Internet DRAFT - draft-tomas-openroaming
draft-tomas-openroaming
Independent Submission B. Tomas
Internet-Draft Wireless Broadband Alliance, Inc.
Intended status: Informational M. Grayson
Expires: 17 August 2024 Cisco Systems
N. Canpolat
Intel Corporation
B. A. Cockrell
SingleDigits
S. Gundavelli
Cisco Systems
14 February 2024
WBA OpenRoaming Wireless Federation
draft-tomas-openroaming-02
Abstract
This document describes the Wireless Broadband Alliance's OpenRoaming
system. The OpenRoaming architectures enables a seamless onboarding
experience for devices connecting to access networks that are part of
the federation of access networks and identity providers. The
primary objective of this document is to describe the protocols that
form the foundation for this architecture, enabling providers to
correctly configure their equipment to support interoperable
OpenRoaming signalling exchanges. In addition, the topic of
OpenRoaming has been raised in different IETF working groups, and
therefore a secondary objective is to assist those discussions by
describing the federation organization and framework.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 August 2024.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Wireless Broadband Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. OpenRoaming Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Identifying OpenRoaming Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Scaling Secured Signalling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IDP Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. Dynamic Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. Discovery of EAP-AKA/AKA' Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.3. Proving a discovered RadSec server is authoritative for a
realm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. OpenRoaming Passpoint Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. OpenRoaming Policy Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. OpenRoaming Closed Access Group Policies . . . . . . . . 14
7.2.1. Level of Assurance Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2.2. Quality of Service Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.2.3. Privacy Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2.4. ID-Type Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3. Prioritizing Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8. OpenRoaming RADIUS Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.1. Operator-Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.2. Chargeable-User-Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.3. Location-Data/Location-Information . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.4. WBA-Identity-Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.5. WBA-Offered-Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.6. WLAN-Venue-Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.7. WBA-Custom-SLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.8. Additional attributes related to OpenRoaming settled . . 22
8.8.1. WBA-Financial-Clearing-Provider . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.8.2. WBA-Data-Clearing-Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.8.3. WBA-Linear-Volume-Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.1. Network Selection and Triggering Authentication . . . . . 23
9.2. Dynamic Discovery of RadSec Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
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9.3. End-User Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10. Future Enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix A. Example OpenRoaming Signalling Flow . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix B. Example OpenRoaming RCOI Usage . . . . . . . . . . . 31
B.1. OpenRoaming RCOI based policy for supporting QoS tiers . 31
B.2. OpenRoaming RCOI based policy for supporting identity type
policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
B.3. OpenRoaming RCOI based policy for supporting different
identity proofing policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Appendix C. OpenRoaming legal framework . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
C.1. Seamless experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
C.2. OpenRoaming Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
C.3. OpenRoaming legal terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1. Introduction
WBA OpenRoaming is a roaming federation service of Access Network
Providers (ANPs) and Identity Providers (IDPs), enabling an automatic
and secure Wi-Fi experience globally. WBA OpenRoaming creates the
framework to seamlessly connect billions of users and things to
millions of Wi-Fi networks.
ANP-1 --\ _----_ /-- IDP-1
\ Access _( Open )_ Identity /
ANP-2 ---<== Network ---( Roaming )--- Providers <==-- IDP-2
/ Providers (_ _) \
ANP-3 --/ '----' \-- IDP-3
Figure 1: OpenRoaming Federation
WBA OpenRoaming recognizes the benefits that the likes of eduroam
[RFC7593] provide to the education and research community. WBA
OpenRoaming defines a global federation that is targeted at serving
all communities, while supporting both settlement-free use cases
where "free" Wi-Fi is being offered to end-users in order to support
some alternative value proposition, as well as traditional settled
"paid" for Wi-Fi offered by some cellular providers.
OpenRoaming is designed to deliver end-to-end security between a
Network Access Server deployed by an OpenRoaming Access Network
Provider and an EAP Server [RFC3748] deployed by an OpenRoaming
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Identity Provider. The security of the solution is based on mTLS
using certificates issued under Wireless Broadband Alliance's Public
Key Infrastructure [RFC5280].
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Terminology
Access Network Query Protocol (ANQP):
An IEEE 802.11 defined protocol that allows for access network
information retrieval in a pre-association state. ANQP has been
further extended by the Wi-Fi Alliance (WFA) as part of its
Passpoint program [PASSPOINT].
Access Network Provider (ANP):
An entity that has joined the federation and serves OpenRoaming
end-users by configuring the OpenRoaming RCOI(s) in its Wi-Fi
equipment.
Broker:
An entity that has joined the federation and performs certain
specific roles to help scale the operation of the federation. The
separate roles of a broker can include:
1. Assigning WBA identities to ANPs and IDPs.
2. Operating an issuing intermediate certificate authority
under the WBA's PKI and issuing certificates to ANPs and
IDPs.
3. Operating a registration authority to a third party
operated issuing intermediate certificate authority under
WBA's PKI to enable certificates to be issued to ANPs and
IDPs.
Closed Access Group (CAG):
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The definition of the 12 most significant bits of an OUI-36 RCOI
to indicate OpenRoaming policy controls that can be enforced by
ANPs and IDPs.
Identity Provider (IDP):
An entity that has joined the federation and includes the
OpenRoaming RCOI(s) in the Passpoint profile of its end-user
devices and authenticates end-user devices on OpenRoaming ANP
networks.
Level of Assurance (LoA):
An ISO/IEC 29115 term that is used to define equivalent levels for
handling of end-user enrollment, credential management and
authentication amongst different IDPs.
OpenRoaming-Settled:
The "base RCOI" of BA-A2-D0 that is used to indicate that the ANP
expects to receive payment for providing OpenRoaming service to
end-users.
OpenRoaming-Settlement-Free:
The "base RCOI" of 5A-03-BA that is used to indicate that the ANP
provides the OpenRoaming service to end-users at no cost to the
IDP.
Passpoint Profile:
Passpoint is a Wi-Fi Alliance (WFA) certification program that
defines the use a Passpoint profile, that includes the user's
credentials and the access network identifiers, to enables Wi-Fi
devices to discover and authenticate to Wi-Fi hotspots that
provide Internet access [PASSPOINT].
PLMN Id:
Is a unique identifier for a mobile network operator. The
identifier consists of a MCC (Mobile Country Code) and a MNC
(Mobile Network Code). [PASSPOINT] defines how the PLMN Id can be
sent in ANQP messages.
Roaming Consortium Identifier (RCOI):
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RCOI identifies the groups of identity providers that are
supported by the network. It is a 3-octet, or a 5-octet value
carried in the 802.11 beacon information element (IE). It is also
sent in the ANQP messages. Based on the access technologies, the
specific link-layer protocols will be used for carrying the RCOI.
RCOI is also part of the Passpoint profile.
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM):
The SIM is traditionally a smart card distributed by a mobile
operator.
WBA Identity (WBAID):
A hierarchical namespace that is used to uniquely identify every
OpenRoaming entity.
Wireless Roaming Intermediary eXchange:
A framework, aimed at facilitating interconnectivity between
operators and the Wi-Fi roaming hub services.
2. Wireless Broadband Alliance
The Wireless Broadband Alliance (WBA) defines the Wireless Roaming
Intermediary eXchange (WRIX) framework, aimed at facilitating
interconnectivity between Wi-Fi operators and the Wi-Fi roaming hub
services, as well as the Carrier Wi-Fi Services program that provides
guidelines to improve customer experience on Carrier Wi-Fi networks.
