Internet DRAFT - draft-thaler-iab-host-firewalls
draft-thaler-iab-host-firewalls
Network Working Group D. Thaler
Internet-Draft Microsoft
Intended status: Informational June 04, 2013
Expires: December 06, 2013
Reflections On Host Firewalls
draft-thaler-iab-host-firewalls-00.txt
Abstract
In today's Internet, the need for firewalls is generally accepted in
the industry and indeed firewalls are widely deployed in practice.
Often the result is that software may be running and potentially
consuming resources, but then communication is blocked by a firewall.
It's taken for granted that this end state is either desirable or the
best that can be achieved in practice, rather than (for example) an
end state where the relevant software is not running or is running in
a way that would not result in unwanted communication. In this
document, we explore the issues behind these assumptions and provide
suggestions on improving the architecture going forward.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 06, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Firewall Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Category 1: Attack Surface Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Stealth Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Discussion of Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1. Fix the Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2. Don't Use the Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.3. Run the Software Behind a Firewall . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Category 2: Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Discussion of Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.1. Security Policies in Applications . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1.2. Security Policies in Firewalls . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1.3. Security Policies in a Service . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction
In Section 2.1 of "Reflections on Internet Transparency" [RFC4924],
the IAB provided some thoughts on firewalls and their impact on the
Internet architecture, including issues around disclosure obligations
and complexity as applications evolve to circumvent firewalls. This
document extends that discussion with additional considerations.
Traditionally, firewalls have been about arming customers to protect
against badly written applications and services. This document
discusses a number of fundamental questions such as who a firewall is
meant to protect from what. It does so primarily, though not
exclusively, from an end system perspective with a focus on host
firewalls in particular.
The Internet Security Glossary [RFC4949] defines a firewall as
follows.
1. (I) An internetwork gateway that restricts data communication
traffic to and from one of the connected networks (the one said to
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be "inside" the firewall) and thus protects that network's system
resources against threats from the other network (the one that is
said to be "outside" the firewall). (See: guard, security
gateway.)
2. (O) A device or system that controls the flow of traffic
between networks using differing security postures. [SP41]
Tutorial: A firewall typically protects a smaller, secure network
(such as a corporate LAN, or even just one host) from a larger
network (such as the Internet). The firewall is installed at the
point where the networks connect, and the firewall applies policy
rules to control traffic that flows in and out of the protected
network.
A firewall is not always a single computer. For example, a
firewall may consist of a pair of filtering routers and one or
more proxy servers running on one or more bastion hosts, all
connected to a small, dedicated LAN (see: buffer zone) between the
two routers. The external router blocks attacks that use IP to
break security (IP address spoofing, source routing, packet
fragments), while proxy servers block attacks that would exploit a
vulnerability in a higher-layer protocol or service. The internal
router blocks traffic from leaving the protected network except
through the proxy servers. The difficult part is defining
criteria by which packets are denied passage through the firewall,
because a firewall not only needs to keep unauthorized traffic
(i.e., intruders) out, but usually also needs to let authorized
traffic pass both in and out.
Informally, most people would tend to think of a firewall as
"something that blocks unwanted traffic" (see [RFC4948] for a
discussion on many types of unwanted traffic). A fundamental
question is, however: "unwanted by whom?"
Possible answers include end users, application developers, network
administrators, host administrators, firewall vendors, and content
providers. We will exclude by definition the sender of the traffic
in question, since the sender would generally want such traffic to be
delivered. Still, the other entities have different, and often
conflicting, desires which means that a type of traffic might be
wanted by one entity and unwanted by another entity. Thus, not
surprisingly, there exist various types of firewalls, and various
types of "arms race" as we will discuss in Section 4.1.2.
1.1. Terminology
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In this document we distinguish between a "host firewall" which
simply intends to protect the single computer on which it runs, and a
"network firewall" which is located in the network and intends to
protect the network and any hosts behind it.
The term "application" is used generically to apply to any component
that can receive traffic. In this sense, it could refer to a process
running on a computer (including a system service) or even to a
portion of a TCP/IP stack itself, such as a component that responds
to pings.
