Internet DRAFT - draft-wang-mmusic-encrypted-ice-candidates
draft-wang-mmusic-encrypted-ice-candidates
MMUSIC A. Drake
Internet-Draft J. Uberti
Intended status: Informational Q. Wang
Expires: May 4, 2020 Google
November 01, 2019
Encrypting ICE candidates to improve privacy and connectivity
draft-wang-mmusic-encrypted-ice-candidates-00
Abstract
WebRTC applications collect ICE candidates as part of the process of
creating peer-to-peer connections. To maximize the probability of a
direct peer-to-peer connection, client private IP addresses can be
included in this candidate collection, but this has privacy
implications. This document describes a way to share local IP
addresses with local peers without compromising client privacy.
During the ICE process, local IP addresses are encrypted and
authenticated using a pre-shared key and cipher suite before being
put into ICE candidates as hostnames with an ".encrypted" pseudo-top-
level domain. Other peers who also have the PSK are able to decrypt
these addresses and use them normally in ICE processing.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
Drake, et al. Expires May 4, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft encrypted-ice-candidates November 2019
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. ICE Candidate Gathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2.1. Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2.2. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. ICE Candidate Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. mDNS Message Flooding via Fallback Resolution . . . . . . 6
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction
The technique detailed in [MdnsCandidate] provides a method to share
local IP addresses with other clients without exposing client private
IP to applications. Given the fact that the application may control
the signaling servers, STUN/TURN servers, and even the remote peer
implementation, the locality of the out-of-band mDNS signaling can be
considered the sole source of trust between peers to share local IPs.
However, mDNS messages are by default scoped to local links
[RFC6762], and may not be enabled to traverse subnets in certain
networking environments. These environments may experience frequent
failures in mDNS name resolution and significant connectivity
challenges as a result. On the other hand, endpoints in these
environments are typically managed, in such a way that information
can be securely pushed and shared, including a pre-shared key and its
associated cipher suite.
This document proposes a complementary solution for managed networks
to share local IP addresses over the signaling channel without
compromising client privacy. Specifically, addresses are encrypted
with pre-shared key (PSK) cipher suites, and encoded as hostnames
with the ".encrypted" pseudo-top-level domain (pseudo-TLD).
Drake, et al. Expires May 4, 2020 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft encrypted-ice-candidates November 2019
WebRTC and WebRTC-compatible endpoints [Overview] that receive ICE
candidates with encrypted addresses will authenticate these hostnames
in ciphertext, decrypt them to IP addresses, and perform ICE
processing as usual. In the case where the endpoint is a web
application, the WebRTC implementation will manage this process
internally and will not disclose the IP addresses in plaintext to the
application.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Description
This section uses the concept of ICE agent as defined in [RFC8445].
3.1. Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suite
ICE agents that implement this proposal pre-share keys for cipher
suites based on symmetric-key algorithms. The mechanism of sharing
such information is outside the scope of this document, but viable
mechanisms exist in browsers today.
The implementation MUST support the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) [AES] algorithm and its operation in the CTR, CBC or GCM mode
with message authentication, and SHOULD use the GCM mode whenever it
is supported. The implementation MUST pre-determine a single mode to
use as part of the mechanism to share the information about the
cipher suite. When using the CTR or CBC mode, HMAC with SHA-2 MUST
be supported.
Since the plaintext to encrypt consists of only a single IPv4 or IPv6
address that fits in a single 128-bit block, the initialization
parameter for each mode can be a cryptographically random number. In
particular, this parameter is given by a 16-byte initial counter
block value for CTR, or a 16-byte or 12-byte initialization vector
for CBC or GCM, respectively.
Note the ICE password associated with an ICE agent has at least
128-bit randomness as defined by [RFC8445]. To reduce the overhead
in the candidate encoding that will be detailed in the next section,
the initialization parameter MUST be chosen as the first 16 bytes or
12 bytes in the network order for the mode in use.
Drake, et al. Expires May 4, 2020 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft encrypted-ice-candidates November 2019
3.2. ICE Candidate Gathering
This section outlines how a PSK cipher suite should be used by ICE
agents to conceal local IP addresses.
3.2.1. Procedure
For each host candidate gathered by an ICE agent as part of the
gathering process described in [RFC8445], Section 5.1.1, the
candidate is handled as described below.
1. Check whether the IP address satisfies the ICE agent's policy
regarding whether an address is safe to expose. If so, expose
the candidate and abort this process.
2. Generate the encrypted address.
1. Let _address_ be the IP address of the candidate, and embed
it as an IPv6 address if it is an IPv4 address, using the
"Well-Known Prefix" as described in [RFC6052].
2. Let _ciphersuite_ be the pre-determined cipher suite and its
initialization parameter, and _key_ the PSK.
3. Let _EncryptAndAuthenticate(plaintext, ciphersuite, key)_ be
an operation that uses the given cipher suite to encrypt a
given plaintext with authentication, and returns concatenated
ciphertext and message authentication code (MAC).
