Internet DRAFT - draft-trammell-plus-spec
draft-trammell-plus-spec
Network Working Group B. Trammell
Internet-Draft M. Kuehlewind
Intended status: Experimental ETH Zurich
Expires: September 14, 2017 March 13, 2017
Path Layer UDP Substrate Specification
draft-trammell-plus-spec-01
Abstract
This document specifies a common Path Layer UDP Substrate (PLUS) wire
image for encrypted transport protocols carried over UDP. The base
PLUS header carries information for driving a minimal state machine
at middleboxes described in [I-D.trammell-plus-statefulness], and
provides optional exposure of additional information to devices along
the path using the mechanism described in
[I-D.trammell-plus-abstract-mech].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. State Maintenance and Measurement: Basic Header . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Sender Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Receiver Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. On-Path State Maintenance using the Basic Header . . . . 6
2.3.1. State Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.2. Bidirectional Stop Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.3. State Rebinding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4. Measurement and Diagnosis using the Basic Header . . . . 9
3. Path Communication: Extended Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. Measurement and Diagnostics using the Extended Header . . 12
4. Implementation and Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Interface to Overlying Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
This document defines a wire image for a Path Layer UDP Substrate
(PLUS), for limited exposure of information from encrypted, UDP-
encapsulated [RFC0768] transport protocols. The wire image
implements signaling to drive the minimal state machine defined in
[I-D.trammell-plus-statefulness] as well as optional exposure of
additional information to devices along the path using the mechanism
described in [I-D.trammell-plus-abstract-mech].
As discussed in [I-D.hardie-path-signals], basic information about
flows currently exposed by TCP are missing from transport protocols
that encrypt their headers. Given the ossification of protocol wire
images due to the widespread deployment of stateful network devices
that rely on header inspection, this header encryption is necessary
to support transport protocol evolution. However, the loss of basic
information for on-path state maintenance as well as network
performance measurement, diagnostics, and troubleshooting via header
encryption makes network management more difficult. The PLUS wire
image defined by this document aims to mitigate this difficulty,
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allowing deployment of encrypted protocols without loss of essential
in- network functionality.
This wire image is intended primarily to support state maintenance
and measurement; the principles of measurement and primitives we aim
to support are drawn from recent work on explicit measurability in
protocol design [IPIM].
1.1. Notational Conventions
The words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", and "MAY" are used in this
document. It's not shouting; when these words are capitalized, they
have a special meaning as defined in [RFC2119].
2. State Maintenance and Measurement: Basic Header
Every packet in each direction of a flow using PLUS carries a PLUS
header. This can be either a basic header, or an extended header.
The PLUS basic header supports multiplexing using a connection token;
basic state maintenance using association and confirmation signals,
packet serial numbers, and a two-way stop signal; and basic
measurability using packet serial number echo. The format of the
basic header, together with the UDP header, is shown in Figure 1.
The extended header is defined in Section 3.
3 2 1
1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
+------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| UDP source port | UDP destination port |
+------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| UDP length | UDP checksum |
+------------------------------+-----------------------+-+-+-+-+
| magic |L|R|S|0|
+------------------------------------------------------+-+-+-+-+
| |
+- connection/association token CAT -+
| |
+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| packet serial number PSN |
+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| packet serial echo PSE |
+--------------------------------------------------------------+
/ \
\ transport protocol header/payload (encrypted) /
/ \
Figure 1: PLUS header with basic exposure
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Fields are encoded in network byte order and are defined as follows:
o magic: A 28-bit number identifying this packet as carrying a PLUS
header. This magic number is chosen to avoid collision with
possible values of the first four bytes of widely deployed
protocols on UDP. The value 0xd8007ff has been provisionally
selected for the PLUS magic number based of experience with the
SPUD prototype, a cursory survey of common UDP protocols, and
compatibility with [RFC8035].
o flags: four bits carrying additional information:
* LoLa flag (L): Packet is latency sensitive and prefers drop to
delay when set.
* RoI flag (R): Packet is not sensitive to reordering when set.
* Stop flag (S): Packet carries a stop or stop confirmation when
set.
