Internet DRAFT - draft-smith-v6ops-mitigate-rtr-dos-mld-slctd-node
draft-smith-v6ops-mitigate-rtr-dos-mld-slctd-node
Internet Engineering Task Force M. Smith
Internet-Draft February 27, 2016
Intended status: Informational
Expires: August 30, 2016
Further Mitigating Router ND Cache Exhaustion DoS Attacks Using
Solicited-Node Group Membership
draft-smith-v6ops-mitigate-rtr-dos-mld-slctd-node-02
Abstract
For each of their IPv6 unicast or anycast addresses, nodes join a
Solicited-Node multicast group, formed using the lower 24 bits of the
address. This Solicited-Node group membership could be used by
routers to further mitigate a Neighbor Discovery cache Denial of
Service attack.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 30, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Tracking Solicited-Node Multicast Group Presence . . . . 4
2.2. Neighbor Presence Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.1. Strict Mitigation Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.2. Relaxed Mitigation Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. MLD Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Change Log [RFC Editor please remove] . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
When an IPv6 unicast or anycast address is added to or removed from
an interface, a node is also required to join or leave the Solicited-
Node multicast group that corresponds to the address
[RFC4291][RFC6434], using the Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD)
protocol [RFC2710][RFC3810]. The Solicited-Node multicast group the
node joins or leaves is determined by appending the lower 24 bits of
the unicast or anycast address, usually part of the Interface
Identifier (IID), to the IPv6 multicast prefix
FF02:0:0:0:0:1:FF00::/104 [RFC4291].
The current use of Solicited-Node multicast groups is to avoid having
to link layer broadcast Neighbor Discovery (ND) Neighbor
Solicitations to all nodes on the link (ARP's [RFC0826] behaviour for
most ARP Requests). Instead, Neighbor Solicitations are sent to the
Solicited-Node multicast group formed from the target address of the
Neighbor Solicitation.
The use of Solicited-Node multicast groups for Neighbor Solicitations
allows nodes to possibly filter Neighbor Solicitations they aren't
interested in in their link layer network interface, avoiding
interrupting the node's general purpose CPU (see sections 7.4 and 7.5
of [RFC1112] for further discussion), and possibly for the link layer
forwarding device(s) to avoid sending Neighbor Solicitations to nodes
that do not have the target address [RFC4541]. Facilitating link
layer network interface multicast filtering and reducing the flooding
scope of multicasts on a link helps increase the number of nodes that
can be attached to a link.
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As the addition or removal of unicast or anycast addresses triggers
Solicited-Node multicast group joins or leaves, this mechanism is in
effect a low resolution address range presence registration protocol,
registering portions of the on-link address range for which there are
unicast or anycast addresses present. The presence of a Solicited-
Node multicast group on a link indicates that at least one unicast or
anycast address that maps to the Solicited-Node multicast group is
present. Conversely, the absence of a Solicited-Node multicast group
on a link indicates that no unicast or anycast addresses are present
that would map to the corresponding Solicited-Node multicast group.
MLDv2 joins for Solicited-Node multicast groups could also be used
as a link-local address registration method for at least one of
each nodes' link-local addresses, as link-local unicast addresses
are used as MLDv2 source addresses, excepting MLDv2 joins for
Solicited-Node multicast groups when a link-local address is not
available [RFC3590]. It would not be possible to do this reliably
with MLDv1 Solicited-Node multicast group joins as MLDv1 listeners
will suppress joins for their own groups if they hear a join for
the same groups from another listener.
This presence or absence of Solicited-Node multicast groups could be
used by a router to determine if it needs to send Neighbor
Solicitations for unresolved addresses on to the link. If the to-be-
resolved address maps to a non-existent Solicited-Node multicast
group, the router could discard the packet, rather than sending a
Neighbor Solicitation to the corresponding Solicited-Node multicast
group for the packet's destination and possibly queuing the trigger
packet while neighbor discovery occurs. Discarding trigger packets
that map to absent Solicited-Node multicast groups could be a further
Neighbor Discovery cache Denial of Service (DoS) attack [RFC3756]
mitigation technique.
For links with prefixes with lengths shorter than or equal to /104,
such as the common /64 [RFC7421], the total number of Solicited-Node
multicast groups possible on a link is 2^24, or 16 777 216 groups.
The number of Solicited-Node multicast groups present on a link is
equal to the number of IPv6 unicast or anycast addresses present on
the link which have unique lower 24 bits, used to form the Solicited-
Node multicast group address.
