Internet DRAFT - draft-tschofenig-secure-the-web
draft-tschofenig-secure-the-web
Network Working Group H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft Nokia Siemens Networks
Intended status: Informational S. Turner
Expires: April 26, 2013 IECA, Inc.
M. Hanson
Mozilla
October 23, 2012
An Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of Web Insecurity
draft-tschofenig-secure-the-web-04.txt
Abstract
The year 2011 has been quite exciting from a Web security point of
view: a number of high-profile security incidents have gotten a lot
of press attention but also new initiatives, such as the National
Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC), had been
launched to improve the Web identity eco-system. The NSTIC strategy
paper, for example, observes problems with Internet security due to
the widespread usage of low-entropy passwords and the lack of widely
deployed authentication and attribute assurance services.
With this memorandum we try to develop a shared vision for how to
deal with the most pressing Web security problems.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 26, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. From Two-Party to N-Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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1. Introduction
HTTP is an IETF standard and documented in RFC 2616 [RFC2616] and
provides the core foundation of the browser-based platform but is
also widely used for non-browser-based applications in smart phones
and Internet tablets. Like any other specification in the IETF HTTP
also comes with various security mechanims. Digest authentication
support in HTTP was published in 1997 with RFC 2069 [RFC2069] and
later updated in 1999 by RFC 2617 [RFC2617]. The HTTP state
management mechanism, namely cookies, was initially published in 1997
with RFC 2109 [RFC2109], revised in 2000 by RFC 2965 [RFC2965], and
obsoleted by RFC 6265 [RFC6265].
For client side authentication for HTTP-based protocols two different
solution tracks have been offered from the IETF, namely TLS client
side authenication and also application level authentication via HTTP
basic and digest. TLS-based client authentication using certificates
was quite complex for end users to configure (and still is today).
HTTP based authentication on the other hand did not found widespread
usage either for a number of reasons. First, the user interface was
rendered differently than regular Web application forms making it
less attractive for Web developers and users. At that time HTTP had
a semantic that was closer to file system access control and
therefore the decision making process was binary, either the user was
granted access to the resource or it wasn't. With the HTTP 401 there
was no way for a user to, for example, recover from a lost password
or other forms of failure cases. The authentication and
authorization process was not seen as continuium but rather as a
binary decision. For these reasons form-based authentication
mechanisms had found widespread acceptance by the Web application
developer community.
Many Web sites decided to deploy their own authentication
infrastructure and to store cleartext credentials, since most of them
use password-based authentication. As reported in a New York Times
article from October 2012 [NYT-2Factor] a recent analysis of a leaked
large password database revealed that among 3.4 million passwords
(among the 30.3 million passwords) consisting of nothing but four
digits. The top 20 passwords account for nearly 27% of the total.
This even makes online guessing attacks feasible. Users also share
the same password across multiple sites making it easy for an
adversary to utilize credentials obtained from one site to also gain
access on other Web sites.
Breach notification laws forced companies to inform their customers
about incidents. Consequently, the community became aware of the
degree of password leakage due to unauthorized access to these
credential databases. For example, in April 2011 Sony experienced a
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data breach within their PlayStation Network and 100 million users
accounts were compromised. This is only one out of thousands of data
breaches collected by the Privacy Rights Clearing House [DataBreach].
In most cases these security vulnerabilities are due to
misconfiguration, security vulnerabilities in software which can be
exploited via buffer overflow attacks, and SQL injection due to
insufficient input parameter verification.
In addition, cookies are still the most common mechanism for session
management, i.e., a non-cryptographic way to bind the initial, often
better protected, authentication procedure to the subsequent protocol
exchanges. The non-cryptographic session management gives attackers
the ability to perform session hijacking. This is of particular
concern when users access Internet services using insecure WLAN
hotspots. Firesheep [FireSheep], a Firefox plugin that worked as a
packetsniffer demonstrated this vulnerability to the non-expert
community and made session hijacking 'friendly to use' for a broader
community.
A number of trends had been observed during the last couple of years,
as briefly summarized below.
From Documents to Mobile Code: During the last 10 years the Web has
changed quite fundamentally with the widespread usage of
JavaScript. While Web pages have for a long time been dynamically
generated the ever increasing capabilities of JavaScript, with
respect to functionality and performance, have changed the
security model. A typical Website collects content from multiple
other Web sites and delivers it to the user's browser and by
delivering code inside HTML new security challenges have emerged.
Also the standardization landscape had been challenged by this new
development and [I-D.tschofenig-post-standardization] documents
architectural implications.
