Internet DRAFT - draft-tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-zero-checksum
draft-tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-zero-checksum
Network Working Group M. Tüxen
Internet-Draft Münster Univ. of Appl. Sciences
Intended status: Standards Track V. Boivie
Expires: 11 November 2023 F. Castelli
Google
R. Jesup
Mozilla
10 May 2023
Zero Checksum for the Stream Control Transmission Protocol
draft-tuexen-tsvwg-sctp-zero-checksum-03
Abstract
The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) uses a 32-bit
checksum in the common header of each packet to provide some level of
data integrity. When the lower layer used by SCTP provides already
the same or a higher level of data integrity, computing this checksum
does not provide any additional protection, but does require
computing resources. This document provides a simple extension to
SCTP allowing to save these computing resources by using the constant
0 as the checksum in a backwards compatible way.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 November 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. A New Chunk Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Declaration of Feature Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Sender Side Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.3. Receiver Side Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Socket API Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Set Accepting a Zero Checksum
(SCTP_ACCEPT_ZERO_CHECKSUM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction
SCTP as specified in [RFC9260] uses a CRC32c to provide some level of
data integrity. When using, for example, Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) as the lower layer for SCTP as specified in
[RFC8261], using the CRC32c does not provide any additional
protection over the one already provided by DTLS. However, computing
the CRC32c at the sender and receiver side does require
computationally resources for no benefit. This is in particular
important for computational limited end points using SCTP
encapsulated in DTLS.
The extension described in this document allows an SCTP end point to
declare that it accepts SCTP packets with a checksum of zero. This
declaration happens during the setup of the SCTP association and
allows end points supporting this extension to be interoperable with
end points not supporting the extension described in this document.
To provide this backwards compatibility, end points using this
extension still need to implement the CRC32c checksum algorithm.
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2. Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. A New Chunk Parameter
The Zero Checksum Acceptable Chunk Parameter is defined by the
following figure.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 0x8001 (suggested) | Length = 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Zero Checksum Acceptable Chunk Parameter
Type: 16 bits (unsigned integer)
This field holds the IANA defined parameter type for the "Zero
Checksum Acceptable" chunk parameter. IANA is requested to assign
the value 32769 (0x8001) (suggested) for this parameter type.
Length: 16 bits (unsigned integer)
This field holds the length in bytes of the chunk parameter; the
value MUST be 4.
All transported integer numbers are in "network byte order" a.k.a.,
Big Endian.
The Zero Checksum Acceptable Chunk Parameter MAY appear in INIT and
INIT ACK chunks. It MUST NOT appear in any other chunk.
If an end point not supporting the extension described in this
document receives this parameter in an INIT or INIT ACK chunk, it
skips this parameter and continues to process further parameters in
the chunk. This behavior is REQUIRED by [RFC9260] because the
highest-order two bits of the Type are '10'.
4. Procedures
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4.1. Declaration of Feature Support
If the lower layer of SCTP provides an equal or better level of data
integrity protection than the one provided by using the CRC32c
algorithm, the computation of the CRC32c checksum requires
computational resources without providing any benefit. To avoid
this, an SCTP end point MAY be willing to accept SCTP packets with an
incorrect CRC32c checksum value of zero in addition to SCTP packets
with correct CRC32c checksum values. An SCTP endpoint SHOULD NOT be
willing to accept SCTP packets with an incorrect CRC32c checksum
value of zero, if the lower layer does not provide at least the level
of data integrity the CRC32c checksum algorithm provides.
One example of such a lower layer is the use of SCTP over DTLS as
described in [RFC8261] (as used in the WebRTC context). Counter
examples include:
* SCTP over IPv4 or IPv6 as specified in [RFC9260].
* SCTP over UDP as specified in [RFC6951].
* The use of SCTP Authentication as specified in [RFC4895].
Therefore using an incorrect zero checksum, in particular when using
SCTP over DTLS, will not result in problems with the middle boxes
expecting correct CRC32c checksums in SCTP packets.
An SCTP implementation MAY also require the upper layer to indicate
that it is fine to accept SCTP packets with an incorrect CRC32c value
of zero.
An end point willing to accept SCTP packets with a checksum of zero
MUST include the Zero Checksum Acceptable Chunk Parameter in the INIT
or INIT ACK chunk it sends.
4.2. Sender Side Considerations
If an end point has received an INIT or INIT ACK chunk containing a
Zero Checksum Acceptable Chunk Parameter from its peer during the
association setup, it SHOULD use zero as the checksum for all packets
sent in this association with the following three exceptions:
* When an end point sends a packet containing an INIT chunk, it MUST
include a correct CRC32c checksum in the packet containing the
INIT chunk.
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* When an end point sends a packet containing a COOKIE ECHO chunk,
it MUST include a correct CRC32c checksum in the packet containing
the COOKIE ECHO chunk.
* When an end point supports the dynamic address reconfiguration
specified in [RFC5061] and sends a packet containing an ASCONF
chunk, it MUST include a correct CRC32c checksum in the packet
containing the ASCONF chunk.