2. Firewall Rules
Desires for wanted or unwanted traffic can be expressed in terms of
"allow" vs. "block" rules, with some way to resolve conflicting
rules. Many firewalls are actually implemented in terms of such
rules. Figure 1 shows some typical sources of such rules.
Source | Consumer | Consumer | Enterprise | Enterprise
| Grade | Grade | Grade | Grade
| Host | Network | Host | Network
| Firewall | Firewall | Firewall | Firewall
----------+-----------+------------+------------+------------
End user | Sometimes | | |
| (as host | | |
| admin) | | |
----------+-----------+------------+------------+------------
App | Yes | Sometimes | |
developer | | (via | |
| | protocols) | |
----------+-----------+------------+------------+------------
Network | | Sometimes | | Yes
admin | | | |
----------+-----------+------------+------------+------------
Host | Sometimes | | Yes |
admin | | | |
----------+-----------+------------+------------+------------
Firewall | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes
vendor | | | |
----------+-----------+------------+------------+------------
Common sources of firewall rules
Figure 1
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Figure 1 assumes that network firewalls are administered by network
administrators (if any), and host firewalls are administered by host
administrators (if any). A firewall may also have rules provided by
the firewall vendor itself.
End users typically cannot directly provide rules to firewalls,
except when acting as host administrators. Application developers
can, however, provide such rules to some firewalls, such as providing
rules at installation time, for example by invoking an API provided
by a host firewall included with the operating system, or by
providing metadata to the operating system for use by firewalls, or
by using a protocol such as UPnP-IGD or PCP to communicate with a
network firewall (see Section 4.1.3 for a longer discussion).
Firewall rules generally fall into two categories:
1. Attack surface reduction: Rules intended to prevent an
application from doing things the developer does not want it to
do.
2. Security policy: Rules intended to prevent an application from
doing things the developer might want it to do, but an
administrator does not.
A firewall is unnecessary if both categories are empty. We will now
treat each category in turn.
3. Category 1: Attack Surface Reduction
As noted above, this category of firewall rule typically attempts to
prevent applications from doing things the developer did not intend.
One might ask whether this category of rules is typically empty, and
the answer is that it is not today. The reason generally stems from
mitigating code injection threats by putting a security barrier in a
separate process isolated from the potentially compromised process.
Furthermore, there is also some desire for a "stealth mode" (see
below).
Hence, typically a firewall will have rules to block everything by
default. A one-time, privileged, application install step adds one
or more Allow rules, and then normal (unprivileged) application
execution is then constrained by the resulting rules.
3.1. Stealth Mode
There is often a desire to hide from address and port scans on a
public network. However, compliance to many RFCs requires responding
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to various messages. For example, TCP [RFC0793] compliance requires
sending a RST in response to a SYN when there is no listener, and
ICMPv6 [RFC4443] compliance requires sending an Echo Reply in
response to an Echo Request.
Firewall rules can allow such stealth without changing the statement
of compliance of the basic protocols. However, stealth mode could
instead be implemented as a configurable option in the protocols
themselves. For example, rather than a firewall rule to drop a
certain outbound message after a protocol generates it, fewer
resources would be consumed if the protocol knew not to generate it
in the first place.
3.2. Discussion of Approaches
When running an application would result in unwanted behavior,
customers have three choices, which we will discuss in turn:
a. fix (or get the developer to fix) the software,
b. not use the software, or
c. let the software run, but then use a firewall to thwart it and
prevent it from working in unwanted ways.
3.2.1. Fix the Software
Firewall vendors point out that one can more quickly and reliably
update firewall rules than application software. Indeed some
applications might have no way to update them, and support for other
applications might no longer be available (e.g., if the developers
are no longer around). Most modern operating systems (and any
applications that come with them) have automatic updates, as do some
independent applications. But until all applications have automatic
updates, and automatic updates are actually used, it will still be
the case that firewall rules can be updated more quickly than
software patches. Furthermore, in some contexts (e.g., within some
enterprises), a possibly lengthy retesting and recertification
process must be employed before applications can be updated. In
short, mechanisms to encourage and ease the use of secure automatic
software updates are important and would greatly reduce overall
complexity.