Mashups and Data Sharing: With the increasing specialization of Web
sites developers started to outsource functionality to other
sites. Partially this is a user-convenience aspect (e.g., users
do not want to create a new address book with every site, publish
their latest status on each and every site again and again) but
often also driven by business interestes. In any case, the need
to access resources hosted on other sites emerged and often these
resources were not visible to everyone. Sharing long-term
passwords is considered a bad habit and consequently the Web
Authorization (OAuth) protocol [RFC6749] started to become used
widely. OAuth avoids the need to share long-term credentials with
random Web sites.
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The Real-Time Web: As HTTP became the protocol of choice for many
application developers, also because of it's ability to go through
firewalls and NATs, requirements for asynchronous protocol
communication had to be addressed as well. HTTP, as a request/
response protocol, was initially not designed for pushing data
from the server-side to the client as soon as it is available.
Long polling requests and other tricks had been used to allow bi-
directional communication between the HTTP client and the HTTP
server. The efforts in the BiDirectional or Server-Initiated HTTP
(hybi) working group improves the communication capabilities of
HTTP. To allow one Web browser to communicate directly with
another Web browser the same-origin security framework utilized by
the browser has to be bypassed and the work on Real-Time
Communication in WEB-browsers (rtcweb) was created to develop a
architecture [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security] and in
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview]. Extending Web clients with real-time
communication capabilities opens the doors for a large number of
applications that had previously only been available for
downloadable applications.
With the increasing number of security challenges and developments in
the Web application environment the standards community was
challenged to initiate activities. Examples include the development
of HTTP Strict Transport Layer Security (HSTS)
[I-D.ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec] that allows Web sites to
declare themselves accessible only via secure connections. The
attempt to clarify the Web Origin Concept [I-D.ietf-websec-origin],
which covers the principles that underlies the concept of origin as
used to scope of authority or privilege by user agents. The work
around Content Security Policy (CSP) [CSP] that allows Web
application developers to declare a set of content restrictions for a
web resources. The OAuth protocol that allows secure and privacy-
friendly sharing of resources. The work on Javascript Object Signing
and Encryption to give Web developers better ways to protect the
exchange of JSON data structures. The W3C Web Cryptography API that
defines JavaScript extensions that enables developers to implement
secure application protocols within Web applications.
A lot has changed over the last 10 years in the Web eco-system.
While astonishing progress has been made in getting the Web
application eco-system on a par with native applications the
foundation of the Web platform is still unable to address many of the
most common security vulnerabilities; problems the Internet community
had been fighting against for over a decade and had solved for other
application protocol frameworks and Internet deployment environments.
It is time to tackle this problem and to develop a common
understanding of the problem and the desired design goals.
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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3. Passwords
Passwords have a long history in authentication protocols on the
Internet. They appear to be convient for users and are easy to
provision to users by many Web site. Still, passwords present a
number of challenges, including:
o Users re-use the same password at multiple sites. This allows a
rouge Website provider to attempt to impersonate users on other
sites. It also allows a hacker to use stolen passwords obtained
from one site to be used at a non-compromised site.
o Password are stored in cleartext in most cases. In case of a data
breach account information, including the password, becomes
accessible to an attacker.
o Users are tricked in typing their password into a Website
maintained by phishing attempts. Furthermore, some Websites
request username and password for access to protected resources
maintained by other Websites. While there are technical ways to
avoid the need for such long-term password sharing practice using
OAuth some Websites still ask users.
o Many password based authenication protocols are not secure against
eavesdropping, or allow easy ways for offline dictionary attacks.
o When end systems are compromised as well then a keyboard logger
can capture any password sequence a user enters.
So, why do we need passwords at all? It is easy to come up with
solutions that use hardware-based mechanisms (e.g., such as OTP
tokens), mobile phones, etc. [Quest] lists some of these mechanisms
and makes an attempt to classify them. Many of the analysed
authentication mechanisms provide additional security but have design
limitations regarding usability and incremental deployment. There
are, however, reasons why alternatives have not found widespread
deployment on the Internet, such as
o Passwords are cheap (at least the primary costs) for user's and
service providers. Hardware tokens on the other hand have a
certain amount of cost associated with them.
o Provisioning new users with passwords is easy. Tools and
processes exist and are widely accepted.
o Service providers have no external dependency when they manage
user accounts themselves (unlike with many third party identity
management solutions).
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o Users are familiar with password-based systems and the acceptance
is good.
o Passwords can easily be delegated to others.
o Users typically feel quite secure when they are using shared
secrets and it fits into their mental model of self-securing.
o Passwords can easily be transferred to multiple devices used by a
single user.
Note that the credential type and the actual form of where these
credentials are stored (e.g., software, hardware) is orthogonal to
the actual identity proofing process. Stronger forms of identity
proofing (e.g., requiring in-person passport verification) can be
quite expensive. There are also secondary costs in the form of
support calls and education if credential provisioning is more
complicated, as it is often the case with client certificates.
