Internet DRAFT - draft-srivastava-sipping-loop-avoidance

draft-srivastava-sipping-loop-avoidance





SIPPING                                                    S. Srivastava
Internet-Draft                                           Nortel Networks
Expires: November 25, 2006                                  May 24, 2006


              Loop Avoidance Using Audits on Registration
               draft-srivastava-sipping-loop-avoidance-00

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2006.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

   This document proposes change in registration process of SIP for
   avoiding installation of looped bindings spread across more than one
   proxy.  This version of the document broadly outlines the solution.
   Exact details will be provided in the subsequent versions, as the
   solution progresses.







Srivastava              Expires November 25, 2006               [Page 1]

Internet-Draft               Loop Avoidance                     May 2006


Table of Contents

   1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Solution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     3.1.  Modified Call Flow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     3.2.  Audit Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
       3.2.1.  Querying Proxies For Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
       3.2.2.  Loop Detection using MAX-FORWARDS . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     3.3.  Action after loop detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     3.4.  Addition of Routes Administratively . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   4.  Backward Compatibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     8.2.  Informational References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements  . . . . . . . . . . 9































Srivastava              Expires November 25, 2006               [Page 2]

Internet-Draft               Loop Avoidance                     May 2006


1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].


2.  Problem Statement

   Looped bindings spread across more than one proxy with forking can
   generate enormous SIP traffic and eventually bring down the SIP
   network elements.  ID.ietf-sip-fork-loop-fix [7] provides the details
   about the problem scenario.


3.  Solution

   ID.campen-sipping-stack-loop-detect [8] fixes the problem by having a
   light weight loop detection algorithm instead of using via branch
   hash computation as specified in RFC 3261 [2].  As verification on
   the contacts is not performed, it goes further in negotiating the
   max-breadth as specified in ID.sparks-sipping-max-breadth [9] to
   contain the amplification.  This solution requires loop detection at
   all proxies for all transactions.

   Consent framework ID.sipping-consent-framework [10] doesn't deal with
   the loop detection using audit mechanism defined in this document.
   Consent framework enables to get the permission from the endpoint
   before adding the bindings.  An attacker can still install the looped
   bindings by deliberately giving the permissions.  It is better for
   the SIP network elements to check for looped bindings defensively.

   The proposed solution doesn't let the looped registrations to succeed
   itself.  It proposes to change the registration process as specified
   in RFC 3261 [2].

   When registrar receives a REGISTER message, it checks for the
   validity of contact.  It terminates the REGISTER transaction with
   "202 Accepted" response.  When it gets the result of the audit on the
   contact specified in REGISTER, it notifies the endpoint the success/
   failure of the REGISTER request using REG-EVENT package RFC3680 [3].
   Solution requires extending reg-event package for including result of
   audit.

   It is assumed that registrar takes care of checking the loops within
   itself before committing it to location database, i.e.  While adding
   binding A@abc -> B@abc, it searches the location database for B@abc
   and checks for loop.  This check can be performed before returning a



Srivastava              Expires November 25, 2006               [Page 3]

Internet-Draft               Loop Avoidance                     May 2006


   final response to REGISTER request.

   The use case of contacts spanning across multiple proxies is
   follow-me kind of services, where forwarding is installed using
   REGISTER.  There is no need to run the audit on the contact in case
   of
      A)Register Refresh Request
      B)UnRegister Request
      C)Register Request where Contact in request doesn't point to
      another proxy and AOR doesn't contain address of a physical device

   In the above cases registrar does the normal processing as specified
   in RFC 3261 [2]

3.1.  Modified Call Flow

     UA             Proxy (P1)                        Proxy for Contact
                                                      in REGISTER (P2)
      |                   |                                   |
      |-----REGISTER----->|                                   |
      |                   |                                   |
      |<---202 Accepted---|                                   |
      |                   |                                   |
      |<-NOTIFY (REG-EV)--|                                   |
      |                   |                                   |
      |--200 OK (NOTIFY)->|                                   |
      |                   |                                   |
      |                   |<--Audit on Contact in REGISTER--->|
      |                   |                                   |
      |<-NOTIFY (REG-EV)--|                                   |
      |                   |                                   |
      |--200 OK (NOTIFY)->|                                   |
      |                   |                                   |

          Figure 1 Call Flow With Modified Registration Process

   Above call flow is similar to REFER method processing as specified in
   RFC3515 [5].  REGISTER transaction is terminated with "202 Accepted"
   final response, as it gives ample time for auditing the contact.  It
   might be possible that audit process might consult multiple proxies
   (e.g.  AOR - Contact pair A->B , B->C ..... ).  Here no of proxies
   visited by default is 70 (MAX-FORWARDS default).  It can be some
   configurable value also.  The second NOTIFY in the above call flow
   will have the outcome of audit on the contact in REGISTER message.

