Internet DRAFT - draft-vasu-ace-core-access-privilege-provisioning
draft-vasu-ace-core-access-privilege-provisioning
Internet Engineering Task Force Vasu K
INTERNET-DRAFT Rahul A J
Intended Status: Standard Track Yangneng
Expires: Oct 15, 2016 Huawei
April 15, 2016
Access Privilege Provisioning for Constrained Devices
draft-vasu-ace-core-access-privilege-provisioning-00
Abstract
As more constrained devices are integrating with current Internet,
the ubiquitous computing in scenarios like smart home is very
important. In smart home, the constrained devices (ex. thermostat)
need to be provisioned in such a way that it can inter-operate with
any kind of devices like other constrained devices (ex. Air
conditioner) or client devices (ex. smart phone). This document
provides a method to support access privilege provisioning based on
pre-configured admission and resource control policies, where this
method explains device's service access in two different use cases:
first provisioning the service when a constrained device accessing
the service provided by other constrained device, second, accessing
the service provided by constrained device from the client device
(non constrained device).
Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full
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Copyright and License Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4 System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5 Network Topology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1 Discover Provisioning Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2 Register Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.3 Verify pre-registered service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.4 Define policies on resource control . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.4.1 Resource Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.5 Search for services by device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.6 Service request and response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7 Alternative Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.1 System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.2 Service Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9 IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
11 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
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1 Introduction
The work on Constrained Restful Environment (CoRE) aimed to realize
the restful architecture for constrained devices [RFC7228] in
constrained networks [RFC4944]. The CORE work group has recently
standardized constrained application protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] for
interacting with constrained resources where general HTTP is not
memory/energy efficient. The use of web linking for resources
description and discovery hosted by constrained web servers is
specified by CORE [RFC6690]. Even though, CoAP allows the direct
resource access for constrained devices, it is not advisable for
direct access of resources in networks where multicast procedures are
infeasible due to heavy network load, and the networks where sleepy
nodes exist. So, the CoRE working group comes up with a solution
called resource directory (RD) [draft-ietf-core-resource-directory]
to host the devices service information, and allow other devices to
perform lookup procedures through .well-known/core path to resources.
Once the services are advertised by any device, those services need
to be verified using commissioner. CORE RD provides a standard
procedure to interact with commissioner, where commissioner acts like
a client device to look up and verify the advertised services. Once
the commissioner verifies the pre-registered services, commissioner
can put some policy rules on services hosted by devices for resource
control. These rules defined on (1) how to access the services either
with other constrained devices or client devices, and (2) on
operational instructions.
Architecture is defined to authenticate and authorize client requests
for a resource on a server using logical entities such as client(C),
client authorization manager (CAM), server(S), and server
authorization manager (SAM) [draft-gerdes-ace-actors]. The main goal
of delegated CoAP authentication and authorization framework (DCAF)
is the setup of a datagram transport layer security channel between
two nodes to securely transmit authorization tickets [draft-gerdes-
core-dcaf-authorize]. The CAM sends an access request message on
behalf of client by embedding requested permissions in client
authorization information (CAI) field of access request message to
SAM. A ticket grant message is sent from SAM by embedding the
permissions given from the server on a specific resource in server
authorization information (SAI) field of ticket grant message to the
client. These SAI, CAI use authorization information format (AIF)
that describes the permissions requested from access request in a
ticket request, where the underlying access control model will be
that of an access matrix, which gives a set of permissions for each
possible combination of a subject and an object [draft-bormann-core-
ace-aif]. This simple information model also doesn't allow
conditional access (e.g.,"resource /s/tempC is accessible only if
client belongs to group1 and does not belong to group2").
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Admission control is addressed with the draft (draft-seitz-ace-oauth-
authz) provides a mechanism for pre-configuring secure/authorization
policies with token mechanism to access the resource. It is not
possible to manage the rest resources by using only tokens that
authorize the clients to access the resource. Because, it also needs
to handle resource control interms of various other parameters such
as priority of request, QoS, Operations that can be performed on
resource by various clients. The draft (draft-seitz-ace-oauth-authz)
talks about how to provide admission control (conditional
authorization) for resource access from client device, but it does
not consider constrained device access from another constrained
device. So, we integrated our solution with RD, and commissioning
procedures along with admission control (AC), and resource control
(RC) of resources. Moreover, we provide the mechanism for resource
access from another constrained device.
For example, consider a user leaves the home in the morning in hot
summer and leaves the office in the evening to reach to home. But,
before he reaches his room he wants to make his room cool enough. So
he has to switch on the air-conditioner from his mobile one hour
before he leaves the office. So, before adjusting his air-conditioner
to make the room cool enough, he might have to know the current room
temperature. Thus he access the service provided by the thermostat to
read the room temperature and adjust the air-conditioner. However,
there is a problem here on how to access these services which are
provided by user's home devices because there may be issues at device
such as 1) what is the authenticity level 2) the device might be
overloaded from other resource access 3) the device is protected at
that time to keep long lifetime 4) Allow only specified users to
control it and 5) how to set quality control on resource access.
The access privilege provisioning presented in this document provides
method to configure the policies for admission as well as resource
control in constrained environment (including both constrained and
non-constrained devices) that includes complete system architecture,
methods for defining policies, and with commissioning procedures.
