Internet DRAFT - draft-yang-spring-sid-as-source-address
draft-yang-spring-sid-as-source-address
SPRING Working Group F. Yang
Internet Draft China Mobile
Intended status: Informational C. Lin
Expires: July 19, 2024 New H3C Technologies
January 19, 2024
SID as source address in SRv6
draft-yang-spring-sid-as-source-address-03
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Abstract
In SRv6 network, the SRv6 packets usually use loopback address as
source address. However, when there is symmetric traffic requirement
for bidirectional flow, or there is requirement for traffic source
validation, using loopback address as source address is not
sufficient. This document proposes using SID as source address for
SRv6 traffic, also identifies solution for several use cases.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction.....................................................3
2. Using SRv6 SID as Source Address.................................3
2.1. User traffic................................................3
2.1.1. L2 VPN Virtual Private Wire Service(VPWS)..............3
2.1.2. L2 VPN Virtual Private LAN Service(VPLS)...............3
2.1.3. L3 IPv4/IPv6 VPN Service...............................4
2.2. Control Traffic.............................................4
2.3. OAM Traffic.................................................4
2.4. Management Traffic..........................................4
3. Using Source Address for Validation in SRv6 Network..............5
3.1. Source Verification on the SRv6 Tunnel 2nd Hop Node.........5
3.2. Source Verification on the SRv6 Tunnel Tail.................5
3.2.1. Content of SRv6 Source Verification Entry..............5
3.2.2. Management of SRv6 Source Verification Table...........6
4. Use Cases........................................................6
4.1. SRv6 Network with SR-aware Stateful Firewall................6
4.1.1. Problem Statement......................................6
4.1.2. Solution for SRv6 Traffic Pass Thru SR-aware Stateful
Firewall......................................................9
4.2. Enhanced Traffic Isolation between VPNs....................10
4.2.1. Problem Statement.....................................10
4.2.2. Source Validation Solution for SRv6 SDWAN Network.....12
4.2.3. Source Validation Solution for SRv6 Core Network......13
5. IANA Considerations.............................................14
6. Security Considerations.........................................14
7. References......................................................14
7.1. Normative References.......................................14
7.2. Informative References.....................................15
8. Acknowledgments.................................................16
Authors' Addresses.................................................17
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1. Introduction
Typically, the SRv6 packets usually use loopback address as source
address. However, when there is symmetric traffic requirement for
bidirectional flow, or there is requirement for traffic source
validation, using loopback address as source address is not
sufficient. This document proposes using SRv6 SID as source address
for SRv6 traffic, also identifies solution for several use cases.
2. Using SRv6 SID as Source Address
2.1. User traffic
There are several cases for using SRv6 SID as source address.
2.1.1. L2 VPN Virtual Private Wire Service(VPWS)
For L2 VPN VPWS case, the user traffic towards SRv6 provider
backbone will be encapsulated in SRv6 tunnel. When constructing an
SRv6 packet, the source address field of the SRv6 packet should be
assigned with the local VPN SID value of the PE device. The local
VPN SID value can be determined by L2 Cross-Connect.
+------------+
| PE | +--------------+
| | + SRv6 +
---+---L2 VPWS---+--------+ Provider +
| | + Backbone +
+------------+ +--------------+
Figure 1
2.1.2. L2 VPN Virtual Private LAN Service(VPLS)
For L2 VPN VPLS, the user traffic towards SRv6 provider backbone
will be encapsulated in SRv6 tunnel. When constructing an SRv6
packet, the source address field of the SRv6 packet should be
assigned with the local VPN SID value of the PE device. The local
VPN SID value can be determined by L2 VPN VPLS.
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+------------+
| PE | +--------------+
| +------+ | + SRv6 +
--------+--+ VPLS +--+--------+ Provider +
| +------+ | + Backbone +
+------------+ +--------------+
Figure 2
2.1.3. L3 IPv4/IPv6 VPN Service
For L3 IPv4/IPv6 VPN Service case, the user traffic towards SRv6
provider backbone will be encapsulated in SRv6 tunnel. When
constructing an SRv6 packet, the source address field of the SRv6
packet should be assigned with the local VPN SID value of the PE
device. The local VPN SID value can be determined by the L3
IPv4/IPv6 VPN.
+-------------+
| PE | +--------------+
+----+ | +--------+ | + SRv6 +
| CE +----+--+Tenant--+-+-----+ Provider +
+----+ | +--------+ | + Backbone +
+-------------+ +--------------+
Figure 3
2.2. Control Traffic
Control traffic will not be terminated by VPN, thus should not be
impacted.
