Internet DRAFT - draft-wiethuechter-drip-identity-claims
draft-wiethuechter-drip-identity-claims
drip Working Group A. Wiethuechter
Internet-Draft S. Card
Intended status: Standards Track AX Enterprize, LLC
Expires: 6 May 2021 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
2 November 2020
DRIP Identity Claims
draft-wiethuechter-drip-identity-claims-03
Abstract
This document describes the Identity Proofs (in the form of Claims,
Certificates and Attestations) for use in various Drone Remote ID
Protocols (DRIP) and the wider Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM)
system.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates . . . 2
1.1.1. Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2. Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.3. Attestations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.4. Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Required Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. DRIP Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Certificate: X on X (Cxx Form) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. Certificate: X on X (Short Form) . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Attestation: X on Y (Axy Form) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1. Attestation: X on Y (Short Form) . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.2. Attestation: X on Y (Offline Form) . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Timestamps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. HHIT Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4. Operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.5. Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5.1. Standard Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5.2. Operator Assisted Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.5.3. Initial Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction
DRIP Proofs are the backbone of trust in DRIP UAS RID, consisting of
a chain of special certificates/attestations that results in a
something useful in Broadcast RID. Some of the certificates are
stored in and are generated by the Registries (defined in
[hhit-registries]) and allow a user to confirm the trustworthiness of
an Unmanned Aircraft (herein referred to as Aircraft) even in the
scenario that the Observer is disconnected from the Internet.
1.1. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates
The authors wish to make a clear distinction on exactly what these
terms mean in the context of DRIP.
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
This is due to the term "certificate" having significant technologic
and legal baggage associated with it, specifically around X.509
certificates. These type of certificates and Public Key
Infrastructure invokes more legal and public policy considerations
than probably any other electronic communication sector. It emerged
as a governmental platform for trusted identity management and was
pursued in intergovernmental bodies with links into treaty
instruments.
As such much discussion has been made around the terms being used.
1.1.1. Claims
For DRIP claims are used in the form of a predicate (X is Y, X has
property Y, and most importantly X owns Y). The basic form of a
claim is an entity using a HHIT as an identifier in the DRIP UAS
system.
1.1.2. Assertions
Assertions, under DRIP, are defined as being a set of one or more
claims. This definition is borrowed from JWT/CWT. An HHIT in of
itself is a set of assertions. First that the identifier is unique
and is a handle to an asymmetric keypair owned by the entity and that
it also is part of the given registry (specified by the HID).
1.1.3. Attestations
An attestation is a signed claim. The signee may be the claimant
themselves or a third party. Under DRIP this is normally used when a
set of entities asserts a relationship between them along with other
information.
1.1.4. Certificates
Certificates in DRIP have a narrow definition of being signed
exclusively by a third party and are only over identities.
2. Terminology
2.1. Required Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
2.2. Definitions
See [drip-requirements] for common DRIP terms.
HDA: Hierarchial HIT Domain Authority. The 16 bit field identifying
the HIT Domain Authority under a RAA.
HID: Hierarchy ID. The 32 bit field providing the HIT Hierarchy ID.
RAA: Registered Assigning Authority. The 16 bit field identifying
the Hierarchical HIT Assigning Authority.
3. DRIP Proofs
The DRIP Proofs is a set of custom structures to be used in the USS/
UTM system. They are created during the provision of an Aircraft and
are tied to the UAS ID (expected to be a HHIT, see [drip-rid] for
details).
These structures when chained together can create a root of trust all
the way back to the manufacturer itself during the initial production
of a given Aircraft. The chain can also be used by authorized
entities to trace an Aircraft through all owners and flights in the
Aircraft's lifetime (something of interest to ICAO).
The rest of this section will define the formats of proofs in DRIP as
forms of certificates and attestations and their common uses.
3.1. Certificate: X on X (Cxx Form)
The Cxx Form of DRIP Proofs is a self-signed certificate (by an
entity known as 'X') staking an unverified claim on a HHIT/HI pairing
until an expiration date/time.
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| Hierarchical |
| Host Identity Tag |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| Host |
| Identity |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Expiration Timestamp |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
Figure 1: Certificate: X on X
Certificates of the Cxx Form are 116 bytes. The offset of the
Expiration Timestamp SHOULD be of significant length (possibly
years).
These are 5 (five) Cxx Certificates that can be created in a standard
DRIP UAS RID system: Manufacturer on Manufacturer, RAA on RAA, HDA on
HDA (Registry on Registry), Operator on Operator, and Aircraft on
Aircraft. This is not an exhaustive list as any entity with the DRIP
UAS system SHOULD have a Cxx for itself.