Here, the service provisioning includes authentication,
authorization, admission and resource control.
2 Motivation
CORE RD solution provides various automated operations such as
service registrations, service update, service removal, and service
lookups initiated by endpoints and clients. However, managing this
centralized directory server by allowing authorized users to perform
these tasks, setting some service level agreements on clients to
access these services, and providing limited or scope oriented
lookups by other endpoints or clients require efficient service
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provisioning mechanism. The access privilege provisioning method
presented in this document deals on how a registered service from
devices can be accessed by various clients or other devices.
Moreover, it also provides a method for handling resource/service
access control mechanism for efficient service provisioning from
outside the constrained home environment.
3 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
o "CORE", CORE is a Constrained RESTful Environment providing a
framework for resource-oriented application intended to run on
constrained networks [RFC7228].
o "COAP" The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a
specialized web transfer protocol for use with constrained nodes
and networks [RFC7252].
o "RD" The Resource Directory (RD) is a directory based server to
host the descriptions of resources and allowing the lookups to be
performed for those resources by various client devices.
o "Commissioner" Commissioning agent is tool/device that verifies
the devices operation, integrity check with the network.
o "Constrained Device" These are embedded computing devices that
are expected to be as resource constrained in terms of RAM/ROM
size, and to be deployed with the constrained environment such as
6LoWPAN Networks. This is also known as Thing.
o "Client" A client device is like resource constrained client
such as other constrained device (ex. Air conditioner) or rich
client devices such as Mobile/Laptop/Tablet etc, which access the
services hosted by constrained devices (ex. thermostat).
o "Provisioning Server" this server is a process of verifying
service requester, providing access control/admission control and
resource control on resources to be accessed and inter-operating
with various devices without bothering about kind of network
protocols used. It provides a method to access a resource either
inside or outside the constrained environment.
o "Device Profile" A device profile comprises a set of attributes
that are associated with a particular device. These include
services, features, names, descriptions etc.
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4 System Architecture
+--------+ IF-e +--------+
|Thing |............|Thing |
|(Client)`. |(Server)|
+---X----+ `. IF-d .'----+---+
X `. .' |
X `-.' | IF-a
IF-h X .' `. |
X .' `. |
+----------+ +---X----+ .'IF-f `.---+----+
| | | .' | RD |
| Client XXXXXXXXXXX PS | | |
| | IF-g | | +----+----+
+----------+ +------+-+ /
\ /
\ IF-c / IF-b
XXXXXXX Client Access Resource \ /
----------+-+
-------- Service Registration & | |
Configuring Policies | CA |
........ Constrained device access | |
resource | |
+------------+
PS-Provisionig Server
RD-Resource Directory
CA-Commissioning Agent
Fig 1. System Architecture
The system architecture is as shown in Fig 1. The thing (device),
always registers its service with RD server. CA verifies
registered service with RD server and configures policies at
provisioning server for resource access by various other devices
or clients. The following interfaces are used in the system
architecture
IF-a: register service (coap)
IF-b: verify service (coap)
IF-c: configure policies (http)
IF-d: service search (coap)
IF-e: obtain resource for constrained devices (coap)
IF-f: check for admission/resource control policies for service
(coap)
IF-g: Service request for non-constrained device (http)
IF-h: Obtain resource for non-constrained devices (coap)
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The system architecture is better explained with two different
scenarios: (1) Constrained device access the service advertised by
other constrained device is as shown in Fig 2. Here, one
constrained device such as air-conditioner can access the service
such as current room temperature advertised by other constrained
device (ex. thermostat). This advertised service is to be
commissioned by commissioner, and then it should be set with some
admission and resource control policies by provisioning server.
And, finally the service is allowed to advertise its service
access from other constrained devices. Any device that is
interested in that advertised service, need to do service lookup
from RD Server. Once obtaining the path to the advertised service,
the constrained client device can request a service to the device
which hosts the service. Before sending the request, it MUST
establish a secure channel between these two nodes [draft-schmitt-
ace-twowayauth-for-iot]. Once the incoming request comes from the
constrained client device, the device which hosts the service MUST
authorize and provision for conditional access of its service from
the provisioning server. The notification regarding the registered
services to the commissioning agent can be sent from the RD
server, which can be implementation specific and left for the user
to choose any standard procedures and is out of scope of present
document. Detailed operational procedure will be explained in the
later sections of this document.
2) Client device access the service advertised by constrained
device is as shown in Fig 3. For example, the client device such
as smart phone can access the service (ex. room temperature)
advertised by other constrained device (ex. thermostat). The
client can access the service within a home environment or outside
the home environment. So, in this scenario, the provisioning
server maintains the service as a web service.
This advertised service is to be commissioned by commissioner,
then to be set with some admission and resource control policies
by provisioning server. And, finally the service is allowed to
advertise its access from the client devices. Any client that
wishes to access this web service looks for corresponding
operations provided from the provisioning server.
