Internet DRAFT - draft-thomas-namecollisions-workshop-report
draft-thomas-namecollisions-workshop-report
INTERNET-DRAFT Matthew Thomas
Intended Status: Informational Allison Mankin
Expires: September 9, 2016 Lixia Zhang
UCLA
March 9, 2016
Report from the Workshop and Prize on
Root Causes and Mitigation of Name Collisions
draft-thomas-namecollisions-workshop-report-04
Abstract
This document provides context and a report of a workshop on Root
Causes and Mitigation of Name Collisions, which took place in London,
United Kindgdom, on March 8 to 10, 2014. The main goal of the
workshop was to foster a discussion on the causes and potential
mitigations of domain name collisions. This report provides a small
amount of background and context, then provides a summary of the
workshop's discussions.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working
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Copyright and License Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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to this document.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Background and Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Brief Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3 Workshop Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1 Research Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2 System Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3 Frameworks - Modeling, Analysis & Mitigation . . . . . . . 9
3.4 Conclusions and Next Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5 IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Program Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix B. Workshop Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix C. Peer-Reviewed Name Collision Papers . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix D. Invited Name Collision Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix E. Panels and Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix F. Workshop Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1 Introduction
It has been well known within the Internet research and engineering
community that many installed systems in the Internet query the DNS
root for a wide range of top-level domains (TLDs). Many of these
TLDs are not delegated which results in a response indicating that
the name queried does not exist (commonly called an NXDOMAIN
response). In the ICANN community, it was observed as early as
November 2010 by the Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC)
report [SAC045] that the addition of new top-level domains in the DNS
root could result in so-called name collisions for installed systems.
Some installed systems, following established (albeit not vetted)
operational practices, generate queries to the global DNS with name
suffixes that under seemingly reasonable assumptions at the time the
systems were designed or configured, were not expected to be
delegated as TLDs. Many of these installed systems depend explicitly
or implicitly on the indication from the global DNS that the domain
name suffix does not exist. After a new TLD is delegated, the global
DNS may give a different response to the query involving the TLD than
it did prior to the TLD's delegation.
A name collision occurs when an attempt to resolve a name used in a
private namespace results in a query to the public Domain Name System
(DNS), and the response indicates that the name is in the global DNS
[NCRI]. In other words, the overlap of public and private namespaces
may result in potential unintended (and therefore potentially
harmful) resolution results. The impact of the global change on
installed systems will be varied; risks to installed systems
introduced by name collisions may arise due to varied causes.
In a globally distributed system such as the Internet, it is
difficult yet critical to enforce policies for demarking boundaries
of ownership and autonomy. The Internet's global DNS is an exemplary
system in which name space governance is critical to ensure name
uniqueness.
In order to help ensure this uniqueness and interoperability, several
namespaces are administered by ICANN for the global global benefit of
Internet users. Prior to ICANN's creation in 1998, seven generic
Top-Level-Domains (TLDs) were defined in the early development of the
Internet [RFC1591]. Since the formationof ICANN, the delegations of
generic, internationalized and country code TLDs have been
administered and delegated by ICANN. During these delegations, it
quickly became apparent within the IETFcommunity there was a need to
reserve name spaces that can be used for creating limited sets of
internal names without fear of conflicts with current or future TLD
name spaces in the global DNS [RFC2606].
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While [RFC2606] aimed to enable operators to use these only a small
set of reserved names internally, with limited uses, educational
awareness and operational best practices did not achieve the goal
[RFC 6761], and other suffixes, not reserved though at the time not
in conflict, were often employed instead. Faulty assumptions of "we
only use this name internally and there is no possibility of leakage
to the global DNS" were made by numerous operators or administrators.
Numerous reports and findings have clearly disproved these faulty
assumptions by showing substantial "DNS leakage" into the global DNS
through mechanisms such as search lists.
In 2012, ICANN created a new gTLD program to add a potentially
unlimited number of new gTLDs to the root zone as a mechanism to
enhance competition, innovation and consumer choice. With the
potential of many new gTLDs becoming delegated in the global DNS,
operators or administrators who elected to use the same name space
internally may face potential "name collision" problems.
This document is primarily a report on the March 2014 workshop that
set out to examine the causes and mitigation of such name collisions
and their associated risks. It is a companion to the workshop
proceedings at [WPNC], and it also provides some additional
background and context.