Regardless how many disadvantages passwords have they will be with us
for a long time. As such, out attempt is therefore to start from the
currently deployment and to look towards a future where fewer of them
are used, and if they are used then in a more secure fashion.
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4. Roadmap
It is our aim to accomplish three types of goals:
1. Reduce the number of passwords used on the Web
2. Increase security of how passwords are used (for example using
two-factor authentication). With the RSA patents for one-time
password based authentication expiring the usage of the work by
the Initiative for Open Authentication (OATH) with their HMAC-
Based One-time Password (HOTP) algorithm (RFC 4226 [RFC4226]) and
the Time-based One-time Password (TOTP) algorithm (RFC 6238
[RFC6238]) has increased.
3. Broaden the use of other, non-password-based credentials. The
weaknesses related to compromised password databases and the
unauthorized access to these stored credentials is difficult to
avoid entirely without switching to stronger credentials or
without outsourcing those functions to specifialized third party
identity providers.
A non-goal of this document is to evaluate ways for improving
identity proofing, which is a requirement for accomplishing higher
levels of assurance.
We do not believe that the technical community should be attempting
to come up with the single and best solution to satisfy these three
goals. We would like to leave room for innovation and allow many
different solutions to co-exist to best suite their deployment.
Subsequently, we try to highlight a few guiding principles in an
attempt to come with a way forward.
Move Authentication down into the Platform:
Exposing authentication protocol functionality to the user and
requiring Web application developers to write security related
code has proven to lead to problems. Avoid user interaction
related to security whenever possible but keep in mind that
authorization decisions, particularly with regard to data sharing,
require a consent. Ensure that library support is available for
Web developers to allow them easy integration of security
functionality into their applications. Unfortunately, a protocol
design also needs to consider the transition scenario where the
Web endpoints are not yet upgraded to support the new
functionality and that the authentication functionality is not yet
available.
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Design for Growth:
No single authentication mechanism nor credential type is able to
fulfill all use cases. Design for later extensions and develop
the protocol architecture in such a way that components are
interchangable. In particular, there are a number of
authentication mechanisms already in use in other deployment
environments.
Context Matters:
Users require context for all disclosures and the sequence of
interactions matters. A monolitic authentication protocol that
provides mutual authentication is less likely going to capture the
context related disclosures. Server-side authentication is the
first interaction that will have to be provided to guarantee
genuine content as well as the prerequisity of an early setup for
a confidentiality protected channel. Client side authentication
may, however, come at a much later stage of the application
interaction. It is often bundled with an authorization decision
where different application execution paths depend on the level of
authorization.
Discussion: Is it indeed given that client authentication will
have to happen at a later stage given that platform-level
authentication proliferates (particularly or mobile phone
applications) and "authenticated by default" becomes the norm?
If so, then strong signals in UIs of authenticated status,
identity selection, and anonymous/pseudonymous modes become
more important. One could compare this to the evolution in the
telephony communication where caller ID information was
initially not provided but became the norm later and blocking
the caller ID instead became the expection.
Transform Long-Term Passwords to Short-Term Credentials:
One of the function of authentication protocols is to transform
long-term credentials into short term secrets. Long-term
credentials, such as passwords, require substantial protection in
a protocol exchange and therefore this interaction often leads to
a computationally expensive, multi-roundtrip protocol exchange.
We do, however, encourage protocol designers to make heavier use
of this transformation step into short term credentials.
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Keep the User Experience in Mind:
Design your protocol stack in such a way that developers up the
stack can give good advice to users. The use case analysis should
include common failure scenarios since error paths need as much
expressiveness as success paths, whereby expressiveness refers to
the ability to communicate with the user about failure cases.
TLS Always:
The initial step of entity authentication cannot be seen in
isolution of the ultimate purpose of securing an entire applicatio
interaction that requires session management to take place. While
this session management today happens in most cases in a non-
cryptographic way (i.e., without data origin authentication) we
believe it is time revisit this practice. Designing a new
cryptographic session management concept is questionable given the
already available tools, such as TLS that provides a secure
session management using the TLS Record Layer. The usage of the
Record Layer is, compared to the TLS Handshake protocol, fairly
computationally less time-consuming
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5. From Two-Party to N-Party
It would be short sighted to write about a topic like this without
touching a commonly desired way to reduce the number of long term
credentials: federated logins
Federated login allows a user to utilize his credential obtained from
one organization, acting as the Identity Provider, for accessing a
resource at another entity, who acts as a Relying Party. While this
approach addresses some of our design goals it causes secondary
problems to appear - particularly related to privacy.
The following issues in this transition from a two-party to a three-
party model are to observe:
Discovery:
How do the three parties find each other? In particular, how does
the user (via his or her user agent) inform the relying party
about the identity provider it wants to use? How does the relying
party inform the user agent (and user) about the identity
providers it is able and willing to interact with? Without any
changes to the end device relying parties often display icons of
identity providers: the more identity providers they support the
more icons are displayed to the user. This is also known as the
NASCAR problem.
