Internet DRAFT - draft-williams-websec-session-continue-prob
draft-williams-websec-session-continue-prob
Network Working Group N. Williams
Internet-Draft Cryptonector
Intended status: Informational January 1, 2013
Expires: July 5, 2013
Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) Session Continuation: Problem
Statement
draft-williams-websec-session-continue-prob-00
Abstract
One of the most often talked about problems in web security is
"cookies". Web cookies are a method of associating requests with
"sessions" that may have been authenticated somehow. Cookies are a
form of bearer token that leave much to be desired. This document
describes the session "continuation" problem for the HyperText
Transport Protocol (HTTP).
Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 5, 2013.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Statelessness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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1. Introduction
Today most web applications use "cookies" to associate HTTP requests
with "sessions". A "session" is a set of related HTTP requests (and
responses), where the relation is to some request(s) that created the
session. Some sessions are created by the act of authenticating a
user, in which case the primary goal of "sessions" is to avoid having
to re-authenticate the user on every request. Other times a session
is created when a request is received that is not associated with any
session, in which case the primary purpose of "sessions" may be to
provide a pseudonymous identifier for an otherwise anonymous user.
We call the mechanisms by which requests are strung into sessions
"session continuation".
"Cookies" are server-assigned bearer tokens - nothing more, nothing
less, though some cookies are used just to store things like
"shopping cart" state. A bearer token is an octet blob which can be
presented as-is, possibly repeatedly, to authenticate a user to some
party; mere possession of the bearer token is sufficient to act on
the user's behalf to at least one service. As such they are
susceptible to theft via passive attacks (eavesdropping) if not
protected in some other way (e.g., by using TLS), or via active
attacks such as BEAST and CRIME
[http://www.xors.me/?attachment_id=3727], as well as to leakage in
various ways [XXX expand].
We would like a session continuation mechanism to replace or augment
cookies that has better security semantics than bearer tokens. In
particular we would like a system that is not susceptible to theft
via active attacks like BEAST and CRIME. We believe that such a
scheme should use cryptographic algorithms and cryptographic session
keys, and should be amenable to being keyed by HTTP- and web-
authentication mechanisms. A new session continuation mechanism
should be suitable for use in web and non-web HTTP applications, and
should work even for unauthenticated sessions.
1.1. Motivation
The motivation for this document and the related session continuation
protocol [I-D.draft-williams-websec-session-continue-proto] document
is as follows. We want:
o A variable authentication token instead of (or in addition to) web
cookies, for resistance to BEAST, CRIME, and other adaptive chosen
plaintext active attacks on TLS.
o The ability to explicitly logout and destroy all session state
even if the session has been compromised, assuming there is no Man
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In The Browser (MITB).
o The ability to manage sessions.
o The ability to negotiate replay protection.
o Cryptographic binding ("channel binding" [RFC5056]) to the lower
transport layer (TLS, where available).
o Cryptographic binding to the user authentication mechanisms (where
the authentication mechanism can export a secret value).
o The ability to use HTTP/Negotiate [RFC4559] in such a way that a)
new HTTP(S) connections need not result in re-authentication, b)
does not strobgly bind requests in a single HTTP connection to the
HTTP/Negotiate authentication that precedes them.
1.2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. Requirements
Any session continuation scheme to replace or augment cookies must
provide the following functionality:
1. Support for authenticated and unauthenticated sessions alike.
2. Support for http: and https: both.
3. Session continuation must be possible to implement without
keeping state on the server side (see below), and it must be
possible to keep some state on the server and some on the
client.
4. Resistance to active attacks on https. [NOTE: This should
probably NOT be a requirement. Instead we should be happy to
note where a proposed protocol provides this.]
5. Session continuation must be expressed via HTTP headers.
6. Session continuation header values must be cryptographically
difficult for attackers to spoof, and servers must be able to
validate these values.
7. Session continuation header values used with TLS must be
cryptographically distinct from those used without TLS such that
no such values taken from HTTP requests sent without TLS can be
used in HTTP requests with TLS.
8. Session continuation must provide protection against man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks when using TLS. (This is important when
using anonymous Diffie-Hellman cipher suites for TLS, as well as
when using server certificates from low-value Public Key
Infrastructures (PKI).
9. Must support explicit session termination ("logout"), initiated
by either party, client or server. Once a session is logged out
there should be no way to use it again, even if any session keys
are compromised. Note that this is not a deployment
requirement, just a protocol requirement; a fully stateless
deployment may not be able to implement faithful logout.
