Internet DRAFT - draft-thomson-tls-sic
draft-thomson-tls-sic
TLS M. Thomson
Internet-Draft Mozilla
Intended status: Standards Track March 27, 2019
Expires: September 28, 2019
Suppressing Intermediate Certificates in TLS
draft-thomson-tls-sic-00
Abstract
A TLS client that has access to the complete set of published
intermediate certificates can inform servers of this fact so that the
server can avoid sending intermediates, reducing the size of the TLS
handshake.
Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Got Intermediates Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction
In some uses of public key infrastructure (PKI) intermediate
certificates are used to sign end-entity certificates. In the web
PKI, clients require that certificate authorities disclose all
intermediate certificates that they create. Though the set of
intermediate certificates is large, the size is bounded, so it is
possible to provide a complete set of certificates.
For a client that has all intermediates, having the server send
intermediates in the TLS handshake increases the size of the
handshake unnecessarily. This document creates a signal that a
client can send that informs the server that it has a complete set of
intermediates. A server that receives this signal can limit the
certificate chain it sends to just the end-entity certificate, saving
on handshake size.
This mechanism is intended to be complementary with certificate
compression [COMPRESS] in that it reduces the size of the handshake.
2. Terms and Definitions
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Got Intermediates Flag
A client that believes that it has a current, complete set of
intermediate certificates sends the tls_flags extension [TLS-FLAGS]
with the 0xTBD flag set to 1. A server can also set the flag in a
CertificateRequest extension.
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A server that receives a value of 1 in the 0xTBD flag from a
ClientHello message SHOULD omit all certificates other than the end-
entity certificate from its Certificate message. A client that
receives a value of 1 in the 0xTBD flag in a CertificateRequest
message SHOULD omit all certificates other than the end-entity
certificate from the Certificate message that it sends in response.
The 0xTBD flag can only be send in a ClientHello or
CertificateRequest message. Endpoints that receive a value of 1 in
any other handshake message MUST generate a fatal illegal_parameter
alert.
4. Security Considerations
This creates an unencrypted signal that might be used to identify
which clients believe that they have all intermediates. This might
allow cilents to be more effectively fingerprinted by peers and any
elements on the network path.
5. IANA Considerations
This document registers the 0xTBD flag in the registry created by
[TLS-FLAGS].
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[TLS-FLAGS]
Nir, Y., "A Flags Extension for TLS 1.3", draft-nir-tls-
tlsflags-00 (work in progress), March 2019.
6.2. Informative References
[COMPRESS]
Ghedini, A. and V. Vasiliev, "TLS Certificate
Compression", draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-04
(work in progress), October 2018.
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Author's Address
Martin Thomson
Mozilla
Email: mt@lowentropy.net
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