Internet DRAFT - draft-thomson-http-scd
draft-thomson-http-scd
Network Working Group M. Thomson
Internet-Draft Mozilla
Intended status: Standards Track G. Eriksson
Expires: May 3, 2017 C. Holmberg
Ericsson
October 30, 2016
An Architecture for Secure Content Delegation using HTTP
draft-thomson-http-scd-02
Abstract
An architecture is described for content distribution using a
secondary server that might be operated with reduced privileges.
This architecture allows a primary server to delegate the
responsibility for delivery of the payload of an HTTP response to a
secondary server. The secondary server is unable to modify this
content. The content is encrypted, which in some cases will prevent
the secondary server from learning about the content.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Content Distribution Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Secure Content Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Out-of-Band Content Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Performance Trade-Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Confidentiality of Resource Identity . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Content Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Content Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Resource Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Confidentiality Protection Limitations . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Cross-Origin Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.3. Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Content Distribution Security
The distribution of content on the web at scale is necessarily highly
distributed. Large amounts of content needs large numbers of
servers. And distributing those servers closer to clients has a
significant, positive impact on performance.
A major drawback of existing solutions for content distribution is
that a primary server is required to cede control of resources to the
secondary server. The secondary server is able to see and modify
content that they distribute.
There are few technical mechanisms in place to limit the capabilities
of servers that provide content for a given origin. Mechanisms like
content security policy [CSP] and sub-resource integrity [SRI] can be
used to prevent modification of resources in some contexts, but these
mechanisms are limited in what they can protect and they can impose
certain operational costs. For the most part, server operators are
forced to limit the content that is served on servers that are not
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directly under their control or rely on non-technical measures such
as contracts and courts to proscribe bad behavior.
1.1. Secure Content Delegation
This document describes how an primary origin server might securely
delegate the responsibility for serving content to a secondary
server.
The solution comprises three basic components:
o A delegation component allows a primary server to delegate
specific resources to another server.
o Integrity attributes ensure that the content cannot be modified by
the secondary server.
o Confidentiality protection limits the ability of the secondary
server to learn what the content holds.
Note that the guarantees provided by confidentiality protection are
not strong, see Section 4 for details.
In addition to these basic components, a fourth mechanism provides a
client with the ability to learn resource metadata from the primary
server prior to making a request for specific resources. This can
dramatically improve performance where a client needs to acquire
multiple delegated resources.
No new mechanisms are described in this document; the application of
several existing and separately-proposed protocol mechanisms to this
problem is described. A primary server can use these mechanisms to
take advantage of secondary servers where concerns about security
might have otherwise prevented their use. This might be for content
that was previously considered too sensitive for third-party
distribution, or to access secondary servers that were previously
consider insufficiently trustworthy.
1.2. Notational Conventions
The words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", and "MAY" are used in this
document. It's not shouting; when they are capitalized, they have
the special meaning defined in [RFC2119].
This document uses the terms client, primary server and secondary
server. These terms refer to the three roles played in this
architecture. Note that "primary server" as used in this document
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encompasses the notion of both an origin server and a gateway as
defined in [RFC7230].
2. Out-of-Band Content Encoding
The out-of-band content encoding [I-D.reschke-http-oob-encoding]
provides the basis for delegation of content distribution. A request
is made to the primary server, but in place of the complete response
only response header fields and an out-of-band content encoding is
provided. The out-of-band content encoding directs the client to
retrieve content from another resource.
Client Secondary Primary
| | |
| Request | |
+----------------------------------->|
| | |
| Response + OOB CE |
|<-----------------------------------+
| | |
|GET | |
+----------------->| |
| | |
| 200 | |
|<-----------------+ |
| | |
Figure 1: Using Out-of-Band Content Encoding
Out-of-band content encoding behaves much like a redirect. In fact,
a redirect was considered as part of the early design, but rejected
because without defining a new set of 3xx status codes it would
change the effective origin [RFC6454] of the resource. Furthermore,
the content encoding specifically preserves header fields sent by the
primary server, rejecting any unauthenticated header fields that
might be provided by the secondary server.
2.1. Performance Trade-Off
An additional request is necessary to retrieve content. This has a
negative impact on latency. However, if the secondary server is
positioned close to the client, there are several potential benefits:
Fewer bit-miles: Content hosted in the secondary server that is
nearby can be served to those clients without having to traverse a
long network path.
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Better server resource allocation: Using a dedicated secondary
server reduces the load on the primary server, allowing it more
capacity for serving other requests.
Better throughput: If a secondary server is closer to a client, more
bandwidth might be available for delivery of content when compared
with the link between client and primary server.
Lower time to last byte: For some resources, increased bandwidth can
counteract the added latency cost of the extra requests, and
potentially reduce the time needed to retrieve the entire
resource.