* Extended Header bit: Flag bit 0x01 is zero in packets with a
Basic Header.
o Connection/Association Token (CAT): A 64-bit token identifying
this association. The CAT should be chosen randomly by the
connection initiator. The CAT performs two functions in the PLUS
header:
* Multiplexing: PLUS packets on the same 5-tuple with a different
CAT value are taken to belong to a separate flow, with
completely separate state.
* Rebinding: A PLUS packet sharing one endpoint (source address/
port pair, or destination address/port pair) and the CAT with
an existing flow is taken to belong to that flow, since the
other endpoint identifier has changed due to a mobility event
or address translation change.
o Packet Serial Number (PSN): A 32-bit serial number for this
packet. The first PSN for each direction in a flow is chosen
randomly, and subsequent packets increment the PSN by one. The
PSN wraps around.
o Packet Serial Echo (PSE): The most recent PSN seen by the sender
in the opposite direction before this packet was sent.
Since PLUS is designed to be used for UDP-encapsulated, encrypted
transport protocols, overlying transports are presumed to provide
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encryption and integrity protection for their own headers. For the
sake of efficiency, it is also assumed that this integrity protection
can be extended to the bits in the PLUS Basic Header.
2.1. Sender Behavior
When a sender has a packet ready to send using PLUS, it determines
the values in the Basic Header as follows:
o The magic number is set to the constant 0xd8007ff.
o If the sender is the flow initiator, and the packet is the first
packet in the flow, the sender selects a cryptographically random
64-bit number for the CAT. When multiplexing, it must ensure the
CAT is not already in use for the 5-tuple. Otherwise, the sender
uses the CAT associated with the flow.
o If the packet is the first packet in the flow in this direction,
the sender selects a cryptographically random 32-bit number for
the PSN. Otherwise, the sender adds one to the PSN on the last
packet it sent in this flow, and uses that value for the PSN. If
the last PSN is 0xffffffff, it wraps around, setting the PSN to
0x00000001. A PSN of 0x00000000 is never sent.
o If the packet is the first packet in the flow in this direction,
the sender sets the PSE to 0x00000000. Otherwise it sets the PSE
to the PSN of the last packet seen in the opposite direction.
o If the overlying transport determines that this packet is loss-
insensitive but latency-sensitive, the sender sets the L flag.
o If the overlying transport determines that this packet may be
freely reordered, the sender sets the R flag.
o If the overlying transport determines that the connection is
shutting down, and no further packets will be sent in this
direction other than packets part of this shutdown, the sender
sets the S flag; see Section 2.3.2 for details.
2.2. Receiver Behavior
When a receiver receives a packet containing a PLUS Basic Header, it
processes the values in the Basic Header as follows:
o It verifies that the magic number is the constant 0xd800fff. If
the receiver is expecting a PLUS packet, and it does not see this
value, it drops the packet without further processing.
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o It verifies the integrity of the information in the PLUS Basic
Header, using information carried in the overlying transport.
Packets failing integrity checks SHOULD be dropped, but MAY be
further analyzed by the receiver to determine the likely cause of
verification failure; reaction to the failure is transport and
implementation specific.
o It stores the PSN to be sent as the PSE on the the next packet it
sends in the opposite direction.
2.3. On-Path State Maintenance using the Basic Header
The basic header provides all the signals necessary to drive the
transport- independent state machine described in
[I-D.trammell-plus-statefulness], as shown in Figure 2.
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`- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -'
` +============+ a->b +============+ '
` / \--------->/ \<-+ '
+--->( zero ) ( uniflow ) | a->b '
^ ` \ /<---------\ /--+ '
| ` +============+ TO_IDLE +============+ '
| `- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | b->a - - - - - - - - -'
| V
| +============+
| TO_IDLE / \
+<-----------------------( associating )
| \ /
| +============+
| | a->b
| V
| +============+
| TO_ASSOCIATED / \<-+
+<-----------------------( associated ) | a<->b
| \ /--+
| +============+
| | stop y->z
| V
| +============+
| TO_ASSOCIATED / \<-+
+<-----------------( stop-wait ) | a<->b
| \ /--+
| +============+
| | stop z->y
| V
| +============+
| TO_STOPPING / \
+------------( stopping )
\ /
+============+
Figure 2: Transport-independent state machine as implemented by PLUS
2.3.1. State Establishment
On the first packet with a PLUS header forwarded by an on-path device
for a given 5-tuple plus CAT, the device moves that flow from the
zero state to the uniflow state. The device retuens the flow to zero
state after not seeing a packet on the same flow in the same
direction with the same CAT within a timeout interval TO_IDLE.
