Internet DRAFT - draft-tschofenig-teep-otrp-v2
draft-tschofenig-teep-otrp-v2
TEEP M. Pei
Internet-Draft Symantec
Intended status: Standards Track H. Tschofenig
Expires: January 9, 2020 Arm Ltd.
D. Wheeler
Intel
July 8, 2019
The Open Trust Protocol (OTrP) v2
draft-tschofenig-teep-otrp-v2-00
Abstract
This document specifies the Open Trust Protocol (OTrP) version 2, a
protocol that provisions and installs, updates, and deletes Trusted
Applications in a device with a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. OTrP Message Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Detailed Messages Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix B. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been designed to
separate a regular operating system, also referred as a Rich
Execution Environment (REE), from security-sensitive applications.
In an TEE ecosystem, different device vendors may use different
operating systems in the REE and may use different types of TEEs.
When application providers or device administrators use Trusted
Application Managers (TAMs) to install, update, and delete Trusted
Applications (TAs) on a wide range of devices with potentially
different TEEs then an interoperability need arises.
This document specifies version 2 of the Open Trust Protocol (OTrP),
a protocol for communicating between an OTrP server (as part of a
TAM) and an OTrP client (which is a client-side component running in
the REE).
The Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) architecture
document [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] has set to provide a design
guidance for such an interoperable protocol.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
This specification re-uses the terminology defined in
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture].
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3. OTrP Message Overview
OTrP consists of a couple of messages exchanged between a TAM and an
OTrP Agent via an OTrP Broker. The messages are encoded either in
JSON or CBOR and designed to provide end-to-end security. OTrP
messages are signed and/or encrypted by the endpoints, i.e., TAM and
OTrP Agent, but trusted applications may as well be encrypted and
signed by the service provider. OTrP not only re-uses JSON and CBOR
but also the respective security wrappers, namely JOSE (JWS [RFC7515]
and JWE [RFC7516], to be more specific) and COSE [RFC8152].
Furthermore, for attestation the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) and
for software updates the SUIT manifest format is re-used.
This specification defines six messages.
A TAM queries a device's current state with a QueryRequest message.
An OTrP Agent will, after authenticating and authorizing the request,
report attestation information, list all TAs, and provide information
about supported algorithms and extensions in a QueryResponse message.
An error message is returned if the request could not be processed.
A TAM will process the QueryResponse message and determine whether
subsequent message exchanges to install, update, or delete trusted
applications shall be initiated.
+------------+ +-------------+
| TAM | |OTrP Agent |
+------------+ +-------------+
QueryRequest ------->
QueryResponse
<------- or
Error
With the TrustedAppInstall message a TAM can instruct an OTrP Agent
to install a TA. The OTrP Agent will process the message, determine
whether the TAM is authorized and whether the TA has been signed by
an authorized SP. In addition to the binary, the TAM may also
provide personalization data. If the TrustedAppInstall message was
processed successfully then a Success message is returned to the TAM,
an Error message otherwise.
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+------------+ +-------------+
| TAM | |OTrP Agent |
+------------+ +-------------+
TrustedAppInstall ---->
Success
<---- or
Error
With the TrustedAppDelete message a TAM can instruct an OTrP Agent to
delete one or multiple TA(s). A Success message is returned when the
operation has been completed successfully, and an Error message
otherwise.
+------------+ +-------------+
| TAM | |OTrP Agent |
+------------+ +-------------+
TrustedAppDelete ---->
Success
<---- or
Error
4. Detailed Messages Specification
For a CBOR-based encoding the following security wrapper is used
(described in CDDL format [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]).
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Outer_Wrapper = {
msg-authenc-wrapper => bstr .cbor
Msg_AuthEnc_Wrapper / nil,
otrp-message => (QueryRequest /
QueryResponse /
TrustedAppInstall /
TrustedAppDelete /
Error /
Success ),
}
msg-authenc-wrapper = 1
otrp-message = 2
Msg_AuthEnc_Wrapper = [ * (COSE_Mac_Tagged /
COSE_Sign_Tagged /
COSE_Mac0_Tagged /
COSE_Sign1_Tagged)]
A future version of this specification will also describe the
security wrapper for JSON (in CDDL format).
suite = int
version = int
data_items = (
attestation: 1,
ta: 2,
ext: 3
)
QueryRequest = (
TYPE : int,
TOKEN : bstr,
REQUEST : [+data_items],
? CIPHER_SUITE : [+suite],
? NONCE : bstr,
? VERSION : [+version],
? OCSP_DATA : bstr,
* $$extensions
)
A QueryRequest message is signed by the TAM and has the following
fields:
TYPE TYPE = 1 corresponds to a QueryRequest message sent from the
TAM to the OTrP Agent.
