Internet DRAFT - draft-wiethuechter-drip-detim-arch
draft-wiethuechter-drip-detim-arch
drip Working Group A. Wiethuechter
Internet-Draft S. Card
Intended status: Standards Track AX Enterprize, LLC
Expires: 31 March 2023 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
J. Reid
RTFM llp
27 September 2022
DRIP Entity Tag (DET) Identity Management Architecture
draft-wiethuechter-drip-detim-arch-00
Abstract
This document describes the high level architecture for the
registration and discovery of DRIP Entity Tags (DETs) using DNS
technologies and practices. Discovery of DETs and their artifacts
are through the existing DNS structure and methods by using FQDNs. A
general overview of the interfaces required between components is
described in this document with supporting documents giving technical
specifications.
Status of This Memo
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Abstract Process & Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Required Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. DIME Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Apex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Registered Assigning Authority (RAA) . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.1. ICAO Registry of Manufacturers (IRM) . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Hierarchial HIT Domain Authority (HDA) . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.1. Manufacturers Registry of Aircraft (MRA) . . . . . . 8
3.4. Role Abbreviation in DETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. DIME Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. DRIP Provisioning Agent (DPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Name Server (NS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4. DRIP Information Agent (DIA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.5. Registration Data Directory Service (RDDS) . . . . . . . 11
5. Registration/Provisioning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. Operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3. Session ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3.1. UA Based . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.3.2. UAS Based . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.4. Child DIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6. Differentiated Access Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. DRIP in the Domain Name System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. Prefix to TLD Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2. DRIP Fully Qualified Domain Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2.1. DRIP Entity Tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2.2. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.3. Supported DNS Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3.1. HIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3.2. TLSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3.3. CERT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3.4. NS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.3.5. SVR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.3.6. CNAME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8. Endorsements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.1. Endorsement Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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8.1.1. Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1.2. Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1.3. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1.4. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.2. Self-Endorsement (SE-x) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.3. Endorsement (E-x.y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.4. Concise Endorsement (CE-x.y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.5. Mutual Endorsement (ME-x.y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.6. Link Endorsement (LE-x.y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8.7. Broadcast Endorsement (BE-x.y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8.8. Abbreviations & File Naming Conventions . . . . . . . . . 26
8.8.1. In Text Abbreviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8.8.2. File Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9. X.509 Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.1. Certificate Policy and Certificate Stores . . . . . . . . 27
9.2. Certificate Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9.4. Alternative Certificate Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
10.1. IANA DRIP Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11.1. Key Rollover & Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11.2. DET Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix A. Binary Endorsements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
A.1. Self-Endorsement (SE-x) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
A.2. Endorsement (E-x.y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
A.3. Concise Endorsement (CE-x.y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.4. Mutual Endorsement (ME-x.y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.5. Link Endorsement (LE-x.y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A.6. Broadcast Endorsement (BE-x.y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1. Introduction
Registries are fundamental to Remote ID (RID). Only very limited
operational information can be Broadcast, but extended information is
sometimes needed. The most essential element of information sent is
the UAS ID itself, the unique key for lookup of extended information
in registries.
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While it is expected that registry functions will be integrated with
USS, who will provide them is not yet determined in most, and is
expected to vary between, jurisdictions. However this evolves, the
essential registry functions, starting with management of
identifiers, are expected to remain the same, so are specified
herein.
While most data to be sent via Broadcast or Network RID is public,
much of the extended information in registries will be private. Thus
AAA for registries is essential, not just to ensure that access is
granted only to strongly authenticated, duly authorized parties, but
also to support subsequent attribution of any leaks, audit of who
accessed information when and for what purpose, etc. As specific AAA
requirements will vary by jurisdictional regulation, provider
philosophy, customer demand, etc., they are left to specification in
policies, which should be human readable to facilitate analysis and
discussion, and machine readable to enable automated enforcement,
using a language amenable to both, e.g., XACML.
The intent of the negative and positive access control requirements
on registries is to ensure that no member of the public would be
hindered from accessing public information, while only duly
authorized parties would be enabled to access private information.
Mitigation of Denial of Service attacks and refusal to allow database
mass scraping would be based on those behaviors, not on identity or
role of the party submitting the query per se, but querant identity
information might be gathered (by security systems protecting DRIP
implementations) on such misbehavior.
Registration under DRIP is vital to manage the inevitable collisions
in the hash portion of the DET. Forgery of the DET is still
possible, but including it as a part of a public registration
mitigates this risk. This document creates the DRIP DET registration
and discovery ecosystem. This includes all components in the
ecosystem (e.g., RAA, HDA, UA, GCS, USS).
1.1. Abstract Process & Reasoning
In DRIP each entity (registry, operator and aircraft) is expected to
generate a full DRIP Entity ID [drip-rid] on the local device their
key is expected to be used. These are registered with a Public
Information Registry within the hierarchy along with whatever data is
required by the cognizant CAA and the registry. Any PII is stored in
a Private Information Registry protected through industry practice
AAA or better. In response, the entity will obtain an endorsement
from the registry proving such registration.
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Manufacturers that wish to participate in DRIP should not only
support DRIP as a Session ID type for their aircraft but also
generate a DET then encode it as a Serial Number. This would allow
aircraft under CAA mandates to fly only ID Type 1 (Serial Number)
could still use DRIP and most of its benefits. Even if DRIP is not
supported for Serial Numbers by a Manufacturer it is hoped that they
would still run a registry to store their Serial Numbers and allow
look ups for generic model information. This look up could be
especially helpful in UTM for Situational Awareness when an aircraft
flying with a Serial Number is detected and allow for an aircraft
profile to be displayed.
Operators are registered with a number of registries or their
regional RAA. This acts as a verification check when a user performs
other registration operations; such as provisioning an aircraft with
a new Session ID. It is an open question if an Operator registers to
their CAA (the RAA) or multiple USS's (HDA's). PII of the Operator
would vary based on the CAA they are under and the registry.