Otherwise, it stays in uniflow state and continues forwarding
packets, as long as it only observes packets in the same direction as
the initial packet. (the a->b direction in Figure 2).
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A PLUS-aware on-path device forwarding a packet with a PLUS header
with a reversed 5-tuple and identical CAT (the b->a direction in
Figure 2) to a flow in the uniflow state, moves that flow to the
associating state. It then waits to see a packet with a PSE in the
a->b direction equal to the PSN on the first reverse packet; on
receipt of this packet, the device moves the flow to associated
state. Otherwise, it drops state after a timeout interval TO_IDLE.
Once a flow has moved to the associated state, it will remain in that
state for a timeout interval TO_ASSOCIATED. The on-path device
forwards any packet with a PLUS header in either direction for this
flow. It resets the TO_ASSOCIATED timer for every packet it forwards
in this state.
2.3.2. Bidirectional Stop Signaling
A PLUS-aware on-path device forwarding a packet for a flow in the
associated state with an S flag set moves that flow to stop-wait
state. It stores the PSN on the packet causing the transition, and
continues forwarding packets as if in associated state, dropping
state on timeout interval TO_ASSOCIATED.
When it sees a packet in the opposite direction with the S flag set
and the PSE set to exactly the stored PSN, it transitions the flow to
stopping state. The device will forward packets in both directions
for flows in the stopping state within a timeout interval
TO_STOPPING; these packets will not reset the timer.
Note that even though the S flag is integrity-protected end to end, a
packet with the S flag set could be forged by one on-path device to
drive the flow into stop-wait state on all downstream devices.
However, this forgery is of severely limited utility. First, it
would require coordination between attackers on both sides of a given
on-path device in order to forge a confirmation of the stop signal -
a flag with the S bit set and a valid PSE corresponding to the PSN of
the first stop signal to drive the flow into stopping state. Second,
the information in the Basic Header on each packet will drive the
state machine into associated state even in the middle of a flow,
enabling fast recovery even in the case of such a coordinated attack.
2.3.3. State Rebinding
One end of a PLUS association may change its address while
maintaining on-path state; e.g. due to a NAT change. A PLUS-aware
on-path device that forwards a packet for a flow in the zero state,
where one of the endpoint identifiers (address and port) and the CAT,
but not the other endpoint identifier, match a flow in a non-zero
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state, treats that packet as belonging to the existing flow, and
updates the endpoint identifier.
2.4. Measurement and Diagnosis using the Basic Header
The basic header trivially supports passive two-way delay measurement
as well as partial loss estimation at a single observation point on
path.
To calculate two-way delay, an observation point calculates the delay
between seeing a PSN and a corresponding PSE in each direction, then
adds the delays from each direction together. The fact that the PSN
increments by one for every packet makes this measurement much
simpler than the equivalent measurement using TCP sequence and
acknowledgment numbers.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: specify this fully.]
Loss and reordering upstream from an observation point in each
direction can be estimated through examination of the PSN sequence
observed. A skipped PSN not seen within a specified interval can be
counted as a lost packet, and the extent of reordering estimated by
the degree of skipping seen in those skipped PSNs that are later
observed. Since PLUS does not expose information about
retransmissions (and, indeed, may not even carry a transport that
uses retransmission for loss recovery), loss downstream from the
observation point cannot be observed.
