Internet DRAFT - draft-sullivan-dnsop-refer-down
draft-sullivan-dnsop-refer-down
DNSOP A. Sullivan
Internet-Draft Oracle
Intended status: Best Current Practice J. Abley
Expires: June 1, 2018 Snake Hill Labs
November 28, 2017
Please See Below: Use Only Downward Referrals in the DNS
draft-sullivan-dnsop-refer-down-00
Abstract
A server in the Domain Name System can use a mechanism called
"referral" to indicate that the server is not authoritative for a
given zone, and to redirect the query to another, more appropriate
server. The mechanism was originally specified such that a referral
might be to any location in the DNS. Operational experience
indicates dubious value to referrals other than those to zones below
the zones for which a server is authoritative. This memo therefore
recommends such referrals and discourages other kinds of referrals.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 1, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Referrals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Downward Referrals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Upward Referrals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Negative Consequences of Upward Referrals . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. Alternatives to Upward Referrals . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.1. NODATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.2. SERVFAIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.3. NXDOMAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.4. REFUSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Discussion Venue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix B. Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) divides parts of the domain name space
"into units called 'zones'" ([RFC1034], Section 2.4). The answers
for data in these zones are (ultimately) provided by authoritative
servers. In the Internet context, for any given query, there is a
set of authoritative servers that can provide an authoritative answer
in response to that query.
Sometimes, however, a server receives a query for which it is not
authoritative. If such a server does not offer recursion, the server
might return a response that refers to another set of servers on the
Internet. This response is called a "referral".
There are two categories of referral response. One of them indicates
a delegation in the DNS, and is a basic part of how the DNS
functions. Without such delegation responses, the distributed nature
of the DNS is impossible. They may be thought of as "downward"
referrals because they refer to a zone somewhere beneath the zone for
which the server is authoritative. Other referrals are for zones
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where the server is neither authoritative for the zone of the QNAME,
nor for any zone that might be an ancestor of the zone containing the
QNAME. These referrals might be thought of as "off-tree" referrals,
because the server is not authoritative for any part of the tree
containing the QNAME.
Historically, authoritative servers that received an off-tree query
would reply with an "upward referral", usually to the root zone;
these were sometimes called a "root referral". Such referrals have
turned out to be undesirable in practice. This memo recommends that
servers not provide upward referrals, and instead should respond to
such queries in some other way.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Unfamiliar DNS-related terms are likely to be found in RFC 7719
[RFC7719], and the reader is assumed to be familiar with that
vocabulary.
2. Referrals
Referrals are defined as part of the algorithm for a name server
([RFC1034], section 4.3.2, henceforth "the algorithm"). Referrals
only happen when the RD bit is clear in the query or the server does
not offer recursion (or both). There are different possible
interpretations of the algorithm; one's interpretation will affect
which kinds of referral one thinks acceptable.
A referral contains an empty answer section. It contains the NS
RRset for the referred-to zone in the authority section. It may
contain RRs that provide addresses in the additional section. The AA
bit is clear.
2.1. Downward Referrals
The first kind of referral is downward, and is uncontroversial. Step
2 of the matching algorithm evaluates whether the name server is
authoritative for some zone that is an ancestor for the QNAME. (If
the QNAME exactly matches, then that zone is the "ancestor". This is
a slightly awkward usage of "ancestor", but makes sense due to the
distinction between a zone and the matching owner name inside the
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zone.) If there is such a zone, then the algorithm moves to step 3;
otherwise, it moves to step 4.
In step 3, the server matches label by label in the zone until
matching terminates. Step 3(b) of the matching algorithm says, "If a
match would take us out of the authoritative data, we have a
referral. This happens when we encounter a node with NS RRs marking
cuts along the bottom of a zone." Such a referral is called
"downward" because the referral is of necessity to a part of the
namespace beneath the zone for which the server is generating a
response. In other words, if the server is authoritative for the
zone example.com, the referral needs to be to the NS records of some
subordinate zone in the domain name space.