2 Background and Context
When the workshop was convened the context and status of the work
around name collisions could be described as follows.
Since early 2008, there had been numerous lengthy discussions within
the ICANN community about the ability of the DNS root to scale to
accommodate new gTLDs, and the impact of making those changes on the
DNS ecosystem. In March 2008, the Internet Architecture Board
observed that the introduction of suffixes in use in a number of
environments could lead to instability [IAB2008]. The Security and
Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) in December 2010 issued [SAC046]
in which the committee formalized several recommendations based on
"actual measurement, monitoring, and data-sharing capabilities of
root zone performance" to help determine the feasibility of root
scaling. Separately, the Root Server System Advisory Committee
[RSSAC] agreed in late 2010 on the need to establish standard metrics
to be collected and reported by all operators. This effort would
provide the community with a baseline measure of the entire root
server system's performance. With such an established baseline, any
possible negative effect from additional TLDs within the root could
potentially be identified. In late 2012, the ICANN Board affirmed the
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need to work with the root server operators via RSSAC to complete the
documentation of the interactions between ICANN and the root server
operators with respect to root zone scaling [IR2012].
In March 2013, SSAC published an advisory titled "SSAC Advisory on
Internal Name Certificates" [SAC057], which identified a
CertificateAuthority (CA) practice that, if widely exploited, "could
pose a significant risk to the privacy and integrity of secure
Internet communications". The ICANN Board acknowledged the issues
identified in [SAC057] as part of a more general category of issues.
These issues included installed systems utilizing a namespace in a
private network that includes a non-delegated TLD that is later
delegated into the root. In May 2013, the ICANN Board commissioned a
study on the use within private name spaces of TLDs that are not
currently delegated at the root level of the global DNS [ISTUDY].
This study was focused on potential name collision events between
applied-for new gTLDs and non-delegated TLDs potentially used in
private namespaces. The study also examined the potential
possibility of name collisions arising from the use of digital
certificates referenced in [SAC057].
Between the [RSSAC] and [SAC046] advisory statements and the ICANN
commissioning of a study in May 2013, there was significant progress
on establishing coordinated monitoring and measurement of the root.
RSSAC approached its finalization of the specific metrics that each
root operator will collect and initiated discussions about where the
operators will send their data for analysis once collected. To
properly gauge the risks of new gTLD delegations to the root, an
established baseline of normal performance of the system would be
required to start sufficiently ahead of the new delegations. The
timing and execution of these RSSAC and SSAC recommendations timed
poorly with the commissioned study, resulting in a limited pool of
data repositories from which any baseline and risk measurements could
be established.
It is common practice for each operator to monitor its own root
server, and some operators report the status and performance of their
services publicly. As of ICANN's study commissioned in May 2013
[ISTUDY], there was no mechanism in place to allow a detailed view of
the entire root system, short of the annual "Day in the Life"
([DITL]) data repository, which contains root DNS data over a short
coordinated time period from a varying subset of root operators and
was intended to be used for research purposes, not to provide overall
monitoring and an operational view of system health. Due to the lack
of a more comprehensive and desirable data repository for baseline
and collision analysis [DITL] became the de facto referential dataset
for root traffic analysis. There still remains no holistic view of
the root system that would enable the technical community to
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determine the potential impact of added TLDs.
The commissioned study, conducted by the Interisle Consulting Group,
was published in August of 2013. The report "Name Collisions in the
DNS" [INTERISLE], based on [DITL] measurements, addressed name
collisions in the DNS and also recommended options to mitigate the
various name collision risks. The study identified categories of
strings according to the risk they represent: low risk (80% of
applied-for strings), uncalculated risk (20% of applied-for strings),
and high risk (2 applied-for strings).
At the same time as the [INTERISLE] study, ICANN published a
proposal, titled "New gTLD Collision Occurrence Management Plan"
[NGCOMP], to manage the risk of name collisions within the applied-
for gTLDs. Based on [INTERISLE] measurements, ICANN deemed two
strings, .home and .corp, as high-risk because of their widespread
use within internal networks and would indefinitely delay their
delegation. Those strings within the uncalculated-risk classification
would be delayed 2-3 months in their application process while ICANN
conducted more research into whether the string is of high or low
risk classification. Those in the low-risk classification would face
a delay in activating domains until 120 days after contracting with
ICANN to allow for the change in certificate authority practices
recommended in [SAC057].
