKF/dtn-demo-agent/>.
[github-dtn-wireshark]
Sipos, B., "UDPCL Wireshark Dissector",
<https://github.com/BSipos-RKF/dtn-wireshark/>.
Appendix A. Significant changes from RFC7122
The areas in which changes from [RFC7122] have been made to existing
requirements:
* Made explicit references to UDP- and IP-related RFCs.
* Made more strict Keepalive and Padding requirements.
* Defined UDPCL security and made mandatory-to-implement.
The areas in which extensions from [RFC7122] have been made as new
behaviors are:
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* Added BPv7 bundle as a possible UDPCL payload.
* Added Extension Map message type and initial extension types.
* Defined semantics for UDPCL multicast addressing.
Author's Address
Brian Sipos
RKF Engineering Solutions, LLC
7500 Old Georgetown Road
Suite 1275
Bethesda, MD 20814-6198
United States of America
Email: BSipos@rkf-eng.com
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