Downward referrals are necessary for the DNS to function. They are
the mechanism by which delegation happens.
2.2. Upward Referrals
The second kind of referral is often called an "upward" referral,
because it is often a referral to the name servers for the root zone
(perforce above everything else in the domain name space), though in
principle the referral could be elsewhere in the domain name space.
Step 4 of the algorithm says, "If there was no delegation from
authoritative data, look for the best one from the cache, and put it
in the authority section." Returning this kind of referral under
normal operational conditions is somewhat more controversial than a
downward referral, because it is not clear that it is necessary for
the operation of the DNS.
There are only two cases where upward referrals are possible:
1. The server offers recursive service, and it cannot provide an
authoritative answer or a downward referral, but the query was
received with the RD bit clear.
2. The server does not offer recursive service, and it cannot
provide either an answer or a downward referral in response to
the query.
The first of these is plainly required by step 4 of the algorithm,
and should therefore be uncontroversial. In normal operation,
however, this case appears to be unusual. A resolver that was using
such a server for full-service DNS resolution would normally query
with the RD bit set. A resolver that did not expect recursion would
likely only send a QNAME for which the server could provide an
authoritative answer or a downward referral; it is unclear why the
query would be sent to the server at all otherwise. Such queries are
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known to occur sometimes, for example when troubleshooting, but they
do not appear to be normal according to the protocol.
The second case is controversial because the server, which only
provides authoritative answers, must somehow have some data in a
cache in order to return anything in the authority section. The
controversy arises because of the question of whether the server
ought to have such data. This amounts to a question of whether a
server that only provides authoritative answers should ever have a
cache.
On the one hand, it would seem that such a server should not have a
cache, because it does not have a resolver side that populates such a
cache. Moreover, the SBELT structure (see [RFC1034], section 5.3.2)
is defined only for resolvers and not for servers. So a server that
only provides authoritative answers has no reason even to have
configured in the SBELT structure a list of servers from which to
start (in resolvers, this is often the "root hints" file). On the
other hand, there is no requirement that a given name server should
not provide both authoritative service and recursive service.
Moreover, even a server that provides no recursive service to others
may need to perform resolution for its own purposes, and therefore
might have need of the SBELT structure. So, depending on one's
reading of the algorithm, either upward referrals should not be
returned from such a server and are a sign of misconfiguration, or
else they will be a normal part of operation.
Upward referrals, and particularly root referrals, were once regarded
as a useful mechanism to indicate lame delegation [RFC1912]. That
use turned out to create some difficulties (see Section 2.3, below).
2.3. Negative Consequences of Upward Referrals
Upward referrals have some negative consequences. The most obvious
of them is that they are not in-domain records, and therefore they
should not be accepted in any case according to RFC 5452 [RFC5452],
section 6. This means that an upward referral response is just extra
traffic, because the querying resolver will need to find those
records from an authoritative source anyway. Moreover, upward
referral response messages can be considerably larger than the query
message that causes them, making them a useful amplifier when used in
reflector attacks [RFC5358].
Upward referrals can be part of a referral loop, and the algorithm
does not specify how or when to terminate such a loop. The use of
upward referrals to indicate lame delegations exhibits this weakness.
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2.4. Alternatives to Upward Referrals
It is possible for a server to send some other response than an
upward referral, when an upward referral might have been generated
under the algorithm. There are several alternatives, each of which
has advantages and disadvantages.
2.4.1. NODATA
A name server that had no information at all in a cache (including
the SBELT structure) would complete step 4 of the algorithm having
added nothing to the authority section in the response. It would
exit step 6 of the algorithm having created an empty response (except
for the query that was copied from the original query message). This
is a type 3 NODATA response [RFC2308]. A disadvantage of returning
such a message is that it is unlikely to cause the query source to
stop querying the nameserver for that name, because type 3 NODATA
responses are not cached (see [RFC2308], section 5).
