Internet DRAFT - draft-soc-load-control-event-package
draft-soc-load-control-event-package
IETF SOC Working Group C. Shen
Internet-Draft H. Schulzrinne
Intended status: Standards Track Columbia U.
Expires: July 21, 2011 A. Koike
NTT
January 17, 2011
A Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Load Control Event Package
draft-soc-load-control-event-package-00.txt
Abstract
This document defines a load control event package for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP). It allows SIP servers to distribute user
load control information to other SIP servers in the network. The
load control can throttle calls based on their source or destination
domain, telephone number prefix or for a specific user. The
mechanism helps to prevent signaling overload and complements
feedback-based SIP overload control efforts.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 21, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Design Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Load Filtering Control Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Filter Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Filter Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Filter Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. Applicability in Different Network Environments . . . . . 9
5. Load Control Event Package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Event Package Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Event Package Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. SUBSCRIBE Bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4. SUBSCRIBE Duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.5. NOTIFY Bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.6. Notifier Processing of SUBSCRIBE Requests . . . . . . . . 11
5.7. Notifier Generation of NOTIFY Requests . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.8. Subscriber Processing of NOTIFY Requests . . . . . . . . . 12
5.9. Handling of Forked Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.10. Rate of Notifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.11. State Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Load Control Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2. Namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.3. Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.3.1. Call Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.3.2. Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3.3. Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.4. Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.5. Complete Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. XML Schema Definition for Load Control . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.1. Relationship with Load Filtering in PSTN . . . . . . . . . 21
8.2. Relationship with Other IETF SIP Load Control Efforts . . 22
9. Discussion of this document meeting the requirements of
RFC5390 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
11.1. Load Control Event Package Registration . . . . . . . . . 28
11.2. application/load-control+xml MIME Registration . . . . . . 29
11.3. Load Control Schema Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
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12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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1. Introduction
Proper functioning of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3265]
signaling servers is critical in SIP-based communications networks.
The performance of SIP servers can be severely degraded when the
server is overloaded with excessive number of signaling requests.
Both legitimate and malicious traffic can overload SIP servers,
despite appropriate capacity planning.
There are three common examples of legitimate short-term increases in
call volumes. Viewer-voting TV shows or ticket giveaways may
generate millions of calls within a few minutes. Call volume may
also spike during special holidays such as New Year's Day and
Mother's Day. Finally, callers may want to reach friends and family
in natural disaster areas such as those affected by earthquakes.
When possible, only calls traversing overloaded servers should be
throttled under those conditions.
SIP load control mechanisms are needed to prevent congestion collapse
in these cases [RFC5390]. There are two types of load control
approaches. In the first approach, feedback control, SIP servers
provide load limits to upstream servers, to reduce the incoming rate
of all SIP requests [I-D.ietf-soc-overload-control]. These upstream
servers then drop or delay incoming SIP requests. Feedback control
is reactive and affects signaling messages that have already been
issued by user agent clients. They work well if core or destination-
specific SIP proxies are overloaded. By their nature, they need to
distribute rate, drop or window information to all upstream SIP
proxies and generally affect all calls equally, regardless of
destination. However, feedback control is ineffective for edge-
server overload. For example, for the ticket giveaway case, almost
all such calls will fail in the core SIP server. If the edge server
is also overloaded, calls to other destinations will also be rejected
or dropped.
Here, we propose an additional, complementary mechanism, called load
filtering. Network operators create filters that indicate that calls
to specific destinations or from specific sources should be rate-
limited or randomly dropped. These filters are then distributed to
SIP servers and possibly user agents likely to generate calls to the
affected destinations or from the affected sources. Load filters
work best if they prevent calls as close to the user agent client as
possible.
Performing SIP load filtering control requires three components:
filter content format definition, filter content computation methods,
and filter distribution mechanism. This document addresses two of
the three components. The filter format is defined by the contents
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of a SIP load control event package, while the filter distribution
mechanism is built upon the existing SIP event framework. The
remaining component, filter content computation, depends heavily on
the actual network topology and service provider policies. Therefore
it is out of scope of this document.
The rest of this document is structured as follows: we begin by
listing the design requirements for this work in Section 3. We then
give an overview of the load filtering control operation in
Section 4. The load control event package is detailed in Section 5.
The load filter content format definition is discussed in the two
sections that follow, with Section 6 defining the load control XML
document and Section 7 defining the corresponding XML schema.
Section 8 relates this work to corresponding mechanisms in PSTN and
other IETF efforts addressing SIP load control. Section 9 evaluates
whether this document meets the SIP overload control requirements set
forth by RFC5390 [RFC5390]. Finally, Section 10 presents security
considerations and Section 11 provides IANA considerations.
2. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Design Requirements
The SIP load filtering control mechanism needs to satisfy the
following requirements:
o To simplify the solution, we focus on SIP load control, rather
than a generic application-layer mechanism.
o The load filter information needs to be distributed efficiently to
possibly a large subset of all SIP elements.
o The solution should re-use existing SIP protocol mechanisms to
reduce implementation and deployment complexity.
o For predictable overload situations, such as holidays and call-in
events, the mechanism should specify during what time period it is
to be applied, so that the information can be distributed ahead of
time.
o For destination-specific overload situations, the load filter
needs to be able to describe the callee.
o To address accidental and intentional high-volume call generators,
the filter should allow to specify the caller.
o Caller and callee need to be specified as both SIP URIs and 'Tel'
URIs[RFC3966].
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o For telephone numbers, it should be possible to specify prefixes
which allow control over limited regionally-focused overloads.
o The solution should draw upon experiences from related PSTN
mechanisms where applicable.
o The solution should be extensible to meet future needs.
4. Load Filtering Control Overview
4.1. Filter Format
A load filter contains both conditions and actions. Filter
conditions include the identities of the targets to be controlled.
For example, there are two typical resource limits in a possible
overload situation, i.e., human destination limits (N call takers)
and proxy capacity limits. The control targets in these two cases
can be the specific callee numbers or the destination domains
corresponding to the overload. Filter conditions also indicate the
period of time during which the control should be activated, and the
specific message type to be controlled, e.g., the INVITE message of a
SIP session. Filter actions describe the desired control functions
such as limiting the request rate below a certain level. Detailed
formats of filter conditions and actions are defined in Section 6.