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
3.1.1. Certificate: X on X (Short Form)
A smaller version of Certificate: X on X exists where the Host
Identity is removed allowing a claim to be made in 84 bytes.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| Hierarchical |
| Host Identity Tag |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Expiration Timestamp |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
Figure 2: Certificate: X on X (Short Form)
3.2. Attestation: X on Y (Axy Form)
This DRIP Proof is an attestation where Entity X asserts trust in the
binding claimed by Entity Y (in Cyy) and signs this asserting with a
timestamp and an expiration of when the binding is no longer asserted
by Entity X.
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
. .
. Cxx .
. .
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
. .
. Cyy .
. .
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Timestamp |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Expiration Timestamp |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
Figure 3: Attestation: X on Y
Axy Form wraps both self-signed certificates of the entities and is
signed by Entity X. Two timestamps, one taken at the time of signing
and one as an expiration time are used to set boundaries to the
assertion. Care should be given to how far into the future the
Expiration Timestamp is set, but is left up to system policy.
Most attestations of this form have a length of 304 bytes.
Attestation: Registry on Operator on Aircraft is unique in that is
680 bytes long, binding of two Axy forms (in this specific case
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
Attestation: Registry on Operator with Attestation: Operator on
Aircraft).
3.2.1. Attestation: X on Y (Short Form)
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| Hierarchical Host Identity Tag |
| of Entity X |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
. .
. Cyy .
. .
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Expiration Timestamp |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
Figure 4: Attestation: X on Y (Short Form)
The short form of the Axy this attestation is 200 bytes long and is
designed to fit inside the framing of the ASTM F3411 Authentication
Message. The HHIT of Entity X is used in place of the full Cxx (see
Section 5 for comments). The timestamp is removed and only an
expiration timestamp is present.
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
During creation the Expiration Timestamp MUST be no later than the
Expiration Timestamp found in Cyy.
3.2.2. Attestation: X on Y (Offline Form)
A special attestation that is the basis for a certificate finalized
onboard the aircraft during flight. It is used in Broadcast RID to
provide the trustworthiness of the Aircraft without the need of the
Observer to be connected to the Internet.
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| Hierarchical Host Identity Tag |
| of Entity X |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| Hierarchical Host Identity Tag |
| of Entity Y |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| Host Identity of Entity Y |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| Expiration Timestamp |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| Signature |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
Figure 5: Attestation: X on Y (Offline Form)
The signature is generated using Entity X's keypair.
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
3.3. Timestamps
Timestamps MAY be the standard UNIX time or a protocol specific
timestamp, to avoid programming complexities. For example [F3411-19]
uses a 00:00:00 01/01/2019 offset. When a Expiration Timestamp is
required a desired offset is added, setting the timestamp into the
future. The amount of offset for specific timestamps is left to best
practice.
3.4. Signatures
Signatures are ALWAYS taken over the preceding fields in the
certificate/attestation. For DRIP the EdDSA25519 algorithm from
[RFC8032] is used.
4. Provisioning
Under DRIP UAS RID a special provisioning procedure is required to
properly generate and distribute the certificates and attestations to
all parties in the USS/UTM ecosystem using DRIP RID.
Keypairs are expected to be generated on the device hardware it will
be used on. Due to hardware limitations (see Section 5) and
connectivity it is acceptable under DRIP RID to generate keypairs for
the Aircraft on Operator devices and later securely inject them into
the Aircraft (as defined in Section 4.5.2). The methods to securely
inject and store keypair information in a "secure element" of the
Aircraft is out of scope of this document.
4.1. HHIT Delegation
Under the FAA [NPRM], it is expecting that IDs for UAS are assigned
by the UTM and are generally one-time use. The methods for this
however are unspecified leaving two options.
1 The entity generates its own HHIT, discovering and using thr RAA
and HDA for the target Registry. The method for discovering a
Registry's RAA and HDA is out of scope here. This allows for the
device to generate an HHIT to send to the Registry to be accepted
(thus generating the required Host Identity Claim) or denied.
2 The entity sends to the Registry its HI for it to be hashed and
result in the HHIT. The Registry would then either accept
(returning the HHIT to the device) or deny this pairing.
In either case the Registry must decide on if the HI/HHIT pairing is
valid. This in its simplest form is checking the current Registry
for a collision on the HHIT.
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
Upon accepting a HI/HHIT pair the Registry MUST populate the required
the DNS serving the HDA with the HIP RR and other relevant RR types
(such as TXT and CERT). The Registry MUST also generate the
appropriate Host Identity Claim for the given operation.
If the Registry denied the HI/HHIT pair, because there was a HHIT
collision or any other reason, the Registry MUST signal back to the
device being provisioned that a new HI needs to be generated.
