Internet DRAFT - draft-unice-dispatch-enc-ports
draft-unice-dispatch-enc-ports
Network Working Group K. Unice
Internet-Draft Anonymous
Intended status: Standards Track 4 February 2022
Expires: 8 August 2022
Privatization of service type in IPv4/IPv6 data flows
draft-unice-dispatch-enc-ports-00
Abstract
The internet and free flow of information has enabled the individual
in society several advantages that have not been available in the
past. The free flow of information has enabled social and political
changes, open education for students, and now the free-flow of money
without the need for intermediate institutions. This free flow of
information etc. is continually under attack from institutions that
are compromised by the Internet. So these institutions have and
continue to implement controls in an attempt to stop the empowerment
of the individual. These controls on information is what this RFC
attempts to weaken.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 August 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4. Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. IANA Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Rationale
The socket number in data flows across the internet is usually tied
to a specific service type. This is a security flaw in that flows
can be intercepted, denied, or compromised by using the socket number
in the IP packet. This RFC is to enable IP data flows across the
internet to hide the type of service being provided from intermediate
routers etc. This will enable internet software developers to build
applications that cannot be subjected to censorship. This also
prevents intermediate points from profiling certain applications.
There are well known sockets (ports 0-1023) that are assigned to
specific services (i.e. 80 is HTTP, 443 is HTTPS, 25 is SMTP, etc.).
Other ports (1024-49151) are registered ports that can be reserved
with IANA. Having well known ports for specific services enables
intermediate routers etc. to snoop, block, or spoof these services.
This RFC is meant to eliminate the ability of intermediate entities
to attach a specific service by controlling the port used by a
service in their routers.
2. Approach
This specification can accept and adopt recommendations for technical
approaches as long as the recommendations maintain the final goal of
this RFC. The final goal is to prevent intermediate internet
providers from filtering and stopping a specific service.
3. Design
There are options as to how the receiving IP stack can determine if
the IPv4/6 header has the ports portion encrypted.
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A. This Secured Service Type (SST) feature will start with a new
(0th bit in the Flags header) in the IPv4 header that will indicate
that the packet is encrypted at the point that the IPv4 header ends
and the TCP/UDP header starts.
B. The Traffic class field of IPv6 could have a number or bit
reserved for SST.
4. Implementation
The IPv4/v6 stack will implement a "side stack" that will implement
the decryption when the received flow has the bit set indicating a
SST type packet. The "side stack" module will be passed inbound
packets and will determine if the header has its ports encrypted. If
so, then it will decrypt the rest of the portion of the IPv4/v6
packet header just after reception from the network controller and
send the decrypted packet up the stack as a normal frame.
As part of the usual "sockets" programming API ( socket, bind,
connect, send, receive, etc. ) there will be an additional
enumeration for the setsockopt API that will indicate the header will
be partially encrypted and have the destination and source ports
unreadable. Applications that want to obscure the service type will
indicate in the APIs that the UDP packet be encrypted using SST, and
to establish a TCP connection using SST.
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+--------------+
|Standard V4/V6|
|Software Stack+-----+
+-+------------+ |C
| ^ |
| | v
| +----+----------+
D| B | SST |
| |Encryption|
| +-+--------+
| | ^
v v |
+-----------------+ |A
|Network Interface+----+
|Software Driver |
+--+-------^------+
| |
+--v-------+------+
|Network Interface|
|Hardware |
+-----------------+
Figure describing the SST software function
(A) All ingressing packets are sent to the SST software module. Both
packets using SST and packets that are not using SST are passed to
the SST module. Traffic that is using SST is decrypted and sent up
the stack (B). Traffic that is not using SST is passed up the stack,
without any change (B).
( C ) Egressing traffic checks the socket control structure for this
socket. The SST module encrypts the ports section of the IPv4/v6
socket using its private key. ( D ) is for traffic that is not using
SST and is passing the destination socket in clear text.
5. Security Considerations
There has to be an initial key acquisition in order for the initial
traffic between the user and the domain server to be able to encrypt
the ports section of the IPv4/v6 header.
The initial idea would be that the DNS resolution of the domain name
would include a public key as part of the response mapping the DNS
ascii name to an IPv4/v6 address. The user would then use the domain
server's public key to encrypt the portion of the IPv4/v6 header that
contains the destination port. This first packet from the user sent
to the domain server will have the destination port encrypted.
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6. IANA Consideration
None
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
TODO
Author's Address
Kyle Unice
Anonymous
Email: kspambot@gmail.com
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