Internet DRAFT - draft-xie-sidrops-moa-profile
draft-xie-sidrops-moa-profile
Network Working Group C. Xie
Internet-Draft G. Dong
Intended status: Standards Track China Telecom
Expires: 2 September 2024 X. Li
CERNET Center/Tsinghua University
1 March 2024
A Profile for Mapping Origin Authorizations (MOAs)
draft-xie-sidrops-moa-profile-01
Abstract
For the authenticity of the mapping origin of IPv4 address block in
IPv6-only networks, this document defines a standard profile for
Mapping Origin Authorizations (MOAs). MOA is a cryptographically
signed object that provides a means of verifying that the holder of a
set of IPv4 prefixes has authorized an IPv6 mapping prefix to
originate mapping for those prefixes. When receiving the MOA objects
from the relying parties, PE devices can verify and discard invalid
address mapping announcements from unauthorized IPv6 mapping prefixes
to prevent IPv4 prefix hijacking.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 September 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology, Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The MOA Content-Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. The MOA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Element version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Element mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.1. type MOAIPMapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. MOA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
This document defines security enhancement for the address mapping
announcement in multi-domain IPv6-only underlay networks
[I-D.ietf-v6ops-framework-md-ipv6only-underlay]. For IPv4 service
delivery in multi-domain IPv6-only network, IPv6 mapping prefixes are
configured at the PE devices to identify the location of IPv4 address
blocks at the network edge, the mapping between IPv4 address block
and IPv6 mapping prefix provides the direction of data forwarding in
IPv6 network, the IPv6 mapping prefix is considered as the mapping
origin of the IPv4 address block. Prior to transmitting IPv4 service
data, the PE at the edge of the IPv6-only network needs to exchange
their respective mapping rules in advance, which also includes the
correspondence between the IPv4 prefix and the IPv6 mapping prefix.
In [I-D.ietf-idr-mpbgp-extension-4map6], PE device distributes the
binding relationship between an IPv4 address block and its IPv6
mapping prefix through 4map6 extension of MP-BGP. Based on the
mapping data obtained, the ingress PE can statelessly transform the
incoming IPv4 packets into IPv6 ones and send them to the correct
egress PE.
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From above it can be seen that the correctness of transmitting IPv4
service data in an IPv6-only network lies on the authenticity of the
address mapping relationship. This can be further explained by the
case where if an attacker maps an IPv4 address block using a fake
IPv6 mapping prefix, IPv4 service data will be sent to the wrong
egress PE, resulting in a situation of IPv4 prefix hijacking. In a
small-scale controlled network, this problem may not be too serious.
However, as the scale of IPv6-only deployment increases and there is
interconnection between multiple operators, it is necessary to
guarantee the authenticity of mapping relationship. This document
proposes a new approach by leveraging Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) architecture to verify the authenticity of the
address binding. RPKI is a security framework by which network
owners can validate and secure the critical route update or BGP
announcements between public Internet networks [RFC6480]. For the
scenario discussed, a new object, namely Mapping Origin Authorization
(MOA), under the RPKI framework is defined in this document. MOA is
a cryptographically signed binding between an IPv4 address block and
its right IPv6 mapping prefix that is allowed to be declared in the
announcement of MP-BGP. With this architecture, a legitimate holder
of IPv4 address block, e.g. an ISP, can authorizes an IPv6 mapping
prefix to map IPv4 address block. A distributed repository system
stores and disseminates the data objects that comprise the RPKI, as
well as other signed objects necessary for improved mapping data and
routing security. When receiving the MOA objects from the relying
parties, PE routers can use them for Mapping Origin Validation (MOV)
of IPv4 address blocks: verifying and discarding "invalid" address
mapping announcements from unauthorized IPv6 mapping prefixes to
prevent IPv4 prefix hijacking.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14[RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Terminology, Abbreviations and Acronyms
The following abbreviations and acronyms are used in this document:
– CMS: Cryptographic Message Syntax
– MOA: Mapping Origin Authorization
– MOV: Mapping Origin Validation
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– MP-BGP: Multiprotocol BGP
– PE: Provider Edge
– PKI: Public Key Infrastructure
– RPKI: Resource Public Key Infrastructure
– ROA: Route Origin Authorization
3. The MOA Content-Type
The content-type for a MOA is defined as MappingOriginAuthz and has
the numerical value of x.x.xxx.xxxxx.x.x.x.x.xx.
This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the
encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute
in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).
4. The MOA eContent
The content of a MOA identifies a single IPv6 mapping prefix that has
been authorized by the address holder to originate mapping and a list
of one or more IPv4 prefixes that will be advertised. If the address
holder needs to authorize multiple IPv6 mapping prefixes to advertise
the same set of IPv4 prefixes, the holder issues multiple MOAs, one
per IPv6 mapping prefix. A MOA is formally defined as:
MappingOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
mappings SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF MOAIPMapping }
MOAIPMapping ::= SEQUENCE {
v6MappingPrefix IPv6MappingPrefix,
v4Prefixs SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF IPv4Prefix }
IPv6MappingPrefix ::= BIT STRING (SIZE (0..ub-IPv6))
IPv4Prefix ::= BIT STRING (SIZE (0..ub-IPv4))
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ub-IPv6 INTEGER ::= 128
ub-IPv4 INTEGER ::= 32
Note that this content appears as the eContent within the
encapContentInfo (see [RFC6488]).
4.1. Element version
The version number of the MappingOriginAttestation MUST be xxx.
4.2. Element mappings
The mappings element encodes the set of address mapping behavior,
which indicates that the given IPv6 Mapping Prefix is authorized to
originate mappings for single or a set of IPv4 prefixes.