Both of these programs leverage the Wi-Fi Alliance specified
Passpoint functionality [PASSPOINT] to enable automatic and secure
connectivity to Wi-Fi networks, allowing devices to be provisioned
with network access credentials with minimal user interaction.
WBA programs have traditionally focussed on "offloading" cell phone
data from cellular networks onto Wi-Fi networks. Deployments of such
systems have seen uneven adoption across geographies, with cellular
operators frequently limiting their engagement to premier locations
that have deployed Wi-Fi and experience a significant footfall of
operator's customers.
Whereas conventional Carrier Wi-Fi has focused on premier locations,
the last decade has seen a continued increase in the requirements of
private Wi-Fi networks to be able to serve visitors, contractors and
guest users. Moreover, in most of these scenarios, the Wi-Fi network
is primarily being used to support some alternative value
proposition; an improved retail experience in a shopping mall, a more
efficient meeting in a carpeted office, a superior stay in a
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hospitality venue, or a better fan experience in a sporting arena.
Traditionally, this segment has made wide-scale use of captive
portals and unencrypted Wi-Fi links to onboard end-users onto their
networks [RFC8952]. However, the decreasing costs for cellular data
means end-users are less motivated to search out and attach to such
"free" Wi-Fi networks, and as a consequence, captive portal
conversion rates continue to decrease.
As a consequence, in 2020 WBA launched its OpenRoaming federation,
designed to provide a better on-boarding experience to end-users,
that is seamless, scalable and secure.
3. OpenRoaming Architecture
Figure 2 contrasts a conventional carrier Wi-Fi roaming system with
OpenRoaming. As illustrated, conventional Wi-Fi roaming is typically
based on:
1. IPSec [RFC6071] tunnels established between access networks, hub
providers and identity providers used to protect exchanged
signalling.
2. Static routing of RADIUS signalling [RFC2865] based on realm
routing tables populated according to agreements between access
networks and hub providers.
3. Passpoint primarily used with SIM based identifiers, where
individual PLMN Ids are configured in the access networks WLAN
equipment enabling them to be sent in ANQP messages, and cellular
providers enable Passpoint based SIM authentication in end-user
devices.
4. EAP-AKA [RFC4187] based passpoint authentication exchanged
between the Supplicant in the end-user device and the EAP Server
in the cellular provider's network.
5. A primary focus on carrier based identities where the end-user
has a billing relationship with the carrier.
In contrast, OpenRoaming is based on:
1. RadSec signalling [RFC6614] secured using mTLS with certificates
issued under WBA's private certificate authority.
2. Dynamic routing of RADIUS based on DNS-based discovery of
signalling peers [RFC7585]
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3. Passpoint based network selection based on 36-bit Roaming
Consortium Organization Identifiers (RCOIs), where WBA defines
the use of 12-bits of the RCOI to embed closed access group
policies.
4. Passpoint authentication that can use any of the Passpoint
defined EAP methods.
5. Encompassing new identity providers who do not have a billing
relationship with their end-users.
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+---------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+
| Visited | | Wi-Fi | | Wi-Fi | |Cellular|
| Wi-Fi | | Hub | | Hub | |Provider|
| Network |<------>|Provider|<------>|Provider|<------>|Network |
| | RADIUS | | RADIUS | | RADIUS | |
| NAS | | RADIUS | | RADIUS | | RADIUS |
| |<------>| proxy |<------>| proxy |<------>| Server |
|Passpoint| IPSec +--------+ IPSec +--------+ IPSec +--------+
|PLMNId(s)|
+---------+
/|\
|
\|/
+---------+ A) Conventional Carrier Wi-Fi
|Passpoint|
| device |
| with |
| PLMN-Id |
| profile |
+---------+
+---------+ +---+ +--------+
| Visited |<----------------->|DNS|<------------------>|Identity|
| Wi-Fi | DNS based peer +---+ Configure NAPTR, |Provider|
| Network | discovery SRV and A/AAAA |Network |
| | records | |
| NAS | | RADIUS |
| |<------------------------------------------>| Server |
|Passpoint| RadSec/TLS secured using mTLS +--------+
| RCOI(s) | and WBA PKI
+---------+
/|\
|
\|/
+---------+ B) OpenRoaming
|Passpoint|
| device |
| with |
| RCOI(s) |
| profile |
+---------+
Figure 2: Contrasting Carrier Wi-Fi and OpenRoaming Architectures
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4. Identifying OpenRoaming Entities
All OpenRoaming providers and OpenRoaming brokers are allocated a WBA
Identity (WBAID). The WBAID is defined to be transported in the
RADIUS Operator-Name attribute (#126) [RFC5580]. WBA has been
allocated the Operator Namespace identifier 0x34 "4" to identify an
Operator-Name attribute carrying a WBAID.
The WBAID is a hierarchical namespace that comprises at its top level
the identity allocated by WBA to a WBA Member and is of the form
shown in Figure 3 where the optional 2 upper case characters
represent an ISO-3166 Alpha-2 country code [ISO3166] e.g.,
"WBAMEMBER:US".
upper-case-char = %x41-5a
member-id = 1*upper-case-char
wbaid = member-id [ %x3a 2*2upper-case-char]
Figure 3: ABNF definition of Primary WBAID Structure
When operating as an OpenRoaming broker, the WBA Member is able to
allocate subordinate identities to OpenRoaming providers who are not
WBA members by pre-pending a subordinate identity , plus "." (%x2e)
to the Member's WBAID, e.g., "OPENROAMINGPROVIDER.WBAMEMBER:US". In
this way, any receiving entity of a WBAID can identify the WBA Member
who is acting as an OpenRoaming broker to the provider by assigning
it an identity.
5. Scaling Secured Signalling
As described in Appendix C, the OpenRoaming legal framework does not
assume any direct relationship between ANP and IDP. In order to
scale the secured signalling between providers, the federation makes
use of a Public Key Infrastructure using a private Certificate
Authority specifically designed to secure the operations of the
roaming federation. WBA and its members have published the WBA
Certificate Policy that defines the policies which govern the
operations of the PKI components by all individuals and entities
within the infrastructure. The OID for Wireless Broadband Alliance
is:
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4)
enterprise(1) The Wireless Broadband Alliance(14122) }
The Wireless Broadband Alliance organizes its OID arcs for the
Certificates Policy Documents using the object identifier
1.3.6.1.4.1.14122.1.1. At the time of writing, the current
certificate policy is 1.3.6.1.4.1.14122.1.1.6.
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This Certificate Policy is based on a 4-level hierarchy, as
illustrated below.
+---------+---------------------------+----------------------------+
| | | |
| Level | Description | Comment |
| | | |
+---------+---------------------------+----------------------------+
| Level 1 | OpenRoaming Root | Operation managed by WBA |
| | Certificate Authority | |
+---------+---------------------------+----------------------------+
| Level 2 | OpenRoaming Policy | Operation managed by WBA. |
| | Intermediate Certificate | Instantiates WBA policy OID|
| | Authority | |
+---------+---------------------------+----------------------------+
| Level 3 | OpenRoaming Issuing | Operated by an OpenRoaming |
| | Intermediate Certificate | broker |
| | Authority | |
+---------+---------------------------+----------------------------+
| Level 3 | OpenRoaming Registration | Optional and when used, |
| | Authority | operated by an OpenRoaming |
| | | broker |
+---------+---------------------------+----------------------------+
| Level 4 | OpenRoaming Entity | A WBA member or non-member.|
| | | WBA's Certificate Policy |
| | | requires the Entity's |
| | | WBAID is included in the |
| | | Subject UID field in the |
| | | certificate. |
+---------+---------------------------+----------------------------+
Figure 4: OpenRoaming PKI Hierarchy
Certificates issued under the WBA PKI are used by Entities to perform
mutual authentication with other Entities and to secure RadSec
signalling [RFC6614] that carries EAP-based Passpoint authentication.
