Internet DRAFT - draft-tuexen-tsvwg-rfc6083-bis
draft-tuexen-tsvwg-rfc6083-bis
Network Working Group M. Tüxen
Internet-Draft Münster Univ. of Applied Sciences
Obsoletes: 6083 (if approved) H. Tschofenig
Intended status: Standards Track 4 March 2024
Expires: 5 September 2024
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 1.3 for Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
draft-tuexen-tsvwg-rfc6083-bis-04
Abstract
This document describes the usage of the Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) 1.3 protocol over the Stream Control Transmission
Protocol (SCTP).
DTLS 1.3 over SCTP provides communications privacy for applications
that use SCTP as their transport protocol and allows client/server
applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent
eavesdropping and detect tampering or message forgery.
Applications using DTLS 1.3 over SCTP can use almost all transport
features provided by SCTP and its extensions.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. DTLS 1.3 Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Version of DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Message Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Replay Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Path MTU Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Retransmission of Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.6. Exporter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.7. Application Message Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. SCTP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Mapping of DTLS Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. DTLS Connection Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Payload Protocol Identifier Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. Stream Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.5. Chunk Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.6. Post-Handshake Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.7. Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.8. Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.9. Handling of Endpoint-Pair Shared Secrets . . . . . . . . 9
4.10. Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
This document describes the usage of the Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) 1.3 protocol, as defined in [RFC9147], over the
Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), as defined in [RFC9260].
Prior versions of DTLS are out of scope for this document. The use
of DTLS 1.0 is described in [RFC6083]. For the rest of the document
we assume version 1.3 when referring to DTLS unless the context
requires it to refer to a dedicated version.
DTLS over SCTP provides communications privacy for applications that
use SCTP as their transport protocol and allows client/server
applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent
eavesdropping and detect tampering or message forgery.
Applications using DTLS over SCTP can use almost all transport
features provided by SCTP and its extensions.
TLS is designed to run on top of a byte-stream-oriented transport
protocol providing a reliable, in-sequence delivery.
TLS over SCTP, as described in [RFC3436], has limitations:
* It does not support the unordered delivery of SCTP user messages.
* It does not support partial reliability, as defined in [RFC3758].
* It only supports the usage of the same number of streams in both
directions.
* It uses a TLS connection for every bidirectional stream, which
requires a substantial amount of resources and message exchanges
if a large number of streams is used.
DTLS over SCTP, as described in this document, overcomes these
limitations of TLS over SCTP. This specification supports:
* preservation of message boundaries.
* a large number of unidirectional and bidirectional streams.
* ordered and unordered delivery of SCTP user messages.
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* the partial reliability extension, as defined in [RFC3758].
* the dynamic address reconfiguration extension, as defined in
[RFC5061].
The list above matches the design of DTLS over SCTP based on
[RFC6083].
This specification supports two ways of relaxing the message size
limitation, which is imposed by the maximum plaintext record size of
2^14 bytes:
* Using DTLS extensions allows to bump this limit to 2^16 - 257
bytes.
* If only ordered and reliable messages are relevant, remove the
limit at all by using a fragmentation and reassembly method making
use of the Payload Protocol Identifier (PPID).
However, the following limitation still apply:
* The DTLS user cannot perform the SCTP-AUTH key management because
this is done by the DTLS layer.
DTLS establishes session keys for SCTP-AUTH in the same style as
[RFC5763] defines how DTLS establishes keys for SRTP. This
specification utilizes a new version of SCTP-AUTH, described in
[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc4895-bis] utilizing modern cryptographic
algorithms.
The method described in this document requires that the SCTP
implementation supports the optional feature of fragmentation of SCTP
user messages as defined in [RFC9260] and the SCTP authentication
extension defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc4895-bis].
The design of this specification is based on the following
principles:
* Re-use RFC 6083 as much as possible. Large parts of RFC 6083 are
re-used.
* Focus of DTLS 1.3 and use its features and extensions.
* Minimize the implementation effort.
* Re-use the SCTP-AUTH extension but utilize a modernized design.
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2. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses the following terms:
Association: An SCTP association.
Stream: A unidirectional stream of an SCTP association. It is
uniquely identified by a stream identifier.
This document uses the following terms:
DTLS: Datagram Transport Layer Security
MTU: Maximum Transmission Unit
PPID: Payload Protocol Identifier
SCTP: Stream Control Transmission Protocol
TCP: Transmission Control Protocol
TLS: Transport Layer Security
3. DTLS 1.3 Considerations
3.1. Version of DTLS
This document is based on [RFC9147].