2.4.2. SERVFAIL
RCODE 2, Server Failure, indicates that a server cannot process the
query due to a problem with the name server. Some operators adopt
the position that the name server would normally provide an upward
referral, except that it has been configured not to. Therefore, the
server can return RCODE 2. Others argue, however, that there is
nothing wrong with the server; and that, moreover, the use of RCODE 2
in DNSSEC (see [RFC4035]) means that this RCODE is already overloaded
enough. Some interpretations of RCODE 2 by resolvers invites
subsequent retries to the same server, which may not always be
desirable.
2.4.3. NXDOMAIN
RCODE 3, Name Error or NXDOMAIN, indicates that the domain name does
not exist. Some operators use RCODE 3 instead of producing upward
referrals. But since RCODE 3 is supposed to be "[m]eaningful only
for responses from an authoritative name server" ([RFC1035] section
4.1.1) and since by definition the upward referral can only happen in
a case where the name server is not authoritative, this use appears
to be inconsistent with the protocol.
2.4.4. REFUSED
RCODE 5, Refused, indicates that the server "refuses to perform the
specified operatio for policy reasons." ([RFC1035], section 4.1.1)
Some operators adopt a policy of refusing to perform upward
referrals, and so return RCODE 5 to queries that would otherwise
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cause such referrals. There are some resolvers, however, that
interpret RCODE 5 to mean that the resolver itself, rather than the
query sent, is what causes the Refused response. Those resolvers
will not attempt to query the server again (or not for some period of
time), running the risk of outages in domains for which the server is
authoritative and would provide a response.
2.5. Recommendations
A name server that only provides authoritative service SHOULD NOT
return upward referrals under any circumstances. Such a name server
SHOULD provide either RCODE 2 or RCODE 5 in response. A name server
MUST NOT return RCODE 3 except for names for which it can provide
authoritative answer that the name does not exist.
A name server that provides recursive service MAY provide upward
referrals when replying to a query with the RD bit clear, or it MAY
refuse to provide upward referrals just as though it provided only
authoritative service. Operators should note that upward referrals
might provide a modest troubleshooting advantage for recursive
servers, but this should be weighed against the advantages of
removing upward referrals as one of the available tools of attackers
on Internet infrastructure.
3. Acknowledgements
This memo has benefitted from the comments of Stephane Bortzmeyer,
Robert Edmonds, Tony Finch, Evan Hunt, John Kristoff, Dave Lawrence,
Edward Lewis, Matthew Pounsett, and Paul Vixie.
4. IANA Considerations
This memo makes no requests of IANA.
[[CREF1: Note in draft: this section can be removed by the RFC Editor
if the document is ever published as an RFC.]]
5. References
5.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
5.2. Informative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC1912] Barr, D., "Common DNS Operational and Configuration
Errors", RFC 1912, DOI 10.17487/RFC1912, February 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1912>.
[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.
[RFC5358] Damas, J. and F. Neves, "Preventing Use of Recursive
Nameservers in Reflector Attacks", BCP 140, RFC 5358,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5358, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5358>.
[RFC5452] Hubert, A. and R. van Mook, "Measures for Making DNS More
Resilient against Forged Answers", RFC 5452,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5452, January 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5452>.
[RFC7719] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", RFC 7719, DOI 10.17487/RFC7719, December
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7719>.
Appendix A. Discussion Venue
This Internet-Draft is discussed on the DNS Operations Working Group
list: dnsop@ietf.org.
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Appendix B. Change History
Note to RFC Editor: this section should be removed prior to
publication as an RFC.
00:
* Initial version
Authors' Addresses
Andrew Sullivan
Oracle
Email: andrew.s.sullivan@oracle.com
Joe Abley
Snake Hill Labs
300-184 York Street
London, ON N6A 1B5
Canada
Email: jabley@shl.io
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