2.3. OAM Traffic
OAM traffic terminated by the SRv6 tunnel may use the SRv6 SID as
source address, such as ping, trace. Refer to RFC 8986 4.1.1,
Allowing the processing of specific Upper-Layer header types is
useful for Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM). As
anexample, an operator might permit pinging of SIDs. To do this,
they may enable local configuration to allow Upper-Layer header type
58(ICMPv6).
2.4. Management Traffic
Management traffic will not be terminated by VPN, thus should not be
impacted.
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3. Using Source Address for Validation in SRv6 Network
Refer to figure 7, when the traffic is passing through the SRv6
bearer network, the received traffic can be verified at the
following two locations.
Ingress PE node of IPv6 backbone network
C-PE node of destination tenant site or destination client network
3.1. Source Verification on the SRv6 Tunnel 2nd Hop Node
Main reason for doing this is to prevent SRv6 tunnel source address
fraud.
On the C-PE node, it will receive one or more local SRv6 SIDs
configuration from controller or generate SRv6 SID locally. On the
nexthop node, i.e. PE node, it can learn those SRv6 SID either from
controller or IGP protocol.
Suppose the C-PE will generate SRv6 packets with the SRv6 SID as
source address, when the SRv6 end point node next to the C-PE, i.e.
PE node, receives the packets, it can do forward table lookup with
incoming interface and source address as key for forwarding table
lookup. If the lookup failed, it is considered as illegal traffic
and should not be forwarded. Otherwise, the source address is legal.
3.2. Source Verification on the SRv6 Tunnel Tail
Main reason for doing this is to prevent SRv6 tunnel tail SID fraud.
Only after the packet is forwarded to the SRv6 egress node (that is,
the access point of the destination client network, such as C-PE)
can we have the opportunity to continue to verify whether the packet
is legal.
As mentioned before, the source C-PE will generate SRv6 packets with
the SRv6 SID as source address. On the destination C-PE, it has
source verification table with all of source VPN SIDs have been
authorized for access. After receiving SRv6 packet, based on the
source address, it can check the SRv6 packet for authorized access.
If the SRv6 packet passes check, it will forward the SRv6 packet;
otherwise, discard it.
3.2.1. Content of SRv6 Source Verification Entry
Every VPN will have a source verification table. And there are
multiple source verification entries in the source verification
table, and each table entry contains the following contents:
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The source service address which is encapsulated as the outer
source IPv6 address of the packet, used to identify the service of
the source client network. For example, the source service SID of
SRv6.
The source service address is the content that must be verified.
3.2.2. Management of SRv6 Source Verification Table
The SRv6 source verification entry can be created in the following
ways:
Manual static configuration on the SRv6 egress node. Configure the
source address in local L3VPN/L2VPN source address Verification
table.
Dynamic creation after learning the service address of the source
client network through BGP. When the L3VPN/L2VPN route with the
remote L3VPN/L2VPN service id is inserted into the local VPN table,
the relationship between the local L3VPN/L2VPN service sid of the
destination VPN table and the remote L3VPN/L2VPN service id is
recorded to form a dynamic source address Verification table in
local VPN table.
4. Use Cases
4.1. SRv6 Network with SR-aware Stateful Firewall
4.1.1. Problem Statement
To provide VPN service in an SRv6 network [RFC9252], the ingress PE
encapsulates the payload in an outer IPv6 header with the Segment
Routing Header (SRH) [RFC8754] carrying the SR Policy segment list
along with the VPN Service SID. If the VPN service is with best-
effort connectivity, the destination address of the outer IPv6
header carries the VPN service SID and the SRH is omitted.
Along the forwarding path in the SRv6 network, firewalls may be
deployed to filter the traffics. If a firewall is SR-aware, it will
retrieve the final destination of an SRv6 packet from the last entry
in the SRH rather than the destination address field of the IPv6
header [I-D.draft-ietf-spring-sr-service-programming].
A stateful firewall keeps a track of the state of the network
connections traveling across it. Whenever a packet arrives to seek
permission to pass through it, the firewall checks from its state
table if there is an active connection between identified by 3 tuple
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or 5 tuple. Thus only legitimate packets are allowed to be
transmitted across it.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the bidirectional VPN traffic packets
passing through a firewall in an SRv6 network.
The source address of the outer IPv6 header is the IPv6 address of
ingress PE. The final destination address of the outer IPv6 header
is the VPN Service SID of egress PE. In the SR-Policy-based way, the
final destination address is encapsulated in the last entry in the
SRH, Segment[0]. In the best-effort way, the SRH is omitted.