4.2. Manufacturer
+--------------+ Ca0a0 +-----------------+
| Manufacturer | <--------> | Manufacturer CA |
+--------------+ Ama0 +-----------------+
^ |
| |
| |
Ca0a0 | | Ama0
| |
| v
+----------+
| Aircraft |
+----------+
During the initial configuration and production at the factory the
Aircraft MUST be configured to have a serial number. ASTM defines
this to be an ANSI/CTA-2063A. Under DRIP a HHIT can be encoded as
such to be able to convert back and forth between them. This is out
of scope for this document.
Under DRIP the Manufacturer SHOULD be using HHITs and have their own
keypair and Cxx (Certificate: Manufacturer on Manufacturer). (Ed.
Note: some words on aircraft keypair and certs here?).
Certificate: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft 0 (Ca0a0) is extracted by the
manufacturer and send to their Certificate Authority (CA) to be
verified and added. A resulting certificate (Attestation:
Manufacturer on Aircraft 0) SHOULD be a DRIP Attestation in the Axy
Form - however this could be a X.509 certificate binding the serial
number to the manufacturer.
4.3. Registry
TODO
DRIP UAS RID defines two levels of hierarchy maintained by the
Registration Assigning Authority (RAA) and HHIT Domain Authority
(HDA). The authors anticipate that an RAA is owned and operated by a
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
regional CAA (or a delegated party by an CAA in a specific airspace
region) with HDAs being contracted out. As such a chain of trust for
registries is required to ensure trustworthiness is not compromised.
More information on the registries can be found in [hhit-registries].
Both the RAA and HDA generate their own keypairs and self-signed
certificates (Certificate: RAA on RAA and Certificate: HDA on HDA
respectively). The HDA sends to the RAA its self-signed certificate
to be added into the RAA DNS.
The RAA confirms the certificate received is valid and that no HHIT
collisions occur before added a HIP RR to its DNS for the new HDA.
An Attestation: RAA on HDA is sent as a confirmation that
provisioning was successful.
The HDA is now a valid "Registry" and uses its keypair and
Certificate: HDA on HDA with all provisioning requests from
downstream.
4.4. Operator
+----------+ +---------+
| Registry | ---------> | HDA DNS |
+----------+ [HIP RR] +---------+
^ |
| |
| |
Coo | | Aro
| |
| v
+----------+
| Operator |
+----------+
The Operator generates a keypair and HHIT as specified in DRIP UAS
RID. A self-signed certificate (Certificate: Operator on Operator)
is generated and sent to the desired Registry (HDA). Other relevant
information and possibly personally identifiable information needed
may also be required to be sent to the Registry (all over a secure
channel - the method of which is out of scope for this document).
The Registry cross checks any personally identifiable information as
required. Certificate: Operator on Operator is verified (both using
the expiration timestamp and signature). The HHIT is searched in the
Registries database to confirm that no collision occurs. A new
attestation is generated (Attestation: Registry on Operator) and sent
securely back to the Operator. Optionally the HHIT/HI pairing can be
added to the Registries DNS in to form of a HIP Resource Record (RR).
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
Other RRs, such as CERT and TXT, may also be used to hold public
information.
With the receipt of Attestation: Registry on Operator the
provisioning of an Operator is complete.
4.5. Aircraft
4.5.1. Standard Provisioning
Under standard provisioning the Aircraft has its own connectivity to
the Registry, the method which is out of scope for this document.
+----------+
| Registry |
+----------+
^
|
|
| Cro, CoaN
|
|
+----------+ +----------+
| Operator | <--------------------- | Aircraft |
+----------+ Ca0aN +----------+
Figure 6: Standard Provision: Step 1
Through mechanisms not specified in this document the Aircraft should
have methods to instruct the Aircrafts onboard systems to generate a
keypair and certificate. This certificate is chained to the factory
provisioned certificate (Certificate: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft 0).
This new attestation (Attestation: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft N) is
securely extracted by the Operator.
With Attestation: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft N the sub certificate
(Certificate: Aircraft N on Aircraft N) is used by the Operator to
generate Attestation: Operator on Aircraft N. This along with
Attestation: Registry on Operator is sent to the Registry.
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
+----------+
| Registry |
+----------+
|
|
|
| Token
|
v
+----------+ +----------+
| Operator | ---------------------> | Aircraft |
+----------+ Token +----------+
Figure 7: Standard Provision: Step 2
On the Registry, Attestation: Registry on Operator is verified and
used as confirmation that the Operator is already registered.
Attestation: Operator on Aircraft N also undergoes a validation check
and used to generate a token to return to the Operator to continue
provisioning.
Upon receipt of this token, the Operator injects it into the Aircraft
and its used to form a secure connection to the Registry. The
Aircraft then sends Attestation: Manufacturer on Aircraft 0 and
Attestation: Aircraft 0 to Aircraft N.
