Internet DRAFT - draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc

draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc







Network Working Group                                        J. Snijders
Internet-Draft                                                    Fastly
Intended status: Informational                         February 20, 2021
Expires: August 24, 2021


                         RPKI Signed Checklists
                  draft-spaghetti-sidrops-rpki-rsc-03

Abstract

   This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) profile
   for a general purpose listing of checksums (a 'checklist'), for use
   with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  The objective is
   to allow an attestation, in the form of a listing of one or more
   checksums of arbitrary digital objects (files), to be signed "with
   resources", and for validation to provide a means to confirm a
   specific Internet Resource Holder produced the signed checklist.  The
   profile is intended to provide for the signing of a checksum listing
   with an arbitrary set of Internet Number Resources.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 24, 2021.






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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  RSC Profile and Distribution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The RSC ContentType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  The RSC eContent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     4.1.  version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.3.  digestAlgorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.4.  checkList . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  RSC Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Implementation status - RFC EDITOR: REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION   6
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     9.1.  OID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     9.2.  File Extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     9.3.  Media Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652]
   profile for a general purpose listing of checksums (a 'checklist'),
   for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480].
   The objective is to allow an attestation, in the form of a listing of
   one or more checksums of arbitrary files, to be signed "with
   resources", and for validation to provide a means to confirm a given
   Internet Resource Holder produced the RPKI Signed Checklist (RSC).



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   The profile is intended to provide for the signing of a checksum
   listing with an arbitrary set of Internet Number Resources.

   RSC files are expected to facilitate Bring Your Own IP (BYOIP)
   authentication, inter-domain interconnection provisioning, and
   resource holdership verification processes.

   The RSC concept borrows heavily from RTA [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta],
   Manifests [RFC6486], and OpenBSD's [signify] utility.  The main
   difference between RSC and RTA is that an RTA enables multiple
   signers to attest a single anonymous digital object through a
   checksum of its content, while an RSC allows a single signer to
   attest the checksums of multiple named digital objects.  This
   difference is expected to represent a simplification for implementers
   and operators.

2.  RSC Profile and Distribution

   RSC follows the Signed Object Template for the RPKI [RFC6488] with
   one exception.  Because RSCs MUST NOT be distributed through the
   global RPKI repository system, the Subject Information Access (SIA)
   extension is omitted from the RSC's X.509 EE certificate.

   What constitutes suitable transport for RSC files is deliberately
   unspecified.  It might be a USB stick, a web interface secured with
   conventional HTTPS, PGP-signed email, a T-shirt printed with a QR
   code, or a carrier pigeon.

3.  The RSC ContentType

   The ContentType for an RSC is defined as rpkiSignedChecklist, and has
   the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD.

   This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the
   encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute
   in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).

4.  The RSC eContent

   The content of an RSC indicates that an a checklist for arbitrary
   named digital objects has been signed "with resources".  An RSC is
   formally defined as:

      RpkiSignedChecklist-2021
        { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
          pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) TBD }

      DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=



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      BEGIN

      IMPORTS
        CONTENT-TYPE, Digest, DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
        FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 -- in [RFC5911]
          { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
            pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) }

        ASIdOrRange, IPAddressFamily
        FROM IPAddrAndASCertExtn -- in [RFC3779]
          { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
            security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) mod(0)
            id-mod-ip-addr-and-as-ident(30) } ;

      ct-rpkiSignedChecklist CONTENT-TYPE ::=
          { TYPE RpkiSignedChecklist IDENTIFIED BY
            id-ct-signedChecklist }

      id-ct-signedChecklist OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
          { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
            pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) TBD }

      RpkiSignedChecklist ::= SEQUENCE {
        version  [0]          INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
        resources             ResourceBlock,
        digestAlgorithm       DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
        checkList             SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF FileAndHash }

      FileAndHash ::= SEQUENCE {
        file            IA5String OPTIONAL,
        hash            Digest }

      ResourceBlock ::= SEQUENCE {
          asID         [0]       AsList OPTIONAL,
          ipAddrBlocks [1]       IPList OPTIONAL }
          -- at least one of asID or ipAddrBlocks MUST be present
          ( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., asID PRESENT} |
            WITH COMPONENTS { ..., ipAddrBlocks PRESENT } )

      AsList ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASIdOrRange

      IPList ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF IPAddressFamily

      END







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4.1.  version

   The version number of the RpkiSignedChecklist MUST be 0.

4.2.  resources

   The resources contained here are the resources used to mark the
   attestation, and MUST match the set of resources listed by the EE
   certificate carried in the CMS certificates field.