Within the ICANN proposal, an approach termed the "alternative path
to delegation" was outlined, in which a registry operator could elect
the option to proceed with delegation provided it initially blocked
all second-level domains (SLDs) that appeared in the certain DITL
datasets pending the completion of the assessment. The majority of
new gTLD applicants that were eligible elected this alternative path
once otherwise approved for delegation. The plan also outlined an
outreach campaign to educate system administrators, software
developers, and other engineers about the name collision issue and
possible mitigation measures.
As a further provision, the "New gTLD Collision Occurrence Management
Plan" called for a follow-up study that would develop a "Name
Collision Occurrence Management Framework" [NCOMF]. In February 2014,
the document "Mitigating the Risk of DNS Namespace Collisions: Phase
One Report" was published by the ICANN-contracted group JAS Global
Advisors [MRDNC]. The report provides a number of recommendations
for addressing the name collision issue focusing on a technique
termed "controlled interruption", in which a registry would
temporarily resolve all second-level domains (or all second-level
domains present in the block list) to a specific IP, 127.0.53.53.
The report also makes provisions to implement an emergency plan and
strategy in case name collisions had a "clear danger to human life".
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2.1 Brief Update
In the timeframe after the workshop, a final version of the Phase One
Report was released in June 2014 [MRDNC].
In July 2014, after a community review phase, a final recommendation
was issued by ICANN [NCOMFINAL] and this has been followed by the
publication of managment documents for the implementation of a
controlled interrupt for new gTLD delegations [NOCA], [NCSLDCIV],
[ADDNOCA].
One part of the original framework was not released by the time of
this document and [MRDNC] indicated that its publication was delayed
due to a security vulnerability identified during the course of the
work.
Broad community efforts to measure the impact of name collisions were
not included in [NCOMFINAL]. At the time of this writing, RSSAC has
just published its specification of common measurements to be
collected by root operators, meeting one part of the needs
[RSSAC002].
3 Workshop Structure
The Workshop and Prize on 'Root Causes and Mitigation of Name
Collisions'[WPNC], sponsored by Verisign, took place March 8-10, 2014
in London, United Kingdom. The WPNC was open to the public, and it
gathered subject area specialists, researchers and practitioners to
discuss and present their views, concerns and ideas surrounding the
name collision issue. Proceedings are published at [WPNC].
The workshop focused on studies of name collision risks and
mitigations with the expectation to advance the global community's
insight into operational uses of name suffixes that can result in
name collisions, and to gain a stronger understanding of the
potential risks for the users of the installed systems. Additional
emphasis and attention was given to discussions that may advance the
state of knowledge about the architecture and impacts of DNS
namespaces with multiple scopes or resolution contexts and the
utilization of new methods of monitoring and understanding the needs
and methods for mitigating emerging Internet risks around name
collisions. A technical program committee, whose members spanned a
variety of organizations and universities, was assembled. The
committee issued a call for papers and evaluated all submissions to
ensure the highest level of quality.
A synthesis of the accepted papers and conference proceedings is
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captured in the subsections below. An informal synopsis of the
workshop combined with individual statements and observations is
available online [COMMENTARY].
3.1 Research Findings
Many of the research papers focused on the analysis of DITL data to
better understand various aspects of the root NXDomain
traffic[TECHNIQUES], [RARDBITS], [BLOCKLISTS], [MODELING],
[SEARCHLISTS]. Note: all workshop contributions are listed in
Appendices C, D, and E, and full papers and slides are available at
[WPNC].
While the DITL data has become the de facto referential dataset for
root traffic analysis, some presenters echoed concerns that the
dataset may have become biased or polluted with "artificial" queries
after the ICANN "Reveal Day", in which the list of applied-for gTLD
strings was publicy disclosed. No conclusive or empirical evidence
of tampering was presented; however, concerns about the integrity and
reliability of future DITL collections and analysis for purposes
related to new gTLDs were echoed by some panelists [IESCPANEL].
Furthermore, the statistical accuracy and completeness of DITL data -
used to draw inferential conclusions or more specifically create
second-level domain (SLD) block lists - was examined. The efficacy
of blocking domains based on sampled DNS data, e.g. DITL, was
investigated by comparing measurements of SLDs within DITL and that
of a multi-month root NXDomain collection at the A and J roots
[BLOCKLISTS]. The findings provided useful insights into SLD-root
affinities, SLD temporal query patterns and occurrence frequencies
that demonstrated the ineffectiveness of block listing domains based
on sampled DNS data such as [DITL].