Finally aircraft that support using a DET would provision per flight
to a USS, proposing a DET to the registry to generate a binding
between the aircraft (Session ID, Serial Number and Operational
Intent), operator and registry. Aircraft then follow [drip-auth] to
meet various requirements from [RFC9153] during flight.
2. Terminology
2.1. Required Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2.2. Additional Definitions
See [RFC9153] for common DRIP terms and [drip-arch] Section 2.2 for
additional terms used in this document.
HDA:
Hierarchial HIT Domain Authority. The 14 bit field identifying
the HIT Domain Authority under a RAA.
HID:
Hierarchy ID. The 28 bit field providing the HIT Hierarchy ID.
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PII:
Personally Identifiable Information. Any information a cognizant
authority (such as a government agency) or a user requires
differentiated access to obtain.
RAA:
Registered Assigning Authority. The 14 bit field identifying the
Hierarchical HIT Assigning Authority.
3. DIME Roles
The DRIP Identity Management Entity (DIME) is an entity encompassed
various logical components (Section 4) and can be classified to serve
a number of different roles (this section). The general hierarchy of
these roles are illustrated in Figure 1.
+----------+
| Apex |
+-o------o-+
| |
******************|******|*****************************
| |
+-----o-+ +-o-----+
RAAs | IRM | | RAA o------.
+---o---+ +---o---+ '
| | |
****************|**********|**********|****************
| | |
+---o---+ +---o---+ +---o---+
HDAs | MRA | | RIDR | | HDA |
+-------+ +-------+ +-------+
Figure 1: Registry Hierarchy
3.1. Apex
The apex is special DIME role that holds the value of RAA=0 and
HDA=0. It serves as the branch point from the larger DNS system in
which HHITs are defined. The Apex generally has prefix portions of
the HHIT associated with it (such as 2001:0030/28) which are assigned
by IANA from the non-routable special IPv6 address space for ORCHIDs
(where HHITs are derived from).
The Apex manages all delegations and allocations of the HHIT's RAA to
various parties with NS records to redirect DNS queries to proper
sub-branches.
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3.2. Registered Assigning Authority (RAA)
RAA's are the upper hierarchy in DRIP (denoted by a 14-bit field
(16,384 RAAs) of an HHIT). An RAA is a business or organization that
manages a registry of HDAs (Section 3.3). Most are contemplated to
be Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA), such as the Federal Aviation
Authority (FAA), that then delegate HDAs to manage their National Air
Space (NAS). This is does not preclude other entities to operate an
RAA if the Apex allows it.
For DRIP and the UAS use case ICAO will handle the registration of
RAAs. Once ICAO accepts an RAA, it will assign a number and create a
zone delegation under the <prefix>.hhit.arpa. DNS zone for the RAA.
As DETs may be used in many different domains, RAA should be
allocated in blocks with consideration on the likely size of a
particular usage. Alternatively, different prefixes can be used to
separate different domains of use of HHITs.
An RAA must provide a set of services to allocate HDAs to
organizations. It must have a public policy on what is necessary to
obtain an HDA. It must maintain a DNS zone minimally for discovering
HID RVS servers. All RAA's use an HDA value of 0 and have their RAA
value delegated to them by the Root.
3.2.1. ICAO Registry of Manufacturers (IRM)
An RAA-level DIME that hands out HDA values to participating
Manufacturer's that hold an ICAO Manufacturer Code used in
[CTA2063A].
To manage the large ICAO Manufacturer Code space (34 character set; 4
characters; 1,336,336 possible codes) a range of RAA values are set
aside for the DRIP use case. These are the RAA values of 2 (0x0002)
up to 96 (0x0060). This allows a single HDA for each Manufacturer
Code.
All IRM's have two reserved HDA values. 0 (0x0000) for itself in its
role as an RAA and 1 (0x0001) if it wishes to offer HDA services.
3.3. Hierarchial HIT Domain Authority (HDA)
An HDA may be an USS, ISP, or any third party that takes on the
business to register the actual UAS entities that need DETs. This
includes, but is not limited to UA, GCS, and Operators. It should
also provide needed UAS services including those required for HIP-
enabled devices (e.g. RVS).
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The HDA is a 14-bit field (16,384 HDAs per RAA) of a DET assigned by
an RAA. An HDA should maintain a set of RVS servers for UAS clients
that may use HIP. How this is done and scales to the potentially
millions of customers are outside the scope of this document. This
service should be discoverable through the DNS zone maintained by the
HDA's RAA.
An RAA may assign a block of values to an individual organization.
This is completely up to the individual RAA's published policy for
delegation. Such policy is out of scope.
3.3.1. Manufacturers Registry of Aircraft (MRA)
An HDA-level DIME run by a manufacturer of UAS systems that
participate in Remote ID. Stores UAS Serial Numbers under a specific
ICAO Manufacturer Code (assigned to the manufacturer by ICAO).
A DET can be encoded into a Serial Number (see [drip-rid]) and this
registry would hold a mapping from the Serial Number to the DET and
its artifacts.
3.3.1.1. Remote ID Registries (RIDR)
An HDA-level DIME that holds the binding between a UAS Session ID
(for DRIP the DET) and the UA Serial Number. The Serial Number MUST
have its access protected to allow only authorized parties to obtain.
The Serial Number SHOULD be encrypted in a way only the authorized
party can decrypt.
As part of the UTM system they also hold a binding between a UAS ID
(Serial Number or Session ID) and an Operational Intent. They may
either be a direct logical part of a UAS Service Supplier (USS) or be
a UTM wide service to USS's.
3.4. Role Abbreviation in DETs
On receiver devices a DET can be translated to a more human readable
form such as: {RAA Abbreviation} {HDA Abbreviation} {Last 4
Characters of DET Hash}. An example of this would be US FAA FE23. To
support this DIMEs are RECOMMENDED to have an abbreviation that could
be used for this form. These abbreviations SHOULD be a maximum of
six characters in length. Spaces SHOULD NOT be used and be replaced
with either underscores (_) or dashes (-). For RAAs the abbreviation
is RECOMMENDED to be set to the ISO 3166 country code (either Alpha-2
or Alpha-3) for the CAA.