This is typically between a RadSec client in the OpenRoaming ANPs
network and an RadSec Server in the OpenRoaming IDPs network,
although a provider can decide to outsource the operation of the
RadSec endpoint to a third party provider.
6. IDP Discovery
6.1. Dynamic Discovery
OpenRoaming defines the use of dynamic discover [RFC7585] by which an
ANP discovers the IP address of the IDP's RadSec server.
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6.2. Discovery of EAP-AKA/AKA' Servers
Passpoint defines the use of EAP-AKA' based authentication [RFC5448]
which uses the 3GPP 23.003 [TS23003] defined realm of
wlan.mnc<mnc>.mcc<mcc>.3gppnetwork.org, where <mcc> represent an
E.212 Mobile Country Code and <mnc> represents the E.212 Mobile
Network Code allocated to the IDP. GSMA is responsible for operating
the 3gppnetwork.org domain and GSMA IR.67 [GSMAIR67] limits access to
the DNS systems supporting such records to those systems connected to
the inter-PLMN IP backbone (known as "GRX/IPX"). As OpenRoaming ANPs
do not connect to this inter-PLMN backbone, then conventional realm
based lookup cannot be used over the Internet to discover the RadSec
server supporting EAP-AKA' authentication.
GSMA IR.67 does allow systems to be discoverable from the public
Internet, specifically calling out the use of the pub.3gppnetwork.org
domain name for such procedures. In order for ANPs to dynamically
discover the RadSec server supporting EAP-AKA' authentication, GSMA
has defined the use of the wlan.mnc<mnc>.mcc<mcc>.pub.3gppnetwork.org
by OpenRoaming systems. This means that whenever a RadSec client
receives a user-name containing an NAI formatted as
user@wlan.mnc<mnc>.mcc<mcc>.3gppnetwork.org, the dynamic peer
detection functionality MUST insert ".pub" into the realm and perform
DNS based dynamic discovery using the
wlan.mnc<mnc>.mcc<mcc>.pub.3gppnetwork.org domain name. The RADIUS
user-name attribute MUST NOT be similarly modified.
IR.67 defines the procedure by which a cellular operator can request
the delegation of their mnc<mnc>.mcc<mcc>.pub.3gppnetwork.org. GSMA
PRD IR.67 also allows an MNO to delegate the entire
mnc<MNC>.mcc<MCC>.pub.3gppnetwork.org sub-domain which could have
already occurred, e.g., to enable use of the
epdg.mnc<MNC>.mcc<MCC>.pub.3gppnetwork.org used with 3GPP's Wi-Fi
calling service. Using this approach, a cellular operator operating
as an OpenRoaming IDP can authenticate their end-users on third party
ANP Wi-Fi networks.
6.3. Proving a discovered RadSec server is authoritative for a realm
The OpenRoaming preferred approach to dynamically discover the RadSec
server IP address serving a particular realm or set of realms is to
use DNS records that are protected with DNSSEC [RFC4035]. However,
GSMA have not enabled DNSSEC on their 3gppnetwork.org domain, meaning
that DNSSEC cannot be applied on the publicly resolvable domains
under pub.3gppnetwork.org. Because of this situation, OpenRoaming
does not currently mandate operation of DNSSEC.
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If the DNS records for a realm are not protected with DNSSEC, because
the realm has been provided directly by the OpenRoaming End-User, the
IDP SHOULD ensure that the discovered RadSec server(s) supporting its
realm(s) is/are configured with a WBA-PKI server certificate that
includes the realm(s) used in the dynamic peer detection in the
certificate SubjectAltName.
Where the DNS records are protected with DNSSEC, the IDP SHOULD
ensure that the discovered RadSec server(s) supporting its realm(s)
is/are configured with a WBA-PKI server certificate that includes the
derived name(s) from the secured DNS NAPTR/SRV query in the
certificate SubjectAltName.
Where the OpenRoaming IDP has offloaded the operation of RadSec
termination to a third party hub-provider that is responsible for
supporting a number of independent realms, the hub-provider SHOULD
ensure that the discovered RadSec server(s) supporting the
independent realms from its partner IDPs is/are configured with a
WBA-PKI server certificate that includes the derived name(s) from the
DNS NAPTR/SRV query in the certificate SubjectAltName.
7. OpenRoaming Passpoint Profile
7.1. OpenRoaming Policy Controls
In order to avoid possible fragmentation of roaming federations,
OpenRoaming recognizes that there is a need to permit OpenRoaming to
be integrated into a variety of different use-cases and value
propositions. These use-cases include scenarios where providers are
able to enforce policy controls of which end-users are authorized to
access the service. The realization of authorization policy controls
in the OpenRoaming federation is a balance between the requirements
for fine grain policy enforcement versus the potential impact of
policy enforcement on the user experience.
Such a level of control is realized using Closed Access Group (CAG)
based policies. A Closed Access Group identifies a group of
OpenRoaming users who are permitted to access one or more OpenRoaming
access networks configured with a particular CAG policy. These
Closed Access Group policies are encoded using one or more Roaming
Consortium Organization Identifiers (RCOIs), first defined in
Passpoint Release 1.0, and well supported across the smartphone
device ecosystem.
Note, encoding CAG policies in OpenRoaming using one or more RCOIs is
aimed at delivering an equivalent functionality to the CAG policies
encoded in 3GPP using one or more CAG-IDs.
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7.2. OpenRoaming Closed Access Group Policies
OpenRoaming defines the use of multiple RCOIs to facilitate the
implementation of closed access group policies across the federation.
The currently defined RCOIs are:
* OpenRoaming-Settled: BA-A2-D0-xx-x
* OpenRoaming-Settlement-Free: 5A-03-BA-xx-x
Figure 5 shows how the 24-bit length OpenRoaming RCOIs are further
extended into 36-bit length OUI-36s with additional context dependent
identifiers used to encode specific closed access group policies.
Following Passpoint Release 1.0 specification, only when there is a
bitwise match of all 36 bits of the configured RCOI in the WLAN
equipment and the Passpoint profile configured in the end-user device
will an EAP authentication be triggered.
The encoding of closed access group policies is defined so that the
"no-restrictions" policy is encoded using the 12-bit value "00-0",
i.e., 54-03-BA-00-0 represents a policy that accepts all OpenRoaming
settlement-free users onto a particular ANP installation.
+---------------------------------------+-------------------+
| OUI-36 Octet 4 | OUI-36 Octet 5 |
+---------------------------------------+-------------------+
| B7 | B6 | B5 | B4 | B3 | B2 | B1 | B0 | B7 | B6 | B5 | B4 |
+----+---------+----+-------------------+-------------------+
| LoA| QoS |PID | ID-Type |Reserved - set to 0|
+----+---------+----+-------------------+-------------------+
Figure 5: Extension of Octets 4 and 5 for OpenRoaming Context
Dependent RCOI Field
7.2.1. Level of Assurance Policies
The format of the Level of Assurance (LoA) field is as shown in
Figure 6.
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| LoA Field | Description |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| B7 | |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 | Baseline Identity Proofing |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | Enhanced Identity Proofing |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
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Figure 6: OpenRoaming CAG LoA Field
The baseline identity proofing requirement on IDPs ensures that all
OpenRoaming identities are managed with at least a medium level of
assurance (LoA level 2) for end-user enrollment, credential
management and authentication, as specified in ISO/IEC 29115
[ISO29115].