The first exception allows backwards compatibility and the second and
third exception allow a simpler implementation of the extension
defined in this document.
When an end point responds to an "Out of the Blue" (OOTB) SCTP
packet, it MUST include a correct CRC32c checksum in the response
packet.
An SCTP end point MAY only send packets with an incorrect checksum of
zero, if the upper layer allowed the reception of SCTP packets with
an incorrect zero checksum.
4.3. Receiver Side Considerations
Zero is a valid result of the CRC32c algorithm. Therefore, a
receiver of an SCTP packet containing a checksum value of zero cannot
determine whether the sender included an incorrect CRC32c of zero to
reduce the CPU cost or the result of the CRC32c computation was
actually zero. However, if the receiver has sent the Zero Checksum
Acceptable Chunk Parameter during the handshake, this ambiguity is
irrelevant, since the receiver is fine with not using the CRC32c to
protect incoming packets.
If an end point has sent the Zero Checksum Acceptable Chunk Parameter
in an INIT or INIT ACK chunk, it MUST accept SCTP packets using an
incorrect checksum value of zero in addition to SCTP packets
containing the correct CRC32c checksum value for this association.
An SCTP implementation MAY process OOTB SCTP packets having an
incorrect zero checksum in addition to OOTB packets with a correct
CRC32c checksum.
5. Socket API Considerations
This section describes how the socket API defined in [RFC6458] needs
to be extended to provide a way for the application to control the
acceptance of a zero checksum.
Please note that this section is informational only.
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A socket API implementation based on [RFC6458] is extended by
supporting one new write-only IPPROTO_SCTP-level socket option.
5.1. Set Accepting a Zero Checksum (SCTP_ACCEPT_ZERO_CHECKSUM)
This socket option can be used to control the acceptance of a zero
checksum. It is a write-only socket option and applies only to
future SCTP associations on the socket.
This option expects an integer boolean flag, where a non-zero value
enables the option, and a zero value disables the option. An
implementation might only send packets with an incorrect checksum of
zero, if this option is enabled.
This option is disabled by default.
6. IANA Considerations
[NOTE to RFC-Editor: "RFCXXXX" is to be replaced by the RFC number
you assign this document.]
[NOTE to RFC-Editor: The suggested value for the parameter type is
tentative and to be confirmed by IANA.]
This document (RFCXXXX) is the reference for the registration
described in this section.
A new chunk parameter type has to be assigned by IANA. This requires
an additional line in the "Chunk Parameter Types" registry for SCTP:
+===================+==========================+===========+
| ID Value | Chunk Parameter Type | Reference |
+===================+==========================+===========+
| 32769 (suggested) | Zero Checksum Acceptable | [RFCXXXX] |
| | (0x8001 (suggested)) | |
+-------------------+--------------------------+-----------+
Table 1: New entry in "Chunk Parameter Types" registry
7. Security Considerations
This document does not change the considerations given in [RFC9260].
8. References
8.1. Normative References
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5061] Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Tuexen, M., Maruyama, S., and M.
Kozuka, "Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
Dynamic Address Reconfiguration", RFC 5061,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5061, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5061>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8261] Tuexen, M., Stewart, R., Jesup, R., and S. Loreto,
"Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Encapsulation of
SCTP Packets", RFC 8261, DOI 10.17487/RFC8261, November
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8261>.
[RFC9260] Stewart, R., Tüxen, M., and K. Nielsen, "Stream Control
Transmission Protocol", RFC 9260, DOI 10.17487/RFC9260,
June 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9260>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC4895] Tuexen, M., Stewart, R., Lei, P., and E. Rescorla,
"Authenticated Chunks for the Stream Control Transmission
Protocol (SCTP)", RFC 4895, DOI 10.17487/RFC4895, August
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4895>.
[RFC6458] Stewart, R., Tuexen, M., Poon, K., Lei, P., and V.
Yasevich, "Sockets API Extensions for the Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP)", RFC 6458,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6458, December 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6458>.
[RFC6951] Tuexen, M. and R. Stewart, "UDP Encapsulation of Stream
Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Packets for End-Host
to End-Host Communication", RFC 6951,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6951, May 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6951>.
Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Gorry Fairhurst, Mike Heard, Nils Ohlmeier,
Claudio Porfiri, and Magnus Westerlund for their invaluable comments.
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Authors' Addresses
Michael Tüxen
Münster University of Applied Sciences
Stegerwaldstrasse 39
48565 Steinfurt
Germany
Email: tuexen@fh-muenster.de
Victor Boivie
Google
Kungsbron 2
SE-11122 Stockholm
Sweden
Email: boivie@google.com
Florent Castelli
Google
Kungsbron 2
SE-11122 Stockholm
Sweden
Email: orphis@google.com
Randell Jesup
Mozilla Corporation
1835 Horse Shoe Trl
Malvern, PA 19355
United States of America
Email: randell-ietf@jesup.org
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