4.2. Filter Computation
The load filter content computation method needs to take into
consideration information such as the overload time, scope and the
network topology as well as service policies. It is also important
to make sure that there is no resource allocation loop and that loads
are allocated in a way that both prevents overload and minimizes the
likelihood of network under-utilization. In some cases, in order to
better utilize system resources, it may be preferable to employ a
dynamic load computation algorithm which adapts to current network
status, rather than using a purely static mechanism. The filter
content computation algorithm is out of scope of this document.
4.3. Filter Distribution
For load filter distribution, this document defines the SIP event
package for load control, which is an "instantiation" of the generic
SIP events framework [RFC3265]. The SIP events framework provides an
existing method for SIP entities to subscribe to and receive
notifications when certain events have occurred. Such a framework
forms a scalable event distribution architecture that suits our
needs. This document also defines the XML schema used to encode the
load control document. The choice of XML allows us to reuse existing
SIP-specific policy related XML schemas when applicable, and also
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fits our goal of flexibility and extensibility.
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
| | | | | | | |
| EPa1 | | EPa2 | | EPa3 | | EPa4 |
| | | | | | | |
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
\ / \ /
\ / \ /
\ / \ /
+-----------+ +-----------+
| | | |
| CPa1 |------------------| CPa2 |
| | | |
+-----------+ +-----------+
| |
Service | |
Provider A | |
| |
=================================================================
| |
Service | |
Provider B | |
| |
+-----------+ +-----------+
| | | |
| CPb1 |------------------| CPb2 |
| | | |
+-----------+ +-----------+
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
| | | | | | | |
| EPb1 | | EPb2 | | EPb3 | | EPb4 |
| | | | | | | |
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
Figure 1: Example Network Scenario with SIP Load Control Event
Notification
The load filter distribution based on the SIP load control event
package is illustrated with an example architecture shown in
Figure 1. This scenario consists of two networks belonging to
Service Provider A and Service Provider B, respectively. Each
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provider's network is made up of two SIP Core Proxies (CPs) and four
SIP Edge Proxies (EPs). The CPs and EPs of Service Provider A are
denoted as CPa1 to CPa2 and EPa1 to EPa4; the CPs and EPs of Service
Provider B are denoted as CPb1 to CPb2 and EPb1 to EPb4.
In general, each SIP proxy server in the network is required to
subscribe to the load control event package from all its outgoing
signaling neighbors. Signaling neighbors are defined by sending
signaling messages. For instance, if A sends signaling requests to
B, B is an outgoing signaling neighbor of A. A needs to subscribe to
the load control event package of B in case B wants to curb requests
from A. On the other hand, if B also sends signaling requests to A,
then B also subscribes to A. In the example topology of Figure 1,
assuming all signaling relationship is bi-directional, each proxy
will need to subscribe to all its neighbors. That is, EPa1
subscribes to CPa1; CPa1 subscribes to EPa1, EPa2, CPa2 and CPb1, so
on and so forth. Notifications are always sent to all subscribing
entities.
To begin load filter distribution on a network when the appropriate
subscriptions among the SIP entities are ready, the initial filter
contents are introduced to a SIP entity which acts as the network
entry point for load filtering control. The filter is then
propagated to other SIP entities throughout the network. The
following shows two examples.
Case I: EPa1 serves a TV program hotline and decides to limit the
total number of incoming calls to the hotline to prevent an overload.
To do so, EPa1 sends a notification to CPa1 with the specific hotline
number, time of activation and total acceptable call rate. Depending
on the filter computation algorithm, CPa1 may allocate the received
total acceptable rate among its neighbors, namely, EPa2, CPa2, and
CPb1 and notify them about the resulting allocation along with the
hotline number and the activation time. CPa2 and CPb1 may perform
further allocation among their own neighbors and notify the
corresponding servers. This process continues until all edge proxies
in the network have been informed about the event and have proper
load filter configured.
Case II: an earthquake affects the region covered by CPb2, EPb3 and
EPb4. All the three servers are overloaded. The rescue team
determines that outbound calls are more valuable than inbound calls
in this specific situation. Therefore, EPb3 and EPb4 are configured
with filters to accept more outbound calls than inbound calls. CPb2
may be configured the same way or receive dynamic filters from EPb3
and EPb4. Depending on the filter computation algorithm, CPb2 may
also send out notifications to its outside neighbors, namely CPb1 and
CPa2, specifying a limit on the acceptable rate of inbound calls to
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CPb2's responsible domain. CPb1 and CPa2 may subsequently notify
their neighbors about limiting the calls to CPb2's area. The same
process could continue until all edge proxy servers are notified and
have filters configured.
The network entry point for load filtering control in the above two
cases is the SIP server to be protected. In other cases, the
filtering entry point could also be an entity that the protected SIP
server is connected to. For example, an operator may host an
application server that performs 800 number translation services.
The application server may itself be a SIP proxy or a SIP Back-to-
Back User Agent (B2BUA). If one of the 800 numbers hosted at the
application server creates the overload condition, the load filtering
control can be introduced from the application server and then
propogated to other SIP proxy servers in the network.
Note that this document does not define the provisioning interface
between the load control policy maker and the policy entry point in
the network. One of the possible solutions for the provisioning
interface is the Extensible Markup Language (XML) Configuration
Access Protocol (XCAP) [RFC4825].
4.4. Applicability in Different Network Environments
Load filtering control is more effective when the filters can be
pushed to the proximity of signaling sources. But even if only part
of the signaling path towards the signaling source could be covered,
use of this mechanism can still be beneficial. In fact, due to
possibly sophisticated call routing and security concerns, trying to
apply automated load filter distribution in the entire inter-domain
network path could get extremely complicated and be unrealistic.
The scenarios where this mechanism could be most useful are
environments consisting of servers with secure and trust relationship
and with relatively straightforward routing configuration known to
the filter computation decision maker. These scenarios may include
intra-domain environments such as those inside a service provider or
enterprise domain; inter-domain environments such as where enterprise
connecting to a few service providers or between service providers
with manageable routing configurations.