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+------+ +-------+ +-----+ +--------+ +----------+
|Device1 |Device2| | RD | |Provis | |Commision
|(Air |(Thermo| | | |ioning | |ing |
|Condi | | stat)| |Serv |Sever | |Agent |
|tioner) | | |er | | | | |
+--|---+ +----|--+ +--|--+ +----|---+ +-----|----+
| | | | |
| | | | |
| |Register | | |
| ----------// | |
| | Service/| Verify Preregistered\ |/
| | ------------------------//
| | | Service| // |
| | | | / |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | |//Define |
| | | /-------------
| | | / \ Policies |
|Search a Service \ | | |
---------------------// | |
| | //| | |
| | / | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
|Request | | | |
-----------/ | | |
|Service /| | | |
| / | | | |
| |Check for authorization |
| |admission, Resource | |
| ---------------------// |
| | Control Policies //| |
| | | / | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | // Service Grant/Deny |
| /--------------------- |
| /|\ | | |
| / | | | |
\//Service | | | |
/\---------- | | |
| Grant/Deny | | |
| | | | |
Fig 2.Constrained device accessing service from constrained device
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+--------+ +-------+ +-------+ +---------+ +---------+
|Client | |Device2| |RD | |Provision| |Commissi |
|(Smart | |(Thermo| |Server | |ing Server |oning |
| Phone) | | stat) | | | | | |Agent |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
+---|----+ +---|---+ +---|---+ +----|----+ +-----|---+
| | | | |
| | | | |
| |Register | | |
| -----------/ | |
| |Service / | |
| | /| | |
| | | / | |
| | |//Verify Preregistered |
| | --------------------------
| | |\ Service |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | / |
| | | |//Define |
| | | -------------
| | | |\ Policies |
| | | | |
| Request for Service | \ |
----------------------------------// |
| | | //| |
| | | / | |
| | | | |
| | / | | |
| |// Request| for Service |
| ----------------------- |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | Service Grant/Deny\ | |
| ----------------------/ |
| | | //| |
| | | / | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| // | | | |
|// Service Grant/Deny | |
\---------------------------------- |
| \ | | | |
| | | | |
Fig 3. Client accessing service from Constrained device
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5 Network Topology
------- --------
// \ // \
/ // \
/ /
/ /
| +--------+ | | +--------+|
| |RD Server---| | | +-----+ |Thermostat|
| +--------+ | | LAN | |Edge | +--------+ |
| |------|------- | |
| +----------+ | | | | |Router 6LoWPAN |
| |Provision --|| | |+-----+ |
|Server | / | +--------+ /
+----------+ / | |Aircondioner
/ | \ +--------+//
\ // | \ //
------- | --------
|
|
-|-----
//- | -\
// +-|----+ \
/ |Edge |
/ |Router|
| +------+ |
| |
| WiFi |
| +-------+ +-----+ |
| |Smart | |Commisioning
| |Phone | | Agent|
+-------+ +-----+/
/
\ //
\- -//
-------
Fig 4. Network Topology
The constrained devices such as Thermostat, Airconditioner may use
small memory constrained sensors/actuators for simple services
such as cooling/heating the room or just to measure the current
room temperature. These memory constrained embedded devices may
implement the 6LoWPAN stack such as uIP (provided by Contiki), and
provide access for communication to other external queries from
client devices such as smart phone which typically implements rich
stack TCP/IP. Even though RD server or Provisioning server are
shown as separate servers in the LAN as given in Fig 4, these can
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be hosted on a single server running two different processes.
Moreover, the commissioner implements a standard procedure to
interact with devices as a separate agent process which is out of
scope of the present document and has been left to user's choice
while satisfying the mentioned operations in the current draft. On
the other hand, these specific operations can be implemented
separately as a third party and to be used at the commissioning
agent. The lower level communication technology can be implemented
either through Bluetooth (BT) or near field communication (NFC) to
verify the devices unique ID (for ex. using MAC). Even though, the
implementation procedure for commissioner is out of scope for the
present document, it is shown as sample interaction with RD
server/provisioning server as part of commissioning procedure in
subsequent sections. Even though the present document discusses
about 6LoWPAN based sensor network, it can be easily moved to any
other technology such as Zigbee/BLE/Wireless HART without any
changes in the architecture or design, because the present
document abstracted the communication networks with their edge
routers. The communication and routing mechanisms or procedure
between edge router and sensor devices/client devices are out of
scope of the present document.
6 Operations
6.1 Discover Provisioning Server
Suppose a client device request for a resource which is hosted on
device that 1) might be unreachable 2) far distant from the
requesting client/device 3) cannot hold more requests 4) might not
intend to provide any resource and 5) want to allow limited
operations; querying that resource is waste of communication
resource. Because, the resource directory server won't be aware
until the device/thing do explicit delete operation. The client or
device which accesses the resource should be provisioned
dynamically for admission and resource control. To query for
resource, the client or device should only query for resource
type, kind of operation it want, and optionally an endpoint. With
this information, the provisioning server should be able to decide
which resource to grant, where the PS might use the conditional
statements made for each resource. When the PS is in network,
client or device can make the following well-known queries for the
provisioning server:
rt=core.ps ---- Provisioning server
=core.ps.search ---- Resource search
Here, core.ps returns resource type as provisioning server, and
"core.ps.search" is used to search for any specific resource
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queries, the following query options are allowed under
provisioning server:
op --- operation
rt --- resource type
ep --- endpoint
The following example explains about how a well-know query for
provisioning server should be done:
REQ: GET /.well-known/core rt=core.ps
RES: </ps> ; "rt=core.ps"
And, the following example explains about how a query options can
be used to search for resource on provisioning server.