   The other alternative solution is return 1xx response on receipt of
   REGISTER and then run the audit.  This causes un-desirable effect due
   to long Non-Invite-Transaction processing as specified in RFC4321 [6]



Srivastava              Expires November 25, 2006               [Page 4]

Internet-Draft               Loop Avoidance                     May 2006


3.2.  Audit Mechanism

   There are two possible mechanism for verifying the contacts in the
   REGISTER message.

3.2.1.  Querying Proxies For Bindings

   If querying capability for third party registration is allowed at the
   proxy (P2 in Figure 1) in contact header for the proxy in To header
   (P1 in Figure 1) in REGISTER request, then registering proxy (P1) can
   query proxy in contact header (P2) for the bindings.  Then
   Registering Proxy (P1) checks whether it is the target in binding
   obtained from retargeting proxy (P2) with the same user, then it
   treats as a loop.  If it is destined for another proxy then it
   queries that proxy and repeats the check.  In the chain of proxies, a
   proxy can ask other proxy to get the contacts on its behalf.  It
   assumes the transitive trust relationship, which may not be provided
   by service provider.

3.2.2.  Loop Detection using MAX-FORWARDS

   Proxy can use increasing MAX-FORWARDS values with OPTIONS message to
   find the loop from detailed information available in the 483 response
   as specified in ID.ietf-sip-hop-limit-diagnostics [4].

3.3.  Action after loop detection

   If there is no loop found, registrar sends the "success" in REG-EVENT
   NOTIFY, otherwise it sends the "failure" in REG-EVENT NOTIFY.

   If loop is found due to addition of binding, a Registrar can take one
   of the following actions for keeping the bindings
      A)keep the contact in the location database but Proxy doesn't use
      this for retargeting the further request unless loop is broken by
      one of the proxies in the loop chain.  If request comes to proxy
      for retargeting in the looped contact time window, it rejects the
      request with new error code "Loop Removal Needed".  Appropriate
      4xx code for this will be defined later.

      B)reject the registration request and doesn't keep the binding.
      Since these are looped bindings, it is difficult to decide which
      binding in the looped chain will be deleted later.  It is already
      the error case, so it is better to reject the latest registration
      which is causing the loop and let endpoints clean up its
      associated registrations.






Srivastava              Expires November 25, 2006               [Page 5]

Internet-Draft               Loop Avoidance                     May 2006


      OPEN ISSUE : Which option A) or B) should be chosen ?

3.4.  Addition of Routes Administratively

   When routes are added by administrator, it is expected from them to
   run the loop detection audits before committing the routes to
   location database.


4.  Backward Compatibility

   TBD


5.  Security Considerations

   TBD


6.  IANA Considerations

   TBD.


7.  Acknowledgments

   The author would like to thank Francois Audet and Meenakshi Kaushik
   for providing valuable feedback.  The author would like to thank
   Robert Sparks and Dale Worley for providing valuable comments on the
   mailing list while discussing the idea.


8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [1]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [2]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
        Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
        Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.

   [3]  Rosenberg, J., "A Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Event
        Package for Registrations", RFC 3680, March 2004.

   [4]  Lawrence, S., "Diagnostic Responses for SIP Hop Limit Errors",
        draft-ietf-sip-hop-limit-diagnostics-00 (work in progress),



Srivastava              Expires November 25, 2006               [Page 6]

Internet-Draft               Loop Avoidance                     May 2006


        February 2006.

8.2.  Informational References

   [5]   Sparks, R., "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Refer
         Method", RFC 3515, April 2003.

   [6]   Sparks, R., "Problems Identified Associated with the Session
         Initiation Protocol's (SIP) Non-INVITE Transaction", RFC 4321,
         January 2006.

   [7]   Sparks, R., "Addressing an Amplification Vulnerability in
         Forking Proxies", draft-ietf-sip-fork-loop-fix-01 (work in
         progress), April 2006.

   [8]   Campen, B., "An Efficient Loop Detection Algorithm for SIP
         Proxies", draft-campen-sipping-stack-loop-detect-00 (work in
         progress), March 2006.

   [9]   Sparks, R., "Limiting the Damage from Amplification Attacks in
         SIP Proxies", draft-sparks-sipping-max-breadth-00 (work in
         progress), March 2006.

   [10]  Rosenberg, J., "A Framework for Consent-Based Communications in
         the Session Initiation  Protocol (SIP)",
         draft-ietf-sipping-consent-framework-04 (work in progress),
         March 2006.
























Srivastava              Expires November 25, 2006               [Page 7]

Internet-Draft               Loop Avoidance                     May 2006


Author's Address

   Samir Srivastava
   Nortel Networks
   4655 Great America Parkway
   Santa Clara, CA  95054
   US

   Phone: +1 408 495 5143
   Email: samirsr@nortel.com









































Srivastava              Expires November 25, 2006               [Page 8]

Internet-Draft               Loop Avoidance                     May 2006


Intellectual Property Statement

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.


Disclaimer of Validity

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
   ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
   INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
   INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.


Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).  This document is subject
   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.


Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.




Srivastava              Expires November 25, 2006               [Page 9]