Another important aspect that affects the applicability of the load
filtering control is that all possible signaling source neighbors
need to participate and enforce the designated filter. Otherwise, a
single non-conforming neighbor could make the whole control efforts
useless by pumping in excessive traffic to overload the server.
Therefore, the SIP server that initiates the filter needs to take
counter-measures towards any non-conforming neighbors. A simple
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policy is to reject excessive requests with 500 responses as if they
were obeying the rate. Considering the rejection costs, a more
complicated but fairer policy would be to allocate at the overloaded
server the same amount of processing to the combination of both
normal processing and rejection as the overloaded server would devote
to processing requests for a conforming upstream SIP server. These
approaches work as long as the total rejection cost does not
overwhelm the entire server resources. In addition, whatever the
actual policy is, SIP servers SHOULD honor the Resource-Priority
Header (RPH) [RFC4412] when processing messages. The RPH contents
may indicate high priority requests that should be preserved as much
as possible, or low priority requests that could be dropped during
overload. The request rejection and message prioritization at an
overloaded server are also discussed in Section 5.1 of
[I-D.ietf-soc-overload-control] and Section 12 of
[I-D.ietf-soc-overload-design].
5. Load Control Event Package
This section defines the details of the SIP event package for load
control according to [RFC3265].
5.1. Event Package Name
The name of this event package is "load-control". This name is
carried in the Event and Allow-Events header, as specified in
[RFC3265].
5.2. Event Package Parameters
No package specific event header field parameters are defined for
this event package.
5.3. SUBSCRIBE Bodies
A SUBSCRIBE request for load control policy MAY contain a body to
filter the requested load control notification. For example, a
subscriber may be interested in some specific types of load control
information only. The details of the subscription filter
specification are not yet defined.
A SUBSCRIBE request sent without a body implies the default
subscription behavior as specified in Section 5.7.
5.4. SUBSCRIBE Duration
The default expiration time for a subscription to load control policy
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is one hour. Since the desired expiration time may vary
significantly for subscriptions among SIP entities with different
signaling relationships, the subscribers and notifiers are
RECOMMENDED to explicitly negotiate appropriate subscription
durations when knowledge about the mutual signaling relationship is
available.
5.5. NOTIFY Bodies
The body of a NOTIFY message in this event package contains policy
information regarding load control. As specified in [RFC3265], the
format of the NOTIFY body MUST be in one of the formats defined in
the Accept header field of the SUBSCRIBE request or be the default
format. The default data format for the NOTIFY body of this event
package is "application/load-control+xml" (defined in Section 6).
This means that if no Accept header field is specified to a SUBSCRIBE
request, the NOTIFY will contain a body in the "application/
load-control+xml" format. If the Accept header field is present, it
MUST include "application/load-control+xml" and MAY include any other
types.
5.6. Notifier Processing of SUBSCRIBE Requests
The effectiveness of load filtering control relies on the scope of
distribution and installation of the control policies in the network.
Since wide distribution of the policy information is desirable, SIP
entity subscribers SHOULD try to subscribe to all those SIP entity
notifiers with which they have regular signaling exchanges, although
not all such SIP notifiers may permit such a subscription.
If the identity of the entity sending the SUBSCRIBE message is not
allowed to receive overload control information, the notifier MUST
return a 403 "Forbidden" response.
If none of MIME types specified in the Accept header of the SUBSCRIBE
is supported, the Notifier SHOULD return 406 "Not Acceptable"
response.
5.7. Notifier Generation of NOTIFY Requests
Following the [RFC3265] specification, a notifier MUST send a NOTIFY
with its current load control policy to the subscriber upon
successfully accepting or refreshing a subscription. The NOTIFY
request MAY include a body. If no applicable restriction is active
when the subscription request is received, an empty document is
attached to the NOTIFY request. A notifier SHOULD generate NOTIFY
requests each time the load control policy changes, with the maximum
notification rate not exceeding values defined in Section 5.10.
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This event package does not support notifications that contain deltas
to previous information or partial information.
5.8. Subscriber Processing of NOTIFY Requests
The way subscribers process NOTIFY requests depends on the contents
of the notifications. Typically, a load control notification
consists of rules that should be applied to requests matching certain
identities. A SIP entity subscriber receiving the notification first
installs these rules and then filter incoming requests to enforce
actions on appropriate requests, for example, limiting the sending
rate of call requests destined for a specific SIP entity.
In the case when load control rules specify a future validity time,
it is possible that when the validity time comes, the subscription to
the specific notifier that conveyed the rules has expired. In this
case, it is RECOMMENDED that the subscriber re-activate its
subscription with the corresponding notifier. Regardless of whether
this re-activation of subscription is successful or not, when the
validity time is reached, the subscriber SHOULD enforce the
corresponding rules.
Upon receipt of a NOTIFY request with a Subscription-State header
field containing the value "terminated", the subscriber MUST remove
all previously received load control information and process all
calls without applying any restriction.
The subscriber SHALL discard unknown bodies. If the NOTIFY request
contains several bodies, none of them being supported, it SHOULD
unsubscribe. A NOTIFY request that does not contain a body MUST be
ignored.
5.9. Handling of Forked Requests
Forking is not applicable when the load control event package is used
within a single-hop distance between neighboring SIP entities. If
the communication scope of the load-control event package is among
multiple hops, forking is not expected to happen either because the
subscription request is addressed to a clearly defined SIP entity.
However, in the unlikely case when forking does happen, the load-
control event package only allows the first potential dialog-
establishing message to create a dialog, as specified in Section
4.4.9 of [RFC3265].
5.10. Rate of Notifications
Rate of notifications is likely not a concern for this event package
when it is used in a non-real-time mode for relatively static load
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control policies. Nevertheless, if situation does arise that a
rather frequent load control policy update is needed, it is
RECOMMENDED that the notifier does not generate notifications at a
rate higher than once per-second in all cases, in order to avoid the
NOTIFY message itself overloading the system.