3.2. Message Sizes
DTLS, as specified in [RFC9147], limits the maximum plaintext record
size to 2^14 bytes.
If this limit is too restrictive, there are at least two options:
1. To bump the maximum plaintext record size limit to 2^16 - 257
bytes, the "record_size_limit" extension, which is defined in
[RFC8449], MAY be used in combination with
[I-D.ietf-tls-tlsflags] and
[I-D.mattsson-tls-super-jumbo-record-limit].
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2. If only ordered and reliable messages are relevant, the PPID
based fragmentation and reassembly method specified in
[I-D.tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-ppid-frag] MAY be used to remove the limit
at all.
3.3. Replay Detection
The DTLS protocol allows two forms of replay protection: replay
detection of handshake messages and replay detection of application
data payloads. Handshake messages must be reliably transmitted and
replay detection is essential.
Contrary to handshake messages, detecting replays of application data
messages is optional. If enabled, this replay detection may result
in the DTLS layer dropping messages. Since DTLS/SCTP provides a
reliable service, if requested by the application, replay detection
cannot be used. Therefore, replay detection for application data
payloads of DTLS MUST NOT be used.
3.4. Path MTU Discovery
SCTP provides Path MTU discovery and fragmentation/reassembly for
user messages. Since DTLS can send maximum sized messages Path MTU
discovery of DTLS MUST NOT be used.
Still, DTLS cannot completely ignore the PMTU for reasons mentioned
in Section 4.4 of [RFC9147]. The DTLS record framing expands the
datagram size, thus lowering the effective PMTU.
As recommended in Section 4.4 of [RFC9147], the DTLS record layer
SHOULD also allow the upper layer protocol to discover the amount of
record expansion expected by the DTLS processing.
3.5. Retransmission of Messages
SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS
messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for
retransmissions of handshake messages MUST NOT be used. For the DTLS
stack the appearance is that there is no message loss and
consequently no retransmission needed.
3.6. Exporter
TLS defines an exporter interface, which is inherited by DTLS. The
exporter interface allows the application using DTLS to obtain keying
material from the DTLS stack. In [RFC8446] the exporter values are
computed as:
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TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) =
HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),
"exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length)
For use with this specification the label MUST be set to
"EXPORTER_DTLS13_OVER_SCTP", an empty context_value field and a key
length of 64 bytes.
3.7. Application Message Length
The size of a DTLS record header depends on several factors, namely
* the use of the DTLS Connection ID (CID) feature,
* the size of the sequence number,
* the presence of the length field, and
* the use of padding to conceal the true message length.
While the CID needs to be negotiated with the peer, the other
parameters can be configured in DTLS stacks. The size of the records
can, however, be influenced with the record size limit extension and
the flags extension.
Hence, an SCTP user application has a number of configuration options
to adjust the use of DTLS to best fit a given deployment environment.
4. SCTP Considerations
4.1. Mapping of DTLS Records
The supported maximum length of SCTP user messages MUST be at least
the size of the maximum size of a DTLSCiphertext. In particular, the
SCTP implementation MUST support fragmentation of user messages.
Every SCTP user message MUST consist of exactly one DTLS record.
4.2. DTLS Connection Handling
Each DTLS connection MUST be established and terminated within the
same SCTP association. A DTLS connection MUST NOT span multiple SCTP
associations.
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4.3. Payload Protocol Identifier Usage
Application protocols using DTLS over SCTP SHOULD register and use a
separate payload protocol identifier (PPID) and SHOULD NOT reuse the
PPID that they registered for running directly over SCTP.
Using the same PPID does not harm as long as the application can
determine whether or not DTLS is used. However, for protocol
analyzers, for example, it is much easier if a separate PPID is used.
This means, in particular, that there is no specific PPID for DTLS.
4.4. Stream Usage
All DTLS messages except ApplicationData protocol messages MUST be
transported on stream 0 with unlimited reliability and with the
ordered delivery feature.
DTLS messages of the ApplicationData protocol SHOULD use multiple
streams other than stream 0; they MAY use stream 0 for everything if
they do not care about minimizing head of line blocking.
4.5. Chunk Handling
DATA chunks of SCTP MUST be sent in an authenticated way, as
described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc4895-bis]. Other chunks MAY be sent
in an authenticated way. This makes sure that an attacker cannot
modify the stream in which a message is sent or affect the ordered/
unordered delivery of the message.
If PR-SCTP, as defined in [RFC3758], is used, FORWARD-TSN chunks MUST
also be sent in an authenticated way, as described in
[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc4895-bis]. Hence, it is not possible for an
attacker to drop messages and use forged FORWARD-TSN, SACK, and/or
SHUTDOWN chunks to hide this dropping.