4.2.1. type MOAIPMapping
Within the MOAIPMapping structure, v6MappingPrefix element contains
the IPv6 prefix used to originate mapping for a set of IPv4 prefixes.
The length of v6MappingPrefix can be set as 40, 48, 56, 64 or 96 in
actual deployment. The v4Prefixs element represents IPv4 prefixes as
a sequence of IPv4Prefix.
5. MOA Validation
Before a relying party can use a MOA to validate a mapping
announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the MOA. To
validate a MOA, the relying party MUST perform all the validation
checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional
MOA-specific validation step.
-The IP address delegation extension [RFC3779] is present in the end-
entity (EE) certificate (contained within the MOA), and each IPv4
prefix(es) in the MOA is contained within the set of IP addresses
specified by the EE certificate’s IP address delegation extension.
6. Security Considerations
There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a MOA; it
is anticipated that MOAs will be stored in repositories that are
accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is
no explicit authentication associated with a MOA, since the PKI used
for MOA validation provides authorization but not authentication.
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Although the MOA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no
intent to convey non-repudiation via a MOA.
The purpose of a MOA is to convey authorization for an IPv6 mapping
prefix to originate a mapping to the prefix(es) in the MOA. Thus,
the integrity of a MOA MUST be established. The MOA specification
makes use of the RPKI signed object format; thus, all security
considerations in [RFC6448] also apply to MOAs. Additionally, the
signed object profile uses the CMS signed message format for
integrity; thus, MOAs inherit all security considerations associated
with that data structure.
The right of the MOA signer to authorize the target IPv6 mapping
prefix to originate mappings to the prefix(es) is established through
use of the address space and IPv6 mapping prefix number PKI described
in[RFC6480]. Specifically, one MUST verify the signature on the MOA
using an X.509 certificate issued under this PKI, and check that the
prefix(es) in the ROA match those in the certificate’s address space
extension.
As mentioned in [I-D.ietf-idr-mpbgp-extension-4map6], the 4map6
extension is mainly used for controlled IPv6-only network operated by
single or multiple ISPs. In this scenario, as the IPv6 mapping
prefix indicates the direction of IPv4 service data transmission in
the IPv6-only network, and MOA is used to validate the mapping origin
of IPv4 address block, there is no need to use IPv4 ROA for the
validation of IPv4 BGP announcements; On the other hand, as the
operation of MOA depends on the authenticity of address authorization
in the underlying IPv6 network, if the IPv6 address prefix is
maliciously originated by an third-party AS, even if the IPv4 address
block is legitimately authorized to its corresponding IPv6 mapping
prefix, traffic hijacking may occur due to the malicious announcement
of the IPv6 mapping prefix. Therefore, it is recommended to also
deploy IPv6 ROA validation where MOA is deployed.
7. IANA Considerations
With this document, IANA is requested to allocate the code for MOA in
the registry of "RPKI Signed Objects". In addition, two OIDs need to
be assigned by IANA, one for the module identifier, and another one
for the content type. The codes will use this document as the
reference.
8. Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank Russ Housley and Job Snijders for
their careful review and useful suggestions.
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9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-idr-mpbgp-extension-4map6]
Xie, C., Dong, G., Li, X., Han, G., and Z. Guo, "MP-BGP
Extension and the Procedures for IPv4/IPv6 Mapping
Advertisement", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-idr-mpbgp-extension-4map6-01, 25 February 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-
mpbgp-extension-4map6-01>.
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-rfc6482bis]
Snijders, J., Maddison, B., Lepinski, M., Kong, D., and S.
Kent, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-
rfc6482bis-09, 14 December 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
rfc6482bis-09>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6448] Yount, R., "The Unencrypted Form of Kerberos 5 KRB-CRED
Message", RFC 6448, DOI 10.17487/RFC6448, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6448>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
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[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-v6ops-framework-md-ipv6only-underlay]
Xie, C., Ma, C., Li, X., Mishra, G. S., Boucadair, M., and
T. Graf, "Framework of Multi-domain IPv6-only Underlay
Network and IPv4-as-a-Service", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-v6ops-framework-md-ipv6only-
underlay-04, 4 February 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-v6ops-
framework-md-ipv6only-underlay-04>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
This normative appendix provides an ASN.1 module that specifies the
MOA content in ASN.1 syntax.
RPKIMappingOriginAuthz-2024
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) TBD0 }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009--in [RFC5911]
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) };
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ct-MappingOriginAuthz CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE MappingOriginAttestation
IDENTIFIEN BY id-ct-MappingOriginAuthz }
id-ct-MappingOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs9(9)smime(16) ct(1) TBD1 }
MappingOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
mappings SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF MOAIPMapping }
MOAIPMapping ::= SEQUENCE {
v6MappingPrefix IPv6MappingPrefix,
v4Prefixs SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF IPv4Prefix }
IPv6MappingPrefix ::= BIT STRING (SIZE (0..ub-IPv6))
IPv4Prefix ::= BIT STRING (SIZE (0..ub-IPv4))
ub-IPv6 INTEGER ::= 128
END
Authors' Addresses
Chongfeng Xie
China Telecom
Beiqijia Town, Changping District
Beijing
102209
China
Email: xiechf@chinatelecom.cn
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Guozhen Dong
China Telecom
Beiqijia Town, Changping District
Beijing
102209
China
Email: donggz@chinatelecom.cn
Xing Li
CERNET Center/Tsinghua University
Shuangqing Road No.30, Haidian District
Beijing
100084
China
Email: xing@cernet.edu.cn
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