For most links the number of present Solicited-Node multicast groups
present will be in the order of 10s, 100s or perhaps on rarer
occasions in the low 1000s. This means that Neighbor Solicitations
do not have to be sent for very large numbers of unresolved unicast
or anycast addresses for which the corresponding Solicited-Node
multicast group is not present. This would significantly reduce the
attack surface for the ND cache exhaustion denial of service attack.
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For example, if a link has 1000 present Solicited-Node multicast
groups, then Neighbor Solicitations do not have to be sent for
addresses that would map to the absent 16 776 216 Solicited-Node
multicast groups, more than 99.99% of the possible on-link Solicited-
Node multicast groups.
This memo describes how a router could collect Solicited-Node
multicast group membership and how it could use this information as
part of its neighbor presence discovery procedure, for the purposes
of further mitigating the ND cache exhaustion attack.
Note that this method has been independently suggested by Greg Daley
and perhaps others.
2. Method
2.1. Tracking Solicited-Node Multicast Group Presence
To track Solicited-Node multicast group presence on a link, a router
uses the multicast listener discovery procedures specified in
[RFC2710] or [RFC3810], without modification.
Note that the procedures specified in [RFC2710] and [RFC3810] do not
require that a router performing them is to forward multicast
packets, or is to be participating in a multicast routing protocol
with other multicast routers. The ND cache DoS mitigation method
described in this memo can be used regardless of whether the other
routers in the network, including other on-link routers, are
performing multicast forwarding.
If a router using this ND cache DoS mitigation method is not
performing multicast forwarding, it may choose to only track
Solicited-Node multicast group presence, ignoring the presence
information it receives for other multicast groups. This may
usefully reduce the router's resources consumption. If a router
using this optimisation becomes a multicast forwarding router, it
will need to collect presence information for all on-link multicast
groups, using the Querier Election procedure [RFC2710][RFC3810], as
though it had just been attached to the link, and had no knowledge of
the presence any of the multicast groups.
A router with two or more interfaces attached to the same link only
needs to operate MLD on one of those interfaces [RFC3810]; the list
of on-link Solicited-Node multicast groups would be used across all
of these interfaces when mitigating ND cache DoSes.
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2.2. Neighbor Presence Discovery
When a router receives a packet for a destination for which it does
not have a neighbor cache entry, it uses the [RFC4291] specified
method to form a Solicited-Node multicast group address from the
packet's destination address.
The router then compares the resulting Solicited-Node multicast group
address with its list of present Solicited-Node multicast groups on
the link.
If the Solicited-Node multicast group is present, the router then
performs the address resolution procedure for the packet's
destination IPv6 address as specified in [RFC4861], starting with
sending a Neighbor Solicitation towards the Solicited-Node multicast
group that corresponds to the address.
Alternatively, when the Solicited-Node multicast group is not
present, the router operates in one of two mitigation modes.
2.2.1. Strict Mitigation Mode
When operating in Strict Mitigation Mode, the router discards all
packets whose destination address Solicited-Node multicast groups do
not match any of the Solicited-Node multicast groups present on the
link.
Strict Mitigation Mode makes the decision to perform Neighbor
Discovery dependent on the successful discovery of the Solicited-Node
multicast groups on the link by MLD. This means that if the router
is assembling a list of present Solicited-Node multicast groups from
scratch, such as after the router has been intialised, or when an
interface comes online, there will be a period where Neighbor
Discovery for existing nodes will not occur, while the full set of
present Solicited-Node multicast groups are discovered. To off-link
hosts sending traffic to the possible on-link hosts, this will appear
to be a period of packet loss. These hosts are expected to have
implemented methods to recover from transient failures of
transmission, such as packet retransmission, if necessary [RFC1958].
This mode of operation is appropriate when it is known that all
attached nodes announce their Solicited-Node multicast group
membership for their addresses, and MLD operation on the link is
known to be reliable. An example scenario would be a large Internet
content provider's environment, where the content network routers and
content servers are being operated by the same organisation.
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2.2.2. Relaxed Mitigation Mode
When operating in Relaxed Mitigation Mode, under normal non-DoS
circumstances the router will also perform the address resolution
procedure for packets whose destination address Solicited-Node
multicast group does not match any of the Solicited-Node multicast
groups present on the link.
However, when there is an indication that a neighbor cache Denial of
Service attack might be occurring, the router treats packets whose
destination address Solicited-Node multicast group does not match a
link present Solicited-Node multicast group with lower importance to
those packets whose do.
Indicators that a neighbor cache Denial of Service attack might be
occurring could be many failed address resolution attempts over a
short period of time, rapid and unexpected consumption of neighbor
cache resources (rapid consumption for a short period of time after
the link or router has come on-line could be expected), or some other
pattern of neighbor cache Denial of Service attack specific
behaviour.