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3.2.2. Don't Use the Software
A key question to ask is whether the application could still do
something useful when firewalled. If the answer is yes, then not
using the software is probably unrealistic. For example, a game with
both single-player and multi-player capabilities could still be
useful in single-player mode when firewalled. If instead the answer
is no, it is better to not allow the application to run in the first
place (and some host firewalls can indeed block applications from
running).
3.2.3. Run the Software Behind a Firewall
As noted earlier, one disadvantage of this approach is that resources
still get consumed. For example, the application can still consume
memory, CPU, bandwidth (up to the point of blockage), ports in the
transport layer protocol, and possibly other resources depending on
the application, for operations that provide no benefit while
firewalled.
A second important disadvantage of this approach is the bad user
experience. Typically the application and the end-user won't know
why the application doesn't work. In addition, a poorly designed
application might not cope well and consume even more resources
(e.g., retrying an operation that continually fails). Finally, using
a firewall without changing the application could impact protocol
operation and hence have adverse effects on other endpoints; for
example blocking ICMP adversely affects path MTU discovery which can
cause problems for other entities (see [RFC4890] for further
discussion).
Sandboxed environments, such as those provided by browsers, can be
thought of as a type of firewall in the more general sense. For
example, a cross-site check in a browser can be thought of as a rule
specified by the "firewall" vendor to block unwanted outbound traffic
per a "same origin policy" where a script can only communicate with
the "site" from which the script was obtained, for some definition of
site such as the scheme and authority in a URI.
In short, it is important to make applications more aware of the
constraints of their environment and hence better able to behave well
when contrained.
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4. Category 2: Security Policy
As noted in Section 2, this category of firewall rule typically
attempts to prevent applications from doing things an administrator
does not want, even if the application developer does intend them to
do.
One might ask whether this category of rules is typically empty, and
the answer varies somewhat. For enterprise-grade firewalls, it is
almost never empty, and hence the problems discussed in Section 3.2.3
can be common here too. Similarly, for consumer-grade firewalls, it
is generally not empty but there are some notable exceptions. For
example, for the host firewall in the Windows operation system, this
category always starts empty and most users never change this. [[Any
other major firewalls that also contain no such rules by default?]]
Security policy rules generally fall into two categories:
1. Simple policies that the developer would want, but that are
difficult to implement. One example might be a policy that an
application should communicate only within the local network
(e.g., a home or enterprise) but not be reachable from the global
Internet or while the device is moved to some public network such
as a hotspot. A second example might be the reverse, i.e., a
policy to communicate over the Internet but not with local
entities. The need for this category would be reduced by better
platform support for such policies, making them easier for
developers to implement and use.
2. Complex policies where the developer cannot possibly be aware of
specifics. One example might be a policy to communicate only
during, or only outside of, normal business hours, where the
exact hours may vary by location and time of year. Another
example might be a policy to avoid communication over links that
cost too much, where the definition of "too much" may vary by
customer, and indeed the end host and application might not even
be aware of the costs. The need for this category would be
reduced by better platform support for such policies, allowing
the application to communicate through some simple API with some
other library or service that can deal with the specifics.
4.1. Discussion of Approaches
Security policy can be implemented in any of three places, which we
will discuss in turn: the application, a firewall, or a library/
service that that application explicitly uses.
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4.1.1. Security Policies in Applications
In this option, each application must implement support for
potentially complex security policies, along with ways for
administrators to configure them. This is impractical for a number
of reasons. First, the complexity makes it difficult to implement
and error-prone, especially for application developers whose primary
expertise is not networking. Second, the potentially large number of
applications (and application developers) results in an inconsistent
experience that makes it difficult for an administrator to manage
common policies across applications, thus driving up training and
operational costs.
4.1.2. Security Policies in Firewalls
Putting security policies in firewalls without explicit interaction
with the applications results in the problems discussed in
Section 3.2.3. In addition, this leads to "arms races" where the
applications are incented to evolve to get around the security
policies, since the desires of the end user or developer can conflict
with the desires of the host or network administrator. As stated in
Section 2.1 of [RFC4924]:
In practice, filtering intended to block or restrict application
usage is difficult to successfully implement without customer
consent, since over time developers will tend to re-engineer
filtered protocols so as to avoid the filters. Thus over time,
filtering is likely to result in interoperability issues or
unnecessary complexity. These costs come without the benefit of
effective filtering since many application protocols began to use
HTTP as a transport protocol after application developers observed
that firewalls allow HTTP traffic while dropping packets for
unknown protocols.