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TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to
responses.
REQUEST The REQUEST field indicates what information the TAM
requests from the OTrP Agent in form of a list of integer values.
Each integer value corresponds to an IANA registered information
element. This specification defines the initial set of
information elements. With 'attestation' (1) the TAM requests the
OTrP Agent to return an EAT entity attestation token in the
response, with 'ta' (2) the TAM wants to query the OTrP Agent for
all installed TAs, and with 'ext' (3) the TAM wants to query the
OTrP Agent for supported extensions. Further values may be added
in the future via IANA registration.
CIPHER_SUITE The CIPHER_SUITE field lists the ciphersuite(s)
supported by the TAM.
NONCE NONCE is an optional field used for ensuring the refreshness
of the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) contained in the response.
VERSION The VERSION field lists the version(s) supported by the TAM.
For this version of the specification this field can be omitted.
OCSP_DATA The OCSP_DATA field contains a list of OCSP stapling data
respectively for the TAM certificate and each of the CA
certificates up to the root certificate. The TAM provides OCSP
data so that the OTrP Agent can validate the status of the TAM
certificate chain without making its own external OCSP service
call.
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ta_id = (
Vendor_ID = bstr,
Class_ID = bstr,
Device_ID = bstr,
* $$extensions
)
ext_info = int
QueryResponse = (
TYPE : int,
TOKEN : bstr,
? SELECTED_CIPHER_SUITE : suite,
? SELECTED_VERSION : version,
? EAT : bstr,
? TA_LIST : [+ta_id],
? EXT_LIST : [+ext_info],
* $$extensions
)
The QueryResponse message is signed and encrypted by the OTrP Agent
and returned to the TAM. It has the following fields:
TYPE TYPE = 2 corresponds to a QueryResponse message sent from the
OTrP Agent to the TAM.
TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to
responses. The value MUST correspond to the value received with
the QueryRequest.
SELECTED_CIPHER_SUITE The SELECTED_CIPHER_SUITE field indicates the
selected ciphersuite.
SELECTED_VERSION The SELECTED_VERSION field indicates the OTrP
protocol version selected by the OTrP Agent.
EAT The EAT field contains an Entity Attestation Token following the
encoding defined in [I-D.ietf-rats-eat].
TA_LIST The TA_LIST field enumerates the trusted applications
installed on the device in form of ta_ids, i.e., a vendor id/class
id/device id triple.
EXT_LIST The EXT_LIST field lists the supported extensions. This
document does not define any extensions.
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TrustedAppInstall = (
TYPE : int,
TOKEN : bstr,
? TA : [+SUIT_Outer_Wrapper],
* $$extensions
)
The TrustedAppInstall message is MACed and encrypted by the TAM and
has the following fields:
TYPE TYPE = 3 corresponds to a TrustedAppInstall message sent from
the TAM to the OTrP Agent. In case of successful processing, an
Success message is returned by the OTrP Agent. In case of an
error, an Error message is returned. Note that the
TrustedAppInstall message is used for initial TA installation but
also for TA updates.
TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to
responses.
TA The TA field is used to convey one or multiple SUIT manifests.
The SUIT manifest contains the code for the trusted app but may
also convey personalization data. TA binaries and personalization
data is often signed and encrypted by the SP. Other combinations
are, however, possible as well. For example, it is also possible
for the TAM to sign and encrypt the personalization data and to
let the SP sign and/or encrypt the TA binary.
TrustedAppDelete = (
TYPE : int,
TOKEN : bstr,
? TA_LIST : [+ta_id],
* $$extensions
)
The TrustedAppDelete message is MACed and encrypted by the TAM and
has the following fields:
TYPE TYPE = 4 corresponds to a TrustedAppDelete message sent from
the TAM to the OTrP Agent. In case of successful processing, an
Success message is returned by the OTrP Agent. In case of an
error, an Error message is returned.
TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to
responses.
TA_LIST The TA_LIST field enumerates the TAs to be deleted.
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Success = (
TYPE : int,
TOKEN : bstr,
? MSG : tstr,
* $$extensions
)
The Success message is MACed and encrypted by the OTrP Agent and has
the following fields:
TYPE TYPE = 5 corresponds to a Error message sent from the OTrP
Agent to the TAM.
TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to
responses.
MSG The MSG field contains optional diagnostics information encoded
in UTF-8 [RFC3629] returned by the OTrP Agent.
Error = (
TYPE : int,
TOKEN : bstr,
ERR_CODE : int,
? ERR_MSG : tstr,
? CIPHER_SUITE : [+suite],
? VERSION : [+version],
* $$extensions
)
If possible, the Error message is MACed and encrypted by the OTrP
Agent. Unprotected Error messages MUST be handled with care by the
TAM due to possible downgrading attacks. It has the following
fields:
TYPE TYPE = 6 corresponds to a Error message sent from the OTrP
Agent to the TAM.