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If a DIME does not have an abbreviation or it can not be looked up
then the receiver SHOULD use the hexadecimal encoding of the field it
is missing.
4. DIME Architecture
+--------------------+
| Registering Client |
+------------o-------+
|
*************|*************************************************************************
* | DRIP Indentity Management Entity *
* | *
* +------o-------+ +-------------+ +--------------+ *
* | DRIP | | | | | *
* | Provisioning o--------------o | | | *
* | Agent | | | | | *
* +-------o------+ | | | | *
* | | | | | *
* | | DRIP | | Registration | *
* +-------o--+ | Information o--------------o Data | *
* | Registry o------------------o Agent | | Directory | *
* +-------o--+ | | | Service | *
* | | | | | *
* | | | | | *
* +-------o-----+ | | | | *
* | Name Server | | | | | *
* +------o------+ +-----o-------+ +------o-------+ *
* | | | *
* | | | *
*************|****************************|*****************************|**************
| | |
| +-------o-------+ |
'--------------------o Lookup Client o---------------------'
+---------------+
Figure 2: Registry Hierarchy
The DIME, in any of its roles (Section 3), is comprised of a number
of logical components that perform specific functions. Any of these
components in Section 4 could be delegated to other entities as a
service both co-located or remote. For example the Name Server
component could be handled by a well established DNS registrar/
registry with the DRIP Provisioning Agent (DPA) (Section 4.1)
interfacing to them. Another common example may be the DPA, Registry
and Name Server are all co-located in one implementation with an
interface to a DRIP Information Agent (DIA) offered by another
organization.
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4.1. DRIP Provisioning Agent (DPA)
The DPA performs the important task of vetting information (such as
the DRIP Endorsements) coming from clients wishing to register and
then delegate (internally or externally) various items to other
components in the DIME.
A standard interface over HTTPS MUST be provided for clients to
access with JSON or CBOR encoding of objects being sent to the DPA.
This interface specification is out of scope for this document.
There MUST be an interface from the DPA to a Registry (Section 4.2)
component which handles the DNS specific requirements of the DIME as
defined by the Registry. There MAY also be interface from the DPA to
a DRIP Information Agent (Section 4.4) as defined by the DIA.
4.2. Registry
The Registry component handles all the required DNS based
requirements of the DIME to function for DRIP. This includes the
registration and maintenance of various DNS Resource Records which
use the DRIP FQDNs (Section 7.2).
A standardized interface MUST be implemented for interactions with
the DPA (Section 4.1). This interface MAY be over HTTPS using JSON/
CBOR encoding or MAY use the Extensional Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
[RFC5730]. The specifications of either of these interfaces is out
of scope for this document.
There MAY be interface from the Registry to a DRIP Information Agent
(Section 4.4) as defined by the DIA.
4.3. Name Server (NS)
This may be very important here as we should not preclude a USS from
running his own Name Server but they are not DNS experts and will
need guidance or at least pointers to it to not mess it up. Such as
SOA and NS formats to allow delegation if as RAA.
Most of time is probably outsourced.
The interface of the Name Server to any component (nominally the
Registry) in a DIME is out of scope as typically they are
implementation specific.
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4.4. DRIP Information Agent (DIA)
The DIA is the main component handling requests for information from
entities outside of the DIME. Typically this is when an Observer
looks up a Session ID from an UA and gets pointed to the DIA via a
SVR RR to obtain information not available via DNS.
The information contained in the DIA is generally more oriented
around the Operator of a given UAS and is thus classified as
Personally Identifiable Information (PII). To protect the privacy of
an Operator of the UAS this information is not publicly accessible
and is only available behind policy driven differentiated access
mechanisms. As an example the Serial Number, under the FAA, is
classified as PII and can only be accessed by federal entities (such
as the FAA themselves).
For DRIP the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) ([RFC7480],
[RFC9082] and [RFC9083]) is the selected protocol to provide policy
driven differentiated access for queries of information.
A standard interface over HTTPS MUST be provided for clients to
access with JSON/CBOR encoding of objects being sent to the DIA.
There MUST also be a standardized interface for the DPA or Registry
to add, update or delete information into the DIA. Both of these
interfaces are out of scope for this document.
An interface defined by the Registration Data Directory Service
(RDDS) (Section 4.5) is also required as specified by the RDDS.
4.5. Registration Data Directory Service (RDDS)
This is the primary information database for the DIA. An interface
MUST be provided to the DIA but its specification is out of scope as
they are typically implementation specific.
5. Registration/Provisioning Process
The general process for a registering party is as follows:
1. Verify input Endorsement(s) from registering party
2. Check for collision of DET and HI
3. Populate Registry/Name Server with required/optional resource
records using the FQDN
4. Populate DIA/RDDS with PII and other info
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5. Generate and return required/optional Endorsements/Certificates
In the following subsections an abbreviated form of Section 4 using
component abbreviations is used to describe the flow of information.
The data elements being transmitted between entities is marked
accordingly in each figure for the specific examples.
5.1. Serial Number
Primarily registered to MRA's (Section 3.3.1) by the Manufacturers.
Could be also registered to CAA's (using their HDA functionality) as
part of Operator registration or to USS's in their capacity as HDAs.
In the later two cases no DNS RRs are made to protect the privacy of
the registering parties.
When the Serial Number is really an encoded DET the DET FQDN is used
to point to HIP and CERT RRs rather than the Serial Number FQDN.
Instead a CNAME is made between the Serial Number FQDN and the DET
FQDN. The same can still happen if the manufacturer chooses to use
their own Serial Number formatting (still within the specification of
[CTA2063A]) and create the CNAME back to a DET loaded into the
unmanned aircraft.