If a neighbor cache Denial of Service attack appears to be occurring,
an implementation could immediately start discarding packets whose
destination address Solicited-Node multicast group does not match
those present on the link. A less harsh alternative would be to
start discarding some of these packets, increasing the discard rate
as neighbor cache resources are increasingly consumed by the Denial
of Service attack.
This mode of operation would be appropriate when it is not known if
all nodes will announce their Solicited Node multicast group
membership, possibly due to some nodes being pre-[RFC2710]
implementations or if MLD operation is not known to be reliable.
Example scenarios would be residential or public Internet access
networks, where the support for or reliability of MLD joins for
Solicited Node multicast groups is not known. Specific to the
residential network case, where the technical ability of the router
operator is not known and likely to be low, Relaxed Mitigation Mode
would be the safest default.
3. MLD Reliability
MLD is currently being used for two purposes:
o to join and leave multicast groups so that multicast applications
will receive routed multicast traffic they are interested in
receiving [RFC2710][RFC3810], and
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o to advise link layer devices of node multicast group membership to
allow the link layer devices to limit to which devices multicast
traffic is sent, instead of flooding multicast traffic to all
attached devices [RFC4541]. Specific to this memo's topic, nodes
using MLD to join Solicited-Node multicast groups for their
addresses allows link layer devices to limit to which nodes
multicast Neighbor Solicitations are sent.
For the first purpose, partial or complete failure of MLD to
successfully join the intended multicast group(s) will likely cause
the respective multicast application(s) to not function adequately or
completely. While likely to be unacceptable to the application(s')
user(s), the effects of the failure are limited to the impacted
application(s); some multicast applications may function, and other
unicast-only applications will not be impacted.
For the second purpose, partial or complete failure of MLD operation
means the link layer device will not forward multicast traffic to
devices for groups for which MLD joins failed. As with the first MLD
purpose, application operation is likely to be impacted. MLD join
failures for Solicited-Node multicast groups would mean that
Duplicate Address Detection [RFC4861] and Neighbor Discovery
[RFC4861] for the node's addresses will fail. IPv6 unicast
connectivity for the effected node could be severely impacted, and
possibly fail completely.
For this memo's method, when operating in Strict Mitigation Mode,
partial or complete failure of MLD for Solicited-Node multicast group
joins will cause Neighbor Discovery to fail for routers implementing
this neighbor cache Denial of Service attack mitigation. The
effected nodes will be unreachable for traffic sources beyond the
impacted router.
With this memo's method, when operating in Relaxed Mitigation Mode,
partial or complete failure of MLD for Solicited-Node multicast group
joins will cause the router to consider neighbor discovery for the
effected node's addresses to be of lower importance. Under normal,
non-neighbor cache Denial of Service circumstances, these nodes will
receive equal service to those who've successfully joined the
Solicited-Node multicast groups via MLD. If a neighbor cache Denial
of Service occurs, these MLD failed nodes will either have less
success at or complete failure of being discovered by the router
performing neighbor discovery. In this situation, some rather than
all of the nodes will have been impacted by the Denial of Service
attack, which is an improvement over the attack impacting all nodes.
It is important to note that failure of neighbor discovery during a
neighbor cache Denial of Service attack will only impact nodes that
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have not been previously discovered by the router. If a node has
been previously discovered, its neighbor information will already
reside in the router's neighbor cache, and its currency will be
maintained by Neighbor Unreachability Detection [RFC4861].
Due to the number of significant consequences of MLD failure,
including those introduced by this memo's method, MLD should be
configured to operate reliably if the default MLD reliability related
parameter values are not adequate [RFC2710][RFC3810]. Although
[RFC6636] provides advice for tuning MLD operation for mobile and
wireless networks, some of the advice and considerations might be
more generally applied.
4. Security Considerations
The method described in this memo further mitigates the ND cache
exhaustion DoS attack. It does not prevent it.
Using this method, neighbor presence discovery will occur for any of
the unicast or anycast addresses that map to the present Solicited-
Node multicast groups. As a Solicited-Node multicast group can map
to up to 2^40 unicast or anycast addresses (for a /64 prefix, 2^(64 -
24)), the ND implementation is likely to continue to be vulnerable to
a ND cache exhaustion denial of service for addresses covered by the
present Solicited-Node multicast groups. While the number of non-
existent addresses that can be targetted remains very large, it is
very significantly smaller than the targettable non-existent
addresses possible in the on-link prefixes without this measure.
The severity of this threat depends on two factors:
o the number of Solicited-Node multicast groups present on the link,
and
o the ability of the off-link attacker to stumble upon or discover
non-existent addresses that map to present Solicited-Node
multicast groups.