REQ: GET coap://ps.example.com/core.ps.search/ep?op=read&rt=temp
RES: <coap://[aaaa::212.7402.2.202]:61616/temp>; ep=node1;
rt=temp;
6.2 Register Service
+---------+ +---------+
| | | |
| Device | |RD Server|
| | | |
+----+----+ +-----+---+
| |
| |
| `. |
| POST /rd?ep=node1&d=example.com&et=temperature-no`.|
+--------------------------------------------------,'.
| gp=thermostat&con=DeviceID(100) ,' |
| ,' |
| ,' |
| ,' 2.01 Created Location: /rd/7521 |
`.----------------------------------------------------
| `-. |
| `. |
| |
Fig. 5 Registering a Service
The constrained device which hosts the service MUST register its
service with the RD server using its unique identifier (for ex.
MAC id, UDDI registry etc.) and IP address as shown in Fig 5. The
device MUST send a POST request for registering its service.
Before sending a request, it MUST establish a secure channel
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between these two nodes [draft-schmitt-ace-twowayauth-for-iot].
Once the service has been registered with the RD server, the RD
server may notify the registered information of a device (for
ex.its unique identifier and device name) to a commissioning
agent.
6.3 Verify pre-registered service
+---------------+ +----------+
|Commissioning | | RD Server|
|Agent | | |
+------+--------+ +--------+-+
| |
| |
| GET /rd-lookup/d `. |
+--------------------------------------------------:'.
| .' |
| |
| .'2.05 Content </rd>;d=example.com,</rd>;d=example.com
::---------------------------------------------------+
| `-. |
| GET /rd-lookup/gp?ep=node1&d=example.com `. |
+---------------------------------------------------/.
| .' |
| |
| .'2.05 Content <coap://ip:port>;gp=thermostat;ep=node1
::---------------------------------------------------+
| `-. |
| `. |
| GET /rd-lookup/res?rt=temp&gp=thermostat&d=example.com
+--------------------------------------------------:'.
| .' |
| |
| .'2.05 Content <coap://host:port>;rt=temp;gp=thermostat
::---------------------------------------------------+
| `-. d=example.com |
+---------------------------+ |
|Authentication of Service | |
|Info and DeviceID | |
+---------------------------+ POST Verified User; DeviceID`. |
+---------------------------------------------------::
| .' .-' |
.`.__________________________________________________|
| `. 2.00 OK |
Fig. 6 Verify pre registered service
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SRV {
Name: Node1
Group: Thermostat
Domain: myhome.com
Type: Temperature node
Device ID: 1001
Device IP: <host:port>
}
Fig 7. Example Service Information
The commissioning agent MUST verify any pre registered service
with the RD server as shown in Fig 6. The commissioning agent
sends a GET request for domain lookup. Before sending the request,
it MUST establish a secure channel between these two nodes
[DTLS][TLS]. Once obtaining the specific domain, it MUST look for
the group to which the service belongs. Once obtaining the
specific domain and group, it MUST send a service look up with the
RD server for the registered service. Once obtaining the service
information about a specific device, the commissioning agent MUST
verify the registered service. This service information is later
used to create service registry in the provisioning server as
explained in the following section. The example service
information (denoted as SRV) looks like as shown in Fig 7.
6.4 Define policies on resource control
Once the hosted service has been verified by commissioning agent
(CA), the CA MUST create a service registry with the provisioning
server as explained in Fig 8. The provisioning server SHOULD send
a service ID as a response back to the commissioning agent after
creating the service entry.
This service ID can be later used by the commissioning agent to
permanently DELETE the service entry ( if required). The
commissioning agent MUST create some admission control policies
such as read (R), write (W), read/write (R/W), delete (D), number
of simultaneous connection on resource etc. on the registered
service. Once the admission control policies has been set on a
specific device, the resource control policies such as conditional
access of a service, quality of service agreements (based on the
priority levels set for clients) can be set on that registered
service. These conditional access on service can be implemented
with simple conditional statements as explained in section 6.3.1
(for ex. "client (c) can access service with only read (R), write
(W) permissions if it only belongs to group (g)").
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+----------------+ +---------------+
|Commissioning | |Provisioning |
| Agent | | Server |
+------+---------+ +--------+------+
| POST /thermostat /HTTP/1.1 `. |
+------------------------------------------/.
