Internet DRAFT - draft-thomson-quic-grease
draft-thomson-quic-grease
QUIC M. Thomson
Internet-Draft Mozilla
Intended status: Informational December 07, 2017
Expires: June 10, 2018
More Apparent Randomization for QUIC
draft-thomson-quic-grease-00
Abstract
Options for creating more apparent randomization in the QUIC header
are discussed.
Status of This Memo
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1. More Grease for QUIC
The QUIC invariants draft [INVARIANTS] commits QUIC [QUIC] to a small
set of traits that are intended to remain stable across all version
of QUIC. However, there are some protocol traits in QUIC version 1
[QUIC] that we do that remain readable.
This note explores a few options for protecting QUIC against casual
inspection by entities other than the endpoints participating in the
connection. These techniques are aimed espectially at making any
form of inspection considerably more difficult if the QUIC version of
a packet is unknown.
The intent of applying this protection is to encourage the use of
protocol fields that are intentionally designed to be readable to
non-participating entities (see also [SIGNALS]). For those fields
that can be recovered without access to negotiated cryptographic
keys, the intent is to create an incentive to implement version-
specific handling rather than to assume that certain properties don't
change between versions.
2. Overall Design
Protocol fields that deploy with predictable values or a limited
range of values can ossify. Ossification is the effect whereby the
use of values in a way that is contradictory to established patterns
triggers adverse reactions from the network. Usually, this is a
result of middleboxes having developed assumptions about how
protocols operate.
The idea that ossification actively prevents the deployment of
modified protocols remains a little contentious in the community. On
the other hand, we have plenty of evidence from TLS deployment to
suggest that this happens. Appendix D.4 of [TLS13] describes an
example of ossification and describes the measures that were
necessary to counteract it.
If it is possible to provide a measure of protection against protocol
ossification without inordinate expense, then it is the view of at
least this author that doing so would have some potential value.
Provided the costs are indeed low enough
This describes changes to some of the version-specific fields in QUIC
version 1 [QUIC]. Any invariant [INVARIANTS] would not be affected
by this change.
The simplest defense against ossification is to apply a reversible
permutation to these values. A pseudo-random function (PRP) is the
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obvious choice. If the key of that function is only known to
endpoints, then the values will be readily accessible to endpoints.
3. Keying
There are two different contexts in which we might consider applying
this sort of protection, and the keys we can use differ.
QUIC already has the tools necessary to derive keys. Handshake
packets use a key that is derived from a combination of a version-
specific key (or salt) and the connection ID. A similar approach
could be used here.
For packets that have packet protection, there are many options
available. The secret used for generating the packet number gap
(packet_number_secret) is a candidate. It might however be better to
derive a key from the packet protection secrets (client_pp_secret_<N>
or server_pp_secret_<N>).
4. Pseudo-Random Permutations
There are many PRP functions that could apply to this case. Most
come from cryptographic contexts and therefore assume inputs and
state spaces that exceed the size of the fields we're interested in.
This section presents three options of varying complexity. It's
likely that there are many more.
It is critical to note that these functions are not intended to
provide any real confidentiality - you need strong keys and ciphers
for that. None of the functions include any integrity protection
either - QUIC already provides integrity protection for its headers.
These techniques might be used to enable unlinkability in some
circumstances.
4.1. Remainder
The first is a simple masking using a remainder remainder operation.
This assumes that there are a limited number of valid values for a
given field. Valid values are either constrained to or mapped to a
contiguous range starting from 0. Then, select a modulus |m| that is
greater than the largest value and encryption and decryption are
simple:
m = max(x) + k
E(x) = x + random() * m
D(x) = x % m
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The drawback here is that you don't get a uniform distribution. If
we use this for the long header and an Initial packet is type 0, then
it will never pick anything that isn't a multiple of |m|. Also, the
number of values that |k| can assume is small. The benefit is that
this is trivial to implement. Also, an implementation that chooses
not to randomize still produces values that can be understood.
4.2. XOR
This PRP uses a simple exclusive OR:
D(x) = E(x) = x ^ k
This method is the easiest to implement. The drawback here is
that |k| is stable and is therefore trivially recovered when multiple
messages use the same key.
4.3. FFX Lite
FFX [1] is a mode of format-preserving encryption that encrypts
values from a space of essentially arbitrary size. FFX would be
ideal apart from one significant drawback: FFX is extremely
computationally expensive for smaller values, as it uses more rounds
for short values to ensure that it continues to preserve its security
margins.
On the other hand, we're not looking for any actual security, so we
wouldn't need to have the obscene number of rounds that FFX depends
on for small values (their recommended parameters don't include
values for 5 bit values, ).