The problems of providing integrity protection for content delivered
in this fashion is discussed in Section 3; confidentiality protection
and its limitations is described in Section 4; and reducing the
latency impact of making multiple requests for each resource is
described in Section 5.
2.2. Confidentiality of Resource Identity
The URL used to acquire a resource from a secondary server can be
unrelated to the URL of the resource that refers to its contents.
This allows a primary server to hide the relationship between content
in a secondary server and the original resources that is use that
content.
Any entity SHOULD be unable to determine the URL of the original
resource based on the URL of the secondary server resource alone.
This can be achieved by having randomized URLs for secondary
resources and maintaining a mapping table, or by using a fixed
mapping function with a secret input such as HMAC [RFC2104].
Without other information, this would prevent the secondary server
from learning which resources are requested from the primary server
by observing the requests that it serves for out-of-band content.
While in some cases, information about the resource is obtainable by
the secondary server cache, see Section 4, an unpredictable mapping
ensures that other protection mechanisms can be effective if
possible.
3. Content Integrity
Ensuring that content is not modified by the secondary server is
critical. Information that is acquired from the secondary server is
not integrity protected and therefore MUST NOT be used without being
authenticated.
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A cryptographic hash over the content sent in the initial response
could be compared against a hash of the content delivered by the
secondary server. This is an expansion of the the basic design of
[SRI].
A progressive integrity mechanism like the one described in
[I-D.thomson-http-mice] ensures that there are no significant
performance penalties imposed by the integrity protection.
Progressive integrity allows for consumption of content as it is
delivered without losing integrity protection.
A response from the primary server could include an M-I header field
with an integrity proof, allowing the content to be delivered out-of-
band without any additional header fields.
4. Content Confidentiality
Confidentiality protection for content is provided by applying an
encryption content encoding [I-D.ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding] to
content before that content is provided to a secondary server.
Much of the value provided by a secondary server derives from its
ability to deliver the same content to multiple nearby clients. The
more clients that can be delivered the same resource, the greater the
efficiency gains. As a result, resources that are provided to many
or all clients are the ones that benefit most from caching.
This means that unless a resource has access control mechanisms that
would prevent the secondary from accessing a resource, the
confidentiality protections provided by encrypting content is
limited. A secondary server need only independently request
resources from the primary server in order to learn everything about
the content it is serving, including the mapping of primary URLs to
secondary URLs. For instance, employing a web crawler on a web site
might reveal the identity of numerous resources and the location of
the any out-of-band content for those resources.
Confidentiality protection allows resources that are protected by
client authentication to remain confidential. Confidentiality
protection also improves protections against cross-origin theft of
confidential data (see Section 7.2).
5. Resource Map
Learning about header fields and out-of-band cache locations for
resources in advance of needing to make requests to those resources
allows a client to avoid making requests to the primary server. This
can greatly improve the performance of applications that make
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multiple requests of the same server, such as web browsing or video
streaming.
Without defining any new additional protocol mechanisms, HTTP/2
server push [RFC7540] can be used to provide requests, responses and
the out-of-band content encoding information describing resources.
Since no actual content is included, this requires relatively little
data to describe a number of resources. Once this information is
available, the client no longer needs to contact the origin server to
acquire the described resources.
This approach has some significant deployment drawbacks, so explicit
data formats for carrying this data might be defined.
Note: We need a separate draft on these alternative methods.
6. Error Handling
Error handling for clients is described in
[I-D.reschke-http-oob-encoding].
For idempotent requests, a second request might be made to the
primary server. This request would omit any indication of support
for out-of-band content coding from the Accept-Encoding header field,
plus a link relation indicating the secondary resource and the reason
for failure.
A primary server can use this information to make informed choices
about whether to use content delegation.
Non-idempotent requests cannot be safely retried. Therefore, clients
cannot retry a a request and provide information about errors to the
primary server. For this reason, primary servers SHOULD NOT delegate
content for non-idempotent methods.
7. Security Considerations
This document describes a framework whereby content might be
distributed to a secondary server, without losing integrity with
respect to the content that is distributed.
This design relies on integrity and confidentiality for the request
and response made to the primary server. These requests MUST be made
using HTTP over TLS (HTTPS) [RFC2818] only. Though there is a lesser
requirement for confidentiality, requests made to the secondary
server MUST also be secured using HTTPS.
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7.1. Confidentiality Protection Limitations
Content that requires only integrity protection can be safely
distributed by a third-party using this design. Entities that make a
decision about confidentiality for others have often been shown to be
incorrect in the past. An incorrect conclusion have serious
consequences. Thus the choice of whether confidentiality protection
is needed is quite important.