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+---+ +---+ +--------+ +---+ +---+
|CE1|---|PE1|--...--|Firewall|--...--|PE2|---|CE2|
+---+ +---+ +--------+ +---+ +---+
Packet (PE1 ---> PE2): Packet (PE1 <--- PE2):
********************** **********************
* IPv6 * * IPv6 *
* SA=PE1-IP-ADDR * * SA=PE2-IP-ADDR *
* DA=NextSegment * * DA=NextSegment *
********************** **********************
* SRH * * SRH *
* Seg[0]=PE2-VPN-SID * * Seg[0]=PE1-VPN-SID *
* Seg[...] * * Seg[...] *
********************** **********************
* Eth/IPv4/IPv6 * * Eth/IPv4/IPv6 *
* Source=CE1 * * Source=CE2 *
* Destination=CE2 * * Destination=CE1 *
********************** **********************
* Payload * * Payload *
********************** **********************
Figure 4: SR-Policy-based VPN Traffic across Firewall
+---+ +---+ +--------+ +---+ +---+
|CE1|---|PE1|--...--|Firewall|--...--|PE2|---|CE2|
+---+ +---+ +--------+ +---+ +---+
Packet (PE1 ---> PE2): Packet (PE1 <--- PE2):
********************** **********************
* IPv6 * * IPv6 *
* SA=PE1-IP-ADDR * * SA=PE2-IP-ADDR *
* DA=PE2-VPN-SID * * DA=PE1-VPN-SID *
********************** **********************
* Eth/IPv4/IPv6 * * Eth/IPv4/IPv6 *
* Source=CE1 * * Source=CE2 *
* Destination=CE2 * * Destination=CE1 *
********************** **********************
* Payload * * Payload *
********************** **********************
Figure 5: Best-Effort VPN Traffic across Firewall
The stateful firewall will check the association relationships of
the bidirectional VPN traffic packets. A common implementation may
record the key information of the packets on forward way(internal to
external), such as source address and destination address. When
receiving a packet on backward way(external to internal), it checks
the state table if there is an existing forward packet flow. For
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example, the firewall may require that the source address of packet
on backward way matches the destination address of packet on forward
way, and destination address will be checked in the similar way. If
not matched, the packet on the backward path will be regarded as
illegal and thus dropped.
An SR-aware firewall is able to retrieve the final destination of an
SRv6 packet from the last entry in the SRH. The <source, destination>
tuple of the packet from PE1 to PE2 is <PE1-IP-ADDR, PE2-VPN-SID>,
and the other direction is <PE2-IP-ADDR, PE1-VPN-SID>. However, the
source address of the outer IPv6 packet is usually a loopback
interface of the ingress PE. Eventually, the source address and
destination address of the forward and backward VPN traffic are
regarded as different flow, and they may be blocked by the firewall.
4.1.2. Solution for SRv6 Traffic Pass Thru SR-aware Stateful Firewall
In the SRv6-based VPN service, the final destination of the outer
IPv6 header is the VPN-SID of the egress PE, which is associated
with that VPN service. But the source address of the outer IPv6
header is usually unrelated to the VPN service. So, it can be
difficult for a stateful firewall to establish the association
relationship between the bidirectional traffic flows.
The proposed solution is to unify the semantic of the source and
destination address thus ensure the symmetry of the bidirectional
flow.
When an ingress PE receives the client packet from CE, it checks
which L3 VPN service it belongs to, and uses the VPN-SID associated
with that L3 VPN service as the source address when encapsulating
the outer IPv6 header with the optional SRH.
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Outer IPv6 Header of SR-Policy-based VPN Traffic:
********************** **********************
* IPv6 * * IPv6 *
* SA=PE1-VPN-SID * * SA=PE2-VPN-SID *
* DA=NextSegment * * DA=NextSegment *
********************** **********************
* SRH * * SRH *
* Seg[0]=PE2-VPN-SID * * Seg[0]=PE1-VPN-SID *
* Seg[...] * * Seg[...] *
********************** **********************
Outer IPv6 Header of Best-effort VPN Traffic:
********************** **********************
* IPv6 * * IPv6 *
* SA=PE1-VPN-SID * * SA=PE2-VPN-SID *
* DA=PE2-VPN-SID * * DA=PE1-VPN-SID *
********************** **********************
Figure 6: Outer IPv6 Header in the Proposed Solution
According to [RFC8402] and [RFC8986], an SRv6 VPN Service SID is an
IPv6 address, and it is routable by its Locator prefix in the SRv6
network. In the proposed solution, when an SRv6 VPN Service SID is
used as the source address of the outer IPv6 header in the SRv6
network, it is treated as a normal IPv6 address and does not perform
any special behavior.