4. Compute _encrypted_address_ as the output of
_EncryptAndAuthenticate(address, ciphersuite, key)_.
3. Generate a pseudo-FQDN as follows.
1. Encode _encrypted_address_ to a hex string, and split the hex
string to substrings after every 32 characters.
2. Form a string by joining the substrings above sequentially
with the delimiter ".". Denote the formed string by
_encoded_encrytped_address_.
3. Generate the pseudo-FQDN
"_encoded_encrypted_address.encrypted_" with the pseudo-TLD
"_.encrypted_".
4. Replace the IP address of the ICE candidate with the pseudo-FQDN
from step 3, and provide the candidate to the application.
Drake, et al. Expires May 4, 2020 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft encrypted-ice-candidates November 2019
3.2.2. Example
The candidate attribute in an SDP message to exchange the encrypted
candidate can be given by
a=candidate:1 1 udp 2122262783 8c9bd03bb7a5a76a5803eebc688f0388.fa991
acbdf116f6b72fd3a781174cd58.encrypted 56622 typ host
following the above procedure. This example assumes the use of the
GCM mode, in which case the 256-bit _encrypted_address_ consists of
128-bit ciphertext and 128-bit MAC, and can be encoded to 64 hex
characters as two labels.
3.3. ICE Candidate Processing
This section outlines how received ICE candidates with mDNS names are
processed by ICE agents, and is relevant to all endpoints.
For any remote ICE candidate received by the ICE agent, the following
procedure is used.
1. If the connection-address field value of the ICE candidate does
not end with ".encrypted", then process the candidate as defined
in [RFC8445] or [MdnsCandidate].
2. If the ICE agent has no PSK cipher suite for encrypted
candidates, proceed to step 5.
3. Decrypt the address as follows.
1. Let _AuthenticateAndDecrypt(ciphertext_and_mac, ciphersuite,
key)_ be an operation using the given cipher suite to
authenticate and decrypt a given ciphertext with MAC, and
returns the decrypted value, or an fail-to-decrypt (FTD)
error.
2. Let _encoded_encrypted_address_ be the value of the
connection-address field after removing the trailing
"_.encrypted_", and let _encrypted_address_ be the string
after removing all "." in _encoded_encrypted_address_.
3. Let _decrypted_address_ be given by
_AuthenticateAndDecrypt(encrypted_address)_. If
_decrypted_address_ does not represent a valid IPv6 address
or an embedded IPv4 address, or an FTD error is raised,
proceed to step 5.
Drake, et al. Expires May 4, 2020 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft encrypted-ice-candidates November 2019
4. Convert _decrypted_address_ to an IPv4 address if it is
embedded.
4. Replace the connection-address field of the ICE candidate with
_decrypted_address_, skip the rest steps and continue processing
of the candidate as described in [RFC8445].
5. Discard the candidate, or proceed to step 6 if the ICE agent
implements [MdnsCandidate].
6. Let _encoded_encrypted_address_ be the same value as defined in
step 3. Construct an mDNS name given by
"_encoded_encrypted_address.local_", and proceed to step 2 in
Section 3.2.1 in [MdnsCandidate].
ICE agents can implement this procedure in any way as long as it
produces equivalent results.
4. Security Considerations
4.1. mDNS Message Flooding via Fallback Resolution
Encrypted candidates can be spoofed and signaled to an ICE agent to
trigger the fallback mDNS resolution as described in step 6 in
Section 3.3. This can potentially generate excessive traffic in the
subnet. Note however that implementations of [MdnsCandidate] are
required to have a proper rate limiting scheme of mDNS messages.
5. IANA Considerations
This document requires no actions from IANA.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6052] Bao, C., Huitema, C., Bagnulo, M., Boucadair, M., and X.
Li, "IPv6 Addressing of IPv4/IPv6 Translators", RFC 6052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6052, October 2010, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6052>.
Drake, et al. Expires May 4, 2020 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft encrypted-ice-candidates November 2019
[RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6762>.
[RFC8445] Keranen, A., Holmberg, C., and J. Rosenberg, "Interactive
Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A Protocol for Network
Address Translator (NAT) Traversal", RFC 8445,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8445, July 2018, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc8445>.
6.2. Informative References
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001.
[MdnsCandidate]
Wang, Q., "Using Multicast DNS to protect privacy when
exposing ICE candidates", October 2019,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtcweb-mdns-ice-
candidates>.
[Overview]
Alvestrand, H., "Overview: Real Time Protocols for
Browser-based Applications", November 2017,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtcweb-overview>.
Authors' Addresses
Alex Drake
Google
Email: alexdrake@google.com
Justin Uberti
Google
Email: juberti@google.com
Qingsi Wang
Google
Email: qingsi@google.com
Drake, et al. Expires May 4, 2020 [Page 7]