5.11. State Agents
The load control policy information can be directly generated by
concerned SIP entities distributed in the network. Alternatively,
qualified state agents external to the SIP entities MAY be defined to
take charge of load control policy making.
6. Load Control Document
6.1. Format
A load control document is an XML document that inherits and enhances
the common policy document defined in [RFC4745]. A common policy
document contains a set of rules. Each rule consists of three parts:
conditions, actions and transformations. The conditions part is a
set of expressions containing attributes such as identity, domain,
and validity time information. Each expression evaluates to TRUE or
FALSE. Conditions are matched on "equality" or "greater than" style
comparison. There is no regular expression matching. Conditions are
evaluated on receipt of an initial SIP request for a dialog or
standalone transaction. If a request matches all conditions in a
rule set, the action part and the transformation part are consulted
to determine the "permission" on how to handle the request. Each
action or transformation specifies a positive grant to the policy
server to perform the resulting actions. Well-defined mechanism are
available for combining actions and transformations obtained from
more than one sources.
6.2. Namespace
The namespace URI for elements defined by this specification is a
Uniform Resource Namespace (URN) ([RFC2141]), using the namespace
identifier 'ietf' defined by [RFC2648] and extended by [RFC3688].
The URN is as follows:
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:load-control
6.3. Conditions
[RFC4745] defines three condition elements: <identity>, <sphere> and
<validity>. In this document, we re-define an element for identity
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and reuse the <validity> element. The <sphere> element is not used.
6.3.1. Call Identity
Since the problem space of this document is different from that of
[RFC4745], the [RFC4745] <identity> element is not sufficient for use
with load control. First, load control may be applied to different
identity information contained in a request, including identities of
both the receiving entity and the sending entity. Second, the
importance of authentication varies when different identities of a
request are concerned. This document defines new identity conditions
that can accommodate the granularity of specific SIP identity header
fields. Requirement for authentication depends on which field is to
be matched.
The identity condition for load control is specified by the <call-
identity> element and its sub-element <sip>. The <sip> element
itself contains sub-elements representing SIP sending and receiving
identity header fields: <from>, <to>, <request-uri> and <p-asserted-
identity>, each is of the same type as the <identity> element in
[RFC4745]. Therefore, they also inherit the sub-elements of the
<identity> element, including <one>, <except>, and <many>.
The [RFC4745] <one> and <except> elements may contain an "id"
attribute, which is the URI of a single entity to be included or
excluded in the condition. When used in the <from>, <to>, <request-
uri> and <p-asserted-identity> elements, this "id" value is the URI
contained in the corresponding SIP header field, i.e., From, To,
Request-URI, and P-Asserted-Identity.
When the <call-identity> element contains multiple <sip> sub-
elements, the result is combined using logical OR. When the <from>,
<to>, <request-uri> and <p-asserted-identity> elements contain
multiple <one>, <except>, or <many> sub-elements, the result is also
combined using logical OR, similar to that of the <identity> element
in [RFC4745]. However, when the <sip> element contains multiple of
the <from>, <to>, <request-uri> and <p-asserted-identity> sub-
elements, the result is combined using logical AND. This allows the
call identity to be specified by multiple fields of a SIP request
simultaneously, e.g., both the From and the To header fields.
The following shows an example of the <call-identity> element.
<call-identity>
<sip>
<to>
<one id="sip:alice@hotline.example.com"/>
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<one id="tel:+1-212-555-1234"/>
</to>
</sip>
</call-identity>
This example matches call requests whose To header field contains the
SIP URI "sip:alice@hotline.example.com", or the 'tel' URI
"tel:+1-212-555-1234".
The [RFC4745] <many> and <except> elements may take a "domain"
attribute. The "domain" attribute specifies a domain name to be
matched by the domain part of the candidate identity. Thus, it
allows matching a large and possibly unknown number of entities
within a domain. The "domain" attribute works well for SIP URIs.
A URI identifying a SIP user, however, can also be a 'tel' URI. We
therefore need a similar way to match a group of 'tel' URIs.
According to [RFC3966], there are two formats of 'tel' URIs: global
format and local format. All phone numbers must be expressed in the
global format when possible. The global format 'tel' URIs start with
a "+". The rest of the phone numbers are expressed in a local
format, which must be qualified by a "phone-context" parameter. The
"phone-context" parameter may be labelled as a global number or any
number of its leading digits, or a domain name. Both formats of the
'tel' URI make the resulting URI globally unique.
'Tel' URIs of global format can be grouped by prefixes consisting of
any number of common leading digits. For example, a prefix formed by
a country code or both the country and area code identifies telephone
numbers within a country or an area. Since the length of the country
and area code for different regions are different, the length of the
number prefix is also variable. This allows further flexibility such
as grouping the numbers into sub-areas within the same area code.
'Tel' URIs of local-number format can be grouped by the value of the
"phone-context" parameter.
To include the two formats of 'tel' URI grouping in the <many> and
<except> elements, one approach is to add a new attribute similar to
the "domain" attribute. In this document, we decided on a simpler
approach. There are basically two forms of grouping attribute values
for both SIP URIs and 'tel' URIs: domain name or number prefix
starting with "+". Both of them can be expressed as strings.
Therefore, we re-interpret the existing "domain" attribute of the
<many> and <except> elements to allow it to contain both forms of
grouping attribute values. In particular, when the "domain"
attribute value starts with "+", it denotes a number prefix,
otherwise, the value denotes a domain name. Note that the tradeoff
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of this simpler approach is the overlapping in matching different
types of URIs. Specifically, a domain name in the "domain" attribute
could be matched by both a SIP URI with that domain name and a local
format 'tel' URI containing the same domain name in the "phone-
context". On the other hand, a number prefix in the "domain"
attribute could be matched by both global 'tel' URIs starting with
those leading digits, and local 'tel' URIs having the same prefix in
the "phone-context" parameter. These overlapping situations would
not be a big problem because of two reasons. First, when the "phone-
context" coincides with the SIP domain name or the global number
prefix, it is usually the case that the related phone numbers indeed
belong to the same domain or the same area, which means the
overlapping is not inappropriate. Second, the use of the local
format 'tel' URI in practice is expected to be rare. As a result,
the chance of such overlapping happening is very small.