| HOST thermostat.ps.example.com .' |
| Content-Type: application/text |
| SRV { Name: Node1 |
| Group: Thermostat |
| Domain: myhome.com |
| Type: Temperature-node |
| DeviceID: 1001 |
| DeviceIP: <host:port> } |
| |
| .' HTTP/1.1 200 OK |
::------------------------------------------'
| `. Content-Type: application/text |
| { sID (service ID) } |
| |
| POST /thermostat /HTTP/1.1 `. |
+------------------------------------------::
| HOST thermostat.ps.example.com .' |
| Content-Type: application/text |
| AC { ServiceID: 1234 |
| Auth: Basic Auth Support |
| Count: 10 |
| Admission Control: R,W,R/W,D } |
| |
| .' HTTP/1.1 200 OK |
::------------------------------------------+
| `. Content-Type: application/text |
| |
| POST /thermostat /HTTP/1.1 `. |
+------------------------------------------::
| HOST thermostat.ps.example.com .' |
| Content-Type: application/text |
| RC { If C is from G1 allow {R,W}; |
| If C is from G2&!G3 allow {R}; |
| If C is from d1&g1 allow {R,W,D}; |
| : } |
| .' HTTP/1.1 200 OK |
::------------------------------------------+
| `. Content-Type: application/text |
| |
Fig. 8 Defining Policies on Resource and Access Control
The implementation or information format details of these
conditional statements is out of scope of the present document
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(TBD). The example admission control and resource control policies
are as shown in Fig 9, and Fig 10 respectively.
AC {
Service ID: 12345
Auth: Basic Auth Support
Count: 10
Admission Control: R, W, R/W, D
:
:
}
Fig 9. Example Admission Control Policies
RC {
If c is from g1 allow {R,W}
If C is from g2 & !g3 {R}
If C is from d1 & g1 allow {R, W, D}
:
:
}
Fig 10. Example Resource Control Policies
6.4.1 Resource Control
Resource control policies for constrained devices are expressed in
terms of conditional expressions as explained in Fig. 10. Consider
a scenario where we define the client (C) (who accesses the
resource) in terms of groups/levels. For example in a typical home
building, we assign each floor as a group. Suppose for a three
floor building, the clients such as mobile phone/air conditioner
can belong to any of the floor within a building. And we allow
various permissions for the clients according to the group it
belongs to, as specified in Fig 11.
---------------------------
| | | | | |
|Client | R | W | U | D |
|-------------|---|---|---|
|G1 | * | - | * | - |
| | | | | |
|G2 | * | * | - | - |
| | | | | |
|G3 | - | - | - | * |
|--------------------------
Fig 11. Example Permissions on Methods
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Suppose, we assigned the priorities for different groups as C
belongs to {G1, G2, G3} => {P1, P3, P2}. Moreover, if we would
like to assign different QoS classes for clients, depending on the
applications they use then it is required to control QoS policies
in resource control. QoS is defined in terms of various parameters
such as {availability, reliability, serviceability, data accuracy,
aggregation delay, coverage, fault tolerance, network lifetime} in
wireless sensor networks. It is assumed that based on these
parameters, QoS is defined in terms of various classes such as
{Q1, Q2, Q3}, then it is required that some of the clients can
make some pre-level agreements on QoS requirement for their
applications either based on the groups it belongs to or based on
the priority of the clients request (Suppose, C belongs to {Q1,
Q2, Q3}). Method for defining QoS classes is out of scope of the
present document. Once defining the groups, its priorities, QoS
classes, and permissions, then the conditional statements which
define the resource control policies can be defined as follows:
ST1: If the client belongs to G1 then it is allowed with
permissions {R, R/W, U}, priority {P1}, QoS {Q1}, and operations
{turn it up, read}; else if the client belongs to G2 then it is
allowed with permissions {R, W, R/W}, priority {P3}, QoS {Q2}, and
operations {turn it up, read}; else if the client belongs to G3
then it is allowed with permissions {D}, priority {P2}, QoS {Q3},
and operations {turn it down}.
ST2: Allow the client with priority {P1}, QoS {Q1}, operations
{turn it up, turn it down, read}, and allow only with permissions
{R} in G1; permissions {R, R/W, D} in G2; and permissions {D} in
G3.
ST3: Allow the client with priority {P1}, QoS {Q1}, and allow with
permissions {R}, operations {read} in G1; allow with permissions
{R, R/W, D}, operations {turn it up, turn it down, read} in G2;
and allow with permissions {D}, operations {turn it down} in G3.
Above conditional statements are few examples on how to define the
conditional statements, the statements can be defined on any
manner based on the resource control policies we would like to
achieve. The above statements can be better explained in plain
semantic notation as shown in Fig 12(a)-14(a), and the
corresponding JSON representations for message exchange is
explained in Fig 12(b)-14(b). These statements can be even
implemented using data modeling language such as YANG or ASN 1.1
which is out of scope of the present document.