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+-------------------+
| Unmanned Aircraft |
+--o---o------------+
| ^
(a) | | (b)
| |
*******|***|*****************************
* | | DIME: MRA *
* | | *
* v | +----------+ *
* +--o---o--+ | | *
* | DPA o--------->o | *
* +----o----+ (d) | | *
* | | | *
* | (c) | DIA/RDDS | *
* v | | *
* +----o--------+ | | *
* | Registry/NS | | | *
* +-------------+ | | *
* +----------+ *
* *
*****************************************
(a) Serial Number, UA Information, UA Self-Endorsement
(b) Success Code, Endorsement: MRA on UA
(c) HIP RR, CERT RRs
(d) UA Information
Figure 3: Example DIME:MRA with Serial Number (DET) Registration
The unmanned aircraft, intending to use DRIP, generates a keypair,
DET and Self-Endorsement: UA using the RAA and HDA values specified
by the manufacturers DIME (running as an MRA). The DET is converted
into a Serial Number (per [drip-rid]) or the manufacturer creates
their own Serial Number.
The Serial Number, UA information and the Self-Endorsement: UA are
sent to the manufacturers DIME. The DIME validates the Self-
Endorsement and checks for DET and HI collisions in the Name Server/
DIA. A Broadcast Endorsement: DIME on UA is generated which is
provisioned into the aircraft for use when using the Serial Number as
its UAS ID. In the Name Server HIP RRs are created using the DET
FQDN while a CNAME points the Serial Number FQDN to the DET FQDN.
Note: Figure 3 is specific for a DET encoded Serial Number. The
Endorsements in (a) and (b) as well as RRs in (c) would not be
present for non-DET based Serial Numbers.
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5.2. Operator
Either by USS or CAA run HDAs. Regulation might require interaction
between them. An Operator can request that certain information
normally generated and provisioned into DNS be omitted due to privacy
concerns.
+----------+
| Operator |
+--o---o---+
| ^
(a) | | (b)
| |
*******|***|*****************************
* | | DIME: HDA *
* | | *
* v | +----------+ *
* +--o---o--+ | | *
* | DPA o--------->o | *
* +----o----+ (d) | | *
* | | | *
* | (c) | DIA/RDDS | *
* v | | *
* +----o--------+ | | *
* | Registry/NS | | | *
* +-------------+ | | *
* +----------+ *
* *
*****************************************
(a) Operator Information, Operator Self-Endorsement
(b) Success Code, Endorsement: HDA on Operator
(c) HIP RR, CERT RRs
(d) Operator Information
Figure 4: Example DIME:HDA with Operator (DET) Registration
The Operator generates a keypair and DET as specified in [drip-rid]
along with a self-signed endorsement (Self-Endorsement: Operator).
The RAA and HDA values used in the DET generation for the Operator
are found by referencing their selected DIME of choice (in Figure 4
an HDA).
The self-signed endorsement along with other relevant information
(such as Operator PII) is sent to the DIME over a secure channel.
The specification of this secure channel is out of scope for this
document.
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The DIME cross checks any personally identifiable information as
required. Self-Endorsement: Operator is verified. The DET and HI is
searched in the DIME DIA and Name Server to confirm that no
collisions occur. A new endorsement is generated (Endorsement: DIME
on Operator) and sent securely back to the Operator. Resource
Records for the HI and Endorsements are added to the DIME Registry/
Name Server.
With the receipt of Endorsement: DIME on Operator the registration of
the Operator is complete.
Note: (c) in Figure 4 MAY be requested by the Operator to be
omitted due to PII concerns.
5.3. Session ID
Session IDs are generally handled by HDAs, specifically RIDRs. In
Figure 5 the UAS comprises of an unmanned aircraft and a Ground
Control Station (GCS). Both parties are involved in the registration
process.
+---------+
| UAS |
+--o---o--+
| ^
(a) | | (b)
| |
*******|***|*****************************
* | | DIME: RIDR *
* | | *
* v | +----------+ *
* +--o---o--+ | | *
* | DPA o--------->o | *
* +----o----+ (d) | | *
* | | | *
* | (c) | DIA/RDDS | *
* v | | *
* +----o--------+ | | *
* | Registry/NS | | | *
* +-------------+ | | *
* +----------+ *
* *
*****************************************
(a) Mutual Endorsement: RIDR on GCS, Endorsement: GCS on UA, Session ID Information
(b) Success Code, Broadcast Endorsement: RIDR on UA, Endorsement: RIDR on UAS
(c) HIP RR, CERT RRs
(d) Session ID Information
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Figure 5: Example DIME:RIDR with Session ID (DET) Registration
Through mechanisms not specified in this document the Operator should
have methods (via the GCS) to instruct the unmanned aircraft onboard
systems to generate a keypair, DET and Self-Endorsement: UA. The
Self-Endorsement: UA is extracted by the Operator onto the GCS.
The GCS is already pre-provisioned and registered to the DIME with
its own keypair, DET, Self-Endorsement: GCS and Endorsement: RIDR on
GCS. The GCS creates a new Endorsement: GCS on UA and also creates
Mutual Endorsement: RIDR on GCS. These new endorsements along with
Session ID Information are sent to the DIME via a secure channel.
The DIME validates all the endorsements and checks for DET and HI
collisions in the Name Server/DIA using the proposed UA DET. A
Broadcast Endorsement: DIME on UA is generated. An Endorsement: RIDR
on UAS is generated using the Endorsement: GCS on UA. HIP and CERT
RRs are provisioned into the Registry/Name server. Both endorsements
are back to the GCS on a secure channel.
The GCS then injects the Broadcast Endorsement: RIDR on UA securely
into the unmanned aircraft. Endorsement: RIDR on GCS is securely
stored by the GCS.
Note: in Figure 5 the Session ID Information is expected to
contain the Serial Number along with other PII specific
information (such as UTM data) related to the Session ID.
