Internet DRAFT - draft-tigress-gssapi-impl
draft-tigress-gssapi-impl
TIGRESS C. Astiz
Internet-Draft A. Pelletier
Intended status: Informational Apple Inc
Expires: 22 August 2023 18 February 2023
Tigress-GSS API-Sample Implementation
draft-tigress-gssapi-impl-00
Abstract
This document describes a sample implementation of transferring
digital credentials securily (Tigress) using GSS API.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tigress-gssapi-impl/. Status
information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-tigress-gssapi-impl/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/dimmyvi/tigress-requirements.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 22 August 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. GSS-Api Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction
Prevously Tigress reviewed an implementation of digital credentials
transfer using Tigress protocol (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/
draft-art-tigress/). In previous IETF meetings community asked to
review other possible solutions using alternative standards to
illustrate how Tigress problem can be solved differently. In this
document we are trying to describe how an alternative potential
implementation of a solution to Tigress [Tigress-req-02] problem of
transferring digital credentials securily can be done using GSS API
[RFC2743].
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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3. GSS-Api Proposal
General security service application program interface, or GSS-API,
from [RFC2743] defines a generic protocol for the security of
messages being transferred and can provide authentication, integrity,
and confidentiality. GSS-API does not define how the messages are
sent between parties.
Leveraging GSS-API provides flexibility to easily change the security
of how a credential is transferred, but a lot of work to define the
communication channel between two devices is still required. GSS-API
also requires that each party have auth credentials before the
communication occurs, which isn’t a requirement for our use case.
## Secure Credential Transfer with GSS-API
Because GSS-API does not define the communication channel we will
assume the devices are able to communicate via an arbitrary
intermediary server. An example transfer using GSS-API + Tigress
could like like:
1. Sender creates a single use auth credential and encrypts it with
a symmetric key that will be a shared secret.
1. _Tigress_: The creation, structure, and validation of this
single use auth credential would need to be defined by
Tigress.
2. Sender creates a GSS-API security context token with the
encrypted credential.
3. Sender sends security context token + shared secret to receiver.
1. If a mailbox style intermediate server is used this can be
done via a url where the shared secret is include in the url
fragment.
2. _Tigress_: How this information is sent to the intermediary
server would need to be defined by tigress.
4. Receiver gets information for communicating with the sender and
the shared secret.
1. This information could be transferred via a url, a file, a QR
code, etc.
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2. _Tigress_: The high level format of this information would
need to be defined by tigress so that devices could parse the
data and extract the GSS-API specific parts.
3. _Tigress:_ We could recommend that this information have a
nice preview, but that wouldn't be required.
5. Receiver accepts the security context token, and uses the shared
secret to validate the credential.
6. Receiver sends back security context token to sender. This
process is repeated until the security context is full
established.
1. _Tigress_: How the receiver sends the opaque blob to the
sender via the intermediary server would need to be defined
by tigress.
7. Sender creates credential to share, use GSS-API to create a
message token, send message token to receiver.
8. Receiver gets message token and uses GSS-API to extract the
underlying credential.
1. If the receiver is done they can terminate the transfer and
send a GSS-API termination back to the sender.
1. _Tigress_: How the session with the intermediary server
between the sender and receiver is terminated would need
to be defined by tigress.
2. Or, the receiver can perform additional calls with the sender
to complete transferring the credential.
4. Security Considerations
TODO Security
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2743, January 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2743>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
6.2. Informative References
[Tigress-req-02]
Vinokurov, D., Pelletier, A., Astiz, C., and B. Lassey,
"Tigress requirements", February 2023,
<https://github.com/dimmyvi/tigress-requirements/>.
Acknowledgments
TODO acknowledge.
Authors' Addresses
Casey Astiz
Apple Inc
Email: castiz@apple.com
Alex Pelletier
Apple Inc
Email: a_pelletier@apple.com
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