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C
{
G1 |"[
{ |"C":{"G1":{"Allow":"R,U",
Allow {R,U} |"Priority":"P1","QoS":"Q1",
Priority {P1} |"Operations":"turnup,read"},
QoS {Q1} |"G2":{"Allow":"R,W",
Operations {tunr it up, read}|"Priority":"P3","QoS":"Q2",
} |"Operations":"turn it
G2 |up,read"},"G3":{"Allow":"D",
{ |"Priority":"P2","QoS":"Q3",
Allow {R,W} |"Operations":"turn it down"
Priority {P3} |}}]"
QoS {Q2} |
Operations {turn it up, read}|
} |
G3 |
{ |
Allow {D} |
Priority {P2} |
QoS {Q2} |
Operations {turn it down} |
} |
} |
(a) (b)
Fig 12. ST1: (a) Semantic Notation (b) JSON Representation
C | "[
{ | "Priority":"P1","QoS":"Q1",
Priority {P1} | "Operations":"turn it up,
QoS {Q1} | turn it down, read",
Operations {turn it up,turn it | "C":{"G1":{"Allow":"R"},
down, read} | "G2":{"Allow":"R,W,D"},
G1 | "G3":{"Allow":"D"}}
{ | ]"
Allow {R} |
}; |
G2 |
{ |
Allow {R,W,D} |
}; |
G3 |
{
|
Allow {D} |
}; |
} |
(a) (b)
Fig 13. ST2: (a) Semantic Notation (b) JSON Representation
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C | "[
{ | "Priority":"P1","QoS":
Priority {P1} | "Q1","C":{"G1": {"Allow":
QoS {Q1} | "R","Operations":"read"},
G1 | "G2":{"Allow":"R,W,D",
{ | "Operations":"turn it up,
Allow {R} | turn it down, read"},
Operations {read} | "G3":{"Allow":"D",
}; | "Operations":"turn it
G2 | down"}}]"
{ |
Allow {R,W,D} |
Operations {turn it up, turn |
down, read} |
}; |
G3 |
{ |
Allow {D} |
Operations {turn it down} |
}; |
} |
(a) (b)
Fig 14. ST3: (a) Semantic Notation (b) JSON Representation
6.5 Search for services by device
Any client device (as explained for scenario 2) MUST interacts
with the provisioning server and looks for deployed services by
devices. Moreover, the provisioning server can verify the complete
authorization, admission, and resource control of any device's
services. Whereas, if any other constrained devices (ex. air
conditioner) searches for services hosted by other constrained
device (as explained for scenario 1) MUST interact with the RD
server as shown in Fig 15. Here, initially the device queries for
all services that are hosted by other devices, then it searches
within the domain for specific service, its SRV info, and path to
the hosted service. Before sending a request, it MUST establish a
secure channel between these two nodes [draft-schmitt-ace-
twowayauth-for-iot].
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+---------------+ +----------+
| Device | | RD Server|
| (aircondit | | |
| ioner) | | |
+-----+---------+ +-------+--+
| |
| GET /rd-lookup/gp?d=example.com `. |
+---------------------------------------------------`.:
| .-' |
| .'2.05 Content <gp="thermostat"> |
::----------------------------------------------------+
| `-. |
| GET /rd-lookup/ep?gp=thermostat `. |
+----------------------------------------------------::
| .' |
| .'2.05 Content <Node1> <Node2> |
::----------------------------------------------------+
| `. |
| |
| GET /rd-lookup/ep?et=temperature&gp=thermostat `. |
+----------------------------------------------------`.
| .' |
| |
| .'2.05 Content <coap://ip:port>;ep="Node1" |
::----------------------------------------------------+
| `-. |
| |
Fig. 15 Search for services by device
6.6 Service request and response
In scenario 1 (as shown in Fig 2), service request and response
MUST use coap based communication to access the service as shown
in Fig 16. Before sending a request, it MUST establish a secure
channel between these two nodes [draft-schmitt-ace-twowayauth-for-
iot]. Suppose, the constrained client device (for ex.
airconditioner) want to access the service hosted by another
constrained device (for ex. thermostat), then the client device
MUST send a coap based GET request to thermostat. Then, this
device (thermostat) SHOULD send a POST request to provision this
service request with the provisioning server by sending clients
<IP:port>. Based on the clients <IP:port>, the provisioning server
MUST find the client (ex. airconditioner) details such as service
information, group, domain, and type details.
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+------------+ +-------------+ +-----------+
|Airconditi | |Thermostat | |Provision |
|oner | | (IP1) | |ining Server
| (IP2) | | | | (IP3) |
+-----+------+ +------+------+ +--------+--+
| | |
|coap://thermostat. `.| |
+----------------------------:: |
| example.com/temp .' |POST /thermostat `. |
| +-------------------------::
| |HOST thermostat.ps. .' |
| | example.com |
| |Content-Type: application/txt
| |{ SRC: <IP1,port> |
| | DST: <IP3,port> |
| | Client: <IP2,port> } |
| | |
| | +--------------------------+
| | |Check for Admission, |
| | |ResourceControl of thermost
| | |for airconditioner |
| | +--------------------------+
| | |
| | .'2.00 OK { Permit/Deny }|
| .'URI-Path: temp CON 200 ::------------------------+
::---------------------------+ `-. |
| `.("thermostat","aaaa::212.| |
| 7402.2.202","temp",27) | |
| | |
Fig. 16 Request/Response within Constrained Environment
Once the client is identified, the provisioning server MUST check
for authorization, admission and resource control policies of
hosted service (ex. thermostat). Once the service request is
authorized to access then the URI-Path for hosted service along
with the value is sent as a coap response to client device (air
conditioner). Here, the request is conditional i.e. based on the
resource control policies of a resource (such as thermostat) for a
client (airconditioner), the permissions are given to access the
resource.