Any IDP that manages its identities according to ISO/IEC 29115 LoA
level 2 MUST NOT configure any RCOI in their end-users' Passpoint
profile with the LoA field set to "1". Conversely, an IDP that
manages its identities according to ISO/IEC 29115 LoA level 3 MAY
configure multiple RCOIs in their end-users' Passpoint profile,
including RCOIs with the LoA field set to "0" and RCOIs with the LoA
field set to "1".
The LoA field is used to support ANPs which operate in regulatory
regimes that require enhanced identity proofing to be used in the
provision of credentials on OpenRoaming devices, equivalent to LoA
level 3 in ISO/IEC29115 [ISO29115]. In such a scenario, the ANP can
set the LoA bit field to 1 in all configured RCOIs to ensure that
only identities provisioned using enhanced LoA 3 procedures can
access via the ANP's network.
7.2.2. Quality of Service Policies
One of the challenges faced by users of Wi-Fi hotspots is when the
Wi-Fi network is configured sub-optimally and results in a poor user
experience. Often the only remedy open to a user it to disable the
Wi-Fi interface on their smartphone and continue to use cellular
data. This is especially the case where the Wi-Fi hotspot has been
automatically selected with no user intervention. As a consequence,
OpenRoaming defines specific service tiers across the federation and
uses the QoS field to differentiate between different tiers. The
format of the QoS field is shown in Figure 7.
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+------------------------------------------------------------+
| QoS Field | Description |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| B6 | B5 | |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 | 0 | Bronze |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 | 1 | Silver |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | 0 | Reserved |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | 1 | Reserved |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 7: OpenRoaming CAG QoS Field
The "Bronze" and "Silver" values of QoS field are used to identify
specific quality of service policy aspects.
The bronze service tier corresponds to the following:
1. The availability of OpenRoaming service when used to access the
Internet measured during scheduled operations across the ANP's
network exceeds 90% over any one month period.
2. The aggregate bandwidth used to receive Internet service on the
ANP's network is sufficient to enable each and every
authenticated and authorized OpenRoaming end-user to
simultaneously receive a sustained 256 kilobits per second
connection.
The silver service tier corresponds to the following:
1. The availability of OpenRoaming service when used to access the
Internet measured during scheduled operations across the ANP's
network exceeds 95% over any one month period.
2. The aggregate bandwidth used to receive Internet service on the
ANP's network is be sufficient to enable each and every
authenticated and authorized end-user to receive a sustained 512
kilobits per second connection.
3. At least 10% of authenticated and authorized users are able to
stream video content at a downlink rate of at least 5 megabits
per second (when measured over a one-minute interval) over all of
the ANP's OpenRoaming enabled Wi-Fi networks.
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4. The authenticated and authorized end-users are able to stream
video from one or more third party content distribution networks
with an end-to-end latency of less than 150ms from all of the
ANP's OpenRoaming enabled Wi-Fi networks.
The QoS field can be used by those IDPs that are only interested in
providing their end-users with a higher quality service level when
automatically authenticated onto an OpenRoaming network. For
example, an IDP configures the QoS field as bronze in a Passpoint
profile that uses the "5A-03-BA" settlement free RCOI and configures
the QoS field as silver in a Passpoint profile that uses the "BA-
A2-D0" OpenRoaming-settled paid service.
ANPs that only support the bronze service tier MUST set the QoS Field
to "00" in all RCOIs configured on their WLAN equipment. ANPs that
support the silver service tier MAY configure multiple RCOIs on their
WLAN equipment that include values where the QoS field is set to "01"
and values where the QoS field is set to "00".
Exceptionally, ANPs that operate OpenRoaming installations on moving
platforms are permitted to deviate from normal OpenRoaming service
level requirements. This is because such installations may
necessitate use of cellular-based backhaul and/or backhaul via Non-
Terrestrial Networks (NTN) which may not be able to meet the
OpenRoaming minimum "bronze" service level requirements. If an ANP
wants to benefit from such deviations, it MUST signal using the WLAN-
Venue-Info attribute [RFC7268] that it is operating in a venue
category identified using a Venue Group value of "10", which is
defined in Section 8.4.1.34 of [IEEE80211] as being used for
vehicular installations. In such cases, the OpenRoaming ANP MAY
signal one or more WBA-Custom-SLA vendor specific attributes [WBAVSA]
to indicate one or more (availability, per-user sustained bandwidth)
tuples to the IDP.
7.2.3. Privacy Policies
The baseline privacy policy of OpenRoaming ensures the identities of
end-users remain anonymous when using the service. The WBA WRIX
specification specifies that where supplicants use EAP methods that
support user-name privacy, i.e., which are compatible with the
"@realm" (or "anonymous@realm") (outer) EAP-Identifier, then the
supplicant SHOULD use the anonymized outer EAP identifier.
Supplicants supporting other EAP methods SHOULD support EAP method
specific techniques for masking the end-user's permanent identifier,
for example pseudonym support in EAP-AKA/AKA' [RFC4187] and/or
enhanced IMSI privacy protection [WBAEIPP]. OpenRoaming IDPs SHOULD
support and enable the corresponding server-side functionality to
ensure end-user privacy is protected.
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The WBA WRIX specification also recognizes that the privacy of end-
users can be unintentionally weakened by the use of correlation
identifiers signalled using the Chargeable-User-Identity attribute
(#89) [RFC4372] and/or the Class attribute (#25) [RFC2865] in the
RADIUS Access-Accept packet. The WBA WRIX Specification recommends
that the default IDP policy SHOULD ensure that, when used, such
correlation identifiers are unique for each combination of end-user/
ANP and that the keys and/or initialization vectors used in creating
such correlation identifiers SHOULD be refreshed at least every 48
hours, but not more frequently than every 2 hours.
This 2 hour limit is designed to assist the ANP in performing
autonomous troubleshooting of connectivity issues from authentic
users/devices that are repeatedly re-initiating connectivity to the
ANP's network and/or to assist the ANP in identifying a new session
originated by an authentic user/device that has previously been
identified by the ANP as having violated the OpenRoaming end-user
terms and conditions. When using typical public Wi-Fi session
durations, it is estimated that, with this 2 hour restriction, the
ANP will be able to correlate an Access-Request/Access-Accept
exchange that immediately follows an Accounting-Request stop message
in over 50% of the sessions.
In contrast to this default policy, there can be scenarios where the
ANP desires to derive value from its OpenRoaming settlement-free
service by analysing aggregate end-user behaviour. Whereas the use
of aggregated end-user information does not violate the OpenRoaming
privacy policy, the derivation of such can benefit from the ANP being
able to uniquely identify end-users. In order to support such
scenarios, the OpenRoaming closed access group policies include the
PID field.
The PID field can be used to support scenarios where the user has
consented with their IDP that an immutable end-user identifier can be
signalled to the ANP in the RADIUS Access-Accept. The format of the
PID field is illustrated in Figure 8. The PID field can be
configured to "1" in the RCOIs used by those ANPs that want to be be
able to account for unique OpenRoaming end-users.
The OpenRoaming IDP terms ensure subscribers MUST explicitly give
their permission before an immutable end-user identity is shared with
a third party ANP. When such permission has not been granted, an IDP
MUST NOT set the PID field to "1" in any of the RCOIs in its end-user
Passpoint profiles. When such permission has been granted, an IDP
MAY configure multiple RCOIs in their end-users' Passpoint profile,
including RCOIs with the PID field set to "0" and RCOIs with the PID
field set to "1".
