Internet DRAFT - draft-sonoda-dnsop-accept-certificate

draft-sonoda-dnsop-accept-certificate







Domain Name System Operations                                Sonoda, Ed.
Internet-Draft                            Internet Initiative Japan Inc.
Intended status: Informational                              Mar 21, 2018
Expires: September 22, 2018


                  Accepting full resolver certificate
                draft-sonoda-dnsop-accept-certificate-00

Abstract

   Full service resolver uses x509 certificate to provide DNS over
   TLS[RFC7858] DNS over DTLS [RFC8094].  This memo describes How to
   accept this certificate.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.





Sonoda                 Expires September 22, 2018               [Page 1]

Internet-Draft              Abbreviated Title                   Mar 2018


1.  Method of using TLSA record - TLSA style

1.1.  full service resolver certificate

   The certificate common name can be decided freely.  Must add full
   service resolver ip addresses to Subject Alternative Name [RFC5280].
   Add TLSA record [RFC7218] of the certificate to full resolver service
   IP address reverse name.  Tha TLSA record MUST validate DNSSec.

1.2.  accepting full service resolver certificate

   Stub resolver begins the TLS handshake and receives Full resolver
   certificate.  If Full service resolver ip not include Subject
   Alternative Name, Stub resolver deny this certificate.  Stub resolver
   requests TLSA record of full resolver service IP address reverse name
   and validates the TLSA recedes itself using.  This process can use
   not safety Server.  If the TLSA recedes are not validate, Stub
   resolver deny this certificate.  If the TLSA recedes are secure and
   The TLSA recedes include recede of handshake certificate, Stub
   resolver can accept this certificate.

1.3.  Distribution and update root trust anchor

   Root trust anchor distribution and update SHOULD update by OS
   periodic update.

2.  Method of using TLS-PKI - HTTPS style

2.1.  full service resolver certificate

   The certificate common name can be decided freely.  Must add full
   service resolver ip addresses to Subject Alternative Name [RFC5280].

2.2.  accepting full service resolver certificate

   Stub resolver begins the TLS handshake and receives Full resolver
   certificate.  If Full service resolver ip not include Subject
   Alternative Name, Stub resolver deny this certificate.  The
   certificate is trusted by root certificate, Stub resolver can accept
   this certificate.

3.  Operational Considerations

   Case of DNSSec chains ot trust is break, TLSA style can't accept new
   certificate.






Sonoda                 Expires September 22, 2018               [Page 2]

Internet-Draft              Abbreviated Title                   Mar 2018


4.  Security Considerations

   Attack create certificate of full resolver service IP address reverse
   name, HTTPS style can MIM attack.

5.  Normative References

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC7218]  Gudmundsson, O., "Adding Acronyms to Simplify
              Conversations about DNS-Based Authentication of Named
              Entities (DANE)", RFC 7218, DOI 10.17487/RFC7218, April
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7218>.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC8094]  Reddy, T., Wing, D., and P. Patil, "DNS over Datagram
              Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 8094,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8094, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8094>.

Author's Address

   Manabu Sonoda (editor)
   Internet Initiative Japan Inc.

   Email: manabu-s@iij.ad.jp

















Sonoda                 Expires September 22, 2018               [Page 3]