+---------+
| HDA DNS |
+---------+
^
|
| HIP RR
|
|
|
+----------+ <----------------------------+
| Registry | |
+----------+ ------------------------+ |
| | |
| | | Token,
| CroaN CraN | | Cma0, Ca0aN
| | |
| | |
v v |
+----------+ +----------+
| Operator | | Aircraft |
+----------+ +----------+
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
Figure 8: Standard Provision: Step 3
The Registry uses Attestation: Manufacturer on Aircraft 0 (with an
external database if supported) to confirm the validity of the
Aircraft. Attestation: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft N is correlated with
Attestation: Operator on Aircraft N and Attestation: Manufacturer on
Aircraft 0 to see the chain of ownership. The new HHIT tied to
Aircraft N is then checked for collisions in the HDA. With the
information the Registry generates two certificates: Attestation:
Registry on Operator on Aircraft N and Attestation: Registry on
Aircraft N (Offline Form). A HIP RR (and other RR types as needed)
are generated and inserted into the HDA.
Attestation: Registry on Operator on Aircraft N is sent via a secure
channel back to the Operator to be stored. Attestation: Registry on
Aircraft N (Offline Form) is sent to the Aircraft to be used in
Broadcast RID.
4.5.2. Operator Assisted Provisioning
This provisioning scheme is for when the Aircraft is unable to
connect to the Registry itself or does not have the hardware required
to generate keypairs and certificates.
+----------+
| Registry |
+----------+
+----------+ +----------+
| Operator | ---------------------> | Aircraft |
+----------+ aN, CaNaN +----------+
Figure 9: Operator Assisted Provision: Step 1
To start the Operator generates on behalf of the Aircraft a new
keypair and Certificate: Aircraft N on Aircraft N. This keypair and
certificate are injected into the Aircraft for it to generate
Attestation: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft N. After injecting the keypair
and certificate, the Operator MUST destroy all copies of the keypair.
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
+----------+
| Registry |
+----------+
^
|
|
| Cro, Cma0, Ca0aN, CoaN
|
|
+----------+ +----------+
| Operator | <--------------------- | Aircraft |
+----------+ Cma0, Ca0aN +----------+
Figure 10: Operator Assisted Provision: Step 2
Attestation: Manufacturer on Aircraft 0 and Attestation: Aircraft 0
on Aircraft N is extracted by the Operator and the following data
items are sent to the Registry; Attestation: Registry on Operator,
Attestation: Manufacturer on Aircraft 0, Attestation: Aircraft 0 on
Aircraft N, Attestation: Operator on Aircraft N.
+----------+ +---------+
| Registry | ---------> | HDA DNS |
+----------+ HIP RR +---------+
|
|
|
| CroaN, CraN
|
v
+----------+ +----------+
| Operator | ---------------------> | Aircraft |
+----------+ CraN +----------+
Figure 11: Operator Assisted Provision: Step 3
On the Registry validation checks are done on all attestations as per
the previous sections. Once complete then the Registry checks for a
HHIT collision, adding to the HDA if clear and generates Attestation:
Registry on Operator on Aircraft N and Attestation: Registry on
Aircraft N (Offline Form). Both are sent back to the Operator.
The Operator securely inject Attestation: Registry on Aircraft N
(Offline Form) and securely stores Attestation: Registry on Operator
on Aircraft N.
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
4.5.3. Initial Provisioning
A special form of provisioning is used when the Aircraft is first
sold to an Operator. Instead of generating a new keypair, the built
in keypair and certificate done by the Manufacturer is used to
provision and register the aircraft to the owner.
For this either Standard or Operator Assisted methods can be used.
5. Security Considerations
A major consideration is the optimization done in Attestation: X on Y
(Short Form) to get its length down to 200 bytes. The truncation of
Certificate: HDA on HDA down to just its HHIT is one that could be
used against the system to act as a false Registry. For this to
occur an attacker would need to find a hash collision on that
Registry HHIT and then manage to spoof all of DNS being used in the
system.
The authors believe that the probability of such an attack is low
when Registry operators are using best practices in security. If
such an attack can occur (especially in the time frame of "one-time
use IDs") then there are more serious issues present in the system.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[F3411-19] "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking",
February 2020.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
6.2. Informative References
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
[drip-requirements]
Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A. Gurtov,
"Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)
Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-drip-reqs-06, 1 November 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/
internet-drafts/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-06.txt>.
[drip-rid] Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-drip-uas-rid-01, 9 September 2020,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-drip-uas-
rid-01.txt>.
[hhit-registries]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Hierarchical HIT Registries", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries-02, 9 March
2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries-02.txt>.
[NPRM] "Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019.
Authors' Addresses
Adam Wiethuechter
AX Enterprize, LLC
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America
Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com
Stuart Card
AX Enterprize, LLC
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America
Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com
Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI 48237
United States of America
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft identity-claims November 2020
Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 6 May 2021 [Page 20]