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+------------------------------------------------------------+
| PID Field | Description |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| B4 | |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 | Baseline ID Policy applies, i.e., users |
| | remain anonymous whilst using the service. |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | An immutable end-user ID will be returned |
| | by the IDP in the Access-Accept packet. |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 8: OpenRoaming CAG PID Field
7.2.4. ID-Type Policies
The ID-Type field can be used to realize policies which are based on
the business sector associated with the identity used by the IDP.
The format of the ID-Type field is illustrated in Figure 9.
All IDPs configure at least one RCOI in their end-user's Passpoint
profile with ID-Type set to "0000" (Any identity type is permitted).
An IDP MAY configure additional RCOIs in their end-users' Passpoint
profile with an ID-Type representing the sector type of IDP.
An ANP what wants to serve all end-users, irrespective of sector,
configures RCOIs in the WLAN equipment with ID-Type set to "0000".
Alternatively, an ANP which operates a sector specific business that
only desires to serve a subset of OpenRoaming end-users MAY set the
ID-Type to their desired sector in all configured RCOIs.
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+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ID-Type Field | Description |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| B3 | B2 | B1 | B0 | |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Any identity type is permitted |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | A service provider identity |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | A cloud provider identity |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | A generic enterprise identity |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | A government identity, e.g., |
| | | | | including city |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | An automotive identity |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | A hospitality identity |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | An aviation industry identity |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | An education or research |
| | | | | identity |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | A cable industry identity |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | A manufacturer identity |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | A retail identity |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| other values | Reserved |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 9: OpenRoaming CAG ID-Type Field
7.3. Prioritizing Policies
The definition of OpenRoaming closed access group policies assumes
the configuration of multiple RCOIs in ANP WLAN equipment and IDP
end-user devices.
When a device has multiple Passpoint profiles matching the ANP's RCOI
policy, an OpenRoaming ANP may want to prefer OpenRoaming subscribers
use a particular IDP's profile when attaching to its access network.
Such a preference can be because the OpenRoaming ANP has a
preferential relationship with certain OpenRoaming IDPs.
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The OpenRoaming ANP is able to use the Home SP preference
functionality defined in Passpoint [PASSPOINT] to prioritize the use
of a particular profile by a Passpoint enabled device. In such a
scenario, the ANP configures the Domain Name list to include the
FQDN(s) associated with the profile(s) to be prioritized.
8. OpenRoaming RADIUS Profile
The OpenRoaming RADIUS profile is based on the WBA WRIX Specification
which in turn are derived from [RFC3580] and [RFC3579].
Additionally, OpenRoaming defines the use of the following RADIUS
attributes.
8.1. Operator-Name
As described in Section 4, OpenRoaming uses the Operator-Name (#126)
[RFC5580] attribute to signal the WBAID of the OpenRoaming ANP. All
ANPs MUST support the Operator-Name attribute and use it to signal
the WBAID of the OpenRoaming ANP.
8.2. Chargeable-User-Identity
All OpenRoaming ANPs MUST support the Chargeable-User-Identity
attribute (#89) [RFC4372] and indicate such by including a CUI
attribute in all RADIUS Access-Request packets.
When an end-user has explicitly given their permission to share an
immutable end-user identifier with third party ANPs, the CUI returned
by the IDP is invariant over subsequent end-user authentication
exchanges between the IDP and the ANP.
8.3. Location-Data/Location-Information
All OpenRoaming ANPs MUST support signalling of location information
using [RFC5580]. As a minimum, all OpenRoaming IDPs need to be able
to determine the country in which the OpenRoaming ANP operates. The
OpenRoaming legal framework described in Appendix C serves as an
"out-of-band agreement" as specified in clause 3.1 of [RFC5580].
Hence, all OpenRoaming ANPs MUST include the Location-Data attribute
(#128) in RADIUS Access-Request packet where the location profile is
the civic location profile that includes the country code where the
ANP is located in all Access-Request packets [RFC5580].
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When the OpenRoaming ANP supports the OpenRoaming-Settled RCOI ("BA-
A2-D0"), the Location-Data attribute (#128) MUST be included where
the location profile is the civic location profile containing Civic
Address Type information that is sufficient to identify the financial
regulatory regime that defines the taxable rates associated with
consumption of the ANP's service.
OpenRoaming also defines the optional use the geospatial location
profile as specified in [RFC5580]. ANPs MAY signal coordinate-based
geographic location of the NAS or end-user device and this
information MAY be used by IDPs, e.g., in their authorization
decisions.
8.4. WBA-Identity-Provider
The Operator-Name attribute allows the WBAID of the ANP to be
signalled to the IDP. In the reverse direction, the IDP MUST use the
WBA-Identity-Provider vendor specific attribute [WBAVSA] to signal
the WBAID of the IDP back to the ANP.
8.5. WBA-Offered-Service
The ANP MAY use the WBA-Offered-Service vendor specific attribute to
signal the highest OpenRoaming service tier supported on its network
[WBAVSA].
8.6. WLAN-Venue-Info
The ANP MAY use the WLAN-Venue-Info attribute [RFC7268] to signal the
category of venue hosting the WLAN.
8.7. WBA-Custom-SLA
When the ANP uses the WLAN-Venue-Info attribute to signal that the
venue hosting the WLAN is a vehicular installation, the ANP MAY use
the WBA-Custom-SLA vendor specific attribute [WBAVSA] to indicate one
or more (availability, per-user sustained bandwidth) tuples to the
IDP.
8.8. Additional attributes related to OpenRoaming settled
OpenRoaming settled defines the use of additional RADIUS attributes.
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8.8.1. WBA-Financial-Clearing-Provider
All OpenRoaming ANPs and IDPs that support the OpenRoaming settled
service MUST use the WBA-Financial-Clearing-Provider vendor specific
attribute to signal the identity of the provider of financial
clearing services [WBAVSA].
8.8.2. WBA-Data-Clearing-Provider
All OpenRoaming ANPs and IDPs that support the OpenRoaming settled
service MAY use the WBA-Data-Clearing-Provider vendor specific
attribute to signal the identity of the provider of data clearing
services [WBAVSA].
8.8.3. WBA-Linear-Volume-Rate
In cellular roaming, inter-operator tariff information is exchanged
in the roaming agreements between operators. In OpenRoaming, as
there is no direct agreement between ANPs and IDPs, the tariff
information is exchanged in RADIUS messages. All OpenRoaming ANPs
that support the OpenRoaming settled service MUST use the WBA-Linear-
Volume-Rate vendor specific attribute to signal the charging model
being offered by the ANP [WBAVSA]. An IDP that authorizes an offered
charging model MUST include the agreed WBA-Linear-Volume-Rate in the
Access-Accept packet.
9. Security Considerations
9.1. Network Selection and Triggering Authentication
OpenRoaming defines the use of Passpoint with Roaming Consortium
Organization Identifiers. A bit-wise match between an RCOI
configured in the Passpoint profile of an end-user's device and the
RCOI signalled by WLAN equipment will trigger a Passpoint defined
EAP-based authentication exchange. The security associated with the
Passpoint RCOI information element is identical to other PLMN Id and
Realm information elements, allowing an unauthorized system to
configure the OpenRoaming RCOI with the aim of triggering a Passpoint
authentication. Because such an unauthorized system will not have
been issued with a certificate using WBA's PKI, the unauthorized
system is unable to communicate with any other OpenRoaming provider.
In such a scenario, after successive multiple failed authentications,
the device's supplicant SHOULD add the Access Point's BSSID to a deny
list to avoid future triggering of an authentication exchange with
the unauthorized system.
