Internet DRAFT - draft-wu-sidr-aspa-validation-signaling

draft-wu-sidr-aspa-validation-signaling







Network Working Group                                              T. Wu
Internet-Draft                                                     J. Ge
Intended status: Standards Track                                 X. Ding
Expires: 31 August 2024                                          H. Wang
                                                                  Huawei
                                                        28 February 2024


            BGP AS_PATH Validation State Extended Community
               draft-wu-sidr-aspa-validation-signaling-00

Abstract

   This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry
   the AS_PATH validation state based on Autonomous System Provider
   Authorization (ASPA) inside an autonomous system.  Internal BGP
   (IBGP) speakers that receive this validation state can configure
   local policies that allow it to influence their decision process.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 31 August 2024.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.



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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Origin Validation State Extended Community  . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry
   the AS_PATH validation state based on Autonomous System Provider
   Authorization (ASPA) inside an autonomous system.  Internal IBGP
   speakers that receive this validation state can configure local
   policies that allow it to influence their decision process.

2.  Origin Validation State Extended Community

   The origin validation state extended community is an opaque extended
   community [RFC4360] with the following encoding:


       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |       0x43    |      0x03     |             Reserved          |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                    Reserved                   |validationstate|
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


                                  Figure 1






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   The value of the high-order octet of the extended Type field is 0x43,
   which indicates it is non-transitive and opaque [RFC7153].  The value
   of the low-order octet of the extended Type field is 0x03 which is an
   unassigned sub-type of non-transitive opaque extended communities.
   The Reserved field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon the receipt of
   this community.  The last octet of the extended community is an
   unsigned integer that gives the AS_PATH's validation state
   [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification].  It can assume the following
   values:


                   +-------+-----------------------------+
                   | Value | Meaning                     |
                   +-------+-----------------------------+
                   |   0   | Lookup result = "Valid"     |
                   |   1   | Lookup result = "Unknown"   |
                   |   2   | Lookup result = "Invalid"   |
                   +-------+-----------------------------+


                                  Figure 2

   If the router is configured to support the extensions defined in this
   document, it SHOULD attach the AS-PATH validation state extended
   community to BGP UPDATE messages sent to IBGP peers by mapping the
   computed validation state in the last octet of the extended
   community.  Similarly, a receiving BGP speaker, in the absence of
   validation state set based on local data, SHOULD derive a validation
   state from the last octet of the extended community, if present.

   An implementation SHOULD NOT send more than one instance of the AS-
   PATH validation state extended community.  However, if more than one
   instance is received, an implementation MUST disregard all instances
   other than the one with the numerically greatest validation state
   value.  If the value received is greater than the largest specified
   value (2), the implementation MUST apply a strategy similar to
   attribute discard [RFC7606] by discarding the erroneous community and
   logging the error for further analysis.

   By default, implementations MUST drop the AS-PATH validation state
   extended community if received from an External BGP (EBGP) peer,
   without processing it further.  Similarly, by default, an
   implementation SHOULD NOT send the community to EBGP peers.  However,
   it SHOULD be possible to configure an implementation to send or
   accept the community when warranted.  An example of a case where the
   community would reasonably be received from, or sent to, an EBGP peer
   is when two adjacent ASes are under control of the same
   administration.



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3.  Deployment Considerations

   In deployment scenarios in which not all the speakers in an
   autonomous system are upgraded to support the extensions defined in
   this document, it is necessary to define policies that match on the
   AS-PATH validation extended community and set another BGP attribute
   that influences selection of the best path in the same way that an
   implementation of this extension would.

4.  IANA Considerations

   The value 0x03 in the "Non-Transitive Opaque Extended Community Sub-
   Types" registry is unassigned by IANA.  This value can be used as
   "BGP AS-PATH Validation State Extended Community".

5.  Security Considerations

   Security considerations such as those described in [RFC4272] continue
   to apply.  Since this document introduces an extended community that
   will generally be used to affect route selection, the analysis in
   Section 4.5 ("Falsification") of [RFC4593] is relevant.  These issues
   are neither new, nor unique to the origin validation extended
   community.

   This document describes a scheme where router A outsources validation
   to some router B.  If this scheme is used, the participating routers
   should have the appropriate trust relationship -- B should trust A
   either because they are under the same administrative control.  The
   security properties of the propagation path between the two routers
   should also be considered.  See [RFC7454] Section 5.1 for advice
   regarding protection of the propagation path.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

6.2.  Informative References





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   [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification]
              Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., Snijders,
              J., and K. Sriram, "BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on
              Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-
              verification-16, 29 August 2023,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
              aspa-verification-16>.

   [RFC4272]  Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
              RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272>.

   [RFC4360]  Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
              Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
              February 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.

   [RFC4593]  Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
              Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, DOI 10.17487/RFC4593,
              October 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4593>.

   [RFC7153]  Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "IANA Registries for BGP
              Extended Communities", RFC 7153, DOI 10.17487/RFC7153,
              March 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7153>.

   [RFC7454]  Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP Operations
              and Security", BCP 194, RFC 7454, DOI 10.17487/RFC7454,
              February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7454>.

   [RFC7606]  Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.
              Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
              RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.

Authors' Addresses

   Tianhao Wu
   Huawei
   Email: wutianhao10@huawei.com


   Jun Ge
   Huawei
   Email: jack.gejun@huawei.com


   Xiangfeng Ding
   Huawei



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   Email: dingxiangfeng@huawei.com


   Haibo Wang
   Huawei
   Email: rainsword.wang@huawei.com













































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