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+-------------+ +------------+ +---------+
| | |Provision | | |
| Client | |ining Server| |Thermostat
| | | | | |
+-----+-------+ +-----+------+ +------+--+
| | |
|http://thermostat. `. | |
+----------------------------:: |
| example.com/temp .' | |
| +-----------------------------+ |
| |Check for Admission, | |
| |Resource Control of thermostat |
| |for airconditioner | |
| +-----------------------------+ |
| | |
| | coap://thermostat. `. |
| +------------------------::
| |example.com/temp .' |
| | |
| | |
| | .'URI-Path: temp CON 200|
| ::------------------------+
| | `. |
| .' HTTP/1.1 200 OK | |
::----------------------------+ |
| `. Temperature: 27 | |
| | |
Fig. 17 Request/Response from outside Constrained Environment
Service request and response in scenario 2 (as shown in Fig 3),
uses simple http based communication to access the service from
the PS. Provisioning Server then sends a coap based GET request to
the ultimate device that hosts service. Before sending this
request to the actual device for service, PS authorizes the
service request. Once, the service request is authorized to
access, then the URI-path for hosted service along with the value
is sent as HTTP response to client device. PS can implement a
reverse proxy case for HTTP-CoAP protocol translation defined in
[draft-ietf-core-http-mapping].
------------------HTTP begin -------------------------------------
HTTP POST
Request:
POST /thermostat /HTTP/1.1
HOST thermostat.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
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Content-Length: length
licenseID=string & content=string & paramsXML=string
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: length
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<string xmlns="http://xyz.com/">
string
</string>
------------------HTTP end -------------------------------------
------------------ REST via HTTP begin --------------------------
REST via HTTP POST
Request:
POST /thermostat /HTTP/1.1
HOST thermostat.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: length
licenseID=string & content=string & paramsXML=string
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: length
string
------------------REST via HTTP end -----------------------------
------------------SOAP begin ------------------------------------
SOAP 1.2
Request:
POST /Thermostat /HTTP/1.1
HOST: www.example.org
Content-Type: application/soap+xml; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: length
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<soap:envelop>
Xmlns:soap=http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelop
Soap:encodingStyle=http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soapencoding>
<soap:body xmlns: m="http://www.myhome.org/thermostat">
<m:GetTemperature>
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<m:thermostat>1</m:thermostat>
</m:GetTemperature>
</soap:body>
</soap:envelop>
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/soap+xml; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: length
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<soap:envelop>
Xmlns:soap=http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelop
Soap:encodingStyle=http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soapencoding>
<soap:body xmlns: m="http://www.example.org/thermostat">
<m:GetTemperatureResponse>
<m:temperature>27.8</m:temperature>
</m:GetTemperatureResponse>
</soap:body>
</soap:envelop>
------------------SOAP end ----------------------------------
7 Alternative Solution
7.1 System Architecture
The system architecture is as shown in the Fig 18, the thing
(device) always registers its service with RD server. CA verifies
registered service with RD server and configures policies at
provisioning server for resource access by various other devices
or clients. The provisioning server can access any resource from
the RD server and also has right to provision any device or client
before assigning the resource. This provisioning server not only
authorizes the client, it also controls the resource access with
the configured policies with various non security parameters. The
client or device should always talk to provisioning sever for
resource access. Once authorized and provisioned completely it is
allowed to access the resource. The following interfaces are
defined in the architecture.
IF-a: register service (coap)
IF-b: verify service (coap)
IF-c: configure policies (coap or http)
IF-d: obtain resource (coap)
IF-e: assign resource (coap or http)
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+-------+
|Thing |
|(Server|
+---+---+
|
|IF-a
|
|
+-------+ +--------+ +--+---+
| | | | | |
|Client |________| |___________| |
|(Thning| IF-e | PS | IF-d | RD |
|/Client) | | | |
+-------+ +-------++ +-+----+
\ /
IF-c \ /
\ /IF-b
\ /
+--+----+-+
| |
| CA |
| |
PS-Provisioning Server +---------+
RD-Resource Directory
CA-Commissioning Agent
Fig 18. System Architecture
7.2 Service Request
The device either constrained (ex. air conditioner) or non-
constrained (ex. mobile phone) that searches for services hosted
by other constrained device MUST interact with the Provisioning
Server (PS) as shown in Fig 19. Here, the device queries to the
provisioning server by query options for example, "op=read &
rt=temp", which means "obtain resource with read operation".
Before sending a request, it MUST establish a secure channel
between these two nodes [draft-schmitt-ace-twowayauth-for-iot].
Whenever the provisioning server receives the resource request
from device or client, it MUST find the group to which the device
or client belongs to from the preconfigured information.