The following example shows the use of the re-interpreted "domain"
attribute.
<call-identity>
<sip>
<from>
<many>
<except domain="+1-212"/>
<except domain="manhattan.example.com"/>
</many>
</from>
<to>
<one id="tel:+1-202-999-1234"/>
</to>
</sip>
</call-identity>
This example matches those requests calling to the number "+1-202-
999-1234" but are not calling from a "+1-212" prefix or a SIP From
URI domain of "manhattan.example.com".
6.3.2. Validity
A rule is usually associated with a validity period condition. This
document reuses the <validity> element of [RFC4745], which specifies
a period of validity time by pairs of <from> and <until> sub-
elements. When multiple time periods are defined, the validity
condition is evaluated to TRUE if the current time falls into any of
the specified time periods. i.e., it represents a logical OR
operation across all validity time periods.
The following example shows a <validity> element specifying a valid
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period from 12:00 to 15:00 US Eastern Standard Time on 2008-05-31.
<validity>
<from>2008-05-31T12:00:00-05:00</from>
<until>2008-05-31T15:00:00-05:00</until>
</validity>
6.3.3. Method
The load created on a SIP server depends on the type of an initial
SIP request for a dialog or standalone transaction. The <method>
element specifies the SIP method to which a particular action
applies. When this element is not included, the rule actions are
applicable to all initial methods.
The following example shows the use of the <method> element.
<method>INVITE</method>
6.4. Actions
As [RFC4745] specified, conditions form the 'if'-part of rules, while
actions and transformations form the 'then'-part. Transformations
are not used in the load control document. The actions for load
control are defined by the <accept> element, which takes any one of
the three sub-elements <rate>, <percent>, and <win>. The <rate>
element denotes an absolute value of the maximum acceptable request
rate in requests per second; the <percent> element specifies the
relative percentage of incoming requests that should be accepted; the
<win> element describes the acceptable window size supplied by the
receiver, which is applicable in window-based load control. In
static load filter configuration scenarios, using the <rate> sub-
element is RECOMMENDED because it is hard to enforce the percentage
rate or window-based control when the incoming load from upstream or
the reactions from downstream are uncertain. (See
[I-D.ietf-soc-overload-control] [I-D.ietf-soc-overload-design] for
more details on rate-based and window-based load control)
In addition, the <accept> element takes an optional "alt-action"
attribute which can be used to explicitly specify the desired action
in case a request cannot be accepted. The possible "alt-action"
values are "drop" for simple drop, "reject" for explicit rejection
(e.g., sending a "500 Server Internal Error" response message to an
INVITE request), and "forward". The default value is "reject" in
order to avoid possible SIP retransmissions when an unreliable
transport is used. If the "alt-action" value is "forward", an "alt-
target" attribute MUST be defined. The "alt-target" specifies a URI
where the request should be forwarded (e.g., an answering machine
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with explanation of why the request cannot be accepted).
In the following <actions> element example, the server accepts
maximum of 100 call requests per second. The remaining calls are
forwarded to an answering machine.
<actions>
<accept alt-action="forward" alt-target=
"sip:answer-machine@example.com">
<rate>100</rate>
</accept>
</actions>
6.5. Complete Examples
This section presents two complete examples of rule sets.
The first example assumes that a set of hotlines are set up at
"sip:alice@hotline.example.com" and "tel:+1-212-555-1234". The
hotlines are activated from 12:00 to 15:00 US Eastern Standard Time
on 2008-05-31. The goal is to limit the incoming calls to the
hotlines to 100 requests per second. Calls that exceed the rate
limit are explicitly rejected.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<ruleset xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"
xmlns:lc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:load-control">
<rule id="f3g44k1">
<conditions>
<lc:call-identity>
<lc:sip>
<lc:to>
<one id="sip:alice@hotline.example.com"/>
<one id="tel:+1-212-555-1234"/>
</lc:to>
</lc:sip>
</lc:call-identity>
<validity>
<from>2008-05-31T12:00:00-05:00</from>
<until>2008-05-31T15:00:00-05:00</until>
</validity>
</conditions>
<actions>
<lc:accept alt-action="reject">
<lc:rate>100</lc:rate>
</lc:accept>
</actions>
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</rule>
</ruleset>
The second example considers optimizing server resource usage of a
three-day period during the aftermath of an earthquake. Incoming
calls to the earthquake domain "pompeii.example.com" will be limited
to a rate of 100 requests per second, except for those calls
originating from a particular rescue team domain
"rescue.example.com". Outgoing calls from the earthquake domain or
calls within the local domain are never limited. All calls that are
throttled due to the rate limit will be forwarded to an answering
machine with updated earthquake rescue information.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<ruleset xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"
xmlns:lc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:load-control">
<rule id="f3g44k2">
<conditions>
<lc:call-identity>
<lc:sip>
<lc:to>
<many domain="pompeii.example.com"/>
</lc:to>
<lc:from>
<many>
<except domain="pompeii.example.com"/>
<except domain="rescue.example.com"/>
</many>
</lc:from>
</lc:sip>
</lc:call-identity>
<validity>
<from>79-08-24T09:00:00+01:00</from>
<until>79-08-27T09:00:00+01:00</until>
</validity>
</conditions>
<actions>
<lc:accept alt-action="forward" alt-target=
"sip:earthquake@update.example.com">
<lc:rate>100</lc:rate>
</lc:accept>
</actions>
</rule>
<ruleset>
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7. XML Schema Definition for Load Control
This section defines the XML schema for the load-control document.