5.3.1. UA Based
There MAY be some unmanned aircraft that have their own Internet
connectivity allowing them to register a Session ID themselves
without outside help from other devices such as a GCS. When such a
system is in use its imperative that the Operator has some method to
create the Endorsement: Operator on UA to send to the DIME. The
process and methods to perform this are out of scope for this
document but MUST be done in a secure fashion.
5.3.2. UAS Based
Most unmanned aircraft will not have their own Internet connectivity
but will have a connection to a GCS. Typically a GCS is an
application on a user device (such as smartphone) that allow the user
to fly their aircraft. For the Session ID registration the DIME MUST
be provided with an Endorsement: GCS on UA which implies there is
some mechanism extracting and inserting information from the unmanned
aircraft to the GCS. These methods MUST be secure but are out of
scope for this document.
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With this system it is also possible to have the GCS generate the DET
based Session ID and insert it securely into the unmanned aircraft
after registration is done. This is NOT RECOMMENDED as this
invalidates the objective of the asymmetric cryptography in the
underlying DET as the private key MAY get in the posession of another
entity other than the unmanned aircraft. See Section 11.2 for more
details.
5.4. Child DIME
TODO
6. Differentiated Access Process
High level explanation of differentiated access goals and
requirements.
7. DRIP in the Domain Name System
The individual DETs may be potentially too numerous (e.g., 60 - 600M)
and dynamic (e.g., new DETs every minute for some HDAs) to store in a
signed, DNS zone. The HDA SHOULD provide DNS service for its zone
and provide the DET detail response.
DNSSEC is strongly recommended (especially for RAA-level zones).
Frequency of updates, size of the zone, and registry policy may
impact its use.
Per [drip-arch] all public information is stored in the DNS to
satisfy REG-1 from [RFC9153]. CERT RRs (Section 7.3.3) contain
public Endorsements or X.509 Certificate relevant to a given Session
ID. SVR RRs (Section 7.3.5) point an Observer to a service to obtain
further information if they have and can prove duly constituted
authority.
7.1. Prefix to TLD Mapping
For DRIP, the prefix 2001:0030/28 is slated for DETs being used in
UAS. Other prefixes may be allocated by IANA in future for different
use cases that do not fit cleanly into an existing prefix.
IANA registry for this?
If so we could remove prefix from FQDN form...Stu would like this to
happen
7.2. DRIP Fully Qualified Domain Names
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7.2.1. DRIP Entity Tag
7.2.1.1. Forward Lookup
The DET has the following FQDN form:
{hash}.{oga_id}.{hda}.{raa}.{prefix}.hhit.arpa.
When building a DET FQDN the following two things must be done:
1. The RAA, HDA and OGA ID values MUST be converted from hexadecimal
to decimal form.
2. The FQDN must be built using the exploded (all padding present)
form of the IPv6 address.
Below is an example:
DET: 2001:0030:00a0:0145:a3ad:1952:0ad0:a69e
ID: a3ad:1952:0ad0:a69e
OGA: 5
HDA: 0014 = 20
RAA: 000a = 10
Prefix: 2001003
FQDN: a3ad19520ad0a69e.5.20.10.2001003.hhit.arpa.
Note: any of the fields in the FQDN could be CNAME'd to more human
readable interpretations. For example the DET FQDN
204.2001003.hhit.arpa. may have a CNAME to uas.faa.gov; if RAA 204
was delegated to the FAA.
7.2.1.2. Reverse Lookup
The DET reverse lookup should be a standard IPv6 reverse address in
ip6.arpa..
$ORIGIN 5.4.1.0.0.a.0.0.0.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.
e.9.6.a.0.d.a.0.2.5.9.1.d.a.3.a IN PTR
7.2.2. Serial Number
See Section 4.2 of [drip-rid] for how to encode DETs as Serial
Numbers.
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Serial Number: 8653FZ2T7B8RA85D19LX
ICAO Mfr Code: 8653
Length Code: F
ID: FZ2T7B8RA85D19LX
FQDN: Z2T7B8RA85D19LX.8653.mfr.hhit.arpa.
Serial Number pose a unique problem. If we explicitly only allow
HHITs be under the hhit.arpa. domain structure how do we standardize
the lookup of Serial Numbers? Perhaps to look up Serial Numbers one
must go to a different tree like mfr.icao.int.? We can have CNAMEs in
MRAs for this but they probably need the same TLD (hhit.arpa.) to be
found properly and these are clearly not HHITs.
7.3. Supported DNS Records
7.3.1. HIP
All DIMEs will use HIP RR [RFC8005] as the primary public source of
DET HIs. The DETs are encoded in an FQDN (Section 7.2.1) and are the
lookup key for the RR. DIMEs have their own DET associated with them
and their respective name server will hold a HIP RR that is pointed
to by their DET FQDN.
MRA (Section 3.3.1) and RIDR (Section 3.3.1.1) DIMEs will also have
HIP RRs for their registered parties (aircraft and operators
respectfully).
7.3.2. TLSA
This RR, [RFC6698], is mainly used to support DTLS deployments where
the DET is used (e.g. Network RID and the wider UTM system). The HI
is encoded using the SubjectPublicKeyInfo selector. DANE [RFC6698]
is for servers, DANCE [dane-clients] is for clients.
The TLSA RR MAY be used in place of the HIP RR, where to primary need
of the DET HI is for DTLS authentication. This DNS server side
optimization is for where the overhead of both RR is onerous. Thus
all clients that work with the HIP RR SHOULD be able to able to
extract the HI from the TLSA RR.
7.3.3. CERT
Endorsements can be placed into DNS in the CERT RRs [RFC4398]. An
exception to this is the Attestation Certificate made during Session
ID registration. This is as this particular certificate acts similar
to a car registration and should be held safe by the operator.
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Endorsements will be stored in Certificate Type OID Private (value
254) with a base OID of 1.3.6.1.4.1.6715.2 and further classified by
the Endorsement/Certificate Type and then Entities involved.