4.6. Post-Handshake Authentication
For periodic re-authentication [RFC9261] MUST be used.
A specific PPID is used to multiplex/de-multiplex user messages used
for performing the procedures defined in [RFC9261] with other user
messages.
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4.7. Rekeying
[I-D.tschofenig-tls-extended-key-update] specifies the
ExtendedKeyUpdate message to indicate that the sender is updating its
sending cryptographic keys. DTLS 1.3 consequently also supports this
message. In DTLS, an update of traffic keys requires the epoch value
to be incremented. Since epoch values are not allowed to wrap, the
maximum number of epoch updates is 2^64 (which includes epoch updates
during the handshake itself).
When the sender of the ExtendedKeyUpdate message receives an ACK, it
knows that it can safely switch from the old epoch to the new epoch.
This is described in Section 8 of [RFC9147] and
[I-D.tschofenig-tls-extended-key-update]. While DTLS 1.3 will make
this switch automatically, the SCTP application using DTLS 1.3 for
updating keys used by SCTP-AUTH requires updating keying material.
While it is not required to keep the update of SCTP-AUTH keys in sync
with the changes of keys at the DTLS layer, it is RECOMMENDED to
switch keys for use with SCTP-AUTH once a ExtendedKeyUpdate message
has been successfully transmitted.
A specific PPID is used to multiplex/de-multiplex user messages used
for performing the procedures defined in
[I-D.tschofenig-tls-extended-key-update] with other user messages.
4.8. Handshake
A DTLS implementation discards DTLS messages from older epochs after
some time, as described in [RFC9147]. This is not acceptable when a
reliable data transfer is performed.
4.9. Handling of Endpoint-Pair Shared Secrets
The endpoint-pair shared secret for Shared Key Identifier 0 is empty
and MUST be used when establishing a DTLS connection. A new
endpoint-pair shared secret MUST be established using the exporter
interface defined in [RFC8446], as described in Section 3.6. The new
Shared Key Identifier MUST be the old Shared Key Identifier
incremented by 1. If the old one is 65535, the new one MUST be 1.
Before sending the Finished message, the active SCTP-AUTH key MUST be
switched to the new one.
Once the corresponding Finished message from the peer has been
received, the old SCTP-AUTH key SHOULD be removed.
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Since KeyUpdate messages are used to change the application traffic
keys it is necessary to update the keying material initially exported
via the TLS 1.3 exporter interface.
The key derivation function MUST be used once the KeyUpdate has been
transmitted successfully. The function follows the design of the
exporter interface.
Derive-Key(label, context_value, key_length) =
HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),
"derive", Hash(context_value), key_length)
For use with this specification the label MUST be set to
"DERIVE_DTLS13_OVER_SCTP", a context_value field containing a 64 bit
sequence number and a key length of 64 bytes. The 64 bit number
logically corresponds to the epoch value but there is no requirement
for the DTLS stack to expose the epoch value to this key derivation
function interfacing the SCTP stack for setting the SCTP-AUTH keying
material. The sequence number MUST be increased with every DTLS key
update.
4.10. Shutdown
To prevent DTLS from discarding DTLS user messages while it is
shutting down, a close_notify alert MUST only be sent after all
outstanding SCTP user messages have been acknowledged by the SCTP
peer and MUST NOT still be revoked by the SCTP peer.
Prior to processing a received close_notify, all other received SCTP
user messages that are buffered in the SCTP layer MUST be read and
processed by DTLS.
5. IANA Considerations
IANA is asked to update in the the TLS Exporter Label registry, which
was established in [RFC5705] and updated by [RFC8447], the Reference
of the label "EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP" to this document.
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations given in [RFC4347], [RFC4895], and
[RFC9260] also apply to this document.
It is possible to authenticate DTLS endpoints based on IP addresses
in certificates. SCTP associations can use multiple addresses per
SCTP endpoint. Therefore, it is possible that DTLS records will be
sent from a different IP address than that originally authenticated.
This is not a problem provided that no security decisions are made
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based on that IP address. This is a special case of a general rule:
all decisions should be based on the peer's authenticated identity,
not on its transport layer identity.
For each message, the SCTP user also provides a stream identifier, a
flag to indicate whether the message is sent ordered or unordered,
and a payload protocol identifier. Although DTLS can be used to
provide privacy for the actual user message, none of these three are
protected by DTLS. They are sent as clear text, because they are
part of the SCTP DATA chunk header.