TOKEN The value in the TOKEN field is used to match requests to
responses.
ERR_CODE The ERR_CODE field is populated with values listed in a
registry (with the initial set of error codes listed below). Only
selected messages are applicable to each message.
ERR_MSG The ERR_MSG message is a human-readable diagnostic message
that MUST be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] using Net-Unicode form
[RFC5198].
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VERSION The VERSION field enumerates the protocol version(s)
supported by the OTrP Agent. This field is optional but MUST be
returned with the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION error message.
CIPHER_SUITE The CIPHER_SUITE field lists the ciphersuite(s)
supported by the OTrP Agent. This field is optional but MUST be
returned with the ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG error message.
This specification defines the following initial error messages.
Additional error code can be registered with IANA.
ERR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER The OTrP Agent sends this error message when a
request contains incorrect fields or fields that are inconsistent
with other fields.
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION The OTrP Agent sends this error message
when it recognizes an unsupported extension or unsupported
message.
ERR_REQUEST_SIGNATURE_FAILED The OTrP Agent sends this error message
when it fails to verify the signature of the message.
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION The OTrP Agent receives a message but
does not support the indicated version.
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRYPTO_ALG The OTrP Agent receives a request message
encoded with an unsupported cryptographic algorithm.
ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE The OTrP Agent returns this error when
processing of a certificate failed. For diagnosis purposes it is
RECOMMMENDED to include information about the failing certificate
in the error message.
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE The OTrP Agent returns this error when a
certificate was of an unsupported type.
ERR_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED The OTrP Agent returns this error when a
certificate was revoked by its signer.
ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED The OTrP Agent returns this error when a
certificate has expired or is not currently valid.
ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR The OTrP Agent returns this error when a
miscellaneous internal error occurred while processing the
request.
ERR_RESOURCE_FULL This error is reported when a device resource
isn't available anymore, such as storage space is full.
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ERR_TA_NOT_FOUND This error will occur when the target TA does not
exist. This error may happen when the TAM has stale information
and tries to delete a TA that has already been deleted.
ERR_TA_ALREADY_INSTALLED While installing a TA, a TEE will return
this error if the TA has already been installed.
ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT The OTrP Agent returns this error when it does
not recognize the format of the TA binary.
ERR_TA_DECRYPTION_FAILED The OTrP Agent returns this error when it
fails to decrypt the TA binary.
ERR_TA_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED The OTrP Agent returns this error when
it fails to decompress the TA binary.
ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED The OTrP Agent returns this error
when manifest processing failures occur that are less specific
than ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT, ERR_TA_UNKNOWN_FORMAT, and
ERR_TA_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED.
ERR_PD_PROCESSING_FAILED The OTrP Agent returns this error when it
fails to process the provided personalization data.
5. Security Consideration
This section summarizes the security considerations discussed in this
specification:
Cryptographic Algorithms This specification relies on the
cryptographic algorithms provided by the security wrappers JOSE
and COSE, respectively. A companion document makes algorithm
recommendations but this document is written in an algorithm-
agnostic way. OTrP messages between the TAM and the OTrP Agent
are protected using JWS and JWE (for JSON-encoded messages) and
COSE (for CBOR-encoded messages). Public key based authentication
is used to by the OTrP Agent to authenticate the TAM and vice
versa.
Attestation A TAM may rely on the attestation information provided
by the OTrP Agent and the Entity Attestation Token is re-used to
convey this information. To sign the Entity Attestation Token it
is necessary for the device to possess a public key (usually in
the form of a certificate) along with the corresponding private
key. Depending on the properties of the attestation mechanism it
is possible to uniquely identify a device based on information in
the attestation information or in the certificate used to sign the
attestation token. This uniqueness may raise privacy concerns.
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To lower the privacy implications the OTrP Agent MUST present its
attestation information only to an authenticated and authorized
TAM.
TA Binaries TA binaries are provided by the SP.It is the
responsibility of the TAM to relay only verified TAs from
authorized SPs. Delivery of that TA to the OTrP Agent is then the
responsibility of the TAM and the OTrP Broker, using the security
mechanisms provided by the OTrP. To protect the TA binary the
SUIT manifest is re-used and it offers a varity of security
features, including digitial signatures and symmetric encryption.
Personalization Data An SP or a TAM can supply personalization data
along with a TA. This data is also protected by a SUIT manifest.
The personalization data may be itself is (or can be) opaque to
the TAM.