4.3.  digestAlgorithm

   The digest algorithm used to create the message digest of the
   attested digital object.  This algorithm MUST be a hashing algorithm
   defined in [RFC7935].

4.4.  checkList

   This field is a sequence of FileAndHash objects.  There is one
   FileAndHash entry for each arbitrary object referenced from the RSC.
   Each FileAndHash is an ordered pair consisting an optional name of
   the file containing the object, and the message digest of the digital
   object.

5.  Operational Considerations

   When working with objects of a plain-text nature (ASCII, UTF-8, HTML,
   Javascript, XML, etc) it is RECOMMENDED to distribute such objects in
   a lossless compressed form, and sign the compressed form.  Wrapping
   plain-text objects in a compression envelope can help make those
   appear as a single octet string to any intermediate systems, which
   hopefully discourages in-transit modification of the file contents.
   The use of lossless compression can help avoid checksum verification
   errors.

6.  RSC Validation

   To validate an RSC the relying party MUST perform all the validation
   checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional
   RSC-specific validation steps.

   o  The message digest of each referenced digital object, using the
      digest algorithm specified in the the digestAlgorithm field, MUST
      be calculated and MUST match the value given in the messageDigest
      field of the associated FileAndHash.

   o  If a filename is present, the filename MUST NOT contain a '/'
      (slash) or '\' (backslash) character.



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7.  Security Considerations

   Relying parties are hereby warned that the data in a RPKI Signed
   Checklist is self-asserted.  These data have not been verified by the
   CA that issued the CA certificate to the entity that issued the EE
   certificate used to validate the Signed Checklist.

8.  Implementation status - RFC EDITOR: REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942.
   The description of implementations in this section is intended to
   assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
   RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
   here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort
   has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
   supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
   be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
   exist.

   According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
   to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
   running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
   and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
   It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
   they see fit".

   o  A signer and validator implementation [rpki-rsc-demo] based on
      perl and OpenSSL was provided by Tom Harrison from APNIC.

   o  A validator implementation based on OpenBSD's rpki-client is
      expected to be published after IANA Early Allocation of the OIDs.

9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  OID

   The IANA has registered the OID for the RPKI Signed Checklist in the
   registry created by [RFC6488] as follows:

      Name          OID                          Specification
      ---------------------------------------------------------
      Checklists    1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD  [RFC-TBD]






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9.2.  File Extension

   The IANA has added an item for the signed Checklist file extension to
   the "RPKI Repository Name Scheme" created by [RFC6481] as follows:

      Filename Extension  RPKI Object           Reference
      -----------------------------------------------------------
         .sig             Signed Checklist      [RFC-TBD]

9.3.  Media Type

   The IANA has registered the media type application/rpki-checklist as
   follows:

      Type name: application
      Subtype name: rpki-checklist
      Required parameters: None
      Optional parameters: None
      Encoding considerations: binary
      Security considerations: Carries an RPKI Signed Checklist
                               [RFC-TBD].
      Interoperability considerations: None
      Published specification: This document.
      Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators.
      Additional information:
        Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
            in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of
            checksums as defined above in this document.
        Magic number(s): None
        File extension(s): .sig
        Macintosh file type code(s):
      Person & email address to contact for further information:
        Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
      Intended usage: COMMON
      Restrictions on usage: None
      Author: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
      Change controller: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.





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   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.

   [RFC6486]  Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
              "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.

   [RFC6488]  Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
              Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.

   [RFC7935]  Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for
              Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public
              Key Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935,
              August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta]
              Michaelson, G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels, T.,
              and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged
              Attestations (RTAs)", draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta-00 (work
              in progress), January 2021.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

   [rpki-rsc-demo]
              Harrison, T., "A proof-of-concept for constructing and
              validating RPKI Signed Checklists (RSCs).", February 2021,
              <https://github.com/APNIC-net/rpki-rsc-demo>.

   [signify]  Unangst, T. and M. Espie, "signify - cryptographically
              sign and verify files", May 2014,
              <https://man.openbsd.org/signify>.



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Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   The author wishes to thank George Michaelson, Tom Harrison, Geoff
   Huston, Randy Bush, Stephen Kent, Matt Lepinski, Rob Austein, Ted
   Unangst, and Marc Espie for prior art.  The author thanks Russ
   Housley for reviewing the ASN.1 notation and providing suggestions.
   The author would like to thank Nimrod Levy, Tom Harrison, Ben
   Maddison, and Tim Bruijnzeels for document review and suggestions.

Author's Address

   Job Snijders
   Fastly
   Amsterdam
   Netherlands

   Email: job@fastly.com


































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