10. Must work across all types of proxies. Proxies that can modify
the plaintext HTTP requests and responses can (but should not)
interfere with any session continuation protocol.
11. Sessions should be tied to "origins"; multi-origin sessions
(sharing sessions across servers) are allowed, but there are
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user interface considerations.
[[anchor1: Can you move a session from one server to another? No,
probably not. Servers can share sessions, so we need to at least be
able to scope sessions to sets of servers or DNS sub-domains. This
appears to require that sessions have names. Once we have proper
session continuation we may well end up needing a mechanism by which
to authenticate to a service as a user of a given session on a
foreign service that is "friends" with the first.]]
Recommendations:
1. Session continuation SHOULD use proof-of-possession of secret
session key(s).
2. Session continuation header values SHOULD include a
cryptographically-secure value (indistinguishable from random)
that can be validated by the server and is hard for attackers to
guess.
3. Session continuation header values should be salted with a nonce
to defeate BEAST- and CRIME-style active attacks.
2.1. Statelessness
Session continuation protocols for HTTP MUST allow for stateless
implementation on the server side, at least when TLS is used.
Statelessness is not a requirement of deployments; implementations
SHOULD support both, stateful and stateless servers. This generally
means that any state must be encrypted and encoded into a session
state cookie that is re-sent by the client to the server on every
request. The server, of course, must be the one to assign such
state, and it must use an encryption key known only by the server.
Server-side statelessness is NOT REQUIRED in actual deployments, but
the ability to implement session continuation in a stateless fashion
on the server side is REQUIRED.
Note that statelessness implies that there is no way to implement
replay protection. In the case of session continuation with TLS this
is not a concern because TLS itself protects against replays. But
when session continuation is used without TLS then statelessness
really does mean that there can be no replay protection (of course,
this is also thus with web cookies). Therefore servers that require
replay protection must either require the use of TLS or must use
stateful sessions.
Note also that statelessness makes session logout a no-op on the
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server-side, which means that a compromised session can continue to
be used even after a client attempts to logout. A session
continuation protocol MUST allow for storing some state on the
server, and some on the client, allowing deployments where the only
state stored is the existence of a session.
Probabilistic data structures (e.g., Bloom filters) MAY be used to
record logouts. This may require the ability to expire and refresh
sessions to render the logout system scalable. In other words, HTTP
responses MUST be allowed to replace session server state stored on
the client side.
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3. IANA Considerations
This document does not specify any protocols and has no IANA
considerations.
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4. Security Considerations
This document does not specify any protocols and is Informational.
There are, however, few security considerations to document here.
We seek to improve security on the web (as well as for non-web HTTP
applications) by:
1. reducing the need for expensive HTTP authentication exchanges
(e.g., HTTP/Negotiate), thereby removing an obstacle to their
use;
2. reducing exposure to session credentials theft via attacks on TLS
such as BEAST and CRIME;
3. reducing exposure to session credentials theft when not using
TLS;
4. introducing a replacement for / augmentation of cookies that will
give browsers a chance to pursue better security policies.
As discussed in Section 2.1, there is a security consideration
regarding session continuation without TLS and with server-side
statelessness: there can be no replay protection in this case.
However, this is not a loss of security relative to web cookies.
Applications must use TLS if they require integrity protection.
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5. Acknowledgements
The author thanks Yaron Sheffer, Yoav Nir, and Phillip Hallam-Baker,
all of whom are practically co-authors, and invited to be listed as
such. The term "session continuation" is Phillip's. The motivation,
requirements and recommendations text is a group effort.
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6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
6.2. Informative References
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, June 1999.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.
[RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
for TLS", RFC 5929, July 2010.
[RFC5849] Hammer-Lahav, E., "The OAuth 1.0 Protocol", RFC 5849,
April 2010.
[RFC4559] Jaganathan, K., Zhu, L., and J. Brezak, "SPNEGO-based
Kerberos and NTLM HTTP Authentication in Microsoft
Windows", RFC 4559, June 2006.
[I-D.draft-williams-websec-session-continue-proto]
Williams, N., "Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) Session
Continuation Protocol",
draft-williams-websec-session-continue-proto-00 (work in
progress), January 2013.
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Author's Address
Nicolas Williams
Cryptonector, LLC
Email: nico@cryptonector.com
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