OTrP Broker OTrP relies on the OTrP Broker to relay messages between
the TAM and the OTrP Agent. When the OTrP Broker is compromised
it can drop, relay, and replay messages but it cannot modify those
messages. A compromised OTrP Broker could reorder TAM messages to
install an old version of a TA. Information in the manifest
ensures that the OTrP Agents are protected against such
downgrading attacks.
CA Compromise The QueryRequest message from a TAM to the OTrP Agent
may include OCSP stapling data for the TAM's signer certificate
and for intermediate CA certificates up to the root certificate so
that the OTrP Agent can verify the certificate's revocation
status.
A certificate revocation status check on a TA signer certificate
is OPTIONAL by an OTrP Agent. A TAM is responsible for vetting a
TA and before distributing them to OTrP Agents. The OTrP Agents
will trust a TA signer certificate's validation status done by a
TAM.
CA Compromise The CA issuing certificates to a TAM or an SP may get
compromised. A compromised intermediate CA certificates can be
detected by an OTrP Agent by using OCSP information, assuming the
revocation information is available. Additionally, it is
RECOMMENDED to provide a way to update the trust anchor store used
by the device, for example using a firmware update mechanism.
If the CA issuing certificates to devices gets compromised then
these devices might be rejected by a TAM, if revocation is
available to the TAM.
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Compromised TAM The OTrP Agent SHOULD use OCSP information to verify
the validity of the TAM-provided certificate (as well as the
validity of intermediate CA certificates). The integrity and the
accuracy of the clock within the TEE determines the ability to
determine an expired or revoked certificate since OCSP stapling
includes signature generation time, certificate validity dates are
compared to the current time.
6. IANA Considerations
There are two IANA requests: a media type and list of error codes.
IANA is requested to assign a media type for application/otrpv2+json.
Type name: application
Subtype name: otrp+json
Required parameters: none
Optional parameters: none
Encoding considerations: Same as encoding considerations of
application/json as specified in Section 11 of [RFC7159]
Security considerations: See Security Considerations Section of this
document.
Interoperability considerations: Same as interoperability
considerations of application/json as specified in [RFC7159]
Published specification: This document.
Applications that use this media type: OTrPv2 implementations
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information:
Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
Magic number(s): N/A
File extension(s): N/A
Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person to contact for further information: teep@ietf.org
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Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: none
Author: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this document
Change controller: IETF
IANA is requested to assign a media type for application/otrpv2+cbor.
Type name: application
Subtype name: otrpv2+cbor
Required parameters: none
Optional parameters: none
Encoding considerations: Same as encoding considerations of
application/cbor
Security considerations: See Security Considerations Section of this
document.
Interoperability considerations: Same as interoperability
considerations of application/cbor as specified in [RFC7049]
Published specification: This document.
Applications that use this media type: OTrPv2 implementations
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information:
Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
Magic number(s): N/A
File extension(s): N/A
Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person to contact for further information: teep@ietf.org
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: none
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Author: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this document
Change controller: IETF
IANA is also requested to create a new registry for the error codes
defined in Section 4.
Registration requests are evaluated after a three-week review period
on the otrp-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or
more Designated Experts [RFC8126]. However, to allow for the
allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Experts may
approve registration once they are satisfied that such a
specification will be published.
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register an error code:
example"). Registration requests that are undetermined for a period
longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the
iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or
whether it is useful only for a single extension, and whether the
registration description is clear.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
Mandyam, G., Lundblade, L., Ballesteros, M., and J.
O'Donoghue, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", draft-
ietf-rats-eat-01 (work in progress), July 2019.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
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[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network
Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]
Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise data
definition language (CDDL): a notational convention to
express CBOR and JSON data structures", draft-ietf-cbor-
cddl-08 (work in progress), March 2019.
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[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Wheeler, D., Atyeo, A., and D.
Liu, "Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
Architecture", draft-ietf-teep-architecture-02 (work in
progress), March 2019.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
This work is based on the initial version of OTrP and hence credits
go to those who have contributed to it.
Appendix B. Contributors
We would like to thank the following individuals for their
contributions to an earlier version of this specification.
- Brian Witten
Symantec
brian_witten@symantec.com
- Tyler Kim
Solacia
tylerkim@iotrust.kr
- Nick Cook
Arm Ltd.
nicholas.cook@arm.com
- Minho Yoo
IoTrust
minho.yoo@iotrust.kr
Authors' Addresses
Mingliang Pei
Symantec
350 Ellis St
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
Email: mingliang_pei@symantec.com
Pei, et al. Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft OTrP July 2019
Hannes Tschofenig
Arm Ltd.
110 Fulbourn Rd
Cambridge, CB1 9NJ
Great Britain
Email: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com
David Wheeler
Intel
US
Email: david.m.wheeler@intel.com
Pei, et al. Expires January 9, 2020 [Page 18]