+=======================+===========+
| Endorsement Type | OID Value |
+=======================+===========+
| Self-Endorsement | 1 |
+-----------------------+-----------+
| Endorsement | 2 |
+-----------------------+-----------+
| Concise Endorsement | 3 |
+-----------------------+-----------+
| Mutual Endorsement | 4 |
+-----------------------+-----------+
| Link Endorsement | 5 |
+-----------------------+-----------+
| Broadcast Endorsement | 6 |
+-----------------------+-----------+
Table 1
+==============================+===========+
| Entity Type | OID Value |
+==============================+===========+
| Unmanned Aircraft (UA) | 1 |
+------------------------------+-----------+
| Ground Control Station (GCS) | 2 |
+------------------------------+-----------+
| Operator (OP) | 3 |
+------------------------------+-----------+
| HDA | 4 |
+------------------------------+-----------+
| RAA | 5 |
+------------------------------+-----------+
| Root | 6 |
+------------------------------+-----------+
Table 2
As an example the following OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.6715.2.6.4.1 would
decompose into: the base OID (1.3.6.1.4.1.6715.2), the Endorsement
Type (6: Broadcast Endorsement) and then the parties involved (4:
HDA, 1: UA)
Certificate Type X.509 as per PKIX (value 1) MAY be used to store
X.509 certificates as discussed in (Appendix B).
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Editor Note: This OID is an initial allocation under the IANA
Enterprise Number OID. It is expect that a general OID will be
allocated at some point.
7.3.4. NS
Used to interconnect entities
7.3.5. SVR
The SVR RR for DRIP always is populated at the "local" registry
level. That is an HDA's DNS would hold the SVR RR that points to
that HDAs private registry for all data it manages. This data
includes data being stored on its children.
The best example of this is RIDR (Section 3.3.1.1) would have a SVR
RR that points to a database that contains any extra information of a
Session ID it has registered. Another example is the MRA
(Section 3.3.1) has a SVR RR pointing to where the metadata of a UA
registered in the MRA can be located.
In all cases the server being pointed to MUST be protected using AAA,
such as using RDAP.
7.3.6. CNAME
Used for SN -> DET mapping and other cross TLD jumps?
8. Endorsements
Under DRIP Endorsements are defined in a JSON structure that can be
encode to CBOR or have their keys removed and be sent as a binary
blob. When the latter is used very specific forms are defined with
naming conventions to know the data fields and their lengths for
parsing.
The first subsection defines the structure of an Endorsement while
the remain subsections define specific forms that are commonly used.
The binary forms of the subsections can be found in Appendix A.
8.1. Endorsement Structure
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endorsement_struct = {
"identity": {
"hhit": "base16 HHIT/DET",
"hi_b16": "base16 HI",
"hi_b64": "base64 HI"
},
"evidence": [
endorsement_struct,
"base16 data",
"base64 data"
],
"scope": {
"vnb": 0,
"vna": 0
}
"signature": {
"sig_b16": "base16 Signature",
"sig_b64": "base64 Signature"
}
}
Figure 6: Endorsement JSON Structure
8.1.1. Identity
The identity section is where the main identity information of the
signer of the endorsement is found. This can be in many forms such
as the the Base16 encoded HHIT or the raw Host Identity (HI) in
either Base16 or Base64.
8.1.2. Evidence
The evidence section contain a list of the claims being asserted in
the endorsement. The list order after signing can not be tampered
with (resulting in different signatures) and is its content is
generally well defined in specific endorsements.
The content may be a blob in Base16/Base64 or be another endorsement
structure.
8.1.3. Scope
The scope section is more formally "the scope of validity of the
endorsement". The scope can come in various forms but MUST always
have a "valid not before" (vnb) and "valid not after" (vna)
timestamps.
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Other forms of the scope could for example be a 4-dimensional volume
definition. This could be in raw latitude, longitude, altitude pairs
or may be a URI pointing to scope information.
8.1.4. Signature
The signature section contain the signature data for the endorsement.
The signature itself MUST be in either Base16 or Base64 strings.
Other forms or data elements could also be present in the signature
section if specified in a specific endorsement.
8.2. Self-Endorsement (SE-x)
self_endorsement = {
"identity": {
"hhit": "base16 HHIT/DET"
},
"evidence": [
"base16 host identity"
],
"scope": {
"vnb": 0,
"vna": 0
}
"signature": {
"sig_b16": "base16 Signature"
}
}
Figure 7: Self-Endorsement JSON Structure
In a Self-Endorsement the identity is a Base16 HHIT/DET, the evidence
is a single element array containing the Base16 HI, and the signature
is in Base16.
8.3. Endorsement (E-x.y)
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endorsement = {
"identity": {
"hhit": "base16 HHIT/DET of X",
"hi_b16": "base16 HI of X"
},
"evidence": [
self_endorsement
],
"scope": {
"vnb": 0,
"vna": 0
}
"signature": {
"sig_b16": "base16 Signature of X"
}
}
Figure 8: Endorsement JSON Structure
8.4. Concise Endorsement (CE-x.y)
In constrained environments and when there is the guarantee of being
able to lookup the DETs to obtain HIs this endorsement can be used.
concise_endorsement = {
"identity": {
"hhit": "base16 HHIT/DET of X",
},
"evidence": [
"base16 HHIT/DET of Y"
],
"scope": {
"vnb": 0,
"vna": 0
}
"signature": {
"sig_b16": "base16 Signature of X"
}
}
Figure 9: Concise Endorsement JSON Structure
8.5. Mutual Endorsement (ME-x.y)
An endorsement that perform a sign over an existing Endorsement where
the signer is the second party of the embedded endorsement. The DET
of party Y is used as the identity.