Measurements of queries specifying the recursion desired (RD) bit to
the roots in DITL were quantified to identify the level and nature of
naive DNS clients and to determine and assess potential impacts that
could arise from the proposed SLD blocking technique to these naive
clients [RARDBITS]. A substantial proportion of the root server
request traffic contained queries with the RD bit specified. Both in
absolute and relative terms, requests specifying the RD bit for
applied-for gTLD were found to be significantly lower when compared
to existing TLDs. The root cause determination of what system or
mechanism is responsible for generating the queries was inconclusive
and only speculative explanations of faulty implementations of a DNS
resolving server were hypothesized. However, the analysis was also
not able to identify instances of actual or potential harm resulting
from these naive clients, suggesting if SLD blocking techniques were
to be utilized it is unlikely there would be any negative impact to
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these naive clients.
3.2 System Analysis
Comparison of elements can often help us to understand a system as a
whole. A passive study of the DNS traffic in a provisioned domain
such as "corp.com." may elucidate certain name collision parallels
[CORPCOM]. Such measurements were presented as a proxy for the
".corp" potential new gTLD. According to the study, significant DNS
traffic volume was directed at a variety of third-level domains under
"corp.com". This prompted a series of questions surrounding how name
collisions can be identified, as most end-users won't recognize that
problems may be due a name collision. How will users know that the
problem they're experiencing is a result of a new, colliding gTLD?
Will support groups be able to diagnose a name collision event from
reported symptom(s)? Will a collision-based security hole be
detectable?
These questions, whose underpinnings rely on communication and
educational awareness, may find recommendations or parallels from
other system references during the workshop [JASFRAMEWORK] - such as
the postal and telephone system. Most telephone and postal systems
have evolved over time, requiring individuals to alter the way they
address their parcels or place their calls. Both systems implemented
their changes in such a way that prior to the change, educational
material is distributed and communicated and for a period of time and
after the change compliance of the previous standard is temporarily
accepted. While the telephone and postal system operate in a very
different way than the DNS, these parallels of "advanced
notification, education and communication, and a grace period" were
insightful for how other similar systems transitioned.
3.3 Frameworks - Modeling, Analysis & Mitigation
Statements from several TLD operators during the conference
reverberated a theme for the need of improved tooling, education and
communication surrounding name collisions. The delegation of new
gTLDs is an ongoing event and there is a clear and immediate need for
these operators to have visibility to monitor and measure the effects
of these new gTLD delegations. A lack of tools, data, communication
and education surrounding name collisions has handicapped operators
in their ability to quantitatively measure and proactively provide
any steps for mitigation of risks. To this end, numerous techniques,
frameworks and models that focused on the concepts of analyzing,
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detecting, and measuring various name collision risk factors were
presented and reviewed in hopes to understand these underlying
concerns and issues [TECHNIQUES], [MODELING], [SEARCHLISTS],
[DNSENDUSER], [ENTNETWORK].
Data-driven analysis and mitigation require operators to be versed
and skilled with data analysis techniques to better understand the
contextual intent and ownership of DNS queries. An overview of
various DNS analysis techniques in which ways of decomposing names,
measuring temporal distributions between queries and detecting
organizational/geographical affinities, was presented [TECHNIQUES].
More specific techniques were also showcased - such as a systematic
way of observing and characterizing the impact of search lists within
root DNS traffic allowing operators to quantify the number of unique
entities that may be reliant on a particular name space
[SEARCHLISTS]. While not exhaustive, the techniques presented have
been proven to elucidate patterns within root DNS traffic data and
could serve as the potential building blocks of a DNS analysis
framework.
Most of the previously published work focused on name collisions has
produced various quantitative analyses based on observations of
Internet traffic and data, including DNS queries and Web content, in
which behavior and associated risks have been inferred. An
understanding of the inverse of the process by starting with a
fundamental model of name resolution at the client was proposed as an
alternative means to define risk [MODELING]. This model
deconstructed the process of name resolution at the resolver library
of a client system and formalized a model from which derived metrics
could be used to define and quantify associated risks. While the
model presented is only a piece of the greater name collision puzzle,
it provides potentially new insights into otherwise what may be
considered a missing piece.