The severity of the threat is lower with lesser numbers of Solicited-
Node multicast groups, and less predictable and sparsely distributed
Solicited-Node multicast group addresses.
[RFC7217] specifies the use of stable yet random and unpredictable
IIDs, on a per-prefix basis. This will increase the number of
present Solicited-Node multicast groups, by up to the number of
prefixes multiplied by the number of hosts implementing [RFC7217].
This will reduce the effectiveness of the measure proposed in this
memo. However, it will also conversely increase the effectiveness of
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this measure, as the IIDs and therefore the Solicited-Node multicast
groups become less predictable and more sparsely distributed.
To protect against ND cache DoS attacks for non-existent addresses
that map to present Solicited-Node multicast groups, other ND cache
protection measures, such as those described in [RFC6583] should also
be implemented.
When a packet is sent to a destination that is unresolved and is not
covered by a present Solicited-Node multicast group, a copy could be
sent to an [RFC6018] greynet collector for further analysis. For
example, packet sent to destinations falling outside the present
Solicited-Node multicast groups could be an indication of an attempt
to discover nodes via address probing.
5. Acknowledgements
Review and comments were provided by (in alphabetical order) Fred
Baker, Lorenzo Colitti and Ray Hunter. Lorenzo expressed a concern
about MLD reliability and its consequences, which prompted the
creation of the two modes of mitigation and the MLD reliability
discussion.
This memo was prepared using the xml2rfc tool.
6. Change Log [RFC Editor please remove]
draft-smith-v6ops-mitigate-rtr-dos-mld-slctd-node-00, initial
version, 2014-04-08
draft-smith-v6ops-mitigate-rtr-dos-mld-slctd-node-01, 2016-02-08
o two modes of response to possible neighbor cache DoS
o MLD reliability discussion
o Expansion on the purpose of using solicited-node multicast groups
draft-smith-v6ops-mitigate-rtr-dos-mld-slctd-node-02, 2016-02-28
o "discard" rather than "drop" to show intentional dropping
o text about Strict Mode MLD discovery period
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7. Informative References
[RFC0826] Plummer, D., "Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or
Converting Network Protocol Addresses to 48.bit Ethernet
Address for Transmission on Ethernet Hardware", STD 37,
RFC 826, DOI 10.17487/RFC0826, November 1982,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc826>.
[RFC1112] Deering, S., "Host extensions for IP multicasting", STD 5,
RFC 1112, DOI 10.17487/RFC1112, August 1989,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1112>.
[RFC1958] Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the
Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1958>.
[RFC2710] Deering, S., Fenner, W., and B. Haberman, "Multicast
Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2710, October 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2710>.
[RFC3590] Haberman, B., "Source Address Selection for the Multicast
Listener Discovery (MLD) Protocol", RFC 3590,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3590, September 2003,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3590>.
[RFC3756] Nikander, P., Ed., Kempf, J., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6
Neighbor Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats",
RFC 3756, DOI 10.17487/RFC3756, May 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3756>.
[RFC3810] Vida, R., Ed. and L. Costa, Ed., "Multicast Listener
Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3810, June 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3810>.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.
[RFC4541] Christensen, M., Kimball, K., and F. Solensky,
"Considerations for Internet Group Management Protocol
(IGMP) and Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) Snooping
Switches", RFC 4541, DOI 10.17487/RFC4541, May 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4541>.
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[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
[RFC6018] Baker, F., Harrop, W., and G. Armitage, "IPv4 and IPv6
Greynets", RFC 6018, DOI 10.17487/RFC6018, September 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6018>.
[RFC6434] Jankiewicz, E., Loughney, J., and T. Narten, "IPv6 Node
Requirements", RFC 6434, DOI 10.17487/RFC6434, December
2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6434>.
[RFC6583] Gashinsky, I., Jaeggli, J., and W. Kumari, "Operational
Neighbor Discovery Problems", RFC 6583,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6583, March 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6583>.
[RFC6636] Asaeda, H., Liu, H., and Q. Wu, "Tuning the Behavior of
the Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) and
Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) for Routers in Mobile
and Wireless Networks", RFC 6636, DOI 10.17487/RFC6636,
May 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6636>.
[RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,
"Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6
(IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.
[RFC7217] Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque
Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>.
[RFC7421] Carpenter, B., Ed., Chown, T., Gont, F., Jiang, S.,
Petrescu, A., and A. Yourtchenko, "Analysis of the 64-bit
Boundary in IPv6 Addressing", RFC 7421,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7421, January 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7421>.
Author's Address
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Mark Smith
PO BOX 521
HEIDELBERG, VIC 3084
AU
Email: markzzzsmith@gmail.com
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