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9.2. Dynamic Discovery of RadSec Peers
OpenRoaming recommends the use of DNSSEC to ensure a dynamically
discovered RadSec server is authoritative for a particular realm or
set of realms. Where this is not possible, e.g., when using dynamic
resolution with the pub.3gppnetwork.org sub-domain, the OpenRoaming
certificate policy permits the configuration of supported realm(s) in
the SubjectAltName of the certificate(s) issued to the IDP.
An ANP can decide to continue with the RadSec establishment, even if
a server cannot prove it is authoritative for a realm. As the ANP's
RadSec client uses a dedicated trust store corresponding to the WBA's
private Certificate Authority, if DNS is hijacked by a third-party
non-federation member who has not been issued a certificate under
WBA's PKI, the subsequent TLS establishment will fail.
9.3. End-User Traffic
The OpenRoaming federation ensures RADIUS traffic is secured between
ANP and IDP and ensures Wi-Fi traffic is protected between the end-
user device and the WLAN equipment of the ANP. The ANP is therefore
able to observe IP traffic to/from end-users who have performed a
successful authentication with their IDP. The OpenRoaming legal
framework (see Appendix C) ensures that the ANP has agreed to the
OpenRoaming Privacy Policy [ORPRIVACY] to correctly handle the
personally identifiable information collected as part of providing
the ANP service.
The Open-Roaming end-user terms and conditions [ORTERMS] ensure that
end-users are aware that the federation does not provide a secure
end-to-end service. The end-user MUST NOT rely on the encryption
delivered by OpenRoaming for providing security of services accessed
using the ANP's Wi-Fi network.
10. Future Enhancements
WBA announced the launch of its OpenRoaming Federation in June 2020.
Since then, WBA members have continued to enhance the technical
framework to address new market requirements that are reflected in
the Closed Access Group policies described in Section 7.2 and the
RADIUS profile described in Section 8. WBA encourages those parties
interested in adapting OpenRoaming to address new requirements to
join the Alliance and help drive the definition of OpenRoaming
forward.
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11. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
12.2. Informative References
[GSMAIR67] GSMA, "GSMA IR.67: DNS Guidelines for Service Providers
and GRX and IPX Providers", 25 November 2022,
<https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/wp-content/
uploads//IR.67-v21.0.pdf>.
[IEEE80211]
IEEE, "Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and
Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", n.d.,
<https://standards.ieee.org/ieee/802.11/5536/>.
[ISO29115] ISO/IEC 29115, "Information technology - Security
techniques: Entity authentication assurance framework",
April 2013.
[ISO3166] ISO 3166-2:2020, "Codes for the representation of names of
countries and their subdivisions", August 2020,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/72483.html>.
[ORPRIVACY]
Wireless Broadband Alliance, "OpenRoaming End-User Privacy
Policy", n.d.,
<https://wballiance.com/openroaming/privacy-policy/>.
[ORTERMS] Wireless Broadband Alliance, "OpenRoaming End User Terms
and Conditions", n.d.,
<https://wballiance.com/openroaming/toc/>.
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[PASSPOINT]
Wi-Fi Alliance, "Wi-Fi Alliance Passpoint", n.d.,
<https://www.wi-fi.org/discover-wi-fi/passpoint>.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, DOI 10.17487/RFC2865, June 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2865>.
[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3579, September 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3579>.
[RFC3580] Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G., and J. Roese,
"IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
(RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", RFC 3580,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3580, September 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3580>.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.
[RFC4187] Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key
Agreement (EAP-AKA)", RFC 4187, DOI 10.17487/RFC4187,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4187>.
[RFC4372] Adrangi, F., Lior, A., Korhonen, J., and J. Loughney,
"Chargeable User Identity", RFC 4372,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4372, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4372>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
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[RFC5448] Arkko, J., Lehtovirta, V., and P. Eronen, "Improved
Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd
Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')",
RFC 5448, DOI 10.17487/RFC5448, May 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5448>.
[RFC5580] Tschofenig, H., Ed., Adrangi, F., Jones, M., Lior, A., and
B. Aboba, "Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS and
Diameter", RFC 5580, DOI 10.17487/RFC5580, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5580>.
[RFC6071] Frankel, S. and S. Krishnan, "IP Security (IPsec) and
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Document Roadmap", RFC 6071,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6071, February 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6071>.
[RFC6614] Winter, S., McCauley, M., Venaas, S., and K. Wierenga,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Encryption for RADIUS",
RFC 6614, DOI 10.17487/RFC6614, May 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6614>.
[RFC7268] Aboba, B., Malinen, J., Congdon, P., Salowey, J., and M.
Jones, "RADIUS Attributes for IEEE 802 Networks",
RFC 7268, DOI 10.17487/RFC7268, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7268>.
[RFC7585] Winter, S. and M. McCauley, "Dynamic Peer Discovery for
RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS Based on the Network Access
Identifier (NAI)", RFC 7585, DOI 10.17487/RFC7585, October
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7585>.
[RFC7593] Wierenga, K., Winter, S., and T. Wolniewicz, "The eduroam
Architecture for Network Roaming", RFC 7593,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7593, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7593>.
[RFC8952] Larose, K., Dolson, D., and H. Liu, "Captive Portal
Architecture", RFC 8952, DOI 10.17487/RFC8952, November
2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8952>.
[TS23003] 3GPP, "3GPP 23.003: Numbering, addressing and
identification v18.1.0", 28 March 2023,
<https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/
archive/23_series/23.003/23003-i10.zip>.
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[WBAEIPP] Wireless Broadband Alliance, "WBA Enhanced IMSI Privacy
Protection", August 2022,
<https://wballiancec.wpenginepowered.com/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/IMSI_Privacy_Protection_for_Wi-
Fi_Technical_Specification_v1.1.0_Revision_FINAL.pdf>.
[WBAVSA] Wireless Broadband Alliance, "Vendor Specific Attributes",
n.d., <https://github.com/wireless-broadband-alliance/
RADIUS-VSA>.
Appendix A. Example OpenRoaming Signalling Flow
An example signalling flow for OpenRoaming is illustrated in
Figure 10.
1. In step 1, the WLAN is configured with Passpoint information and
includes configured RCOIs in its beacon.
2. The beacon can only contain 3 RCOIs and so if none of the RCOIs
match a profile provisioned in the device, the device queries
for the list of RCOIs supported.
3. If the list includes an RCOI that matches a configured profile
in the device, then device sends an EAPOL Start message to the
authenticator.
4. The authenticator in the AP/WLC requests the EAP-Identity of the
device.
5. The device responds with its EAP-Identity, which is a user@realm
Network Access Identifier (NAI)
6. The NAS in the WLC/AP embeds the NAI in the user-name attribute
in a RADIUS Access-Request packet and forwards to the configured
RadSec client.
7. The RadSec client recovers the realm from the NAI/user-name
attribute and performs a DNS-based dynamic peer discovery.
8. The RadSec client established an mTLS authenticated TLS session
with the discovered peer using certificates issued by the WBA
PKI.
9. Once TLS is established, the RadSec client forwards the Access-
Request to the RadSec server.
10. If the EAP Server is not co-located with the RadSec server, the
RadSec server proxies the Access-Request to the EAP-Server.
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11. The EAP-Server continues the EAP dialogue with the EAP
Supplicant in the device using a Passpoint defined EAP method.
12. Following successful authentication, the EAP-Server responds
with an Access-Accept packet containing the EAP-SUCCESS message
and the keying material generated through the EAP method to
secure the Wi-Fi session.