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+-------------+ +-------------+ +--------------+
|Device | | | | |
|(AirCondition| |Provisioning | |RD Server |
|er) | |Server | | |
| | | | | |
+----|--------+ +-------|-----+ +--------|-----+
|GET | |
|coap://ps.example.com/c | |
|ore.ps.search/ep?op=rea | |
|d&rt=temp \ |
--------------------------/ |
| / |
| +-------------------------+ |
| | | | |
| | find the group to which | |
| | the device belongs to | |
| +-------------------------+ |
| |GET |
| |/rd-lookup/res?rt= \|
| -temp-----------------/
| | /|
| | / |
| | / <coap://[aaaa::212.7
| |/ 402.2.202]:61616/tem
| ---p>;-ep=node1;------
| | rt=temp;...... |
| | |
| | |
| +-----------------------------+ |
| | Parse the conditional | |
| | statements for each | |
| | resource obtained | |
| +-----------------------------+ |
| | |
| | |
| +------------------------------+ |
| |Obtain the most suited | |
| |resource from the list and | |
| |increase the count field in | |
| |AC. And assign that resource | |
| +------------------------------+ |
| <coap://[aaaa::212.74| |
|// 02.2.202]:61616/temp>| |
\-----------------------| |
| \ | |
Fig 19. Search for Service
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Once obtaining the group information of device or client, PS
SHOULD do rt-lookup query to RD server. After obtaining the
resource information, the PS MUST parse the conditional statements
for each resource to detect most suited resource to be assigned to
the client or device. The method for detecting the best resource
can use any well-know MADM or fuzzy logic techniques which is out
of scope of the present document. And finally, the provisioning
server should increase the count field in admission control, and
assign the resource to device/client. Once the service request is
authorized and provisioned to control the resource, the device or
client can obtain the resource directly as shown in Fig 20.
+---------------+ +--------------+
| | | |
|Device | |Thermostat |
|(Airconditione | | |
|r | | |
| | | |
+-------|-------+ +-------|------+
| |
| |
| |
|coap://[aaaa::212.7402.2.202]:61 |
|616/temp \ |
-------------------------------------/-
| / |
| / |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| / |
|// { et:"thermostat"; "temp":27} |
/--------------------------------------
|
|\ |
| |
| |
Fig 20. Service Request and Response
8 Security Considerations
Security level for message authentication is out of scope of the
present document. However, the following security consideration
needs to be considered for the present proposed method. Services
that run over UDP are unprotected and vulnerable to unknowingly
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become part of a DDoS attack as UDP does not require return
routability check. Therefore, an attacker can easily spoof the
source IP of the target entity and send requests to such a service
which would then respond to the target entity. The TLS/DTLS based
security solution can be considered for secure message
communication.
9 IANA Considerations
core.ps and "core.ps.search" to be registered with the resource
type registry defined by [RFC6690]. Under "CoRE Parameters" , a
new query parameter needs to be defined as shown below. The query
parameter MUST be a valid URI query key [RFC3986].
+--------+---------+----------+---------+
|Name | Query |Validity |Description
|________|_________|__________|_________|
| | | |Used for |
|Operatio| op | string |operation|
| n| | |on device|
| | | | |
+--------+---------+----------+---------+
10 References
10.1 Normative References
10.2 Informative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228, May 2014.
[RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
"Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4 Networks", RFC
4944, September 2007.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, June 2014.
[RFC6690] Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
Format", RFC 6690, August 2012.
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[draft-ietf-core-resource-directory] Shelby, Z., and Bormann, C.,
"CoRE Resource Directory", draft-ietf-core-resource-directory-02
(work in progress), November 2014.
[draft-gerdes-ace-actors] Gerdes, S., "Actors in the ACE
Architecture", draft-gerdes-ace-actors-03 (work in progress),
March 2015.
[draft-gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize] Gerdes, S., Bergmann, O., Bormann,
C., "Delegated CoAP Authentication and Authorization Framework
(DCAF)", draft-gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize-02, March 2015.
[draft-bormann-core-ace-aif] Bormann, C., "An Authorization
Information Format (AIF) for ACE", draft-bormann-core-ace-aif-oo,
January 2014.
[draft-schmitt-ace-twowayauth-for-iot] Schmitt, C., Stiller, B.,
"Two-way Authentication for IoT", draft-schmitt-ace- twowayauth-
for-iot-01, December 2014.
[DTLS] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security", RFC 6347, January 2012.
[TLS] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.2", RFC
5246, August 2008.
[draft-ietf-core-http-mapping] Castellani, A., Loreto, S., Rahman,
A., Fossati, T., and Dijk, E., "Guidelines for HTTP-CoAP Mapping
Implementations", draft-ietf-core-http-mapping-05, (work in
progress), Oct 2015.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, DOI
10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[draft-seitz-ace-oauth-authz] Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem,
E., Erdtman, S., Tschofenig, H., "Authorization for the Internet
of Things using OAuth 2.0", draft-seitz-ace-oauth-authz-00, (work
in progress), Oct 2015.
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11 Acknowledgements
Special thanks to Amit Kumar S,Zhengfei, Fubaicheng, zuojing,
Yangjun,Vijayachandran Mariappan, Shashidhar C Shekar,
Jayaraghavendran K, Ajay Sankar, Puneet Balmukund Sharma, and Rabi
Narayan Sahoo for extensive comments and contributions that improved
the text.
Special Thanks to Caozhen, Hedanping (Ana), Behcet Sarikaya, and
Carsten Bormann for helpful comments and discussions that have shaped
the document. Thanks to IETF 94th participants to give valuable
comments that shaped the draft with clear information.
Authors' Addresses
Vasu K
Huawei Technologies
Bangalore
India
EMail: vasu.kantubukta@huawei.com
Rahul A Jadhav
Huawei Technologies
Bangalore
India
EMail: rahul.jadhav@huawei.com
yangneng
Huawei Technologies
Shenzhen
China
EMail: yangneng@huawei.com
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