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mutual_endorsement = {
"identity": {
"hhit": "base16 HHIT/DET of Y",
},
"evidence": [
endorsement
],
"scope": {
"vnb": 0,
"vna": 0
}
"signature": {
"sig_b16": "base16 Signature of Y"
}
}
Figure 10: Mutual Endorsement JSON Structure
8.6. Link Endorsement (LE-x.y)
An endorsement that perform a sign over an existing Concise
Endorsement where the signer is the second party of the embedded
endorsement. The DET of party Y is used as the identity.
link_endorsement = {
"identity": {
"hhit": "base16 HHIT/DET of Y",
},
"evidence": [
concise_endorsement
],
"scope": {
"vnb": 0,
"vna": 0
}
"signature": {
"sig_b16": "base16 Signature of Y"
}
}
Figure 11: Link Endorsement JSON Structure
8.7. Broadcast Endorsement (BE-x.y)
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broadcast_endorsement = {
"identity": {
"hhit": "base16 HHIT/DET of X",
},
"evidence": [
"base16 HHIT/DET of Y",
"base16 HI of Y
],
"scope": {
"vnb": 0,
"vna": 0
}
"signature": {
"sig_b16": "base16 Signature of X"
}
}
Figure 12: Broadcast Endorsement JSON Structure
This endorsement is required by DRIP Authentication Formats &
Protocols for Broadcast RID ([drip-auth]) to satisfy [RFC9153] GEN-1
and GEN-3 and is sent in its binary form (Appendix A.6).
8.8. Abbreviations & File Naming Conventions
The names of endorsements can become quite long and tedious to write
out. As such this section provides a guide to a somewhat
standardized way they are written in text.
8.8.1. In Text Abbreviation
In a long form the name of a particular endorsement can be written as
follows:
* Self-Endorsement: Unmanned Aircraft
* Endorsement: Operator on Aircraft or Endorsement: Operator,
Aircraft
When multiple entities are listed they can be separated by either on
or by ,. These long forms can be shortened:
* SE(Unmanned Aircraft) or SE-ua
* E(Operator, Unmanned Aircraft) or E-op.ua
Typical abbreviations for the entity can be used such as Unmanned
Aircraft being shorthanded to ua.
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8.8.2. File Naming
For file naming of various endorsements a similar format to the short
form is used:
* se-{hash of entity}
* e-{hash of entity x}_{hash of entity y}
Some examples of file names:
* se-79d8a404d48f2ef9.cert
* e-120b8f25b198c1e1_79d8a404d48f2ef9.cert
9. X.509 Certificates
9.1. Certificate Policy and Certificate Stores
X.509 certificates are optional for the DRIP entities covered in this
document. DRIP endpoint entities (EE) (i.e., UA, GCS, and Operators)
may benefit from having X.509 certificates. Most of these
certificates will be for their DET and some will be for other UAS
identities. To provide for these certificates, some of the other
entities covered in this document will also have certificates to
create and manage the necessary PKI structure.
Any Certificate Authority (CA) supporting DRIP entities SHOULD adhere
to the ICAO's International Aviation Trust Framework (IATF)
Certificate Policy [ICAO-IATF-CP-draft]. The CA(s) supporting this
CP MUST either be a part of the IATF Bridge PKI or part of the IATF
CA Trust List.
EEs may use their X.509 certificates, rather than their rawPublicKey
(i.e. HI) in authentication protocols (as not all may support
rawPublicKey identities). Some EE HI may not be 'worth' supporting
the overhead of X.509. Short lived DETs like those used for a single
operation or even for a day's operations may not benefit from X.509.
Creating then almost immediately revoking these certificates is a
considerable burden on all parts of the system. Even using a short
not AfterDate will completely mitigate the burden of managing these
certificates. That said, many EEs will benefit to offset the effort.
It may also be a regulator requirement to have these certificates.
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Typically an HDA either does or does not issue a certificate for all
its DETs. An RAA may specifically have some HDAs for DETs that do
not want/need certificates and other HDAs for DETs that do need them.
These types of HDAs could be managed by a single entity thus
providing both environments for its customers.
It is recommended that DRIP X.509 certificates be stored as DNS TLSA
Resource Records. This not only generally improves certificate
lookups, but also enables use of DANE [RFC6698] for the various
servers in the UTM and particularly DRIP registry environment and
DANCE [dane-clients] for EEs (e.g. [drip-secure-nrid-c2]). All DRIP
certificates MUST be available via RDAP. LDAP/OCSP access for other
UTM and ICAO uses SHOULD also be provided.
9.2. Certificate Management
(mostly TBD still)
PKIX standard X.509 issuance practices should be used. The
certificate request SHOULD be included in the DET registration
request. A successful DET registration then MUST include certificate
creation, store, and return to the DET registrant.
Certificate revocation will parallel DET revocation. TLSA RR MUST be
deleted from DNS and RDAP, LDAP, and OCSP return revoked responses.
CRLs SHOULD be maintained per the CP.
Details of this are left out, as there are a number of approaches and
further research and experience will be needed.
9.3. Examples
TBD
9.4. Alternative Certificate Encoding
(CBOR encoded certs here. TBD)
10. IANA Considerations
TODO: requesting hhit.arpa
10.1. IANA DRIP Registry
This document requests a two new subregistries for Endorsement Type
and Entity Type under the DRIP registry
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-drip-rid-
28#section-8.2).
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DRIP Endorsement Type: This 8-bit valued subregistry is for
Endorsement Types to be used in OID's for CERT Resource Records.
Future additions to this subregistry are to be made through Expert
Review (Section 4.5 of [RFC8126]). The following values are
defined:
| Endorsement Type | Value |
| ----------------------- | --------- |
| Self-Endorsement | 1 |
| Endorsement | 2 |
| Concise Endorsement | 3 |
| Mutual Endorsement | 4 |
| Link Endorsement | 5 |
| Broadcast Endorsement | 6 |
DRIP Entity Type: This 8-bit valued subregistry is for Entity Types
to be used in OID's for CERT Resource Records. Future additions
to this subregistry are to be made through Expert Review
(Section 4.5 of [RFC8126]). The following values are defined:
| Entity Type | Value |
| ---------------------------- | --------- |
| Unmanned Aircraft (UA) | 1 |
| Ground Control Station (GCS) | 2 |
| Operator (OP) | 3 |
| HDA | 4 |
| RAA | 5 |
| Root | 6 |
11. Security Considerations
11.1. Key Rollover & Federation
During key rollover the DIME MUST inform all children and parents of
the change - using best standard practices of a key rollover. At
time of writing this is signing over the new key with the previous
key in a secure fashion and it being validated by others before
changing any links (in DRIPs case the NS RRs in the parent registry).