It extends the Common Policy schema in [RFC4745] by defining new
members of the <conditions> and <action> elements.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:load-control"
xmlns:lc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:load-control"
xmlns:cp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
elementFormDefault="qualified"
attributedFormDefault="unqualified">
<xs:import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"/>
<!-- CONDITIONS -->
<!-- CALL IDENTITY -->
<xs:element name="call-identity" type="lc:call-type"/>
<xs:element name="method" type="lc:method-type"/>
<!-- CALL TYPE -->
<xs:complexType name="call-type">
<xs:choice>
<xs:element name="sip" type="lc:sip-id-type"/>
<any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:choice>
<anyAtrribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/>
</xs:complexType>
<!-- SIP ID TYPE -->
<xs:complexType name="sip-id-type">
<xs:sequence>
<element name="from" type="cp:identityType" minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="to" type="cp:identityType" minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="request-uri" type="cp:identityType" minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="p-asserted-identity" type="cp:identityType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<anyAtrribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/>
</xs:complexType>
<!-- Action -->
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<xs:element name="accept">
<xs:choice>
<element name="rate" type="xs:decimal" minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="win" type="xs:integer" minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="percent" type="xs:decimal" minOccurs="0"/>
<any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:choice>
<xs:attribute name="alt-action" type="xs:string" default="reject"/>
<xs:attribute name="alt-target" type="xs:anyURI"/>
<anyAtrribute namespace="##other" processContents="lax"/>
</xs:element>
<!-- METHOD TYPE -->
<xs:simpleType name="method-type">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="INVITE"/>
<xs:enumeration value="MESSAGE"/>
<xs:enumeration value="REGISTER"/>
<xs:enumeration value="SUBSCRIBE"/>
<xs:enumeration value="OPTIONS"/>
<xs:enumeration value="PUBLISH"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>
8. Related Work
8.1. Relationship with Load Filtering in PSTN
It is known that the existing PSTN network also uses a load filtering
mechanism to prevent overload and the filter configuration is done
manually. This document defines the SIP event framework based
distribution mechanism which allows automated filter distribution in
suitable environments.
There are control messages associated with PSTN overload control
which would specify an outgoing control list, call gap duration and
control duration [AINGR]. These items could be roughly correlated to
the identity, action and the time fields in the SIP load filter
content definition in this document. However, the filter defined in
this document is much more generic and flexible as opposed to its
PSTN counterpart.
Firstly, PSTN filtering only applies to telephone numbers, and the
number of prefix to be matched for a group of telephone numbers is
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usually a fixed set. The SIP filter identity allows both SIP URI and
telephone numbers (through Tel URI) to be specified. The identities
can be arbitrary grouped by SIP domains or any number of leading
prefix of the telephone number.
Secondly, the PSTN filtering action is usually limited to call
gapping with a fixed set of allowed gapping intervals. The action
field in the SIP load filter allows more flexible rate throttle and
other possibilities.
Thirdly, the duration field in PSTN filtering specifies a value in
seconds for the control duration only and the allowed values are
mapped into a value set. The time field in the SIP load filter may
specify not only a duration, but also a future activation time which
could be especially useful for automating overload control for
predictable overloads.
PSTN filtering can be performed in both edge switches and transit
switches; SIP filtering can also be applied in both edge proxies and
core proxies, and even in capable user agents.
PSTN overload control also has special accommodation for High
Probability of Completion (HPC) calls, which would be similar to the
calls designated by the SIP Resource Priority Headers [RFC4412]. SIP
filtering mechanism can also prioritize the treatment of these calls
by specifying favorable actions for these calls.
PSTN filtering also provides administrative option for routing failed
call attempts to either Reorder Tone or a special announcement.
Similar capability can be provided in the SIP filtering mechanism by
specifying the appropriate "alt-action" attribute in the SIP
filtering action field.
8.2. Relationship with Other IETF SIP Load Control Efforts
The filter content definition in this document is based on identity,
action and time. The identity can range from a single specific user
to an arbitrary user aggregate, domains or areas. The user can be
identified by either the source or the destination. When the user is
identified by the source and a favorable action is specified, the
result is to some extent similar to identifying a priority user based
on authorized Resource Priority Headers [RFC4412] in the requests.
Specifying a source user identity with an unfavorable action would
cause an effect to some extent similar to an inverse SIP resource
priority mechanism.
The filter content defined in this document is generic and is
expected to be applicable not only to the load filtering control
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mechanism but also to the feedback overload control mechanism in
[I-D.ietf-soc-overload-control]. In particular, both of them could
use specific or wildcard filter identities for load control and could
share well-known load control actions. The time duration field in
the filter content could also be used in both mechanisms. As
mentioned in Section 1, the load filter distribution mechanism and
the feedback overload control mechanism address complementary areas
in the load control problem space. Load filtering is more proactive
and focuses on distributing the filter towards the source of the
traffic; the hop-by-hop feedback based approach is reactive and
targets more at traffic already accepted in the network. Therefore,
they could also make different use of the generic filter components.
For example, the load filtering mechanism may use the time field in
the filter to specify not only a control duration but also a future
activation time to accommodate a predicable overload such as one
caused by Mother's Day or a viewer-voting program; the feedback-based
control might not need to use the time field or might use the time
field to specify an immediate control duration.
9. Discussion of this document meeting the requirements of RFC5390
This section evaluates whether the load filtering control event
package mechanism defined in this document satisfies the various SIP
overload control requirements set forth by RFC5390 [RFC5390]. Not
all the RFC5390 requirements are found applicable due to the scope
limit of this document. Therefore, we categorize the assessment
results into Yes (meet the requirement), P/A (partially applicable),
No (must be used in conjunction with another mechanism to meet the
requirement), and N/A (not applicable).
REQ 1: The overload mechanism shall strive to maintain the overall
useful throughput (taking into consideration the quality-of-
service needs of the using applications) of a SIP server at
reasonable levels, even when the incoming load on the network is
far in excess of its capacity. The overall throughput under load
is the ultimate measure of the value of an overload control
mechanism.
P/A. The goal of the load filtering control is to prevent overload or
maintain overall goodput during the time of overload, but it is
dependent on the advance predictions of the load. If the predictions
are incorrect, in either direction, the mechanism will throttle too
much or too little.
REQ 2: When a single network element fails, goes into overload, or
suffers from reduced processing capacity, the mechanism should
strive to limit the impact of this on other elements in the
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network. This helps to prevent a small-scale failure from
becoming a widespread outage.