Just as important as understanding the root causes of name
collisions, providing effective mitigation strategies is a critical
piece of the name collision puzzle. Mitigation can be achieved from
both higher levels, such as ICANN, as well as the enterprise level.
Proposed strategies for mitigating name collisions at both of these
levels were presented. While the technical details for each proposed
strategy varies, underlying dependencies in both strategies require
operators to monitor and educate/train their users.
3.4 Conclusions and Next Steps
In their concluding statement, the workshop committee stated: "It
occurs to the program committee that the analysis of the interactions
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between the different uses of domain names within local of global
context is almost a non-existent topic of research. This may have to
do with the lack or accessible data, lack of theory of root causes,
or a lack of interest, or a bias in the participation of the
workshop. We think that this is evidence that this study of the
global centrally important technical system needs to be ramped up".
Follow-on commentary [NEXTSTEPS] from the attendees reaffirmed this
opinion with recurring messages of a need to understand the root
causes of name collision and the need to overcome shortcomings within
our data collection, monitoring and analysis of the DNS.
Many name collision unknowns still exist. What are the root-causes
of these queries? What is going on within a recursive name server?
What vulnerabilities or subtle attack vectors do these new gTLD
delegations enable? The limited datasets available to researchers
operators are not sufficient to draw baseline measurements for these
questions - forcing the community to make inferences and rank guesses
as to what is going on within the DNS. Using these sub-optimal data
repositories to create solutions such as block lists are only dealing
with the symptoms of the problem and not addressing the root cause.
To properly answer these questions, the community needs to address
the issue of a shortage of funding and data collection / analysis.
Communication and educational outreach programs need to be improved
in order raise the awareness of impacted parties and broadening the
participation and sharing.
4 Security Considerations
Workshop participants discussed security aspects related to root
cause analysis and mitigation techniques of potential name collision
events. As noted in several papers and presentations, security
concerns both may arise, and may be addressed, with name collision
mitigation techniques. Follow-on measurement-based research is
important to security considerations for name collisions.
5 IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA.
6 Acknowledgments
We would like to thank both the program committee (Appendix A) and
the workshop participants (Appendix F), with equal appreciation to
those who spoke formally and those who joined in the lively
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discussions.
Additionally, we would like to thank the following persons for their
review comments: Burt Kaliski, Olaf Kolkman, and Danny McPherson.
7 Informative References
[SAC045] "Invalid Top Level Domain Queries at the Root Level of the
Domain Name System",
https://www.icann.org/en/groups/ssac/documents/sac-045-
en.pdf , November 2010.
[NCRI] "Name Collision Resources & Information",
http://www.icann.org/en/help/name-collision, Accessed
December 2014.
[RFC1591] J. Postel, "Domain Name System Structure and Delegation",
RFC 1591, March 1994.
[RFC2606] D. Eastlake, A. Panitz, "Reserved Top Level DNS Names", RFC
2606 (also BCP 32), June 1999.
[RFC6761] S. Cheshire, M. Krochmal, "Special-Use Domain Names", RFC
6761, February 2013.
[WPNC] "Workshop and Prize on Root Causes and Mitigation of Name
Collisions (WPNC)", http://namecollisions.net/, June 2014.
[SAC046] "Report of the Security and Stability Advisory Committee on
Root Scaling",
https://www.icann.org/en/groups/ssac/documents/sac-046-
en.pdf, December 2010.
[RSSAC] "RSSAC response to the root scaling report",
http://www.icann.org/en/news/correspondence/murai-to-
board-25nov10-en.pdf, November 2010.
[IR2012] "Preliminary Report | Regular Meeting of the ICANN Board",
http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents/prelim-
report-13sep12-en.htm, September 2012.
[SAC057] "Advisory on Internal Name Certificates",
http://www.icann.org/en/groups/ssac/documents/sac-057-
en.pdf, March, 2013.
[ISTUDY] "Security Studies on the Use of Non-Delegated TLDs, and
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Dotless Names",
https://www.icann.org/en/news/announcements/announcement-
28may13-en.htm, May 2013.
[DITL] "A Day in the Life of the Internet (DITL)" ,
http://www.caida.org/projects/ditl/, July 2011.
[INTERISLE] "Name Collision in the DNS",
https://www.icann.org/en/about/staff/security/ssr/name-
collision-02aug13-en.pdf, August 2013.