3. Path Communication: Extended Header
Additional facilities for communicating with on-path devices under
endpoint control are provided by the PLUS Extended Header. The
extended header shares the layout of its first 20 bytes with the PLUS
Basic Header, except the Extended Header bit (0x01 on byte 11) is
set. As with the Basic Header, overlying transports are presumed to
provide encryption and integrity protection for the PLUS Extended
Header. The Extended Header has a 1-byte type field, a 6-bit length
field, a 2-bit Integrity indicator, and variable-length value field
for the Path Communication Function (PCF):
o PCF Type: a 1-byte value defining the type and semantics of the
PCF value. Types 0x00 and 0xff are special and further explained
below.
o PDF Integrity indication field: a 2-bit field indicating how much
of the PCF value field is integrity protected:
* 00: the PCF field is not integrity protected.
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* 01: the first quarter of the PCF value field is integrity
protected, rounded up to the nearest bit.
* 10: the first half of the PCF value field is integrity
protected, rounded up to the nearest bit.
* 11: the whole PCF field is integrity protected.
o PCF Length: a 6-bit field indicating the length of the variable
length value field.
o PCF Value: variable-length field containing a value of the type
described in the PCF Type field.
3 2 1
1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
+------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| UDP source port | UDP destination port |
+------------------------------+-------------------------------+
| UDP length | UDP checksum |
+------------------------------+-----------------------+-+-+-+-+
| magic |L|R|S|1|
+------------------------------------------------------+-+-+-+-+
| |
+- connection/association token CAT -+
| |
+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| packet serial number PSN |
+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| packet serial echo PSE |
+---------------+-----------+---+------------------------------+
| PCF Type | PCF Len | I | \
+---------------+-----------+---+ PCF value (variable) /
/ \
+- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
\ /
/ transport protocol header/payload (encrypted) \
\ /
Figure 3: PLUS extended header with 1-byte PCF
The extended header is generally used to expose or request
information from/to the path. If the value field is integrity
protected it MUST NOT be changed by an element on the network path
and provides only consumable information. Non-integrity protected
parts of the value field carry a scratch space for path elements to
provide the requested information defined by the PCF type. The type
of the PCF determines the semantics of the value field and limits the
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intended use of the scratch space. A middlebox only needs to check
for PCF types that are relevant for the function that middlebox
provides. Knowing the type, also means that the semantics of the
value field are fully known. Therefore a middlebox does not need to
check the length and integrity field. These field are provided for
receiver-side handling on unknown PCF types.
If a sender requests information from a path, these are generally
used to expose information about the traffic for measurement or
diagnostic purposes. These signals generally take the form of
accumulators: initialized to some value by the sender, and subject to
some aggregation function by each on-path device that understands
them. In any case, the information sent and received is to be
treated as advisory only, given its integrity cannot be checked.
A PLUS receiver that receives a PLUS packet with an extended header
and an unknown PCF type where the integrity indication is smaller
than 11, MUST feed the non-integrity-protected part of the PCF value
field back to the sender, using an encrypted feedback channel
provided by the upper layer protocol. The sender usually consumes
this data as it has requested it previously from the path. The
sender SHOULD check the reasonability of the received information, as
follows:
o If the information was intended to be consumed by the receiver
instead of the sender, reflecting the receiver indicates by
reflecting this information that the PFC is unknown.
o If the value field is unchanged from its initial value, this may
indicate that there is no path element on the current path that
supports the requested PCF. However, as the path can change, a
PLUS sender might re-try to requested the information at a later
point of time or if any indication is received that the path might
have changed.
o If the PCF value field has an invalid or unreasonable value
regarding the requested PCF type, this may be an indication that
the scratch space is misused, and the sender SHOULD NOT use this
extended header PCF on this path anymore.
The PCF types 0x00 and 0xff are used for special purposes. 0x00
indicates that another 1-byte type field is followed (before the
length and integrity indication) to provide future extensibility.
The type 0xff indicates that that PLUS payload data follows (without
a PDF length and integrity indication). The semantics of this PLUS
payload are not specified in this revision of this document but e.g.
can be used to carry ICMP messages over PLUS.
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If the length field is zero, the integrity indication field is not
specified and reserved for future use. It MUST be set to zero and
ignored by the receiver.
3.1. Measurement and Diagnostics using the Extended Header
We have identified the following signals that can be exposed by the
sender as potentially useful for measurement and diagnostic purposes.