N/A if filter values are installed in advance and do not change
during the potential overload period. P/A if filter values are
dynamically adjusted due to the specific filter computation
algorithm. The dynamic filter computation algorithm is outside the
scope of this document, while the distribution of the updated filters
uses the event package mechanism of this document.
REQ 3: The mechanism should seek to minimize the amount of
configuration required in order to work. For example, it is
better to avoid needing to configure a server with its SIP message
throughput, as these kinds of quantities are hard to determine.
No. This mechanism is entirely dependent on advance configuration,
based on advance knowledge. In order to satisfy Req 3, it should be
used in conjunction with other mechanisms which are not based on
advance configuration.
REQ 4: The mechanism must be capable of dealing with elements that
do not support it, so that a network can consist of a mix of
elements that do and don't support it. In other words, the
mechanism should not work only in environments where all elements
support it. It is reasonable to assume that it works better in
such environments, of course. Ideally, there should be
incremental improvements in overall network throughput as
increasing numbers of elements in the network support the
mechanism.
No. This mechanism is entirely dependent on the participation of all
possible neighbors. In order to satisfy Req 4, it should be used in
conjunction with other mechanisms, some of which are described in
Section 4.4.
REQ 5: The mechanism should not assume that it will only be
deployed in environments with completely trusted elements. It
should seek to operate as effectively as possible in environments
where other elements are malicious; this includes preventing
malicious elements from obtaining more than a fair share of
service.
No. This mechanism is entirely dependent on the non-malicious
participation of all possible neighbors. In order to satisfy Req 5,
it should be used in conjunction with other mechanisms, some of which
are described in Section 4.4.
REQ 6: When overload is signaled by means of a specific message,
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the message must clearly indicate that it is being sent because of
overload, as opposed to other, non overload-based failure
conditions. This requirement is meant to avoid some of the
problems that have arisen from the reuse of the 503 response code
for multiple purposes. Of course, overload is also signaled by
lack of response to requests. This requirement applies only to
explicit overload signals.
N/A. This mechanism signals anticipated overload, not actual
overload. However the signals in this mechanism are not used for any
other purpose.
REQ 7: The mechanism shall provide a way for an element to
throttle the amount of traffic it receives from an upstream
element. This throttling shall be graded so that it is not all-
or-nothing as with the current 503 mechanism. This recognizes the
fact that "overload" is not a binary state and that there are
degrees of overload.
Yes. This event package allows rate/loss/windows-based overload
control options as discussed in Section 6.4.
REQ 8: The mechanism shall ensure that, when a request was not
processed successfully due to overload (or failure) of a
downstream element, the request will not be retried on another
element that is also overloaded or whose status is unknown. This
requirement derives from REQ 1.
N/A to the load control event package itself.
REQ 9: That a request has been rejected from an overloaded element
shall not unduly restrict the ability of that request to be
submitted to and processed by an element that is not overloaded.
This requirement derives from REQ 1.
Yes. For example, the filter format [Section 4.1] allows the
inclusion of alternative forwarding destinations for rejected
requests.
REQ 10: The mechanism should support servers that receive requests
from a large number of different upstream elements, where the set
of upstream elements is not enumerable.
No. Because this mechanism requires advance configuration of
specific identified neighbors, it does not support environments where
the number and identity of the upstream neighbors are not known in
advance. In order to satisfy Req 10, it should be used in
conjunction with other mechanisms.
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REQ 11: The mechanism should support servers that receive requests
from a finite set of upstream elements, where the set of upstream
elements is enumerable.
Yes. See also answer to REQ 10.
REQ 12: The mechanism should work between servers in different
domains.
Yes. The load control event package is not limited by domain
boundaries.
REQ 13: The mechanism must not dictate a specific algorithm for
prioritizing the processing of work within a proxy during times of
overload. It must permit a proxy to prioritize requests based on
any local policy, so that certain ones (such as a call for
emergency services or a call with a specific value of the
Resource-Priority header field [RFC4412]) are given preferential
treatment, such as not being dropped, being given additional
retransmission, or being processed ahead of others.
P/A. This mechanism does not specifically address the prioritizing of
work during times of overload. But it does not preclude any
particular local policy.
REQ 14: The mechanism should provide unambiguous directions to
clients on when they should retry a request and when they should
not. This especially applies to TCP connection establishment and
SIP registrations, in order to mitigate against avalanche restart.
N/A to the load control event package itself.
REQ 15: In cases where a network element fails, is so overloaded
that it cannot process messages, or cannot communicate due to a
network failure or network partition, it will not be able to
provide explicit indications of the nature of the failure or its
levels of congestion. The mechanism must properly function in
these cases.
P/A. Because the filters are provisioned in advance, they are not
affected by the overload or failure of other nodes. But, on the
other hand, they may not, in those cases, be able to protect the
overloaded node (see Req 1).
REQ 16: The mechanism should attempt to minimize the overhead of
the overload control messaging.
Yes. The standardized SIP event package mechanism RFC3265 [RFC3265]
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is used.
REQ 17: The overload mechanism must not provide an avenue for
malicious attack, including DoS and DDoS attacks.
P/A. This mechanism does provide a potential avenue for malicious
attacks. Therefore the security mechanisms for SIP event packages in
general [RFC3265] and of section 10 of this document SHOULD be used.
REQ 18: The overload mechanism should be unambiguous about whether
a load indication applies to a specific IP address, host, or URI,
so that an upstream element can determine the load of the entity
to which a request is to be sent.
Yes. The identity of load indication is covered in the filter format
definition in Section 4.1.
REQ 19: The specification for the overload mechanism should give
guidance on which message types might be desirable to process over
others during times of overload, based on SIP-specific
considerations. For example, it may be more beneficial to process
a SUBSCRIBE refresh with Expires of zero than a SUBSCRIBE refresh
with a non-zero expiration (since the former reduces the overall
amount of load on the element), or to process re-INVITEs over new
INVITEs.
N/A to the load control event package itself.
REQ 20: In a mixed environment of elements that do and do not
implement the overload mechanism, no disproportionate benefit
shall accrue to the users or operators of the elements that do not
implement the mechanism.