[IAB2008] "The IAB's response to ICANN's solicitation on DNS
stability", https://www.iab.org/documents/correspondence-
reports-documents/docs2008/2008-03-07-icann-new-gtlds/,
March 2008.
[NGCOMP] "New gTLD Collision Risk Mitigation",
https://www.icann.org/en/about/staff/security/ssr/new-
gtld-collision-mitigation-05aug13-en.pdf, August 2013.
[NCOMF] "ICANN Selects Lead for Development of Name Collision
Occurrence Management Framework",
http://www.icann.org/en/news/announcements/announcement-2-
11nov13-en.htm, November 2013.
[NCOMFINAL] https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/name-
collision-framework-30jul14-en.pdf
[MRDNC] "Mitigating the Risk of DNS Namespace Collisions",
https://www.icann.org/en/about/staff/security/ssr/name-
collision-mitigation-26feb14-en.pdf, February 2014.
[RSSAC002] "Advisory on Measurements of the Root Server System",
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/rssac-002-
measurements-root-20nov14-en.pdf
[COMMENTARY] "Proceedings of Name Collisions Workshop Available" ,
http://www.circleid.com/posts/20140326_proceedings_
of_name_collisions_workshop_available/, March 2014.
[NOCA] "Name Collision Occurrence Assessment" ,
http://newgtlds.icann.org
/sites/default/files/agreements/name-collision-assessment-
04aug14-en.htm , August 2014.
[NCSLDCIV] "Name Collision SLD Controlled Interruption Variations" ,
http://newgtlds.icann.org/
sites/default/files/agreements/name-collision-sld-
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controlled-interruption-12sep14-en.htm , September 2014.
[ADDNOCA] "Addendum To Name Collision Occurrence Assessment" ,
http://newgtlds.icann.org/
sites/default/files/agreements/name-collision-assessment-
addendum-14nov14-en.htm , November 2014.
Appendix A. Program Committee
This workshop program committee consisted of Geoff Huston, Burt
Kaliski, Olaf Kolkman, John Levine, Allison Mankin, Lixia Zhang,
Anne-Marie Eklund Loewinder, and Andrew Sullivan.
Appendix B. Workshop Material
Main Workshop Page: http://namecollisions.net/
Name Collision Invited and Submitted Papers, Panels and Videos:
http://namecollisions.net/program/index.html
Appendix C. Peer-Reviewed Name Collision Papers
[TECHNIQUES] "Analysis Techniques for Determining Cause and Ownership
of DNS Queries" by Matthew Thomas and Andrew Simpson
[RARDBITS] "Analysing the Use of the RA and RD bits in Queries to
Root Servers" by Jim Reid
[BLOCKLISTS] "The Effectiveness of Block Lists in Preventing
Collisions" by Matthew Thomas, Yannis Labrou and Andrew
Simpson
[MODELING] "What's in a Name (Collision): Modeling and Quantifying
Collision Potential" by Casey Deccio and Duane Wessels
[SEARCHLISTS] "Detecting Search Lists in Authoritative DNS" by Andrew
Simpson
Appendix D. Invited Name Collision Talks
[KEEPEYE] "Keeping an Eye on Name Collisions" by Bruce Schneier
[CORPCOM] "Looking at corp.com as a proxy for .corp" by Colin Strutt
[DNSENDUSER] "Measuring DNS Behaviors from the End User Perspective"
by Geoff Huston
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INTERNET DRAFT Name Collisions Workshop March 7, 2015
[DNS-OARC] "DNS-OARC" by Keith Mitchell
[ENTNETWORK] "Name Collision Mitigation for Enterprise Networks" by
Paul Hoffman
Appendix E. Panels and Discussions
[IESCPANEL] "Internet Engineering and Standards Considerations" by
Suzanne Woolf, Peter Koch, Olaf Kolkman, Warren Kumari,
and John Levine
[JASFRAMEWORK] "Name Collisions Management Framework" by Jeff Schmidt
[NEXTSTEPS] "Workshop Wrap-Up and Next Steps" by Burt Kaliski
Appendix F. Workshop Participants
A list of workshop participants is provided at [WPNC].
Authors' Addresses
Matthew Thomas
Email: mthomas@verisign.com
Allison Mankin
Email: allison.mankin@gmail.com
Lixia Zhang
Email: lixia@cs.ucla.edu
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