These signals are advisory only, and should not be presumed by either
the endpoints or devices along the path to affect forwarding
behavior. Details of type and encoding for these information
o Packet number echo delta time. Exposes the interval between the
receipt of the packet whose number appears in the PSE and the
transmission of this packet, as in section 4.1.2 of [IPIM].
Together with analysis of the PSN and PSE sequence, this allows
high-precision RTT estimation. The encoding of this field is TBD.
o Timestamp (Type 0x22, 3-byte sender to path). Similar to TCP
timestamps in [RFC7323], allows constant-rate clock exposure to
devices on path. Note that this is less necessary for RTT
measurement of one-sided flows than it is in TCP, due to the
properties of the PSN and PSE values in the Basic Header.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: is this useful enough to keep?]
o Timestamp Echo. Echo of the last received timestamp, as above.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: as above, is this useful enough to keep?]
o Congestion Exposure. The sender exposes the number of observed
losses and ECN marks [RFC3168]. The path observes the information
over time and derive information about the current whole-path
congestion, as currently provided by counting retransmission on
TCP, the RTCP Extended Report (XR) block for periodic ECN feedback
[RFC6679], or ConEx for IPv6 [RFC7837]. The encoding of this
field is TBD.
We have identified the following signals for request from the path as
potentially useful. Note that accumulated values for use at the
sender must be fed back to the sender by the overlying transport, and
that the presence of non-PLUS aware devices on path at breaks in MTU
mean that the accumulated value can only be used as a hint to
processes for measurement and discovery of the accumulated values at
the sender.
o State timeout accumulator: This signal allows measurement of
timeouts from PLUS-aware devices. It is initialized to a maximum
("no information") value by the sender. A PLUS-aware forwarding
device on path receiving this value fills in the minimum of the
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received value and the configured timeout for the flow's present
state into this field. The encoding of this field is TBD.
o Rate limit accumulator: This signal allows exposure of rate
limiting along the path. It is initialized to a maximum ("no
information") value by the sender. A PLUS-aware forwarding device
on path receiving this value fills in the minimum of the received
value and the rate limit to which this flow is subject into this
field. The encoding of this field is TBD.
o MTU accumulator: This signal allows measurement of MTU information
from PLUS-aware devices. The sender sets the initial value to the
sender's MTU. A PLUS-aware forwarding device on path receiving
this value fills in the minimum of the received value and the MTU
of the next hop, in bytes into this field. The information, when
fed back to the sender, can be used as a hint for a running
PLPMTUD [RFC4821] process.
o Trace accumulator. This signal allows exposure of a trace of
PLUS-aware devices on path, similar to the Path Changes mechanism
in section 4.3 of [IPIM]. The sender initializes the value to a
value chosen randomly for the flow; all packets in the flow using
path trace accumulator must use the same initial value. A PLUS-
aware forwarding device on path receiving this value fills in the
result of XORing the received value with a randomly chosen device
identifier, which it must use for all path trace accumulator
signals it participates in. Packets traversing the same set of
PLUS-aware forwarding devices in the same flow therefore arrive at
the receiver with the same accumulated value, and changes to the
set of devices on path can be detected by the receiver.
4. Implementation and Deployment Considerations
Here we discuss considerations for the implementation of overlying
transports on PLUS, and their deployment in the Internet
4.1. Interface to Overlying Transport
[EDITOR'S NOTE: Since the overlying transport is responsible for
providing the cryptographic context used for integrity protection and
feedback, and may be responsible for feedback as well, the
"northbound" interface needs to be concretely specified in a future
revision of this document.]
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4.2. Discovery
[EDITOR'S NOTE: Discovery is currently explicitly out of band.
Should there be a way for a PLUS-aware overlying transport to
discover whether its peer wants to use a PLUS- or non-PLUS variant of
the transport? This is a specific case of the generalized multi-
transport discovery and negotiation problem, so whatever happens here
should be interoperable with deployed/deployable approaches.]
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. Path communication field
types and PLUS magic numbers may be moved to a Standards Action
registry in a future revision.