Some confidentiality protection against the secondary server is
provided, but that is limited to content that is not otherwise
accessible to that server (see Section 4). Only content that has
access controls on the primary server that prevent access by the
secondary server can retain confidentiality protection.
Content with different access control policies MUST use different
keying material for encryption. This prevents a client with access
to one resource from acquiring keys that can be used for resources
they are not authorized to access.
Clients that wish to retain control over the confidentiality of
responses can omit the out-of-band label from the Accept-Encoding
header field on requests, thereby indicating that a direct response
is necessary.
7.2. Cross-Origin Access
The content delegation creates the possibility that a primary server
could adopt remotely hosted content. On the web, this is normally
limited by Cross-Origin Resource Sharing [CORS], which requires that
a client first request permission to make a resource accessible to
another origin.
This document describes a method whereby content hosted on a remote
secondary server can be made accessible to another origin. The
content of the out-of-band resource is written into the content of a
response from the origin. All an origin needs to make this happen is
knowledge of the identity of the out-of-band resource, something that
might be difficult based on the guidance in Section 2.2, but not
infeasible. A client requests this content using any ambient
authority available to it (such as HTTP authentication header fields
and cookies).
The simplest option for reducing the ability to steal content in this
fashion is to require that the origin demonstrate that it knows the
content of the resource. Unfortunately, this demonstration is
difficult without imposing significant performance penalties, so we
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require a lesser assurance: that the origin knows how to decrypt the
content.
This makes content confidentiality (Section 4) mandatory and limits
the resources that can be stolen by an origin to those that are
already encrypted. Most importantly, only resources for which the
origin knows the encryption key can be stolen.
For this protection to be effective, origins MUST use different
encryption keys for resources with different sets of authorized
recipients. Otherwise, an attacker might learn the encryption key
for one resource then use that to decrypt a resource that it is not
authorized to read.
Resources that rely on signature-based integrity protection are made
only marginally more difficult to steal, since the origin needs to
learn the signing public key. However, this is not expected to be
difficult, since confidentiality protection for public keys.
Resources that rely on hash-based integrity protection require that
the origin learn the hash of the resource.
7.3. Traffic Analysis
Using a secondary server reveals a great deal of information to the
secondary server about resources even if confidentiality protection
is effective. The size of responses and the pattern of requests for
resources can reveal information about their contents. When used
carefully, padding as described in
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding] can obscure the length of
responses and reduce the information that the secondary server is
able to learn.
A random or unpredictable mapping from the primary resource URL on
the primary server to the URL of the content is necessary, see
Section 2.2.
Length hiding for header fields on responses from the primary server
might be more important when an out-of-band encoding is used, since
the body of the response becomes less variable.
Making requests for content to multiple different servers can improve
the amount of content length information available to network
observers. HTTP/2 multiplexing might have otherwise reduced the
exposure of length information, but using out-of-band content
encoding could expose lengths for those resources that can be
distributed by a secondary server. Note that this is not
fundamentally worse than HTTP/1.1 in the absence of pipelining.
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Padding in HTTP/2 or encrypted content encoding can be used to
further obscure lengths.
8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.reschke-http-oob-encoding]
Reschke, J. and S. Loreto, "'Out-Of-Band' Content Coding
for HTTP", draft-reschke-http-oob-encoding-07 (work in
progress), July 2016.
[I-D.thomson-http-mice]
Thomson, M., "Merkle Integrity Content Encoding", draft-
thomson-http-mice-01 (work in progress), June 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
9.2. Informative References
[CORS] van Kesteren, A., "Cross-Origin Resource Sharing", January
2014, <https://www.w3.org/TR/cors/>.
[CSP] West, M., Barth, A., and D. Veditz, "Content Security
Policy Level 2", August 2015, <https://w3c.github.io/
webappsec-csp/2/>.
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding]
Thomson, M., "Encrypted Content-Encoding for HTTP", draft-
ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding-02 (work in progress),
June 2016.
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[I-D.thomson-http-content-signature]
Thomson, M., "Content-Signature Header Field for HTTP",
draft-thomson-http-content-signature-00 (work in
progress), July 2015.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC6454] Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454>.
[SRI] Akhawe, D., Braun, F., Marier, F., and J. Weinberger,
"Subresource Integrity", November 2015,
<https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-subresource-integrity>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
Magnus Westerlund noted the potential for a violation of the cross
origin protections offered in browsers.
Authors' Addresses
Martin Thomson
Mozilla
Email: martin.thomson@gmail.com
Goeran AP Eriksson
Ericsson
Email: goran.ap.eriksson@ericsson.com
Christer Holmberg
Ericsson
Email: christer.holmberg@ericsson.com
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