A DET has a natural ability for a single DIME to hold different
cryptographic identities under the same HID values. This is due to
the lower 64-bits of the DET being a hash of the public key and the
HID of the DET being generated. As such during key rollover, only
the lower 64-bits would change and a check for a collision would be
required.
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This attribute of the DET to have different identities could also
allow for a single registry to be "federated" across them if they
share the same HID value. This method of deployment has not been
thoroughly studied at this time.
11.2. DET Generation
Under the FAA [NPRM], it is expecting that IDs for UAS are assigned
by the UTM and are generally one-time use. The methods for this
however are unspecified leaving two options.
Option 1:
The entity generates its own DET, discovering and using the RAA
and HDA for the target registry. The method for discovering a
registry's RAA and HDA is out of scope here. This allows for the
device to generate an DET to send to the registry to be accepted
(thus generating the required Self-Endorsement) or denied.
Option 2:
The entity sends to the registry its HI for it to be hashed and
result in the DET. The registry would then either accept
(returning the DET to the device) or deny this pairing.
Keypairs are expected to be generated on the device hardware it will
be used on. Due to hardware limitations and connectivity it is
acceptable, though not recommended, under DRIP to generate keypairs
for the Aircraft on Operator devices and later securely inject them
into the Aircraft. The methods to securely inject and store keypair
information in a "secure element" of the Aircraft is out of scope of
this document.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[drip-arch]
Card, S. W., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., Zhao, S.,
and A. Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol
(DRIP) Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-drip-arch-29, 16 August 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-arch-
29.txt>.
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[drip-rid] Moskowitz, R., Card, S. W., Wiethuechter, A., and A.
Gurtov, "UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-drip-uas-rid-01, 9 September 2020,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-uas-rid-
01.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9153] Card, S., Ed., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A.
Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)
Requirements and Terminology", RFC 9153,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9153, February 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9153>.
12.2. Informative References
[CTA2063A] "ANSI/CTA 2063-A Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Numbers",
September 2019, <https://shop.cta.tech/products/small-
unmanned-aerial-systems-serial-numbers>.
[dane-clients]
Huque, S., Dukhovni, V., and A. Wilson, "TLS Client
Authentication via DANE TLSA records", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dance-client-auth-00, 24 March
2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-dance-
client-auth-00.txt>.
[drip-auth]
Wiethuechter, A., Card, S. W., and R. Moskowitz, "DRIP
Entity Tag Authentication Formats & Protocols for
Broadcast Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-drip-auth-21, 1 September 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-auth-
21.txt>.
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[drip-secure-nrid-c2]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S. W., Wiethuechter, A., and A.
Gurtov, "Secure UAS Network RID and C2 Transport", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-drip-secure-
nrid-c2-11, 23 July 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-moskowitz-drip-
secure-nrid-c2-11.txt>.
[NPRM] "Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019.
[RFC4398] Josefsson, S., "Storing Certificates in the Domain Name
System (DNS)", RFC 4398, DOI 10.17487/RFC4398, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4398>.
[RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5730>.
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.
[RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 7480, DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>.
[RFC8005] Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name
System (DNS) Extension", RFC 8005, DOI 10.17487/RFC8005,
October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8005>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC9082] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", STD 95, RFC 9082,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9082, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9082>.
[RFC9083] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 9083, DOI 10.17487/RFC9083, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9083>.
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Appendix A. Binary Endorsements
A.1. Self-Endorsement (SE-x)
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| DRIP |
| Entity Tag |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| Host Identity |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Valid Not Before |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Valid Not After |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
Figure 13: Binary Self-Endorsement (Length: 120-bytes)
A.2. Endorsement (E-x.y)
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| DRIP |
| Entity Tag of X |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| Host Identity of X |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
. .
. SE-y .
. .
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Valid Not Before by X |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Valid Not After by X |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Signature by X |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
Figure 14: Binary Endorsement (Length: 240-bytes
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A.3. Concise Endorsement (CE-x.y)
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| DRIP |
| Entity Tag of X |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| DRIP |
| Entity Tag of Y |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Valid Not Before by X |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Valid Not After by X |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Signature by X |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
Figure 15: Binary Concise Endorsement (Length: 104-bytes
A.4. Mutual Endorsement (ME-x.y)
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| DRIP |
| Entity Tag of Y |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
. .
. E-xy .
. .
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Valid Not Before by Y |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Valid Not After by Y |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Signature by Y |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
Figure 16: Binary Mutual Endorsement (Length: 328-bytes
A.5. Link Endorsement (LE-x.y)
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| DRIP |
| Entity Tag of Y |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
. .
. CA-xy .
. .
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Valid Not Before by Y |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Valid Not After by Y |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Signature by Y |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
Figure 17: DRIP Link Endorsement (Length: 192-bytes)
A.6. Broadcast Endorsement (BE-x.y)
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| DRIP |
| Entity Tag of X |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| DRIP |
| Entity Tag of Y |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| Host Identity of Y |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Valid Not Before by X |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Valid Not After by X |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Signature by X |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
Figure 18: DRIP Broadcast Endorsement (Length: 136-bytes)
Authors' Addresses
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Adam Wiethuechter
AX Enterprize, LLC
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America
Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com
Stuart Card
AX Enterprize, LLC
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America
Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com
Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI 48237
United States of America
Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com
Jim Reid
RTFM llp
St Andrews House
382 Hillington Road, Glasgow Scotland
G51 4BL
United Kingdom
Email: jim@rfc1035.com
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