6. Security Considerations
This document describes the PLUS Basic and Extended Headers, and the
protocol they support. This protocol can be used to expose
information to devices along the path to replace the analysis of
transport- and application-layer headers when those headers are
encrypted. Care must be taken in the exposure of such information to
ensure no irrelevant application and/or user confidential information
is exposed.
PLUS itself contains some security-relevant features. In concert
with an encrypted overlying transport, the PLUS Basic and Extended
Headers are integrity-protected to prevent manipulation on-path of
any value except Path to Receiver values; this integrity protection
prevents path elements from injecting values without explicit sender
involvement, or from being stripped from the PLUS Extended Header.
The CAT and PSE described in Section 2 taken together, provide
entropy to prevent on-path devices from being driven into incorrect
states by off-path attackers. Bidirectional stop signaling as in
Section 2.3.2 requires an on-path attacker of a given middlebox to
forge traffic on both of the middlebox's interfaces to drive a
middlebox to inappropriately drop state for a flow.
7. Acknowledgments
This work is partially supported by the European Commission under
Horizon 2020 grant agreement no. 688421 Measurement and Architecture
for a Middleboxed Internet (MAMI), and by the Swiss State Secretariat
for Education, Research, and Innovation under contract no. 15.0268.
This support does not imply endorsement. Thanks to Ted Hardie, Joe
Hildebrand, Mark Nottingham, and the participants of the PLUS BoF at
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IETF 96 in Berlin for input leading to this design; and to Gorry
Fairhurst for the detailed review.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, August 1980,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.hardie-path-signals]
Hardie, T., "Path signals", draft-hardie-path-signals-00
(work in progress), October 2016.
[I-D.ietf-quic-transport]
Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic-transport-01 (work
in progress), January 2017.
[I-D.trammell-plus-abstract-mech]
Trammell, B., "Abstract Mechanisms for a Cooperative Path
Layer under Endpoint Control", draft-trammell-plus-
abstract-mech-00 (work in progress), September 2016.
[I-D.trammell-plus-statefulness]
Kuehlewind, M., Trammell, B., and J. Hildebrand,
"Transport-Independent Path Layer State Management",
draft-trammell-plus-statefulness-02 (work in progress),
December 2016.
[IPIM] Allman, M., Beverly, R., and B. Trammell, "Principles for
Measurability in Protocol Design (arXiv preprint
1612.02902)", December 2016.
[RFC2474] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
"Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2474, December 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2474>.
Trammell & Kuehlewind Expires September 14, 2017 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft PLUS Spec March 2017
[RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3168>.
[RFC4821] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>.
[RFC6679] Westerlund, M., Johansson, I., Perkins, C., O'Hanlon, P.,
and K. Carlberg, "Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)
for RTP over UDP", RFC 6679, DOI 10.17487/RFC6679, August
2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6679>.
[RFC7323] Borman, D., Braden, B., Jacobson, V., and R.
Scheffenegger, Ed., "TCP Extensions for High Performance",
RFC 7323, DOI 10.17487/RFC7323, September 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7323>.
[RFC7675] Perumal, M., Wing, D., Ravindranath, R., Reddy, T., and M.
Thomson, "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) Usage
for Consent Freshness", RFC 7675, DOI 10.17487/RFC7675,
October 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7675>.
[RFC7837] Krishnan, S., Kuehlewind, M., Briscoe, B., and C. Ralli,
"IPv6 Destination Option for Congestion Exposure (ConEx)",
RFC 7837, DOI 10.17487/RFC7837, May 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7837>.
[RFC8035] Holmberg, C., "Session Description Protocol (SDP) Offer/
Answer Clarifications for RTP/RTCP Multiplexing",
RFC 8035, DOI 10.17487/RFC8035, November 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8035>.
Authors' Addresses
Brian Trammell
ETH Zurich
Gloriastrasse 35
8092 Zurich
Switzerland
Email: ietf@trammell.ch
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Mirja Kuehlewind
ETH Zurich
Gloriastrasse 35
8092 Zurich
Switzerland
Email: mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch
Trammell & Kuehlewind Expires September 14, 2017 [Page 17]