If you make a few choices (cryptographers rarely do this for you, and
FFX has the usual cornucopia of tuning parameters), you can produce a
set of parameters that makes FFX quite simple and performant. This
is essentially two rounds of FFX with radix=2, P={}, addition=0,
method=2, split(n)=floor(n/2), rnds(n)=2, and F(x)=AES(k, x).
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E(x):
split = num_bits(x) / 2
a = x >> split
b = s & (1 << split - 1)
tmp = a ^ AES(k, b)
result = (tmp << split) | (b ^ AES(k, tmp))
D(x):
split = num_bits(x) / 2
a = x >> split
b = s & (1 << split - 1)
tmp = b ^ AES(k, a)
result = ((a ^ AES(k, tmp)) << split) | tmp
4.4. Predictability
The XOR and FFX-based methods exhibit properties similar to
encryption with AES-ECB mode. That is, for a given key, the same
plaintext will always encrypt to the same ciphertext.
That means that if input values do not vary over time, it will be
possible to infer underlying values easily. The goal is to ensure
that the protected values change for each new connection, for which a
changing key is sufficient. As stated, the goal is not to provide
confidentiality against a determined attacker, only to defend against
a lazy observer.
5. Scrambling QUIC Packet Headers
There are two fields in the QUIC header that merit some degree of
scrambling: the packet type and the packet number. The other fields
of QUIC packets: invariant bits, connection ID, version, and the
message payload are either:
o invariant and thus important to leave unmodified,
o explicitly designed for consumption by middleboxes and thus
important to leave unmodified, or
o already protected by other means, such as an AEAD [AEAD].
It's possible that this technique could be applied to invariant
fields, but that is likely to have less immediate utility. Worse, it
would commit every future version of the protocol to employ the same
technique. Limiting this to version-specific fields allows the
technique to improve with successive protocol versions.
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5.1. Scrambling Packet Types
We have two values here, a 7-bit value that is used for the long
header, and a 5-bit value that is used for the short header. It is
possible that the KEY_PHASE bit in the short header could also be
covered.
Any of the described methods could work to obscure these fields. The
remainder method would however degrade as new packet types are
defined, though the current set of types is very small.
The cost of scrambling for packet types is that the entire space of
values is then used, which could make multiplexing with realtime
protocols more challenging. However, it is possible that those
protocols could use their out-of-band negotiation to influence the
scrambling. For instance, they might mandate the use of a connection
ID from a set of values that produce values that are compatible with
the multiplexing scheme in use (determining such a value would be
easy).
5.2. Scrambling Packet Numbers
Scrambling packet numbers is relatively straightforward to apply.
The remainder method doesn't work here, though the XOR and FFX-based
techniques both work well.
The cost of scrambling the packet number is that it would make it
more difficult to use packet numbers to support the use of other
features, like the heuristics necessary to use the spin bit in the
presence of loss and reordering.
If a variable-length integer is used to represent a packet number and
FFX is chosen, the length would need to be separately scrambled.
That suggests that retaining the packet number length in the type
field is desirable if FFX is chosen.
For a packet number, the XOR-based technique would not provide any
appreciable barrier to recovery of the underlying value.
5.2.1. Taking Packet Number Scrambling Further
If packet numbers are scrambled, it is possible to use that
scrambling instead of both initial packet number randomization and
the packet number gap.
For the initial packet number, scrambling would be sufficient to
ensure that the packet number field could contain all possible
values. That removes the need to reserve 1024 values to avoid
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overflow of the 32-bit space before a peer receives the initial
value. Packet numbers would always start at 0, but the wire encoding
would be encoded.
For the packet number gap, if the key calculation takes connection ID
as input, the need for a packet number gap is eliminated. Switching
to a new connection ID would cause packet numbers to become
unlinkable with previous ones. Deriving the per-connection-ID key
with HKDF would ensure that even with a simple XOR, the two keys
can't be correlated.
6. Security Considerations
This section exists so that I can submit a draft without being
badgered about this. There are almost certainly security concerns
here, but I don't care. This draft is a throwaway.
7. References
7.1. Informative References
[AEAD] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
[INVARIANTS]
Thomson, M., "Version-Independent Properties of QUIC",
draft-thomson-quic-invariants-00 (work in progress),
November 2017.
[QUIC] Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic-transport-08 (work
in progress), December 2017.
[SIGNALS] Hardie, T., "Path signals", draft-hardie-path-signals-02
(work in progress), November 2017.
[TLS13] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-22 (work in progress),
November 2017.
7.2. URIs
[1] https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Block-Cipher-
Techniques/documents/BCM/proposed-modes/ffx/ffx-spec.pdf
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Author's Address
Martin Thomson
Mozilla
Email: martin.thomson@gmail.com
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