13. The Access-Accept packet is forwarded back to the RadSec client.
14. The RadSec client forwards the Access-Accept packet to the NAS
in the AP/WLC.
15. The AP/WLC recovers the keying material from the Access-Accept
packet and forwards the EAP-SUCCESS message to the device.
16. The keying material is used to secure the Wi-Fi interface
between the device and AP/WLC.
17. The AP/WLC generates a RADIUS Accounting-Request packet with
Acct-Status-Type Start which is forwarded to the RadSec client.
18. The RadSec client forwards the Accounting-Request packet over
the TLS tunnel to the RadSec server.
19. The RadSec server can forward the Accounting-Request packet to
the EAP-Server.
20-22. After the Wi-Fi session terminates, an Accounting-Request
message with Acct-Status-Type Stop is proxied towards the RadSec
Server.
+------+ +------+ +------+ +------+ +------+ +------+
| | |Wi-Fi | |RadSec| | | |RadSec| | EAP |
|Device| |AP/WLC| |Client| | DNS | |Server| |Server|
+------+ +------+ +------+ +------+ +------+ +------+
| 1) Beacon | | | | |
|<----------| | | | |
| 2) ANQP | | | | |
| Query | | | | |
|<--------->| | | | |
| 3) EAPOL | | | | |
| Start | | | | |
|---------->| | | | |
| 4) EAP-ID | | | | |
| Request | | | | |
|<----------| | | | |
| 5) EAP-ID | 6) RADIUS | | | |
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| Response | Access- | 7) DNS | | |
|---------->| Request | Query | | |
| |---------->| NAPTR,SRV,| | |
| | | A/AAAA | | |
| | | Records | | |
| | |<--------->| | |
| | | 8) mTLS | | |
| | |<--------------------->| |
| | | 9) RadSec | | |
| | | Access-Request | |
| | |---------------------->| |
| | | | | 10) RADIUS|
| | | | | Access- |
| | | | | Request |
| | | | |---------->|
| | 11) EAP Dialogue | |
|<--------------------------------------------------------->|
| | | | | 12) RADIUS|
| | | | | Access- |
| | 14) RADIUS| | | Accept |
| | Access- | | | (EAP- |
| | Accept | 13) RadSec Access- | SUCCESS) |
| | (EAP- | Accept (EAP-SUCCESS) |<----------|
| 15) EAP- | SUCCESS) |<----------------------| |
| SUCCESS |<----------| | | |
|<----------| | | | |
+---------------+ | | | |
| 16) Secured | | | | |
| OpenRoaming 17) RADIUS| | | |
| Service Accounting| | | |
| Request | | | 19) RADIUS|
| (Start) | 18) RadSec Accounting | Accounting|
| |-------->| -Request (Start) | Request |
| | |---------------------->| (Start) |
| | | | |---------->|
+---------------+ | | | |
| | 20) RADIUS| | | |
| | Accounting| | | |
| | Request | | | 22) RADIUS|
| | (Stop) | 21) RadSec Accounting | Accounting|
| |---------->| -Request (Stop) | Request |
| | |---------------------->| (Stop) |
| | | | |---------->|
+------+ +------+ +------+ +------+ +------+ +------+
|Device| |Wi-Fi | |RadSec| | DNS | |RadSec| | EAP |
| | |AP/WLC| |Client| | | |Server| |Server|
+------+ +------+ +------+ +------+ +------+ +------+
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Figure 10: Example OpenRoaming Signalling Flow
Appendix B. Example OpenRoaming RCOI Usage
This Annex illustrates the use of OpenRoaming RCOIs to enforce
different policies in the OpenRoaming federation, ensuring that when
there is a policy mismatch between the device and access network,
that the device will avoid triggering an authentication exchange that
would subsequently have to be rejected because of policy enforcement
decisions.
B.1. OpenRoaming RCOI based policy for supporting QoS tiers
Figure 11 illustrates the use of OpenRoaming RCOIs for supporting the
standard (bronze) and silver QoS tiers across the federation. The
figure shows two different devices:
* Device 1 has been provisioned by its IDP to require the basic
bronze QoS policy.
* Device 2 has been provisioned by its IDP to require the silver
tier of QoS handling.
The figure also shows illustrates the RCOI configuration of two ANP
Access Networks:
* ANP#1 is configured to support the silver tier of QoS handling
corresponding to the silver RCOI. Because the network
requirements associated with the silver tier are a superset of the
bronze QoS tier, the ANP also configures the bronze RCOI on its
Wi-Fi access network.
* ANP#2 is only configured to support the standard (bronze) QoS tier
and as such only configures the RCOI corresponding to the bronze
QoS tier on its Wi-Fi access network.
The figure shows how normal Passpoint RCOI matching rules can be used
to ensure that devices only trigger authentication with ANP access
networks which support the required QoS tier according to the
device's policy.
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+----------------------+ +----------------------+
|OpenRoaming Device #1 | |OpenRoaming Device #2 |
| Bronze Service Level | | Silver Service Level |
| +------------------+ | | +------------------+ |
| |Passpoint Profile | | | |Passpoint Profile | |
| | Bronze RCOI | | | | Silver RCOI | |
| +------------------+ | | +------------------+ |
| /|\ /|\ | | /|\ |
+------|----------|----+ +------------|---------+
| | |
| | |
| | | RCOI
| | | Match
| +-----------------------------+
RCOI | | |
Match | | |
| | |
| | +------------------------+
| | | RCOI
| | | Match
| | |
\|/ \|/ \|/
+----------------------+ +----------------------+
| OpenRoaming ANP#1 | | OpenRoaming ANP#2 |
| Silver QoS | | Bronze QoS |
| +--------------+ | | +--------------+ |
| | WLAN | | | | WLAN | |
| | Bronze RCOI | | | | Bronze RCOI | |
| | Silver RCOI | | | | | |
| +--------------+ | | +--------------+ |
+----------------------+ +----------------------+
Figure 11: Use of OpenRoaming RCOIs to realize QoS policies
B.2. OpenRoaming RCOI based policy for supporting identity type
policies
Figure 12 illustrates the use of OpenRoaming RCOIs for supporting
different identity type policies across the federation. The figure
shows two different devices:
* Device#1 has been provisioned by an IDP corresponding to a service
provider. It provisions the device's Passpoint profile with the
RCOI policy identifying the service provider ID-type policy as
well as the "any ID-type" RCOI policy.
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* Device 2 has been provisioned by a IDP corresponding to a
hospitality provider. It provisions the device's Passpoint
profile with the RCOI policy identifying the hospitality ID-type
policy as well as the "any ID-type" RCOI policy.
The figure also shows the RCOI configuration of three different ANP
Access Networks:
* ANP#1 only supports access using service provider type-IDs and so
has configured the service provider ID-type policy RCOI.
* ANP#2 supports access from all identity types and so has
configured the any ID-type policy RCOI.
* ANP#3 only supports access using hospitality type IDs and so has
configured the hospitality ID-type policy RCOI.
The figure shows how normal Passpoint RCOI matching rules can be used
to ensure that devices only trigger authentication with ANP access
networks which support the required identity types according to the
ANP's policy.