While TLS 1.3 reduced the number of supported cipher suites and
removed a number of cipher suites, including all NULL cipher
algorithm. However, [RFC9150] later re-introduced support for cipher
suites that do not support confidentiality protection. Negotiating
such cipher suites will not provide communications privacy for SCTP
applications and will not provide privacy for user messages and MUST
NOT be used with this specification.
7. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Eric Rescorla and Robin Seggelmann for
being coauthors of [RFC6083], which is the basis of this document.
The authors wish to thank Anna Brunstrom, Lars Eggert, Gorry
Fairhurst, Ian Goldberg, Alfred Hoenes, Carsten Hohendorf, Stefan
Lindskog, Daniel Mentz, and Sean Turner for their invaluable comments
on [RFC6083].
Finally, the authors wish to thank Eric Rescorla and Martin Thomson
for their invaluable comments on this document.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3758] Stewart, R., Ramalho, M., Xie, Q., Tuexen, M., and P.
Conrad, "Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
Partial Reliability Extension", RFC 3758,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3758, May 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3758>.
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[RFC4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security", RFC 4347, DOI 10.17487/RFC4347, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4347>.
[RFC4895] Tuexen, M., Stewart, R., Lei, P., and E. Rescorla,
"Authenticated Chunks for the Stream Control Transmission
Protocol (SCTP)", RFC 4895, DOI 10.17487/RFC4895, August
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4895>.
[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.
[RFC5763] Fischl, J., Tschofenig, H., and E. Rescorla, "Framework
for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
(SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS)", RFC 5763, DOI 10.17487/RFC5763, May
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5763>.
[RFC8449] Thomson, M., "Record Size Limit Extension for TLS",
RFC 8449, DOI 10.17487/RFC8449, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8449>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8447] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447>.
[RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.
[RFC9260] Stewart, R., Tüxen, M., and K. Nielsen, "Stream Control
Transmission Protocol", RFC 9260, DOI 10.17487/RFC9260,
June 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9260>.
[RFC9261] Sullivan, N., "Exported Authenticators in TLS", RFC 9261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9261, July 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9261>.
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[I-D.ietf-tsvwg-rfc4895-bis]
Tüxen, M., Stewart, R. R., Lei, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Authenticated Chunks for the Stream Control Transmission
Protocol (SCTP)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tsvwg-rfc4895-bis-02, 4 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/api/v1/doc/document/draft-
ietf-tsvwg-rfc4895-bis/>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-tlsflags]
Nir, Y., "A Flags Extension for TLS 1.3", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-tlsflags-12, 23
July 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-tls-tlsflags-12>.
[I-D.mattsson-tls-super-jumbo-record-limit]
Mattsson, J. P., Tschofenig, H., and M. Tüxen, "Large
Record Sizes for TLS and DTLS", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-mattsson-tls-super-jumbo-record-
limit-02, 4 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/api/v1/doc/document/draft-
mattsson-tls-super-jumbo-record-limit/>.
[I-D.tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-ppid-frag]
Tüxen, M., Jesup, R., and H. Tschofenig, "Payload Protocol
Identifier based Fragmentation and Reassembly for the
Stream Control Transmission Protocol", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-ppid-frag-00, 7
December 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-ppid-frag-00>.
[I-D.tschofenig-tls-extended-key-update]
Tschofenig, H., Tüxen, M., Reddy.K, T., and S. Fries,
"Extended Key Update for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-tschofenig-
tls-extended-key-update-01, 3 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tschofenig-
tls-extended-key-update-01>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC3436] Jungmaier, A., Rescorla, E., and M. Tuexen, "Transport
Layer Security over Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
RFC 3436, DOI 10.17487/RFC3436, December 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3436>.
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[RFC5061] Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Tuexen, M., Maruyama, S., and M.
Kozuka, "Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
Dynamic Address Reconfiguration", RFC 5061,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5061, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5061>.
[RFC6083] Tuexen, M., Seggelmann, R., and E. Rescorla, "Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP)", RFC 6083,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6083, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6083>.
[RFC9150] Cam-Winget, N. and J. Visoky, "TLS 1.3 Authentication and
Integrity-Only Cipher Suites", RFC 9150,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9150, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9150>.
Authors' Addresses
Michael Tüxen
Münster University of Applied Sciences
Stegerwaldstr. 39
48565 Steinfurt
Germany
Email: tuexen@fh-muenster.de
Hannes Tschofenig
Email: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
Tüxen & Tschofenig Expires 5 September 2024 [Page 14]