4.2. Enhanced Traffic Isolation between VPNs
4.2.1. Problem Statement
As analyzed in [RFC5920], there is no 100% safe network. There is a
risk of traffic being hijacked or tampered anywhere in the network.
In SRv6 network when someone manipulate the SRH, he/she can reach
any VPNs without authorized. In other words, VPN isolation needs be
improved in the source routing scenario.
Taking the SRv6 SDWAN overlay network as an example, if C-PE is
hijacked, misconfigured or misconnected, the services that should be
isolated between CPE sites can be accessible to each other.
As shown in the figure below, C-PE is deployed in the tenant site,
and the tenant of the site is responsible for operation and
maintenance management. Normally users in client network 1 (CN1) of
C-PE1 can only communicate with users in CN1 of other C-PEs through
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IPv6 backbone network. CN1 is isolated from other client networks,
and traffic cannot be forwarded to each other.
+----+
+-----------| RR |----------+
/ +----+ \
/ \
/ \
+----+ +--------+ +------+ +----+
| CN1|--| A1----+ +---- B1 |--| CN1|
+----+ | C-PE1 | | +--------------+ | | C-PE2| +----+
+----+ | A2--+-+-+ +-+-+ | | +----+
| CN2|--| | | PE| |PE |---B2 |--| CN2|
+----+ +--------+ +---+ +---+ +------+ +----+
| IPv6 |
+----+ +--------+ +---+ Network +---+ +------+ +----+
| CN1|--| C1--| PE| |PE |-- D1 |--| CN1|
+----+ | C-PE3 | +-+-+ +-+-+ | C-PE4| +----+
| | | +--------------+ | | |
+----+ | | | | | | +----+
| CN3|--| C2----+ +-----D2 |--| CN3|
+----+ +--------+ +------+ +----+
|<=========== SRv6 Forwarding ===========>|
Figure 7
However, due to some misconfiguration or security issues, the
destination address of VPN packets sent by C-PE to other destination
client networks may be filled in as the service address of other
client networks.
For example, the destination address of the traffic from CN1 of C-
PE1 to CN1 of C-PE2 is misconfigured or tampered with as the service
SID of CN3 of C-PE4. The traffic can be send to C-PE4. If the
service SID happens to exist in CN3 of C-PE4, the traffic will be
forwarded to CN3. This is a very serious security vulnerability for
client networks that should be completely isolated.
In theory, the HMAC TLV in the SRH with integrity check on the way
can address this problem. However, HMAC integrity check is hard to
be supported by the routers hardware in line rate. Thus nobody
actually do that on router.
By leveraging the routes' native search capability, we introduce a
source address verification mechanism to address such problem.
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4.2.2. Source Validation Solution for SRv6 SDWAN Network
In the SRv6 SDWAN overlay network, in order to completely isolate
the VPN services of different tenant sites, the SRv6 source
verification function can be enabled on the C-PE of the tenant site
connecting to the IPv6 backbone network. At the same time, specify
which user sites from which C-PE can communicate with it on each C-
PE.
That is, destination C-PE verifies the source VPN SID, destination
VPN SID.
+---+
+--------------|RR |------------+
/ +-+-+ \
/ \
/ \
+----+ +---------+ + -------------+ +------+ +----+
| CN1|--| P1-----+ +------ P1 |--| CN1|
+----+ | C-PE1 P2-----+ | | C-PE2| +----+
+----+ | P3-----+ +------ P2 | +----+
| CN2|--| | | IPv6 +------ P3 |--| CN3|
+----+ +---------+ | Network | +------+ +-+--+
+----+ +---------+ | | +------+ +----+
| CN2|--| P1-----+ +------ P1 |--| CN1|
+----+ | C-PE3 P2-----+ | | C-PE4| +----+
+----+ | P3-----+ +------ P2 | +----+
| CN3|--+---------+ + -------------+ +------+--| CN2|
+-+--+ +----+
|<=========== SRv6 Forwarding ===========>|
Figure 8
Taking the networking shown in Figure 8 as an example, C-PE1
connects two VPN tenants CN1 and CN2, and C-PE2 connects VPN tenants
CN1 and CN3.
1) Configure VPN SID.