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+----------------------------+ +-----------------------------+
| OpenRoaming Device #1 | | OpenRoaming Device #2 |
| IDP is Service Provider | | IDP is Hospitality Provider |
|+------------++------------+| |+------------++------------+ |
|| Passpoint || Passpoint || || Passpoint || Passpoint | |
|| Profile || Profile || || Profile || Profile | |
|| SP ||Any ID-Type || ||Any ID-Type || Hospitality| |
||ID-Type RCOI|| RCOI || || RCOI ||ID-Type RCOI| |
|+------------++------------+| |+------------++------------+ |
| /|\ /|\ | | /|\ /|\ |
+-------|------------|-------+ +-------------------|---------+
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| RCOI | RCOI | RCOI | RCOI
| Match | Match | Match | Match
| | | |
| +-----+ +-----+ |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
\|/ \|/ \|/ \|/
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
|OpenRoaming ANP#1 | |OpenRoaming ANP#2 | |OpenRoaming ANP#3 |
| Only accepts | | Accepts all | | Only accepts |
| Service Provider | | ID-Types | | Hospitality |
| ID-Types | | | | ID-Types |
| +--------------+ | | +--------------+ | | +--------------+ |
| | WLAN | | | | WLAN | | | | WLAN | |
| | SP ID-Type | | | | Any ID-Type | | | | Hospitality | |
| | RCOI | | | | RCOI | | | | ID-Type RCOI | |
| +--------------+ | | +--------------+ | | +--------------+ |
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
Figure 12: Use of OpenRoaming RCOIs to realize ID-Type policies
B.3. OpenRoaming RCOI based policy for supporting different identity
proofing policies
Figure 13 illustrates the use of OpenRoaming RCOIs for supporting
different identity proofing policies across the federation. The
figure shows two different devices:
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* Device 1 has been provisioned by an IDP that uses enhanced
identity proofing controls that meet the enhanced OpenRoaming
requirements, equivalent to LoA 3 in [ISO29115]. Because the
enhanced identity proofing requirements are a superset of the
requirements of the baseline identity proofing policy, the IDP
also configures the use of the RCOI with baseline identity
proofing.
* Device 2 has been provisioned by an IDP that uses identity
proofing with controls that meet the baseline OpenRoaming
requirements.
The figure also shows the RCOI configuration of two ANP Access
Networks:
* ANP#1 is operated in a geography where regulations require support
of enhanced identity proofing.
* ANP#2 is operated in a geography where regulations permit support
of authentications with identities managed using the OpenRoaming
baseline identity proofing requirements.
The figure shows how normal Passpoint RCOI matching rules can be used
to ensure that devices only trigger authentication with ANP access
networks which support the required identity proofing according to
the ANP's policy.
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+----------------------------+ +-----------------------------+
| OpenRoaming Device #1 | | OpenRoaming Device #2 |
| IDP uses enhanced | | IDP uses baseline |
| identity proofing | | identity proofing |
|+------------++------------+| | +------------+ |
|| Passpoint || Passpoint || | | Passpoint | |
|| Profile || Profile || | | Profile | |
||Enhanced LoA||Baseline LoA|| | |Baseline LoA| |
|| RCOI || RCOI || | | RCOI | |
|+------------++------------+| | +------------+ |
| /|\ /|\ | | /|\ |
+-------|------------|-------+ +--------------|--------------+
| | |
| | |
| | |
| RCOI | RCOI | RCOI
| Match | Match | Match
| | |
| | |
| +--------------------+ +-----+
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
\|/ \|/ \|/
+------------------------+ +------------------------+
| OpenRoaming ANP#1 | | OpenRoaming ANP#2 |
| Operates in a country | | Operates in a country |
| where the regulator | | where the regulator |
| requires enhanced | | permits baseline |
| identity proofing | | identity proofing |
| +--------------+ | | +--------------+ |
| | WLAN | | | | WLAN | |
| | Enhanced LoA | | | | Baseline LoA | |
| | RCOI | | | | RCOI | |
| +--------------+ | | +--------------+ |
+------------------------+ +------------------------+
Figure 13: Use of OpenRoaming RCOIs to realize identity proofing
policies
Appendix C. OpenRoaming legal framework
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C.1. Seamless experience
In order for OpenRoaming to avoid the need for end-users to be
presented with and accept legal terms and conditions covering their
use of the Wi-Fi hotspot service, there needs to be a legal framework
in place.
C.2. OpenRoaming Organization
The federation is based on a legal framework that comprises a set of
policies, templated agreements and immutable terms as agreed to by
the WBA and its membership. The framework defines a hierarchy of
roles, responsibilities and relationships that are designed to enable
the federation to scale to millions of Wi-Fi access networks.
Figure 14 shows the relationships between WBA, OpenRoaming Brokers,
who are members of the WBA that have agreed terms with WBA to perform
the OpenRoaming broker role and the OpenRoaming providers.
OpenRoaming brokers agree terms with OpenRoaming Providers that can
act as Access Network Providers (ANPs) and/or Identity Providers
(IDPs). OpenRoaming providers do not have to be members of the WBA
to provide OpenRoaming services. Finally, OpenRoaming IDPs agree
terms with OpenRoaming end-users who then benefit from seamless
authentication onto the Wi-Fi networks deployed by the different
OpenRoaming ANPs.
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+----------+
| Wireless |
| Broadband|
| Alliance |
+----------+
/|\ /|\
| |
Agrees terms with
| |
+-----------+ | | +-----------+
|OpenRoaming|<-------+ +------->|OpenRoaming|
|Broker | |Broker |
+-----------+ +-----------+
/|\ /|\ /|\ /|\
| | | |
Agrees terms with Agrees terms with
| | | |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
| | | |
\|/ \|/ \|/ \|/
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
|OpenRoaming| |OpenRoaming| |OpenRoaming| |OpenRoaming|
|Access | |Identity | |Identity | |Access |
|Network | |Provider | |Provider | |Network |
|Provider | | | | | |Provider |
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
/|\ /|\ /|\ /|\
| | | |
Agrees terms with Agrees terms with
| | | |
+-------------+ | | +-------------+
| | | |
\|/ \|/ \|/ \|/
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
|OpenRoaming| |OpenRoaming| |OpenRoaming| |OpenRoaming|
|End-User | |End-User | |End-User | |End-User |
+-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+
Figure 14: Organization of the OpenRoaming Federation
C.3. OpenRoaming legal terms
In OpenRoaming there is no direct agreement between individual ANPs
and individual IDPs or between end-users and ANPs. As a consequence,
OpenRoaming brokers agree to use certain federation-specific terms in
their agreements with OpenRoaming providers.
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This arrangement ensures that all ANPs agree to abide by the
OpenRoaming privacy policy [ORPRIVACY] and all end-users agree to
abide by the OpenRoaming end-user Terms and Conditions [ORTERMS].
Changelog
* 01 - added details of WBA-Custom-SLA for OpenRoaming ANP networks
that signal using [RFC7268] that they operate on a vehicular
platform. Added clarifications regarding use of direct and
indirect names in certificate validation.
* 02 - added details of OpenRoaming protection of end-user privacy,
including WRIX recommendations on use of correlation identifiers
in RADIUS Access-Accept packet that may unintentionally weaken
end-user privacy.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank all the members of the WBA's
OpenRoaming Workgroup who help define the OpenRoaming specifications.
Authors' Addresses
Bruno Tomas
Wireless Broadband Alliance, Inc.
5000 Executive Parkway, Suite 302
San Ramon, 94583
United States of America
Email: bruno@wballiance.com
Mark Grayson
Cisco Systems
10 New Square Park
Feltham
TW14 8HA
United Kingdom
Email: mgrayson@cisco.com
Necati Canpolat
Intel Corporation
2111 NE. 25th Ave
Hillsboro, 97124
United States of America
Email: necati.canpolat@intel.com
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Betty A. Cockrell
SingleDigits
San Antonio,
United States of America
Email: bcockrell@singledigits.com
Sri Gundavelli
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, 95134
United States of America
Email: sgundave@cisco.com
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