Such arms races stem from inherent tussles between the desires of
different entities. For example, the tussle between end user desires
and network administrator desires led to the arms race between
network firewalls and deep packet inspection on the one hand, vs. the
use of tunnels and obfuscation on the other. Similarly, the tussle
between application developer desires and network administrator
desires contributed to the use of HTTP as a transport in order to
work from within the widest possible set of networks (see
Section 3.3.1 of [RFC6250] and [I-D.blanchet-iab-internetoverport443]
for more discussion).
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Such arms races most typically, though not exclusively, occur with
network (not host) firewalls. This is because it is more likely for
network firewalls to have lack of trust between the policy-desiring
entities, and less likely that there is any trusted arbiter.
4.1.3. Security Policies in a Service
In this approach, applications use a library or other external
service whereby the applications have explicit knowledge of the
impact of the security policies (and in a sandboxed environment this
might be the application's only way to interact with the network).
Thus in this opt-in approach, applications provide a description of
the network access requested, and the library/service can ensure that
applications and/or users are informed in a way they can understand,
and that administrators can craft policy that affects the
applications.
This approach is very difficult to do in a firewall-specific library/
service when there can be multiple firewall implementations
(including ones in the middle of the network), since it is usually
impractical for an application developer to know about and develop
for many different APIs. It is, however, possible to employ this
approach with a generic library/service that can communicate with
both applications and firewalls. Thus application developers and
firewall developers can use a common platform.
We observe that this approach is very different from the classic
firewall approach. It is, however the approach used by the
aforementioned Windows firewall, and it is also the approach used by
the Port Control Protocol (PCP) [RFC6887] in the IETF. As such, we
encourage the deployment and use of this model. [[Any other major
platforms besides Windows that already use this approach?]]
Furthermore, while this approach lessens the incentive for arms races
as discussed above, one important issue still remains. Namely, there
is no standard mechanism today for a library to learn complex
policies from the network. Further work in this area is needed.
5. Security Considerations
There is a common misconception that firewalls protect users from
malware, when in fact firewalls protect users from buggy software.
There is some concern that firewalls give users a false sense of
security; firewalls are not invulnerable and will not prevent malware
from running if the user allows it.
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This document has focused primarily on host firewalls. For
additional discussion (focused more on network firewalls), see
[I-D.baker-opsawg-firewalls].
6. IANA Considerations
This document requires no actions by the IANA.
7. Acknowledgements
Stuart Cheshire provided the motivation for this document by asking
the thought-provoking question of why one would want to firewall an
application rather than simply stop running it. The ensuring
discussion, and subsequent IAB tech chat, led to this document.
8. Informative References
[I-D.baker-opsawg-firewalls]
Baker, F., "On Firewalls in Internet Security", draft-
baker-opsawg-firewalls-00 (work in progress), January
2012.
[I-D.blanchet-iab-internetoverport443]
Blanchet, M., "Implications of Blocking Outgoing Ports
Except Ports 80 and 443", draft-blanchet-iab-
internetoverport443-01 (work in progress), October 2012.
[RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC
793, September 1981.
[RFC2979] Freed, N., "Behavior of and Requirements for Internet
Firewalls", RFC 2979, October 2000.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, "Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol
Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 4443, March 2006.
[RFC4890] Davies, E. and J. Mohacsi, "Recommendations for Filtering
ICMPv6 Messages in Firewalls", RFC 4890, May 2007.
[RFC4924] Aboba, B. and E. Davies, "Reflections on Internet
Transparency", RFC 4924, July 2007.
[RFC4948] Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the
IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006", RFC
4948, August 2007.
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[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007.
[RFC6250] Thaler, D., "Evolution of the IP Model", RFC 6250, May
2011.
[RFC6887] Wing, D., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and P.
Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 6887, April
2013.
Author's Address
Dave Thaler
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
USA
Phone: +1 425 703 8835
Email: dthaler@microsoft.com
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