No. This mechanism is entirely dependent on the participation of all
possible neighbors. In order to satisfy Req 20, it should be used in
conjunction with other mechanisms, some of which are described in
Section 4.4.
REQ 21: The overload mechanism should ensure that the system
remains stable. When the offered load drops from above the
overall capacity of the network to below the overall capacity, the
throughput should stabilize and become equal to the offered load.
N/A to the load control event package itself.
REQ 22: It must be possible to disable the reporting of load
information towards upstream targets based on the identity of
those targets. This allows a domain administrator who considers
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the load of their elements to be sensitive information, to
restrict access to that information. Of course, in such cases,
there is no expectation that the overload mechanism itself will
help prevent overload from that upstream target.
N/A to the load control event package itself.
REQ 23: It must be possible for the overload mechanism to work in
cases where there is a load balancer in front of a farm of
proxies.
Yes. The load control event package does not preclude its use in a
scenario with server farms.
10. Security Considerations
Two aspects of security considerations arise from this document. One
is the SIP event framework based filter distribution mechanism, the
other is the filter enforcement mechanism.
Security considerations for SIP event framework based mechanisms are
covered in Section 5 of [RFC3265]. A particularly relevant aspect
for notification control is that, in order to prevent the load
control notification being used to launch denial of service attacks,
all load control notification MUST be authenticated and authorized
before being accepted. Standard authentication and authorization
mechanisms recommended in [RFC3261] such as TLS [RFC5246] and IPSec
[RFC4301] may serve this purpose.
Security considerations for filter enforcements vary depending on the
filter contents. This document defines possible filter match of the
following SIP header fields: <from>, <to>, <request-uri> and
<p-asserted-identity>. The exact requirement to authenticate and
authorize these fields is up to the service provider. In general, if
the identity field represents the source of the request, it SHOULD be
authenticated and authorized; if the identity field represents the
destination of the request the authentication and authorization is
optional.
11. IANA Considerations
This specification registers a SIP event package, a new MIME type, a
new XML namespace, and a new XML schema.
11.1. Load Control Event Package Registration
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This section registers an event package based on the registration
procedures defined in [RFC3265].
Package name: load-control
Type: package
Published specification: This document
Person to contact: Charles Shen, charles@cs.columbia.edu
11.2. application/load-control+xml MIME Registration
This section registers a new MIME type based on the procedures
defined in [RFC4288] and guidelines in [RFC3023].
MIME media type name: application
MIME subtype name: load-control+xml
Mandatory parameters: none
Optional parameters: Same as charset parameter application/xml in
[RFC3023]
Encoding considerations: Same as encoding considerations of
application/xml in [RFC3023]
Security considerations: See Section 10 of [RFC3023] and Section 10
of this specification
Interpretability considerations: None
Published Specification: This document
Applications which use this media type: load control of SIP entities
Additional information:
Magic number: None
File extension: .xml
Macintosh file type code: 'TEXT'
Personal and email address for further information:
Charles Shen, charles@cs.columbia.edu
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Intended usage: COMMON
Author/Change Controller: IETF SIPPING Working Group
<sippping@ietf.org>, as designated by the IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
11.3. Load Control Schema Registration
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:load-control
Registrant Contact: IETF SIPPING working group, Charles Shen
(charles@cs.columbia.edu).
XML: the XML schema to be registered is contained in Section 7.
Its first line is
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
and its last line is
</xs:schema>
12. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Bruno Chatras, Janet Gunn, Vijay
Gurbani, Volker Hilt, Geoff Hunt, Timothy Moran, Eric Noel,
Parthasarathi R, Keith Drage, Salvatore Loreto and other members of
the SIPPING and SIP-OVERLOAD working group for helpful comments.
Bruno Chatras proposed a number of text improvements, including
adding the <method> condition element. Janet Gunn provided detailed
text suggestions for Section 9.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2141] Moats, R., "URN Syntax", RFC 2141, May 1997.
[RFC2648] Moats, R., "A URN Namespace for IETF Documents", RFC 2648,
August 1999.
[RFC3023] Murata, M., St. Laurent, S., and D. Kohn, "XML Media
Types", RFC 3023, January 2001.
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[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
June 2002.
[RFC3265] Roach, A., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-Specific
Event Notification", RFC 3265, June 2002.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004.
[RFC3966] Schulzrinne, H., "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers",
RFC 3966, December 2004.
[RFC4288] Freed, N. and J. Klensin, "Media Type Specifications and
Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 4288, December 2005.
[RFC4745] Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J.,
Polk, J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document
Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745,
February 2007.
13.2. Informative References
[AINGR] Bell Communications Research, "AINGR: Service Control
Point (SCP) Network Traffic Management", GR-2938-CORE ,
December 1996.
[I-D.ietf-soc-overload-control]
Gurbani, V., Hilt, V., and H. Schulzrinne, "Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) Overload Control",
draft-ietf-soc-overload-control-00 (work in progress),
November 2010.
[I-D.ietf-soc-overload-design]
Hilt, V., Noel, E., Shen, C., and A. Abdelal, "Design
Considerations for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
Overload Control", draft-ietf-soc-overload-design-04 (work
in progress), December 2010.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC4412] Schulzrinne, H. and J. Polk, "Communications Resource
Priority for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
RFC 4412, February 2006.
[RFC4825] Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
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Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)", RFC 4825, May 2007.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5390] Rosenberg, J., "Requirements for Management of Overload in
the Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 5390, December 2008.
Authors' Addresses
Charles Shen
Columbia University
Department of Computer Science
1214 Amsterdam Avenue, MC 0401
New York, NY 10027
USA
Phone: +1 212 854 3109
Email: charles@cs.columbia.edu
Henning Schulzrinne
Columbia University
Department of Computer Science
1214 Amsterdam Avenue, MC 0401
New York, NY 10027
USA
Phone: +1 212 939 7004
Email: schulzrinne@cs.columbia.edu
Arata Koike
NTT Service Integration Labs &
NTT Washington DC Representative Office
1100 13th St., NW, Suite 900
Washington DC, 20005
USA
Phone: +1 202 312 1451
Email: koike.arata@lab.ntt.co.jp
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