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VPN SID on C-PE1:
CN1:
vpn-instance 1 end-dt4 100::100
CN2:
vpn-instance 2 end-dt4 100::200
VPN SID on C-PE2:
CN1:
vpn-instance 1 end-dt4 200::100
CN3:
vpn-instance 3 end-dt4 200::300
VPN SID on C-PE3:
CN2:
vpn-instance 2 end-dt4 300::200
CN3:
vpn-instance 3 end-dt4 300::300
VPN SID on C-PE4:
CN1:
vpn-instance 1 end-dt4 400::100
CN2:
vpn-instance 3 end-dt4 400::200
2) Configure source address verification entries.
Source address verification table on C-PE1:
vpn-instance 1:
Trusted-source-address 200::100
Trusted-source-address 400::100
Vpn-instance 2:
Trusted-source-address 300::200
Trusted-source-address 400::200
Source address verification table on C-PE2:
Vpn-instance 1:
Trusted-source-address 100::100
Trusted-source-address 400::100
Vpn-instance 3:
Trusted-source-address 300::300
4.2.3. Source Validation Solution for SRv6 Core Network
Some operators are currently building, or plan to build an IPv6-only
native infrastructure for their core network. These operators are
also looking at the possibility to set up an explicit path based on
the IPv6 source address for specific types of traffic in order to
efficiently use their network infrastructure. In such an
environment, the IPv6 source address could be used by the edge nodes
of the network to steer traffic and forward it through a specific
path other than the optimal path. Additionally, one of the
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fundamental requirements for SRv6 core network architecture is to
provide scalable, isolated tenant networks.
Due to some misconfiguration or security issues, when the traffic is
pass through the SRv6 core network, the received traffic can be
verified by source verification. The SRv6 source verification
function can be enabled on the PE of the tenant network connecting
to the PE-based SRv6 core network.
+---+
|PE2|
+-+-+
^
|
v
+---+ +-+-+ +---+
|PE1| <=====> | RR| <====> |PE3|
+-+-+ +---+ +-+-+
| |
+--- SRv6 core netowrk ----+
Figure 9 PE-based SRv6 core network
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
6. Security Considerations
This document does not introduce any security considerations.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC5920] Fang, L., "Security Framework for MPLS and GMPLS Networks",
RFC 5920, DOI 10.17487/RFC5920, July 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5920>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017
[RFC8402] Filsfils, C., Ed., Previdi, S., Ed., Ginsberg, L.,
Decraene, B., Litkowski, S., and R. Shakir, "Segment
Routing Architecture", RFC 8402, DOI 10.17487/RFC8402,
July 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8402>.
[RFC8754] Filsfils, C., Ed., Dukes, D., Ed., Previdi, S., Leddy, J.,
Matsushima, S., and D. Voyer, "IPv6 Segment Routing Header
(SRH)", RFC 8754, DOI 10.17487/RFC8754, March 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8754>.
[RFC9252] Dawra, G., Ed., Talaulikar, K., Ed., Raszuk, R., Decraene,
B., Zhuang, S., and J. Rabadan, "BGP Overlay Services
Based on Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6)", RFC 9252, DOI
10.17487/RFC9252, July 2022, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc9252>.
[I-D.li-savnet-intra-domain-architecture] Li, D., Wu, J., Qin, L.,
Gao, F., Geng, N., Zhou, T., "Intra-domain Source Address
Validation (SAVNET) Architecture", draft-li-savnet-intra-
domain-architecture-00, (work in progress), October 2022.
[I-D.wu-savnet-inter-domain-architecture] Wu, J., Li, D., Huang, M.,
Qin, L., Geng, N., Zhou, T., "Inter-domain Source Address
Validation (SAVNET) Architecture", draft-wu-savnet-inter-
domain-architecture-00(work in progress), October 2022.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC8986] Filsfils, C., Ed., Camarillo, P., Ed., Leddy, J., Voyer,
D., Matsushima, S., and Z. Li, "Segment Routing over IPv6
(SRv6) Network Programming", RFC 8986, DOI
10.17487/RFC8986, February 2021, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc8986>.
[I-D.ietf-spring-sr-service-programming] Clad, F., Xu, X., Filsfils,
C., Bernier, D., Li, C., Decraene, B., Ma, S., Yadlapalli,
C., Henderickx, W., and S. Salsano, "Service Programming
with Segment Routing", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-spring-sr-service-programming-07, 15 February
2023, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-spring-
sr-service-programming-07.txt>.
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8. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the following for their valuable
contributions of this document:
TBD
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Authors' Addresses
Feng Yang
China Mobile
Beijing
China
Email: yangfeng@chinamobile.com
Changwang Lin
New H3C Technologies
Beijing
China
Email: linchangwang.04414@h3c.com
Yang, et al. Expires July, 2024 [Page 17]