Mutual Authentication:
How do we ensure that each party is authenticated to each other?
Trust and Permissions:
What information should the user share with the relying party and
how can he be reassured that the information is used in the way he
permitted? What information is needed by the Relying Party for
the application specific functionality? How is the identity
provider able to protect its users against misbehaving relying
parties?
Collusion:
There are three related properties systems should be tying to
provide:
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Relying parties can be prevented from knowing the real or
pseudonymous identity of an individual, since the identity
provider is the only entity involved in verifying identity.
Relying parties that collude can be prevented from using an
individual's credentials to track the individual. That is, two
different relying parties can be prevented from determining that
the same individual has authenticated to both of them. This
requires that each relying party use a different means of
identifying individuals.
The identity provider can be prevented from knowing which relying
parties an individual interacted with. This requires avoiding
direct communication between the identity provider and the relying
party at the time when access to a resource by the initiator is
made.
Security:
Keeping data secure at rest and in transit is another important
component of security and privacy protection. How can it be
ensured that the interactions between the three parties are not
manipulated? An identity provider providing services to many
relying parties is exposed to increased risk of a at breach via an
nauthorized access to the credential database. How can this
increased security protection be provided?
Note: While this text talks about three parties there may well be
more parties involved in the exchange. The role of the identity
consists of a credential provider and an attribute provider that may
be provided by different parties. Furthermore, attributes associated
with personal data may be contributed by multiple attribute
providers, not just by a single entity. There may also be additional
parties involved in the communication between the identity provider
and the relying party the trust path from the identity provider to
the relying party.
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6. IANA Considerations
This document does not require actions by IANA.
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7. Acknowledgments
The content of this document has been created based on discussions
with a number of persons, including
o Jeff Hodges
o Michael Garcia
o Adam Barth
o Brad Hill
o Dan Mills
o Ed Felton
o Tara Whalen
o Andy Steingruebl
o Tim Polk
o Dirk Balfanz
o Nico Williams
o Tobias Gondrom
o Julian Reschke
We would like to thank them for their input. We would also like to
thank the participants of the May 2011 W3C Identity in the Browser
workshop for their discussion feedback.
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8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, June 1999.
[RFC2109] Kristol, D. and L. Montulli, "HTTP State Management
Mechanism", RFC 2109, February 1997.
[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
April 2011.
[RFC2965] Kristol, D. and L. Montulli, "HTTP State Management
Mechanism", RFC 2965, October 2000.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, October 2012.
[RFC5849] Hammer-Lahav, E., "The OAuth 1.0 Protocol", RFC 5849,
April 2010.
[I-D.ietf-websec-origin]
Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept",
draft-ietf-websec-origin-06 (work in progress),
October 2011.
[I-D.ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec]
Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS)",
draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec-14 (work in
progress), September 2012.
[RFC2069] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Leach, P.,
Luotonen, A., Sink, E., and L. Stewart, "An Extension to
HTTP : Digest Access Authentication", RFC 2069,
January 1997.
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[I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth]
Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP/1.1): Authentication", draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-21
(work in progress), October 2012.
[I-D.tschofenig-post-standardization]
Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., and D. McPherson,
"Trends in Web Applications and the Implications on
Standardization", draft-tschofenig-post-standardization-02
(work in progress), May 2012.
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview]
Alvestrand, H., "Overview: Real Time Protocols for Brower-
based Applications", draft-ietf-rtcweb-overview-04 (work
in progress), June 2012.
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security]
Rescorla, E., "Security Considerations for RTC-Web",
draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-03 (work in progress),
June 2012.
[RFC4226] M'Raihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and
O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password
Algorithm", RFC 4226, December 2005.
[RFC6238] M'Raihi, D., Machani, S., Pei, M., and J. Rydell, "TOTP:
Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm", RFC 6238,
May 2011.
[CSP] "Content Security Policy 1.0", July 2012.
[FireSheep]
"FireSheep, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firesheep", October 2012.
[NYT-2Factor]
"Doing the Two-Step, Beyond the A.T.M., New York Times,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/technology/
two-step-verification-is-inconvenient-but-more-
secure.html", October 2012.
[DataBreach]
"Privacy Rights Clearinghouse - Data Breaches, available
at https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach",
October 2012.
[Quest] "The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for
Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes, In
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Proc. IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy 2012 (Oakland
2012)", July 2012.
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Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
Linnoitustie 6
Espoo 02600
Finland
Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Sean Turner
IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
Fairfax, VA 22031
USA
Phone:
Email: turners@ieca.com
Mike Hanson
Mozilla
Phone:
Email: mhanson@mozilla.com
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